Coney Case Brief 2020 PDF

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2020 Torts Law I Case Brief - Coney case (refer to pages 377-427 in case book)...

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Joint Tortfeasors: liability and Joinder of defendants Pg. 377-384; 390-396;396-427 Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc. Supreme Court of IL, 1983 Parties: Coney - P, administrator J.L.G. - D, manufacturer Basis for Dispute:  Clifford M. Jasper died while operating hydraulic aerial work platform manufactured by D, claims are on stict product liability  D argued that Jasper had committed contributory negligence and that his employer, V. Jobst & Sons has also contributed to the P’s injuries by failing to privide groundman and employer didn’t instruct and train decedent on operation of the platform Procedural History:  P sued for wrongful death  D argued contributory negligence by decedent and his employer precluded joint and several liability o said it violates equal protections of 14th Issue: Whether D’s should still be jointly and severally liable when there was contributory negligence on the part of the P. Holding: The adoption of comparative negligence doesn’t change the doctrine of joint and several liability. Affirmed and remanded Reasoning:  common law doctrine of joint and several liability holds joint tortfeasors responsible for the plaintiff’s entire injury, allowing plaintiff to pursue all, some, or one of the tortfeasors responsible for his injury for the full amt. of the damages  majority of jurisdictions who have adopted it kept joint and several liability  court gives 4 main reasons to keep J&S: o apportioning fault on a comparative basis doesn’t render an indivisible injury divisible and a concurrent tortfeasor is liable for the whole of an indivisible injury when his negligence is a proximate cause of that damage o where P isn’t guilty of negligence he would be forced to bear a portion of the loss if a D couldn’t pay o where P is partially at fault, his culpability isn’t equal to D’s and P’s actions are tortious, while D’s are o elimination of Joint and several libility would have a serious and unwarranted deleterious effect on injured P’s ability to be compensated  fairness dictates that wronged party shouldn’t be deprived of right to redress  court said simply doesn’t violate equal protections for that argument  quid pro quo is the reduction of plaintiff’s damages (what for what, something for something)

Joint Tortfeasors: liability and Joinder of defendants Pg. 377-384; 390-396;396-427 Bartlett v. New Mexico Welding Supply, Inc. Court of Appeals of NM, 1982 Parties: Bartlett - P, car that was hit Welding - D, hit P from behind Basis for Dispute:  3 cars were involved in an accident  car 1 signaled a right turn, then pulled into and out of a service station in a fast motion  car 2 (P- Jane Bartlett) slammed on brakes and stopped, while car 3 (D) hit brakes but couldn’t stop and skidded into P  the driver of car 1 is unknown Procedural History:  P sued D for negligence  T1 jury determined P’s damages to be $100K and found D 30% at fault, unknown driver 70% at fault  P moved for a judgment entered in her favor for $100K, DENIED  T1 instead ordered a new trial based on the jury instructions concerning comparative negligence  D made interlocutory appeal GRANTED Issue; Whether, in a comparative negligence case, a concurrent TF is liable for the entire damage caused by all TF’s. Holding: A concurrent TF cannot be held liable on theory of Joint and several liability. Order for new trial is reversed. Cause is remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of P against D for 30% of P’s damages caused by D Reasoning:  “joint and several liability” means either of 2 persons whose concurrent negligence contributed to cause plaintiff’s injury and damages may be held liable for the entire amt of the damage cause by them  2 reasons to keep J&S don’t make sense: 1. P’s injury is indivisible a. court said it isn’t logical to hold a TF who’s 1% at fault liable for all damages b. logical answer in this case is jury found TF 30% at fault and she only be liable for 30% of damages 2. J&S should be retained so Ps don’t bear the risk of not being able to collect on judgment. a. When there’s 1 P and 1 D, who’s insolvent, P bears risk b. There’s no reason for risk to shift when there’s 2 Ds SATISFACTION AND RELEASE Elbaor v. Smith Supreme court of Texas, 1992 Cause of action: The following is a cause of action for damages as a result of medical malpractice.

