Civil Procedure Final Exam - Cases PDF

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Condensed version of pertinent cases to know ...

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Minimum Contacts: Due process requires only that the ∆ have certain “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Specific: Test: (1) minimum contacts? (2) related to claim? (3) reasonable form of notice? International Shoe McGee v. International Life Insurance/Hanson v. Denkla:  K had a “substantial connection” with the forum state (K was delivered there, premiums were mailed from there, insured was a resident when he died  Forum state would want to have jurisdiction over people who refuse to pay claims  Compare this to Hanson v. Denkla where while the insured trust income and carried out csome trust administration in the forum state, the ∆ (trust company) didn’t have minimum contacts – connection only happened when insured became domiciled there. Purposeful Availment & Stream of Commerce/Foreseeability Arguments: Hanson v. Denkla: The ∆ must “purposely avail itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws” FOR: WWVW: “When a corporation ‘purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State,’ it has clear notice that it is subject to suit there.” WWVW: “The forum state does not exceed its powers under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corporation that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expectation that they will be purchased by consumers in the forum State.”  

Concurrence (Brennan): injecting goods into the stream of commerce with foreseeable destination should suffice for PJ (Asahi) J McIntyre (2011): Ginsberg’s dissent + 3 justices: ∆ was subject to PJ in NJ because it put its product into the stream of commerce, knowing that it could be sold there (irrespective of its use of a national distributor) o Due Process = Fairness and Reason; Not Sovereign Power (or Tradition)

AGAINST: 

Foreseeable that car might travel to forum state where accident happened o But ∆ did not sell cars, advertise, or deliberately market there (WWVW)

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Asahi knew that some of the valves would be sold to CA Plurality: o But there was no “purposeful action directed towards the forum state.”  “The placement of a product into the stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the ∆ purposefully directed toward the forum state.” o Additional activities would need to be shown

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Designing the product to be marketed there, advertising, establishing channels for providing regular service to customers there, marketing it through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent there

J McIntyre (2011): No purposeful action (did not manufacture or ship goods in the forum state). Against Brennan’s Asahi opinion and the dissent o Due Process protects rights so that PJ can only exercised with “lawful authority” (determined by “traditional practice”). Brennan’s and the dissent’s grounds were “inconsistent with the promises of lawful judicial power.”  At no time did the petitioner engage in any activities in NJ that reveal an intent to invoke or benefit from the protections of its laws.

DEPENDS:  

Even Brennan agreed with the judgment because it was a “rare case” where “fair play and substantial justice” outweighed if the “∆ has purposefully engaged in forum activities.” Justice Stevens (concurring): depends on volume, value, and hazardous character of the component

“Fair Play and Substantial Justice” (Asahi) 8 justices (except Scalia) in Asahi said PJ would violate “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” because the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable, even if minimum contacts existed (Part IIB). (1)

Burden on defendant o Not only in traveling from Japan to CA but also having to litigate in a foreign nation’s judicial system Interests of forum state o π was not a CA resident so CA’s legitimate interest in the dispute were considerably diminished Interests of plaintiff o There would really be no good reason for π (Cheng Shin) wanting Asahi to have to be subject to litigation in CA o The transaction the claim is based on occurred in Taiwan o Asahi’s components were shipped from Japan to Taiwan o π (Cheng Shin) did not show it was more convenient to litigate claim against Asahi in CA rather than Taiwan or Japan Interests of federal system (especially foreign nations) o Quotes that, “Great care and reserve should be exercised when extending our notion of personal jurisdiction into the international field.”

(2)

(3)

(4)

Service of Process (Burnham v. Superior Court): CA court could exercise PJ over a non-resident who was personally served with process while temporarily in the state. FOR: 

Bright-Line Rule (Scalia) = “tradition”: Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in American tradition (and one commonly accepted at the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted) is that the courts of a state have jurisdiction over nonresidents who are physically present in the state.

AGAINST:

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Case-By-Case Inquiry (Brennan’s concurring opinion) = “fairness”: Due Process Clause generally permits a state court to exercise general PJ over a ∆ if he is personally served with process while voluntarily present in the forum state. o Nonetheless, it is necessary to “undertake an independent inquiry into the fairness of the prevailing in-state service rule.” o The critical insight of Shaffer is that all the rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions of due process.

Consent: Forum Selection Clause (Carnival Cruise Lines): 

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No bad faith, fraud, or overreaching (FL was a sensible place to conduct litigation) o It was Carnival Cruise Line’s home state o Many cruises deported from there πs “essentially conceded” they had notice of the provision In the absence of the clause they could be sued anywhere and would result in many jurisdictional problems Forum selection clauses are favored now??? Use the fundamental fairness test

