Criminal Justice Act, Summaries PDF

Preview

Summary

According to section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA 2003), “any person who as an article to which this section applies with him in a public place shall be guilty of an offence”...

Description

“The Criminal Justice Act 1988”: According to section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 (CJA 2003), “any person who as an article to which this section applies with him in a public place shall be guilty of an offence” (CJA 1988 c.33). However, subsection (4) provides a defence for the accused, “It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that he had good reason or lawful authority for having the article with him in a public place” (CJA 1988 c.33). According to our fact it is clear that Margaret had possession of knives while he was traveling in the public bus. So according to section 139 he has committed an offence, however, arguably he had a good reason to keep knives as a result of that he can get defence under section 139 (4) of the CJA 2003. However, it can be argued on the basis of above analysis that Margaret had a good reason to keep possession of knives. According to our fact it is clear that Margaret brought kitchen knives from a departmental store, name Texco for his own personal purposes, for not committing any criminal offences. Fact also suggests that in the bus he took out knives for cutting an apple. So, on the basis of Margaret’s version of explanation we can presume that he can get defence under section 139 (4) of the CJA 1988, because he had good reason to keep knives with him. He brought knives because these are kitchen knives as well as selling these half prices by Texco. Knives also were highly reviewed cookware and kitchenware. Arguably, according to section 139 (4) and Evan v Hughes case law, he had good reason to keep knives with him.

Now in this part I am going to discuss some case law in respect of section 139 of the CJA 2003. In Evan v Hughes [1972] 56 Cr. App. R. 813, “the court held that the accused was expecting an imminent attack and was carrying the weapon for his own defence. But, the Act was not intended to permit the carrying of weapon simply to guard against a general threat of violence”. R v McAuley [2009] EWAC Crim 2130, is a similar case to Evan case, in this case The trail judge stated that fear of attack in those circumstances could not amount to good reason. However, appeal court allowed the appeal against conviction and held that there was a good reason to have knife with defendant to protect defendant himself as well as court stated that the matter should be left to the jury to determine. However, in DPP v Gregson [1992] 96 Cr. App. Rep. 240, the respondent who was found in possession of a knife, said that he continually utilized it at work for cutting plug floor tiles, had cleared out it in his coat when he final utilized it six days prior and had overlooked that it was there. But court held that it is not a good reason to have a knife for six days in the coat, so no defence. In the case House of Lords in Brutus v Cozens [1973] AC 854, Henry L.J. “held that the judge are entitle to leave the matter to the jury and tell them it was for them to decide what they meant in the

context of the case”. However, keeping possession of a kitchen knife hidden under the driver’s car was not a good reason to have a knife (R v Jolie [2003] EWCA Crim 1543). From, the above analysis we can put an argument that Margaret has a ‘good reason’ to have possession of knives, details and reason discussed above, however, jury has a final say to determine whether he had a good reason for keeping possession of knives. The burden of proof lies on the defendant, balance of probability, the defence has to proof in the court that Margaret had a reasonable ground to have knife with him, arguably defence may will proof it in the court. “Fairness of the proceedings: Section 78, of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984” (PACE 1984): Section 78 of the PACE Act 1984, stated about exclusion of unfair evidence, provision stated that “In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it” (PACE Act 1984, C.60). As well as subsection (2) stated that “Nothing in this section shall prejudice any rule of law requiring a court to exclude evidence” (PACE 1984 Act, C.60). Section 78 PACE is concerned with the fundamental concept of fairness and is an important means by which the defence can seek to have prosecution evidence excluded. In Rv Quinn [1990] Crim.L.R. 581 Lord Lane CJ explained that nature of the court’s exclusionary discretion under section 78: “the function of the judge is therefore to protect the fairness of the proceedings, and normally proceedings are fair if a jury hears all relevant evidence which either side wishes to place before it, but proceedings may become unfair if, for example, one side is allowed to adduce relevant evidence which, for one reason or another, the other side cannot properly challenge or meet.” Often the defence will rely on the breach of the code as the basis for seeking to exclude the evidence section 78. Further, section 82(3) of the PACE Act stated that “Nothing in this part of this Act shall prejudice any power of a court to exclude evidence (whether by preventing questions from being put or otherwise) at its discretion”. However, section 82(3) PACE preserves the common-law discretion of the court to exclude evidence where it prejudicial effect outweighs its probative value (R v Sang [1979] 69 Cr. App. R 282).

“Right to Fair Trial: Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (ECHR) ,1950: The United Kingdom has incorporated conventional rights into the domestic law by passing the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), section 1 of the HRA 1998 incorporated articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention (HRA 1998, C.42). One of the important article is article 6 “right to a fair trial”. According to article 6 of the ECHR, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a

reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. So, it is vey fair to argue that Defendant Margaret has right to get fair trail in the UK court or tribunal. The court have to listen about his version of the explanation in the court. According to our fact it is clear that Margaret brought kitchen knives for his own personal purposes not committing any criminal offences. Fact also suggest that he took out knives for cutting an apple. So, arguably John made a wrong perception about Margaret because our facts did suggest any criminal mind of Margaret. So, on the basis of Margaret’s version of explanation we can presume that if fair trial occurs than he will not convicted for possession a knife with him under section 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1998, because he had good reason to keep knives with him, he also brought knives because these are kitchen knives as well as selling half price by Texco, and these were highly reviewed cookware and kithenware seller. So, fair trail is an essential part in the Margaret criminal proceedings. In the case of “DG V Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2010] UKUT 409 (AAC)”, Upper Tribunal found that DG did not have fair trail hearing as required by article 6. “Fairness of the Proceedings: Section 101(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003” (CJA 2003): Additionally, we also can advance argument about fair trial in the criminal law proceeding under section 101(3) CJA 2003, which stated that “The court must not admit evidence under subsection (1)(d) or (g) if, on an application by the defendant to exclude it, it appears to the court that the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it” (CJA 2003, C. 44). Also, section 101(d) CJA 2003 discussed about the “relevant important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution”, as well as 101 (1) (g) CJA 2003 discussed about if the “defendant has made an attack on another person’s character”. So, in those situation court may not allow evidence from the prosecution on the ground of fair trial (R. v Bowman (Michael) [2014] EWCA Crim 716)....