Case briefs for Farrell, Morse AND KELM PDF

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Completed Case Brief of Farrell, Morse, and Kelm...

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Alaina White Professor Girasa Business Law October 6, 2016 Case Brief of People v. Farrell I.

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Facts A complaint was filed charging defendant with the theft of a trade secret that exceeded 2.5 million dollars. A hearing was held in the superior court on the limited question of whether the California Penal Code applies to the theft of property other than money, including trade seconds. The court concluded that the provision applies to the theft of all property of a certain value, including trade secrets. Issue Whether the California Penal Code applies to the theft of property other than money, including trade secrets. Decision The Court of Appeal reversed. Reason The Court of Appeal reversed, concluding that the California Penal Code applies only to the theft of what it termed “monetary property.” Every person is guilty of theft who, with intent to deprive or withhold the control of a trade secret from its owner, or with an intent to appropriate a trade secret to his or her own use or to the use of another, does any of the following: steals, takes, carries away, or uses without authorization, or deprives economic value. The Court of Appeal examined the words of the statute and the legislative history of the enactment and, concluding that the statute is at best ambiguous, applied the socalled rule of lenity to give defendant the benefit of the doubt.

Alaina White Professor Girasa Business Law October 6, 2016 I.

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Case Brief of State of South Dakota v. Morse Facts Janice Heffron orally contracted with her neighbor, Wyatt Morse, to convert her second=floor bedroom into a bathroom in five weeks for $5,000. Morse told Heffron that he could do the project quick and cheap, and said that he had plumbing experience and that his work would meet code. Morse convinced Heffron to pay in cash so that he could avoid the Internal Service Revenue. They agreed that Morse would convert the room into a bathroom, install and antique claw-foot tub, put wainscoting on the walls, install an old tin ceiling, and install crown molding. Morse worked on the bathroom until his already bad back started to aggravate him. Heffron had already paid him somewhere between $6,000 and $6,500 cash, but Morse showed up to the work site less and less because of his back and eventually stopped showing up entirely. After Morse abandoned the project, Janice contacted a licensed plumber, who examined Morse’s work and pointed or the several deficiencies in Morse’s work. In sum, Morse’s work on the bathroom, in the opinion of the licensed plumber, had no value to the home. Morse was indicted for grand theft by deception in violation of South Dakota law. A jury returned a guilty verdict. Morse was sentenced to five years in prison. He appealed asserting that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. Issue Whether Morse had an intent to defraud the Heffrons. Decision The Decision was reversed. Reason There is no evidence that Morse had a purpose to deceive or intended to defraud the Heffrons when he agreed to remodel Heffron’s bathroom. Although his work was not above and beyond code, the State never argued that Morse knew he would do faulty work. It cannot be inferred that Morse intended to defraud the Heffrons because his work product was not up to code. Moreover, the State never argued or presented evidence that Morse took the Heffrons money with the intention of never performing under their agreement. To sustain a conviction, each element of an offense must be supported by evidence. Theft by deception is a specific intent crime, and therefore, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Morse had the specific intent to defraud the Heffrons when he agreed to remodel the bathroom.

Alaina White Professor Girasa Business Law October 6, 2016 I.

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Case Brief of State v. Kelm Facts Through a local attorney, the defendant sought a short term loan of a few thousand dollars which she said she needed to complete an escrow for an absent buyer in a real estate transaction in which the defendant was the broker. Based on the information obtained from the attorney, Ms. Joan Williams, believing the amount to be $2500, agreed to meet with the defendant to make such a loan. Williams was told by the defendant that she was involved in a real estate deal for a manufacturing plant and that she would lose a real estate commission if she did not obtain sufficient money to complete an escrow, the buyer she represented being out of town and unavailable. She said she needed $6,000 and would repay the loan either from a reimbursement from the buyer or from commissions from a Florida sale. Ms. Williams loaned the defendant the amount asked in the form of a check for $3,500 and $2,500 cash. Williams received a check five days later from the defendant for $6,000. Later that day, the defendant asked Williams to delay depositing the check to permit uncollected funds to clear. The following week Williams learned that the check was uncollectible. Issue Whether an intent to defraud the victim was specifically set forth in the statute. Decision The jury was correctly instructed by this charge, and found that there was no intent for the defendant to defraud. Reason The defendant contends that the issuance of a post-dated check cannot be found to be a violation of the criminal statute and that proof of an intent to defraud is required for a conviction. The defendant also denied any intention to defraud Williams. The State must prove that the defendant knew that the check would not be honored. The State is required to prove under the statute that there was any intent to defraud; the State need only prove that the defendant knew that the check would not be honored in the future....