2020 Criminal Law Reviewer ( Judge Marlo B. Campanilla) PDF

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BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLAWarning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by lawrexestore/2-lawBY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLAWarning: This is the intellectual property...

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2020 CRIMINAL LAW BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law

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2020 CRIMINAL LAW BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law

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2020 CRIMINAL LAW BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law

2020 CRIMINAL LAW BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA 1. Territoriality – The ground occupied by US embassy is in fact the territory of the USA to which the premises belong through possession or ownership. A person who committed a crime within the premises of an embassy will be prosecuted under the law of Philippines because of the principle of territoriality (Reagan vs. Commission on Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969). a. Effects - For purpose of venue and territoriality principle in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the place of commission of the criminal act and the place of occurrence of the effect of such act which is an element of the offense shall be considered. If one pulled the trigger of his gun in Quezon City and hit the victim in City of Manila, who died as a consequence, Quezon City and City of Manila, which are the places of commission of the criminal act and the occurrence of the criminal effect, are proper venues. If the psychological violence consisting of marital infidelity punishable under RA No. 9262 is committed in Singapore but the psychological effect occurred in the Philippines since the wife of the respondent, who suffered mental anguish, are residing in the Philippines, our court can assume jurisdiction (see: AAA vs. BBB, G.R. no. 212448, January 11, 2018). However, if the commission of the criminal act consummates the crime and the effect thereof is not an element of the crime, the place of occurrence of the effect shall not be considered for purpose of venue and territoriality rule. Bigamy committed in Singapore is beyond the jurisdiction of our court although the offended spouse is residing in the Philippines since the psychological effect of bigamy to her is not an element thereof. b. Convention of the law of the sea - Under the Convention on the Law of the Sea, the flag state of foreign merchant vessel passing through the territorial sea of another state has jurisdiction over crimes committed therein. However, a coastal state such as the Philippines can exercise jurisdiction over any crime committed on board such ship in the following cases: (1) if its consequences extend to the coastal State; (2) if it disturbs the peace of the country or the good order of the territorial sea; (3) if the ship master or a diplomatic or consular officer of the flag State requested assistance from the local authorities; or (4) if it is for the suppression of traffic in narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances. Murder or serious physical injuries committed in a foreign vessel anchored in a Philippine port against a passenger thereof is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine court since this crime disturb the peace of the country. c. Regime of islands - Under the principle of territoriality, the court has also jurisdiction over crime committed in Kalayaan Islands or Scarboruogh Shoal because the Baseline Law (RA No. 9522) declares that the Philippines exercise sovereignty and jurisdiction over it. d. 200-miles exclusive economic zone - The Philippines has no sovereignty over the 200-miles exclusive economic zone. Under the convention of the law of the sea, the Philippines has sovereign right to fish and to exploit the natural resources in the zone. This sovereign right is not equivalent to sovereignty. Under the convention, foreign States have the freedom of navigation and overflight over the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines. Freedom of navigation and overflight cannot be exercised in a place where a State has sovereignty such as such its 12-mile territorial water. Under the convention, the Philippines has limited jurisdiction over crimes committed within the exclusive economic zone such as those involving fiscal, custom, immigration, health and safety. A State has absolute jurisdiction over crimes committed in a territory over which it has sovereignty subject only to a few exceptions under international laws. The recognition of freedom of navigation and overflight and the limited jurisdiction over crimes committed in the exclusive economic zone militate against the concept of sovereignty. If a Chinese fishing vessel deliberately bump a Filipino vessel in the West Philippines Sea covered by the exclusive economic zone of the Philippines, and as a consequence, several Filipino fishermen died, the Philippines’s jurisdiction over the crime of murder cannot be based on the theory that the Philippines has sovereignty over the zone. Other principles must be used to justify its jurisdiction over murder committed within the zone such as flag state rule or passive personality principle. 2. Extraterritoriality – Under the flag state rule, the Philippines has jurisdiction over hijacking of PAL airplane in an American territory since it its registered in the Philippines but not over murder committed in vessel registered in Panama while on high seas although it is owned by a Filipino. Under the protective principle, the court has jurisdiction over forgery of Philippine

money committed in Taiwan whether by a Filipino or an alien but not over forgery of US dollars committed therein. Under the extraterritoriality rule, the court has jurisdiction over plunder, direct bribery and falsification of document by a public officer in a Philippines consular premises stationed in America but not corruption of public officer and falsification of document committed by private individual as principal by inducement. Under the universality principle, the court has

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2020 CRIMINAL LAW BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law jurisdiction over piracy committed on high seas for being a universal crime but not over murder qualified by the circumstance of taking advantage of the calamity brought about by piracy on high seas. The 12-mile territorial water of Taiwan or Sabah may be considered as high seas; hence, piracy committed therein can be prosecuted in the Philippines (People vs. Lol-Lo and Saraw, G.R. No. L-17958, February 27, 1922 ). 3. Concept of culpa - There are two views on whether culpa is a crime or just a mode of committing a crime. Under the first view, culpa or reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself; it is simply a way of committing it (People vs. Faller, G.R. No. L-45964, April 25, 1939; Angeles vs. Jose, G.R. No. L-6494, November 24, 1954). Following this first view, if a person is killed, property is damaged and another person suffered slight physical injuries through reckless driving on the part of the accused, culpa under Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code shall be considered as a mere mode of committing crimes while the killing, causing damage to property and inflicting slight physical injuries are the crimes themselves. Hence, the accused committed three crimes, to wit: homicide through reckless imprudence, damage through property through reckless imprudence, and slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. But since a single reckless imprudence produces these crimes, the accused is liable for a complex crime of homicide and damage to property through reckless imprudence under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. (Lontoc, Jr. v. Gorgonio, L-37396, April 30, 1979; Reodica vs. CA, G.R. No. 125066, July 8, 1998; Gonzaga v. People, G.R. No. 195671, January 21, 2015). The third crime will be considered as a separate crime of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The third crime is a light felony, which cannot be made a component of a compound crime since under Article 48 speaks of a single act constituting a grave or less grave felony. (People vs. Turla, G.R. No. L-26388, February 14, 1927) Under the second view, culpa is not just a mode of committing a crime. It is the crime itself. (Quizon vs. Hon. Justice of Peace, G.R. No. L-6641, July 28, 1955; People vs. Buan, L25366, March 29, 1968; People vs. Cano, G.R. No. 19660, May 24, 1966). Following this second view, if a person is killed, property is damaged and another person suffered slight physical injuries through reckless driving on the part of the accused, the commission of reckless imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code is the crime itself. Hence, the accused shall be held liable for a single crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, damage through property and slight physical injuries. Single culpable felony is committed regardless of its consequence. The consequent death, injuries and damage to property shall only be considered to impose the proper penalties. This single crime cannot be split into two for purpose of double prosecution because of the rule on double jeopardy. (Ivler v. Modesto-San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010; Sevilla vs. People, G.R. No. 194390, August 13, 2014). 4. Malum in se - In People vs. Caballo, G.R. No. 198732, June 10, 2013; Malto vs. People, G.R. No. 164733, September 21, 2007, the Supreme Court considered sexual abuse under RA No. 7610 as malum prohibitum simply because is it punishable under special law. However, Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019 and People vs. Mabunot, G.R. No. 204659, September 19, 2016, the Supreme Court considered child abuse under RA No. 7610 as malum in se. Accordingly, when the acts complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special law. Physical abuse of a child under RA No. 7610 is inherently wrong; hence, criminal intent on the part of the offender must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime. It is submitted that the correct principle is Patulot case and Mabunot case, and not the Caballo case and Malto case. The Supreme Court itself in Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012 explained that a common misconception is that all mala in se crimes are found in the Revised Penal Code, while all mala prohibita crimes are provided by special penal laws. The better approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the inherent immorality of the penalized act. If the punishable act or omission is immoral in itself, then it is a crime mala in se; on the contrary, if it is not immoral in itself, but there is a statute prohibiting its commission by reasons of public policy, then it is mala prohibita. There may be mala in se crimes under special laws, such as plunder under R.A. No. 7080. Similarly, there may be mala prohibita crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code, such as technical malversation. Malversation is malum in se and a culpable felony, which can be committed by means of dolo and culpa. Hence, public officers, who commits malversation, can be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 for causing damage to the government through evident bad faith

(dolo) or gross inexcusable malversation (culpa). (Pajaro, G.R. Nos. 167860 –65, June 17, 2008). On the other hand, technical malversation is malum prohibitum (Ysidoro v. People, G.R. No. 192330, November 14, 2012), which can be committed without dolo and culpa. Manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence are not elements of technical malversation. Hence , public

