Bourhill v Young - Detailed case brief, including paragraphs and page references Topic: Nervous PDF

Title Bourhill v Young - Detailed case brief, including paragraphs and page references Topic: Nervous
Course The Law of Torts
Institution Victoria University of Wellington
Pages 2
File Size 154.2 KB
File Type PDF
Total Downloads 12
Total Views 152

Summary

Detailed case brief, including paragraphs and page references
Topic: Nervous Shock...


Description

XvY Nervous shock concerns someone who causes an accident, and whether they can owe a duty of care not only for the physical consequences of their actions but also psychological consequences of those not actually in the accident. Area of law concerned:

Negligence arising out of nervous shock

Court:

House of Lords

Date:

1943

Judge:

Lord Russell and Lord Wright

Counsel: Summary of Facts:

John Young lost control of his motorbike and was killed when he struck an oncoming car. Mrs Bourhill suffered ‘fright’ at hearing the noise. At the time of the accident she was eight months pregnant and her baby was stillborn one month later (which appears to have been accepted to have been the result of the fright). She sued John Young’s estate.

Relief sought: Issues:

Relevant Statute(s): Procedural History: Plaintiff/Appellant’s arguments Defendant/Respondent’s arguments: Result: Judge’s reasoning:

The first essential for the appellant is to establish the existence of a duty owed to her by John Young. As between Young and the driver of the car, he was negligent in his driving. But that does not mean that he owed a duty of care to the appellant. Duty owed to driver but not to a bystander.

The appellant was not in any way physically involved in the collision. She was standing on the road, and could not see the collision. She was frightened by the noise, but had no reasonable fear of immediate bodily injury to herself. Appellant’s position.

Can it be said that Young could reasonably have anticipated that a person in the appellant’s shoes would be affected by his proceeding at the speed at which he was travelling? His road was clear of pedestrians. The appellant was not within his vision. His speed in no way endangered her. I am unable to see how he could reasonably anticipate that, if he came

into collision with a vehicle coming across the tramcar the resultant noise would cause physical injury by shock to a person standing behind the tramcar. In my opinion, he owed no duty. Not guilty of negligence, test fails at duty.

Lord Wright

There may be no one injured in a particular case by impact, but still a wrong may be committed to anyone who suffers nervous shock or is injured in an act of rescue… An old lady at Charing Cross, who suffers shock because she narrowly escapes being run over, cannot claim damages if the driver is driving carefully, whether he hits her or not. Nature of negligence. Has to be a breach of a duty

This case may raise a question over whether the appellant’s illness was not due to her peculiar susceptibility. She was eight months pregnant. Can it not be said that it was likely that a person of normal nervous strength would have been affected in the same way as the appellant? What if she was not of peculiar susceptibility?

what is now being considered is the question of liability, whether there is a duty owing to members of the public who come within the ambit of the act. This must generally depend on a normal standard of susceptibility. Though vague, it is desirable to limit the scope of the relatively new tort of negligence.

What danger of particular infirmity that would include must depend on all the circumstances, but I think a reasonably normal condition, if medical evidence is capable of defining it, would be standard. The test of the plaintiff’s extraordinary susceptibility, if unknown to the defendant, would in effect make him an insurer....


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