Joint Tortfeasors: liability and Joinder of defendants Pg. 377-384; 390-396;396-427 Parties: Elboar is the defendant/appellant doctor who is the remaining non-settled defendant pre-trial. Smith is suing party and alleged victim of medical malpractice. Procedural History:Court found in favor of plaintiff/appellee in trial. (88 percent defendant and 12 percent Synquin) Facts: The Plaintiff suffered serious injuries as a result of an automobile accident and required significant medical attention. She was treated at various times by Dr. Syrquin(D/FW) the night of the accident, 8 days later she was transferred to Arlington Community Hospital under the care of Dr. Elbaor (an orthopediac surgeon), Dr. Stephens(a plastic surgeon) and Dr. Gatmaitan(an infectious disease specialist). She received other treatments over the next few years and ultimately her ankle joint was fused. Plaintiff filed medical malpractice claims against the Defendants, all four above doctors, D/FW Medical Center, and Arlington Community Hospital (ACH), (Defendants) due to a fused ankle that resulted from treatment. Prior to trial, Plaintiff settled and dismissed her claim against D/FW Medical Center and non-suited her claim against Dr. Gatmaitan. She also entered into “Mary Carter” settlement agreements (is one in which a co-defendant secretly agrees with the plaintiff that, if that defendant will defend himself in court, his own maximum liability will be proportionately lessened by increasing the other co- defendants' liability) with Dr. Syrquin, Dr. Stephens and ACH. The agreements provided that they would pay plaintiff a total of $425,010, remain as defendants, participate in the trial, and be paid back all or a portion of the settlement money out of the recovery against Dr. Elbaor. Dr. Elbaor requested the agreements be voided, or the settling Defendants be dismissed from trial. The trial court denied the requests and proceeded with trial. The jury awarded Plaintiff damages in the amount of $2,253,237, allocating responsibility between Dr. Elbaor (88%) and Dr. Syrquin (12%). The trial court entered judgment against Dr. Elbaor for $1,872,848. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Issue(s): Under law regarding joint and several liability of defendants at trial, does a settlement agreement between plaintiff and all but one of defendants promote an honest and fair trial according to both judiciary policy and public policy? Holding: Reversed and remanded for new trial. Reasoning:  Mary Carter agreements are agreements where a plaintiff enters into a settlement agreement with one defendant and goes to trial against the remaining defendants. The settling defendant remains a party and guarantees the plaintiff a minimum payment, which may later be offset by an excess judgment recovered at trial. These agreements create an incentive for the settling defendant to assist the plaintiff in receiving a sizably recovery.  The trial court recognized this incentive and took remedial measures to mitigate the effects of the agreement. These measures included reapportioning preemptory challenges, changing the order of proceedings to favor the adverse Defendant, allowing counsel to explain the agreements to the jury and instructing the jury regarding the agreements.  Throughout the trial the settling Defendant’s attorneys sat with Dr. Elbaor’s attorneys, but vigorously assisted the plaintiff in placing the majority of the blame on Dr. Elbaor.  This Court believes that Mary Carter agreements do not accomplish what most court approved agreements do, help to promote settlement. Although allowing for partial settlement, Mary Carter agreements nearly always ensure a trial will occur.

Joint Tortfeasors: liability and Joinder of defendants Pg. 377-384; 390-396;396-427 This Court believes that the negative effects of Mary Carter agreements outweigh any potential benefits. They create a false sense of adversity between plaintiff and one codefendant, with the parties actually being allied. They also pressure the settling defendant to contribute discovery material, peremptory challenges, trial tactics and supportive witness examination. Because the public policy favoring fair trials outweighs that of favoring partial settlements, the Court declared Mary Carter agreements void as violating of sound public policy. Significance: No. These "Mary Carter Agreements" in which plaintiffs settle with one or more co-defendants pre-trial, with the co-defendants having the veto power against any other codefendant(s) gives to much incentive for defendants to skew opinions and almost change their stories so as to change a potential verdict. Dissent by Justice Doggett The trial court went to great lengths to ensure that the agreements were not hidden from the jury and did not unduly favor the Plaintiff. As long as two parties to the trial remain antagonistic, the adversarial process should still effectively result in discovery of the truth. 

CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY Knell v. Feltman United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, 1949 Synopsis of Rule of Law. As long as concurrent tortfeasors are not intentional wrongdoers, contribution will be enforced regardless of whether or not a joint judgment is entered against them. Facts. This case involves a car accident. The Plaintiffs, Evelyn Langland (Mrs. Langland) and her husband (Plaintiffs), were guest passengers in a car driven by Kenneth Knell. The car they were riding in collided with a taxicab owned by the Defendant, Ralph Feltman (Feltman) and operated by his employee. Mrs. Langland was seriously injured in the accident. The Plaintiffs sued the Defendant to recover damages. The Defendant filed a third-party complaint against Knell, claiming the accident was caused by his sole or contributing negligence. The jury found both the Defendant and Knell negligent. The court awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiffs against the Defendant for $11,500, and upon payment, judgment in favor of Defendant against Knell for $5,750. Knell appeals, claiming that the right of contribution exists only between tortfeasors liable in common to the plaintiff and his liability to the Plaintiffs was not established by the judgment because the Plaintiffs did not include him in the suit. Issue. Is a joint judgment against tortfeasors who commit a tort through concurrent negligence a prerequisite for enforcement of contribution? Held. No. Judgment affirmed. Reasoning  Knell’s argument that contribution can only be enforced if both tortfeasors are judgment debtors to the plaintiff fails for two reasons. First, it is at odds with the Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), which allows a defendant to bring into the action any person who may be liable to him for damages regardless of if the plaintiff seeks judgment against him. Second, it is illogical, as the right to contribution cannot be based upon a selection of defendants by the plaintiff.

Joint Tortfeasors: liability and Joinder of defendants Pg. 377-384; 390-396;396-427 Based on the Merryweather holding [Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 term Rep. 186, 101 Eng.Rep. 1337 (K.B.1799)], a majority of American courts have held that there can be no contribution between joint or concurrent tortfeasors. However, this Court feels that this is a misinterpretation of Merryweather, differentiating between intentional wrongdoers and those whose unpurposed negligence results in a tort. This Court holds that so long as the concurrent tortfeasors are not intentional wrongdoers, contribution will be enforced regardless of whether or not a joint judgment is entered against them. Discussion. A substantial majority of states now permit contribution among joint tortfeasors, either by statute or judicial decision. 

Yellow Cab Co. of D.C., Inc. v. Dreslin United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 1950 Synopsis of Rule of Law. In order to receive contribution, joint liability must be present. Facts. A taxicab owned by the Appellant and an automobile driven by the Appellee collided. Appellee’s wife and others in his car were injured. They sued Appellant for the resulting damages. Appellee joined in the suit, claiming loss of consortium and medical expenses for Mrs. Dreslin and damages to his automobile. Appellant claimed contributory negligence against Appellee and cross-claimed against him for damages to the taxicab and contribution for sums recovered by other plaintiffs. The jury determined that the collision was caused by concurrent negligence, with judgments being entered in favor of all plaintiffs except Appellee. A declaratory judgment was also entered allowing Appellant contribution against Appellee for several judgments except for that of his wife. Yellow cab appealed this decision. Issue. Is contribution disallowed from a husband for damages claimed by his wife due to a lack of joint liability between the husband and the other tortfeasor as to the wife? Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed. Reasoning  Based on common law, neither husband nor wife is liable for tortious acts by one against the other. The right of contribution arises out of a common liability. In order to obtain contribution, the injured plaintiff from which the right of contribution develops, must have a valid cause of action against the party from whom contribution is sought. Because the plaintiff could not bring a valid cause of action against her husband, no joint liability occurs and the Appellant has no right to contribution. Discussion. The common law rule that husband and wife cannot bring tortious claims against one another is based on public policy considerations of preserving “domestic peace and felicity.” Slocum v. Donahue Court of Appeals of Massachusetts, 1998 Synopsis of Rule of Law. Indemnification is only allowed when the defendant is vicariously or derivatively liable for the wrongful act of another. Contribution is not allowed under this statute when a settlement agreement is reached in good faith. Facts. Robert Donahue pled guilty to a motor vehicle homicide resulting in the death of the Plaintiff’s eighteen-month-old son. The Plaintiffs filed a civil action against the Defendants claiming negligence and gross negligence. The Defendants filed a third-party complaint against Ford, denying negligence and seeking contribution and indemnification based on Ford’s