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2020 CRIMINAL LAW BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law officers, who commits technical malversation, may not be held liable for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA No. 3019 (Villarosa vs. Hon. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 221418, January 23, 2019) unless additional circumstance establishes manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. In Villarosa vs. Hon. Ombudsman, supra, using tobacco fund to finance the regular operations of the municipality, which are not in accordance with the law creating such fund constitutes technical malversation. However, it was held that the mere act of using government money to fund a project which is different from what the law states you have to spend it for does not fall under the definition of manifest partiality nor gross inexcusable negligence. It must always be remembered that manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence are not elements in the crime of technical malversation. 5. Mistake of fact - Authorities, who manned a checkpoint because of information that there are armed rebels on board a vehicle, have the duty to validate the information, identify them, and to make a bloodless arrest unless they were placed in real mortal danger. If they shot the suspected vehicle, which did not stop after have been flagged down and killed the occupants therein, who turned out be unarmed civilians, they are liable for multiple homicides. The mistake of fact principle is not applicable since there is negligence or bad faith on their part (Yapyucu vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 120744-46, June 25, 2012). 6. Tetanus - There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when victim was rushed to hospital, exhibiting symptoms of tetanus infection. Since infection is severe, he died the next day. The incubation period of severe tetanus infection is less than 14 days. Hence, he could not have been infected at the time of the stabbing since that incident occurred 22 days before the symptoms manifested. The infection was an efficient intervening cause breaking the connection between the physical injuries and death. Hence, the crime committed is physical injuries (Villacorta vs. People, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011). If the victim was infected by tetanus at the time of stabbing, and the infection is the proximate cause of death, the crime committed is homicide (People vs. Cornel, G.R. No. L-204, May 16, 1947). 7. Offense punishable under special law - Practicing medicine without license is an offense punishable under special law but not a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC. Hence, a quack doctor, who killed his patient while treating him, is only liable for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide (People vs. Carmen, G.R. No. 137268, March 26, 2001). If the victim accidentally killed is the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crime committed is qualified carnapping or carnapping in the aggravated form under Section 3 of RA No. 10883. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing of owner, driver or occupant of the vehicle was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping (People vs. Mallari, G.R. No. 179041, April 1, 2013). If the victim accidentally killed is not the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle, the crimes committed are simple carnapping and homicide. The concept of carnapping is the same as that of theft and robbery (People vs. Sia, G.R. No. 137457, Nov. 21, 2001). Although not punishable under RPC, it can be treated as a felony within the meaning of Article 4 of RPC (See: Dimat vs. People, G.R. No. 181184, January 25, 2012). Hence, the accused is liable for homicide, which is the direct and natural consequence of simple carnapping. 8. Sense of danger - If a person in committing threat, murder, rape or robbery creates in the mind of the victim an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries or death (US vs. Valdez, G.R. No. 16486, March 22, 1921; People vs. Toling, G.R. No. L-27097, January 17, 1975; People vs. Castromero, G.R. No. 118992, October 9, 1997; People vs. Arpa, G.R. No. L-26789, April 25, 1969 ). 9. Aberratio ictus – If the crimes committed against the target victim and third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, were produced by a single act, the accused is liable for a complex crime. Thus, single act of throwing a grenade killing one and injuring another constitutes a complex crime of murder and attempted murder. (People v. Julio Guillen, G.R. No. L-1477, January 18, 1950) However, the accused is liable for separate crimes despite the application of the aberratio ictus rule, and not a compound crime in the following cases: a. If the bullet that killed that target victim is different from the bullet that killed the third person, who

was hit by reason of aberratio ictus (People v. Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000; People v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015); or b. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, is merely a light felony such as slight physical injuries (People v. Violin, G.R. Nos. 114003-06, January 14, 1997); or c. If the components of a compound

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2020 CRIMINAL LAW BAR REVIEWER BY JUDGE MARLO B. CAMPANILLA Warning: This is the intellectual property of Judge Campanilla. Copying any parts of this work in writing materials or book for publication without proper attribution is prohibited by law crime are alleged in two different information. (People v. Umawid, G.R. No. 208719, June 9, 2014); or d. If the crime committed against the third person, who was hit by reason of aberratio ictus, is child abuse, which is an offense punishable under special law (Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019) In Patulot vs. People, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019, accused consciously poured hot cooking oil from a casserole on CCC, consequently injuring AAA (3 years old) and BBB (2 months old) burning their skins and faces. Accused is liable for child abuse involving infliction of physical injury although there is no intent to degrade, debase or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. In fact, the intention of the accused is merely to inflict injury on CCC but because of aberratio ictus or mistake of blow, AAA and BBB were also injured. In sum, because of Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, accused is liable for the wrongful act done (child abuse against AAA and BBB) although it differs from the wrongful act intended (physical injuries on CCC). 10. Praeter intentionem - In Wacoy v. People, G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015, accused merely kicked and punched the victim on the stomach, which shows that their intention is merely to maltreat, and not to end his life. The concept of intent to kill as an element of homicide should not be confused with that of lack of intent to kill, on the basis of which the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem shall be appreciated. Since the victim died as a consequence of a felonious act of violence employed by the accused, intent to kill as an element of homicide is conclusively presumed. Even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is still homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof. However, the mitigating circumstance of praeter intentionem shall be appreciated since there is no intent to kill. Under Article 49 of the Revised Penal Code, if the penalty for the intended crime is different from that of the committ...