Case Note - Allcard v Skinner PDF

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Complete case note of Allcard v Skinner. Received a HD. ...

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32850981

CASE NOTE FOR ALLCARD V SKINNER (1887) 36 Ch D 145 1.0

OVERVIEW

The case takes place in the Court of Appeal of England and Wales with the appellant being Miss Allcard and the defendant being Miss Skinner. The case was appealed again by Miss Allcard following the decision from Kekewich J to dismiss in favour of the defendant. The judges presiding were Cotton, Lindley, and Bowen LJJ. The plaintiff’s submission for appeal was dismissed with a majority ruling from Lindley and Bowen LJJ and a dissenting opinion from Cotton LJ. 2.0

FACTS OF THE CASE

In 1868 the Defendant was introduced to Miss Skinner, a superior at the charitable sisterhood where shortly after she became an associate of the institution. Until 1871 the Defendant engaged with the sisterhood and joined in the charitable work but was not a fully-fledged member. In August 1871, she became a professed sister and from 1872 to 1874 transferred several large sums of money and stock to the Defendant. The rules of the sisterhood dictated that a sister was not permitted to seek advice or counsel with any person not connected to the sisterhood, as well as the requirement that a sister could not hold any property as she must take a vow of poverty. In 1879 Miss Allcard left the sisterhood and despite a solicitor advising her to ask for the sum back - Miss Allcard chose not to. Six years later in 1885, the Plaintiff initiated proceedings to recover the sum of money in addition to the railway stock. 3.0

JUDGEMENT

Kekewich J examined the nature of the relationship between the Defendant and Plaintiff and identified that while there was a presumption of influence in a religious or spiritual relationship such as this, the court must be able to identify actual undue influence. 1 Kekewich J also notes that the Plaintiff had consulted with her brother whom, regardless of whether the Defendant took his advice or not, had access to some advice outside of the sisterhood prior to drafting the will. On the issue of

1 Allcard v Skinner (1887) 36 Ch D 145, 158.

32850981 undue influence in relation to delay, Kekewich J, Bowen and Lindley LLJ all assent that it was in May of 1979 where the Defendant was free from any undue influence and may have conducted a successful case for rescission.2 Cotton LJ in his dissenting opinion reached the conclusion that the court should interfere where relations exist between parties where influence within that relationship is abused.3 Cotton LJ maintained that the delay which occurred is not a defence as he believed the delay did not constitute evidence that the act was spontaneously made at the time. Lindley LJ raises two questions that must be satisfied for the successful appeal: (1) whether the gifts made by the Defendant were revocable when they were made and, (2) assuming they were, was it competent for the Defendant to revoke them when she did? The first question he answers in saying that the doctrine of undue influence protects people from being victimised by others and in this case, there is no evidence of influence exercised by Miss Skinner over the Plaintiff. 4 Regarding the second question, Lindley LJ distinguishes his judgement from Cotton LJ in stating that the conduct of the Plaintiff warrants a ‘confirmation of the gift’ to the sisterhood. This confirmation refers to the inaction of the Plaintiff over the course of five years in attempting to recover a sum from the institution. Bowen LJ also iterates that the longer a gift is left, the more difficult it becomes for the law to interfere. Bowen and Lindley LLJ establish that the Plaintiff’s decision not to disturb the gift disentitles the plaintiff to relief as her actions constitute finality to the gift she imparted several years ago. Ultimately the deciding factor in the case was the significant delay in initiating legal proceedings after ending her involvement with the church. Lindley and Bowen LJJ held that at least part of the property could be recovered were it not for the significant delay of action. Cotton LJ would have allowed a claim in part as he believed that undue influence was exercised, although there was not any actual evidence of any such influence exerted over the Plaintiff.

2 Ibid 163, 192. 3 Ibid 172-3. 4 Ibid 183....