Aristotle on virtue ethics essay PDF

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According to Aristotle, what does it mean to be virtuous, and how does one become virtuous? Is Aristotle’s account correct? It can be said that Aristotle was one of the founding thinkers on “virtue ethics”, an approach to ethics which emphasises virtue and moral character (Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2016). The question of what it means to be a virtuous person and how one becomes virtuous lies at the heart of Aristotle’s agent centred moral theory discussed within the books of Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle begins by stating that each “skill and inquiry” and every “action and choice” is performed to accomplish a good or an end (I:1,1094a). The most complete good is that which is not instrumental to any other good and is good intrinsically. This highest good or “eudaimonia” is what can be translated as happiness or flourishing (Crisp 2000:xi) and is something which is not achieved for the sake of anything else in the way that subordinate goods such as wealth or health are as these are often achieved for a greater good, overall happiness. As happiness is a certain kind of activity of the rational soul which is determined by virtue, Aristotle urges us that to consider happiness we ought to look at virtue (I:13, 1102a) which can be defined as a state of character or a disposition on how to behave. In order to determine what goods happiness consists in, Aristotle puts forth the function argument or the “purpose of human life treatise” (Pakaluk 2005:4) asking what is the “ergon” or “function” of a human arguing that “the characteristic activity of a human being is an activity of the soul in accordance with reason”. The function argument is Aristotle’s way of answering what it means to be virtuous as he holds that ones ultimate end is found within the actions we carry out as a result of the virtues (Pakaluk 2005:4). The example of a lyre player is used stating that the characteristic activity of a lyre player is to play the lyre, and that of a good lyre player to play it well (I:7, 1098a). The ultimate goal of human life is therefore achieved through being virtuous in accordance with reason and human happiness consists in ac However the function argument could be criticised for assuming that human beings only have one characteristic activity and assuming that rationality can belong to humans alone and not other sentient beings (Crisp 2000:xiii). When considering this criticism, it is difficult to see what it means to be virtuous as correct as it constrains the function of humans to one characteristic activity. Crisp asserts that idea that asks why should one assume that the good for a human being is the same as performing well the characteristic activity of another? (2000:viii). It is incorrect to argue that one persons characteristic activity is the most beneficial one for another.

For Aristotle, to be a virtuous person is to complete virtuous acts and act as a virtuous person would. Actions which are completed in accordance with virtue are one’s that are good and noble, as well as pleasant in themselves (I:8, 1099a). For example, one becomes just through undertaking just actions and courageous through doing courageous actions (II:1, 1103b) just as by practising a skill allows us to advance this skill. Yet some may wonder what is meant by saying that to become just is to do just actions first and becoming temperate, temperate actions. If one does these actions isn’t one already just and temperate? (II, 4, 1105A).

Furthermore, this doesn’t tell one how virtuous people are

acting, as if we acted virtuously we would already be virtuous. However Aristotle responds to this by claiming that actions which are performed in accordance with virtue demonstrate the method of acquisition, these acts are completed in a “just or temperate way” if an agent acts in a specific state through knowledge and from rational choice. These virtues which are demonstrated through action are undertaken for their own sake (II:4, 1105a) therefore virtues require us to not only behave in a certain way but to do it for the correct reason, and to feel the right way about our action. In this instance, what makes actions right is their being virtuous and what may be morally required of us is how the virtuous person would act in our circumstance (Crisp 2000:xvi). Aristotle differentiates between two kinds of virtue, those that pertain to the part of the soul which engages in reasoning known as virtues of intellect and those that pertain to the part of the soul that cannot reason but is capable of following reason, these are known as virtues of character or ethical virtues. Intellectual virtues are divided into those that are concerned with theoretical reason and those that are concerned with practical reasoning. (Kraut 2017). Virtues of character are concerned with pleasure and pain as Aristotle states that “it is because of pleasure that we do bad actions, and pain that we abstain from noble ones” (II:3, II04b).

As we regulate our actions by pleasure and pain, these have an

influence on our actions. In the example of temperance the person who abstains from bodily pleasures and finds enjoyment from this is temperate whereas the person who finds doing this oppressive is intemperate. Intellectual virtues are concerned with development and originate through teaching, just as one may learn a particular skill over a period of time whereas virtues of character arise in us neither by nature nor contrary to nature,. Nature gives us the capacity to acquire the virtues , and completion comes through habituation. Aristotle offers the example of the stone to discuss how nothing natural can be made to behave differently through habituation, a stone that naturally falls downwards could not be made by habituation to rise upwards not even through throwing it upward a thousand times (II:1, 1103a).

Acting in a state of virtue is not a habit, habituation instead is merely an aid to the development of virtue (Athanassoulis 2016), this is how one becomes virtuous. Acquiring ethical virtues through habituation is not a mindless process, it must involve assessing situations and analysing what act may be called for. If someone is to be a good tempered person, they must not be habituated to avoid anger in all circumstances, instead the habit they must require is to avoid anger on the correct occasions and to be inclined to feel angry when it is most necessary (Sorabji 1980:216). The habituation that shapes character involves not merely doing actions but also reflecting upon and reasoning about what one is doing and feeling (Polansky 227). Furthermore, it is important to acknowledge that habituation is not the end of virtue rather it is the beginning as the end of virtue is to Aristotle clearly the chief good as activity of the rational soul in accordance with virtue (I:9, 1100a) which leads to “eudaimonia” or happiness. In this case, one becomes virtuous through habituation. The doctrine of the mean has two components to it. The first is associated with three dispositions, two extremes and the mean or the virtue, each of these dispositions are in opposition to each other (II:8, 1108b). The second component is that any “correctly felt” emotion or action correctly carried out, falls in the middle of those that would stray due to an excess or those that would stray due to a deficiency (Pakaluk. 2005:108). In Aristotle’s account of morality, states of character or virtues are means which are naturally corrupted by the vices of deficiency and the vices of excess. The cases of strength and health are used by Aristotle wherein too much exercise and too little can impair ones strength, likewise excessive amounts of food and drink are detrimental to ones health, whilst the correct amount produces, increases and preserves it (II, 2, 1104a) demonstrating a need for moderation. For example in the case of the virtue of courage, to have a deficiency of courage is to be a coward and to have an excess of the virtue of courage is to be rash. Therefore the middle way also known as the “doctrine of mean” is the virtue of courage. One can feel fear either in excessive amounts or deficient amounts, yet having fear at the correct time is what the mean exemplifies (Crisp 2000:xvi). Other examples of the doctrine of the mean include the virtue of greatness of the soul. A vice of deficiency in this instance is smallness of soul whereas the vice of excess is vanity (II:7, 1107b). The doctrine of the “intermediate” is vital as it appears to specify the intrinsic value of morally virtuous action and Aristotle’s insistences that genuinely morally virtuous actions are chosen for their own sakes. Virtuous states are named as “intermediate” as they are dispositions to perform intermediate actions. (Richardson Lear 2004:123). Furthermore,

Aristotle argues that in some cases, there is a possibility that one vice can be more opposed to the mean than the other vice. The example he gives is in the virtue or mean of courage, it is not rashness, the excess which is more opposed to courage rather it is cowardice the deficiency. One reason for this is that one vice derives from the nature of the action itself, as one extreme is nearer and emulates the mean more than the other. The other derives from our own nature, “it is the things to which we ourselves are naturally inclined that appear more contrary to the mean”. This is because we are naturally inclined to pleasures and are therefore more prone to intemperance than self discipline (II:8, 1109a). As one of the extremes is a greater missing of the mark than the other, one must incline toward the vice of excess which as this makes it easier to hit the mark (II:9, 1109b). This allows Aristotle’s account to be strengthened as he acknowledges the difficulty in knowing how much one should act in a specific way before it becomes a vice of excess and emphasises the need to practice and habituate the virtues as much as is possible. Despite Aristotle acknowledging the difficulty in knowing how much of a mean becomes a vice, he doesn’t offer a solution to this problem. Simply “aiming for the vice of excess” (II:9, 1109b) in an attempt to hit the target does not give a clear indication on how much becomes too much. One may argue how it is possible that all actions have a mean, especially injurious ones such as murder. Yet Aristotle validates his account on morality by arguing that not every action has a good, there is no possible way for one to “hit the target” on actions such as

murder, theft and adultery. For this reason, these actions are wrong intrinsically.

Furthermore, it is equally as wrong to expect there to be a “mean, an excess and a deficiency in committing injustice, being a coward and being intemperate” since this would result in there being a mean of excess and a mean of deficiency and then an excess of excess and a deficiency of deficiency (II, 6, 1107a). It is implausible to contemplate this for Aristotle therefore by recognising that not all actions have a virtue this enables the doctrine of the mean as a sufficient mode of assessing virtue. Further reason which allows the doctrine of the mean in accordance with Aristotle’s account of virtue to be correct is it states that the mean or the middle path between the two vices of excess and deficiency is relative to us an individuals as virtues are states which involve rational choice consisting in a mean relative to us which is determined by reason (II:6, 1106a). It therefore places individuality at the centre of the account on morality and further renders the account as a correct mode of morality. Although Aristotle’s account on virtue is correct in it’s emphasis on moral character and habituation as a means to becoming virtuous, the doctrine of the mean can be flawed

as it falls to offer a decision procedure. In comparison, Utilitarianism offers one the Greatest Happiness Principle, holding that an act is morally correct if it maximises pleasure and incorrect if it produces the reverse of pleasure, pain (Mill 1998:55) and therefore gives one a guidance on how to behave. Despite this criticism, Aristotle’s account can be correct as the doctrine of the mean allows us to systemise our understanding of which qualities are virtues. An example of this is that once one is able to understand that temperance and courage are virtues, one is able to identify other mean states as virtues (Kraut 2017). This permits Aristotle’s account as valuable as it can allow one to develop habituation through the doctrine of the mine and to become a virtuous person. Aristotelian ethics has been adopted by many modern virtue ethic thinkers, most predominantly G. E. M Anscombe as a reaction against prevailing deontology and utilitarianism forms of ethics due to the fact that neither of these forms accounted for moral character, virtues and vices and the role of emotion within our moral life (Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2016). The emergence of modern virtue ethics can demonstrate the need for an agent centred moral theory which sustains Aristotle’s virtue ethics as a correct account in a contemporary context. For Aristotle, it is evident from his account on virtue that what it means to be virtuous is an expression of the virtue of “philosophical wisdom” as the ultimate goal of human life (Pakaluk, 2005:2) therefore one can see how virtue is linked with achieving happiness, as to act in accordance with virtue, one will gain happiness. Modern virtue ethical thinkers however do not identify happiness with the exercise of virtues (Crisp 2000:xv). To infer, although Aristotle’s account was asserted in a society far different from ones own, it still possesses the ability to be relevant today due to its correctness on how one is able to become virtuous through exercising the virtues and habituation.

Bibliography Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Translated Roger Crisp, (Cambridge University Press, 2000) R, Crisp, “Introduction”, Nicomachean Ethics, (Cambridge University Press, 2000)

R, Hursthouse, and G, Pettigrove, Glen, "Virtue Ethics", The Stanford Encyclopedia of

Philosophy (Winter 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) R, Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer 2017 Edition, Edward N. Zalta (ed.) J, S Mill, Utilitarianism, Translated Roger Crisp, (Oxford University Press, 1998)

M. Pakaluk, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction. (Cambridge University Press, 2005) R, Polanksy, The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, (Cambridge University Press, 2014) G, Richardson Lear, Happy Lives and the Highest Good: An Essay on Aristotle’s Nicomachean

Ethics, (Princeton University Press 2004) R, Sorabji, “Aristotle on the Role of Intellect of Virtue”, Essays On Aristotle’s Ethics, Edited Amelie Rorty, (The Regents of the University of California, 1980)...