Joint Tortfeasors: liability and Joinder of defendants Pg. 377-384; 390-396;396-427 negligence. The Defendants’ expert was prepared to testify that the driver’s side floor mat was defective, allowing it to interfere with the vacuum booster, which caused the power breaks to fail. Prior to trial, Ford and the Plaintiffs signed a settlement agreement releasing Ford from any claim. Ford then moved for summary judgment asserting that all claims for contribution were extinguished by the settlement agreement and that there is no basis for the Defendants’ claims for indemnity. The trial court dismissed the third-party complaint and the Defendants appealed. Issue. Was it appropriate for the trial court to dismiss the third-party complaint for contribution and indemnification on a motion for summary judgment? Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed. Reasoning  a release given in good faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury, discharges the tortfeasor from liability for contribution to any other torfeasor. The Defendants claim that the settlement was not made in good faith because the amount of the settlement was for less than the value of the case and because Ford allegedly told the Plaintiffs it would allow them to use its experts.  The Court believes there were facts to allow the trial court to determine the settlement was fair and reasonable. Even if the settlement was low, it was reasonable to think a jury might find no liability on the part of Ford, given the facts that Robert Donahue pleaded guilty in the criminal case and admitted to drinking from a bottle of vodka in the car prior to the accident.  This Court also states that the Defendants’ contention that the Plaintiffs’ use of experts originally retained by Ford is evidence of collusion is invalid because it is equally evidence that the Plaintiffs settled with Ford because they believe it was not responsible for their son’s death.  The right to indemnity allows someone without fault who is compelled by law to defend himself to recover from the wrongdoer the entire amount of loss. The right to indemnity is allowed only when the indemnity is vicariously or derivatively liable for the wrongful act of another. Robert Donahue was found negligent in this case and his liability is not vicarious. Therefore, he is not entitled to indemnification by Ford. Discussion. This case demonstrates the difference between contribution and indemnification. Indemnification is only available when the defendant is not directly at fault, such as in a respondent superior case.

APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES Bruckman v. Pena Colorado Court of Appeals, 1971 Synopsis of Rule of Law. The plaintiff retains the burden of proof when claiming that a second accident aggravated previous injuries sustained in an original accident. Facts. On July 21, 1964 the Plaintiff was injured when the car he was riding in collided with a truck driven by the Defendant. On June 11, 1965 Plaintiff was injured in a second collision, aggravating injuries sustained in the first collision. The only Defendants named in this suit were the driver and owner of the truck involved in the first collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The Defendant seeks a reversal claiming error on one of the jury instructions.

Joint Tortfeasors: liability and Joinder of defendants Pg. 377-384; 390-396;396-427 Issue. Did the trial court err by instructing the jury that the defendant is liable for the entire disability if the jury is unable to apportion the injuries between the two collisions? Held. Yes. Judgment reversed and remanded. Reasoning  The trial court instructed the jury that it is their duty to apportion the injuries aggravated by the second collision from those caused by the second collision. Additionally, the court instructed that if apportionment was not possible, the Defendants are liable for the entire disability. While the first instruction is a correct statement of law, the second is not.  The burden of proof is on the Plaintiff to establish that damages were proximately caused by the negligence of the Defendant. The court’s instruction would place the burden on the defense to prove that damages could be apportioned. This is an incorrect application of the law. Discussion. The Defendant is still liable for aggravation of injuries caused in the first collision, in addition to those original injuries.

Michie v. Great Lakes Steal Division, Nat’l Steel Corp. United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit, 1974 Synopsis of Rule of Law. Under Michigan law, multiple defendants may be found jointly and severally liable when injuries cannot effectively be apportioned between defendants. Facts. The Appellees, thirty-seven people (Appellees), filed a complaint against the Appellants, three corporations (Appellants), claiming that pollutants emitted by Appellants represent a nuisance. Each Appellee individually claims damages ranging from $11,000 to $35,000 from all three corporations jointly and severally. However, there is no assertion of joint action or conspiracy against the Appellants. Appellants appealed a denied motion to dismiss based on the claim that each Appellee individually failed to meet the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement set forth in 28 U.S.C.A Section: 1332 (1970). Issue. Under Michigan State law, may multiple defendants be jointly and severally liable to multiple plaintiffs for individual injuries sustained from the action of all defendants when the separate effects of defendants’ actions are impossible to differentiate between. Held. Yes. Judgment affirmed. Reasoning:  Four catagorie...