Consent to Jurisdiction (Pennoyer):  If ∆ personally appears in court and doesn’t complain, no problem (court can exercise jurisdiction) Reasonable Notice (Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank): An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is “notice reasonably calculated, under all of the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” *this was before in rem proceedings were eliminated under Shaffer  Although court attached the ∆’s property (trust assets) and notice of publication is usually how in rem proceedings are done (because you or someone else is watching over the property), this was not in rem because  If the state allows notice by publication and you don’t know the address of the person, notice by publication would be reasonable.  However, if you did know the address of the person, notice by publication would be unreasonable and would be entitled to notice pursuant to first class mail. SMJ – Federal Q Mottey (Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule):  Issue of federal law must be in π’s original claim o Here, π’s original claim was breach of K (under state law) o Federal Q would only likely arise as an affirmative defense SMJ – Diversity Jurisdiction Redner v. Sanders:  

∆ was from NY π’s complaint alleged he was a “citizen of the U.S. residing in France” and thus, diversity jurisdiction should be invoked under (a)(2) o ∆ (citizens of a State - NY) and π (citizens or subjects of a foreign state – France)

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o However, residing ≠ citizen Complaint didn’t allege that he was a resident of CA. If it did, diversity could be invoked under (a)(1)

Sadat v. Mertes (dual citizenship): 

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π was a citizen of the U.S. (naturalized citizen) but not a citizen of a STATE within the U.S. because he was domiciled in Egypt o A citizen of the United States who is not also a citizen of one of the United States may not maintain suit under § 1332(a)(1). Not considered a citizen of a foreign state under (a)(2) because his Egyptian nationality was not “dominant.” o [O]rdinarily, [however,] only the American nationality of the dual citizen should be recognized under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2). Supplemental Jurisdiction

1367(a): Whether the state and federal claims arise under the “same common nucleus of operative facts.” In re Ameriquest Mortgage Co.:  

Federal Q (Truth in Lending Act) + state law claims (fraud) π wanted to get out of the mortgage. π raised the fraud claim to reduce the amount of $ she owed. She wouldn’t be able to do this if the claims weren’t related.

Even if they do arise under the “same common nucleus of operative facts,” the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. 1367(c): Court decided to decline to exercise supp. jurisdiction under (a) Szendrey-Ramos:  

State law claims (wrongful discharge, defamation, tortious interference with K) substantially predominated over federal claim (Title VII employment discrimination) because this seemed more like a wrongful discharge case Novel and complex issues of state law o Canon 21 state law; what she was told she would be ethically barred from disclosing this info Removal to Federal Court

Caterpillar v. Lewis:  

Original lawsuit: π1 (KY) and π2 (MA) v. ∆1 (Delaware), ∆2 (KY) π1 settled with ∆2 before trial so thought there was now complete diversity o However, this was improper under § 1441  (a) Could not have originally been heard in federal court (no complete diversity)  (b)(2): Could not have been removed solely based on diversity jurisdiction (KY and KY). Moreover, there was no original federal SMJ (no federal Q or diversity).

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Although district court made an error by not remanding the case because it was improperly removed, this was not “fatal to the ensuing adjudication” because federal jurisdictional requirements are met at the time judgment is entered. o § 1447(c): “If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.” Once a diversity case has been tried in federal court with rules of decisions supplied by state law under Erie, considerations of finality, efficiency, and economy become overwhelming.

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o

It wouldn’t have made a difference if it was heard in state court because KY state law applied regardless. Erie Doctrine

*is it true that Erie only applies to substance not procedure?? Erie:  Federal courts in diversity cases and supplemental jurisdiction cases should apply state “substantive” common law o “The line between procedural and substantive law is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure.” Guaranty Trust Co. v. York: *federal procedural common law (made up)   

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State law (SOL had expired). π argued court should apply federal practice (ignore SOL in “equity cases”) Focused less on distinguishing between “substantive” and “procedural.” Instead, emphasized that the purpose of Erie was to ensure the same outcome would occur whether or not the case was brought in federal or state court. Outcome-determinative test: Federal courts sitting in diversity should apply a state law that conflicts with federal practice when disregarding the state law would significantly affect the outcome of the litigation. o “Does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in a State court?” Here it was outcome-determinative because π would have lost in state court but would have won in federal court. Therefore, state law should apply. Problem with this test: everything could be considered outcome-determinative

Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative: *federal common law practice   

Issue was whether π was a “statutory employee” which would determine whether his tort claim would be barred State law (judge decides); federal practice (jury decides) o Jury would say he wasn’t a statutory employee and case could go forward Byrd Balancing Test: court balances the federal practice versus the likelihood of a different outcome in state court o Important federal practice: judge-jury relationship (Seventh Amendment)

Hanna v. Plumer: *rule codified in FRCP 

State law (in-hand service of process); FRCP Rule 4 (leave complaint at ∆’s home) Litigation as a Means of Resolving Disputes and Securing Remedies

Troupe v. C & S Wholesale Grocers:  

∆ filed a notice of removal to federal court. π tried to argue it didn’t meet the $75,000 requirement (she only requested around $13K in medical expenses) ∆ has carried its burden of proving that, if π prevails, her damages will “more likely than not” exceed the minimum jurisdictional amount (i.e. > $75,000).

Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.:

(1) Likelihood of succeeding on the merits o Supreme Court doesn’t really address this issue (2) Likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of the injunction o Even if this was the case it should still not be granted (3) Balance of equities tips in favor of π (4) Public interest   

Navy’s interests in effective training clearly outweighs the environmental concerns of the πs Strength of the Navy’s interests: the court defers to military authorities Strength of the π’s interests (focus on π’s injury): harm to an unknown # of the marine animals to those they study and observe Pleadings

A. Stating a Claim Haddle v. Garrison (legal sufficiency):   

π asserted he could maintain an action under § 1985(2) which required him showing there was an actual “injury” induced his employer to terminate him. ∆ argued there was no “injury” because π was an at-will employee  ∆ filed motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted Court concluded that interference with at-will employment could give rise to a claim for damages under the Civil Rights Act of 1871

Twombly/Iqbal (factual sufficiency):  

Twombly only required “plausible factual allegations” (didn’t need to be detailed) Now, the requirement is from Iqbal: To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.

Stradford v. Zurich Insurance (heightened pleading requirement):    

π filed for breach of K (insurance company refused to pay water damage) ∆ filed counterclaim for fraud (claimed π devised a scheme to obtain $ through false pretenses) Satisfied the requirement of 9(b) that, “Malice, intent, knowledge, and other conditions of a person’s mind may be alleged generally.” Didn’t satisfy requirement of 9(b) that “In alleging fraud or mistake, a party must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.” – did not specifically identify π’s alleged ties o You know if it’s fraud because of the nature of the claim (who said the lie, what was said who it was said for). o However, the court did grant leave to amend

Ethical Limitations (Rule 11) Walker v. Norwest Corp.:  

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Complaint only stated that “at least some of the Defendants” were citizens of different states Court held the complaint violated Rule 11 o Prob. 11(b)(3) for not conducting reasonable factual investigation as to where ∆s were from o Prob. 11(b)(2) for not conducting adequate legal research because the complaint failed to establish diversity jurisdiction on its face District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing monetary sanctions for this violation of denying π’s motion to amend the complaint

o

The attorney had to pay the sanctions

Christian v. Mattell, Inc.:  

District court did not abuse discretion by imposing sanctions (lawyer’s inadequate factual investigation). However, it was tainted by its consideration of other misconduct that cannot be the basis for sanctions under Rule 11 – such as discovery abuses, misstatements made during oral argument, and conduct in other litigation.

B. Responding to the Complaint: Dispositive Motions and Answers Zielinski v. Philadelphia Piers (not a specific enough answer):  

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∆ “denied” paragraph 5 which alleged that “a motor driven vehicle known as a fork lift or chisel (was) owned, operated and controlled by the ∆, its agents, servants and employees.” ∆ violated Rule 8(b) by failing to provide a more specific answer because it was only allowed to deny all of paragraph 5 if all of it was false o ∆ still owned the equipment so it should have admitted this o This would have provided π with the information necessary to determine that he sued the wrong ∆ o Then π could have used an interrogatory/deposition to figure out what went wrong The court therefore issued an order that (falsely) instructed the jury that the ∆ employed the alleged tortfeasor on the date of the accident, and explained that ∆ would not be prejudiced by this order because it was represented throughout the litigation by the same company that insures Carload Contractors. Consequences o π didn’t realize that it was Carload Contractors until the pre-trial conference o Could not amend its complaint because the SOL had run out

Beeck v. Aquaslide ‘N’ Dive Corp. (amendment to pleading + new trial):   

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π’s complaint alleged that ∆ manufactured the Aquaslide slide he was injured on. ∆ admitted this. After the SOL expired, the president claimed the slide wasn’t manufactured by them District court correctly allowed ∆ to amend its answer to deny manufacturing the slide o Had a good reason for initially admitting in the answer o The π would not be unduly prejudiced by the amendment  π could still show it was an Aquaslide slide  If he couldn’t, π could still sue the right manufacturer If court discovered counterfeits, they may have required Aquaslide to stick to initial allegation Also allowed a new trial o Separate trial would advance the goals of efficiency and fairness  Efficiency: just focus on this question  Fairness: so jury wouldn’t be biased about the evidence of how injured π was

Relation Back Moore v. Baker / Bonerb v. Richard J. Caron Foundation: Moore v. Baker: original complaint (failure to provide informed consent); amendment (negligence of performance of surgery/post op care) Bonerb: original complaint (negligently maintained basketball court); amendment (“professional malpractice”)

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Whether the amendment arose out of the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out in the original complaint o Moore v. Baker (no): before surgery vs. during/after o Bonerb (yes): same transaction…negligent care while at rehab facility o Lesson: draft complaint in broad, inclusive language so amendment fits better When the amendment was filed o Moore v. Baker: didn’t file until the court was about to grant ∆’s motion for SJ o Bonerb: filed before discovery

Discovery (Scope) 1. Relevance Favale v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Bridgeport:   

π’s claim was that ∆ negligently hired or supervised the principal (who was accused of sexually harassing the π) Therefore, π’s motions to compel (testimony from Sister and documents related to any anger management history or related psychological or psychiatric conditions) were not relevant o Granted ∆’s motion for a protective order to shield this discovery ∆ could not be held liable for negligent hiring, supervision, etc. ...