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Banda vs. ErmitaG. No. 166620 April 20, 2010618 SCRA 488Facts:President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the printing services requirements of govern...

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Banda vs. Ermita G.R. No. 166620 April 20, 2010 618 SCRA 488

Facts: President GMA issued Executive Order No. 378 on 2004 amending Section 6 of Executive Order No. 285 by, inter alia, removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO (National Printing Office) over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 378, government agencies and instrumentalities are allowed to source their printing services from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that the services offered by the private supplier be of superior quality and lower in cost compared to what was offered by the NPO. Executive Order No. 378 also limited NPO’s appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to its income. Perceiving Executive Order No. 378 as a threat to their security of tenure as employees of the NPO, petitioners now challenge its constitutionality, contending that: (1) it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still exercised legislative powers; and (2) Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners’ security of tenure, because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO. Issue: Whether or not The President has the power to reorganize the NPO

Ruling: Yes. It is a well-settled principle in jurisprudence that the President has the power to reorganize the offices and agencies in the executive department in line with the President’s constitutionally granted power of control over executive offices and by virtue of previous delegation of the legislative power to reorganize executive offices under existing statutes. Ratio decidendi: Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 gives the President continuing authority to reorganize and redefine the functions of the Office

of the President. Section 31, Chapter 10, Title III, Book III of the said Code, is explicit: The President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President .It is undisputed that the NPO, as an agency that is part of the Office of the Press Secretary (which in various times has been an agency directly attached to the Office of the Press Secretary or as an agency under the Philippine Information Agency), is part of the Office of the President. To be very clear, this delegated legislative power to reorganize pertains only to the Office of the President and the departments, offices and agencies of the executive branch and does not include the Judiciary, the Legislature or the constitutionally-created or mandated bodies. Moreover, it must be stressed that the exercise by the President of the power to reorganize the executive department must be in accordance with the Constitution, relevant laws and prevailing jurisprudence. Doctrine Learned: Since petitioners instituted this case as a class suit, the Court, thus, must first determine if the petition indeed qualifies as one. An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class, in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest. Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court defines a class suit, as follows: “Sec. 12. Class suit.—When the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons so numerous that it is impracticable to join all as parties, a number of them which the court finds to be sufficiently numerous and representative as to fully protect the interests of all concerned may sue or defend for the benefit of all. Any party in interest shall have the right to intervene to protect his individual interest.” From the foregoing definition, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

Ganila v CA 461 SCRA 435 June 28, 2005 Overview: Herrera filed ejectment complaints against Ganila et al with the MCTC. On appeal, Ganila et al questioned the jurisdiction of the MCTC. The SC ruled that being a case for unlawful detainer, it was within the jurisdiction of the MCTC and that Ganila et al are barred from raising their opposition for the first time on appeal. Statement of the Case Petition for review on certiorari Facts Violeta Herrera filed 21 ejectment complaints alleging that she owns Lot 1227 of Jordan, Guimaras and that shetolerated Ganila et al (18 persons and the Baptist Christian Learning Center) to construct residential houses or other improvements on certain portions of the lot without rental. When she asked Ganila et al to vacate, they refused. Barangay conciliation failed; hence, she filed the complaints. 8 claimed that Lot 1227 was formerly a shoreline. 8 maintained that their houses stood on Lot 1229. 3 asserted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. Geodetic engineers surveyed the area and reported that all the houses were inside Lot1227. MCTC rendered decision in favor of Herrera and ordered Ganila et al to vacate. RTC dismissed the appeal and the CA affirmed the denial. Issues: WON MCTC erred in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the case and WON RTC and CA erred in sustaining the MCTC’s judgment

Ruling: No. Ganila et al insist that Herrera should have filed an action to recover possession de jure, not a mere complaint for ejectment because (1) they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years and (2) there was no withholding of possession since Herrera was not in prior possession of the lot. Ratio decidendi: The SC agrees with Herrera that there was no error in her choice of remedy. The complaint itself is defined by the allegations therein, not the allegations of Ganila et al. Besides, Ganila et al have admitted in their preliminary statement that the complaints filed are indeed for unlawful detainer, and that the only issue to be determined is mere

physical possession and not juridical possession. While petitioners assert that this case involves only deprivation of possession, they confuse the remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. Also, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. Thus, the fact that petitioners are in possession of the lot does not automatically entitle them to remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all in a suit for unlawful detainer, simply because prior lawful possession by virtue of contract or other reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts. An unlawful detainer is different from a possessory action and from a reinvidicatory action in that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvidicatoria or the action to recover ownership which includes recovery of possession, make up three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. Herrera’s allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer : (1) she owns Lot 1227, (2) she tolerated Ganila et al to construct houses, (3) she withdrew her tolerance, and (4) Ganila et refused to heed her demand. The suit was well-within the jurisdiction of MCTC. Besides, Ganila et al raised their opposition only for the first time in their appeal, they are now stopped from doing so. Doctrine Learned: If only to stress the fundamental principles related to present controversy, jurisdiction over unlawful detainer suits is vested in municipal trial courts. And in ejectment cases, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. In this case for ejectment, private respondent’s allegations sufficiently present a case of unlawful detainer. She alleged that (1) she owns Lot 1227; (2) she tolerated petitioners to construct their houses thereon; (3) she withdrew her tolerance; and (4) petitioners refused to heed her demand to vacate the lot. The Complaints were also filed within one year from the date of her demand. The cause of action for unlawful detainer between the parties springs from the failure of petitioners to vacate the lot upon lawful demand of the private respondent. When they refused to vacate the lot after her demand, petitioners’ continued possession became unlawful. Her complaint for ejectment against respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis. A person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he

will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him. His status is analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term of lease has expired but whose occupancy continued by tolerance of the owner. In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate....