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JUSMAG Phil V NLRC, G.R. No. 108813, December 15,1994...

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25. JUSMAG Phil V NLRC, G.R. No. 108813, December 15,1994 FACTS: Florento Sacramento (private respondent) was one of the 74 security assistance support personnel (SASP) working at the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to the P h i li p p i n e s ( J U SMA G- Ph i ls . ). H e ha d be en wi t h J U SM AG fro m 19 6 9- 1 99 2. W he n dismissed, he held the position of illustrator 2 and incumbent Pres. of JUSMAG Phils. - Filipino Civilian Employees Association, a labor org. duly registered with DOLE. His services were terminated allegedly due to the abolition of his position. Sacramento filed a complaint with DOLE on the ground that he was illegally suspended and dismissed from service by JUSMAG. He asked for reinstatement. JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking immunity from suit. The Labor Arbiter in an Order, dismissed the complaint for want of jurisdiction. Sacramento appealed to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and held that the petitioner had lost his right not to be sued because the principle of estoppel- JUSMAG failed to refute the existence of employer- employee relationship Jusmag has waived its right to immunity from suit when it hired the services to private respondent. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not JUSMAG has immunity from suit.

HELD: Yes. When JUSMAG took the services of the private respondent, it was performing a governmental function in behalf of the United States pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement between the Phils. and the US. JUSMAG consists of Air, Naval and Army group and its primary task was to advise and assist the Phils. on air force, army and naval matters. A suit against JUSMAG is one against the United States government, and in the absence of any waiver or consent of the latter to the suit, the complaint against JUSMAG cannot prosper. Immunity of State from suit is one of these universally recognized principles. In international law, "immunity" is commonly understood as an exemption of the state and its organs from the judicial

jurisdiction of another state. This is anchored on the principle of the sovereign equality of states under which one state cannot assert jurisdiction over another in violation of the maxim par in parem non habet imperium (an equal has no power over an equal).As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or governmental activities and does not extend to commercial, private and proprietary acts.

26. Republic v. Purisima, G.R. No. L-36084, August 31, 1977 FACTS: The jurisdictional issues raised by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding arose from the failure of respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima of the Court of First Instance of Manila to apply the well-known and of-reiterated doctrine of the non-suability of a State, including its offices and agencies, from suit without its consent. It was so alleged in a motion to dismiss filed by defendant Rice and Corn Administration in a pending civil suit in the sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintif being private respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. Such a motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972. At that time, the leading case of Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the merits of a claim against any office or entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent be shown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. There is thus more than sufficient basis for an allegation of jurisdictional infirmity against the order of respondent Judge denying the motion to dismiss dated October 4, 1972. What is more, the position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this provision of the present Constitution: "The State may not be sued without its consent."

ISSUE:

Can an agreement between the Rice and Corn Administration and Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. operate as a waiver of the national government from suit?

HELD: NO. The consent to be sued, to be efective must come from the State thru a statute, not through any agreement made by counsel for the Rice and Corn Administration. Apparently respondent Judge was misled by the terms of the contract between the private respondent, plaintif in his sala, and defendant Rice and Corn Administration which, according to him, anticipated the case of a breach of contract within the parties and the suits that may thereafter arise. The consent, to be efective though, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted statute as pointed out by Justice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant Rice and Corn Administration agreed to have no binding force on the government. That was clearly beyond the scope of his authority. The petition for certiorari is granted and the resolution of October 4, 1972 denying the motion to dismiss filed by the Rice and Corn Administration nullified and set aside and the petition for prohibition is likewise granted restraining respondent Judge from acting on Civil Case No. 79082 pending in his sala except for the purpose of ordering its dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued on February 8, 1973 by this Court is made permanent except for the above-mentioned purpose of definitely terminating this case. Costs against Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc.

27. Santiago v. Republic, G.R. No. L-48214, December 19, 1978 FACTS: On August 9, 1976, Ildefonso Santiago through his counsel filed an action for revocation of a Deed of Donation executed by him and his spouse in January of 1971, with the Bureau of Plant Industry as the Donee, in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City. Mr. Santiago alleged that the Bureau, contrary to the terms of donation, failed to install lighting facilities and water system on the property and to build an office building and parking lot thereon which should have

been constructed and ready for occupancy on before December7, 1974. That because of the circumstances, Mr. Santiago concluded that he was exempt from compliance with an explicit constitutional command, as invoked in the Santos v Santos case, a 1952 decision which is similar. The Court of First Instance dismissed the action in favor of the respondent on the ground that the state cannot be sued without its consent, and Santos v Santos case is discernible. The Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza affirmed the dismissal on ground of constitutional mandate. Ildefonso Santiago filed a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether the state can be sued without its consent?

HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court rules, that the constitutional provision shows a waiver. Where there is consent, a suit may be filed. Consent need not to be express. It can be implied. In this case it must be emphasized, goes no further than a rule that a donor, with the Republic or any of its agency being a Donee, is entitle to go to court in case of an alleged breach of the conditions of such donation. The writ of Certiorari prayed is granted and the order of dismissal of October 20, 1977 is nullified, set aside and declare to be without force and efect. The Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, Branch II, is hereby directed to proceed with this case, observing the procedure set forth in the rules of court. No cost....