Criminal Law - MCQ\'s, Semester 1 PDF

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Multiple choice – Criminal law Answers Actus Reus MCQs: Correct answer = red. 1. What is the conduct element of the actus reus? (a) What D has to cause to happen. (b) D’s act or omission required for the offence. (c) Where D must be at the time of the offence. (d)What D must cause another person to do. (e)What D thinks about doing. 2. What is the circumstance element of the actus reus?

(a) Whether the crime was intentional or not. (b) What D’s actions must cause. (c) Surrounding facts or circumstances necessary for the offence. (d) D’s acts or omissions required for the offence. (e) Whether D has a defence or not. 3. What additional requirements are there for an offence to be committed by omission? (a) No additional requirements are necessary. (b) The offence must be very serious. (c) The offence must be specifically designed to be an omissions-based offence only. (d) The offence must be capable of commission by omission; there must be a duty to act; and there must be a breach of that duty. (e) D must be a bad Samaritan. 4. The duty to act based on endangerment, as set out by the House of Lords in R v. Miller [1983] 2 AC 161, was subsequently extended by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) in R v. Evans [ 2009] EWCA Crim 650–but in what way? (a) To situations where D creates a dangerous situation. (b) To situations where D contributes to the creation of a dangerous situation. (c) To situations where D sets fire to property. (d) To situations where D carries bladed items. (e) To situations where D uses controlled substances. 5. What is the test for ‘factual causation’? (a) D completed the crime. (b) D is responsible for the crime. (c) But for D’s conduct, the prohibited result would not have occurred in the way that it did. (d) But for D’s conduct, the prohibited result might not have occurred in the way that it did. (e) But for D’s conduct, the prohibited result probably would not have happened. 6. Within ‘legal causation’, what is the function of the ‘blameworthiness’ test? (a) To ensure there is a connection between the prohibited result and some fault in D’s conduct. (b) To ensure that D is a more than de minimiscause of the prohibited result. (c) To determine whether there is a novus actus interveniens between D’s conduct and the prohibited result.

(d) To establish the reasonable foreseeability of the prohibited result. (e) To establish mens rea.

Mens rea MCQs: 1. What does the term ‘mens rea’ represent? (a) A guilty act carried out by the defendant. (b) The reason that the defendant carried out the guilty act (c) The ‘guilty mind’ – the state of mind of the defendant must have when carrying out the guilty act to make that action a criminal offence (d) A defence to a wrongful act (e) A term for saying that defendant had capacity to act 2. To what kind of ‘guilt’ does the phrase ‘guilty mind’ refer? (a) Moral guilt – what D has done is morally wrong and therefore a criminal offence (b) Legal guilt – D has the state of mind prescribed by the criminal offence (c) Knowledge of the offence – D is guilty only when they knew what they were doing was a criminal offence (d) Objective guilt – D is guilty if the reasonable person would not have done what he/she did (e) Emotional guilt – D is guilty where he/she feels bad about what he/she has done 3.Which of the below summaries accurately captures the material facts and legal principle arising from the case of Yip Chiu-Cheung [1995] 1 AC 111 (a) D conspired with E to export drugs. E was an undercover police officer who had agreed to the criminal conspiracy in order to catch criminal drug traffickers. Although E had a good motive, and so was not ‘morally guilty’, he still legally intended to export drugs with D. Therefore, E had still conspired with D and D was guilty of conspiracy to export drugs. Mens rea concerns legal, not moral guilt and a good motive is irrelevant. (b) D conspired with E to export drugs. E was an undercover police officer who had agreed to the criminal conspiracy in order to catch criminal drug traffickers. However, E had a good motive and so E could not be said to intend to export the drugs. As a result, D had not conspired with someone who had the mens rea for exporting drugs and so could not be guilty of the conspiracy either. (c) D carried out a sexual act on V whilst on a ship docked in an English port. The act he committed was not a criminal offence in his own country and so he did not know that what he was doing was a criminal offence. As a result, D did not have the mens rea for the offence and so could not be guilty. (d) D carried out a sexual act on V whilst on a ship docked in an English port. The act he committed was not a criminal offence in his own country and so he did not know what he was doing was a criminal offence. However, he did intend to do that sexual act. Since he intended the sexual act, he had the mens rea for the offence. Since he had also carried out the act, he had actus reus for the offence. D was guilty of the offence because mens rea relates to the state of mind needed to do the act. Knowledge that the act is an offence is not necessary. (e) V was terminally ill. D, a doctor, administered a lethal dose of a drug to end V’s life in order to end her suffering. D still had the mens rea for murder – an intention to kill or cause

serious bodily harm. The fact that D had, what would be viewed by many as a ‘good motive’ was irrelevant. Mens rea concerns legal, not moral guilt.

4. Select the statement that is not a potential mens rea for a criminal offence (a) intention (b) belief (c) damaged (d) recklessness (e) dishonesty 5.Different offences will have different requirements in terms of mens rea. Which one of the following statements accurately and fully states the available mens rea requirements for the nominated offence? (a) Murder: intention or recklessness as to causing death or serious bodily harm (b) Rape: A intentionally penetrates the vagina, anus or mouth of another (B)... A does not honestly believe that B consents (c) Criminal damage: D intentionally destroys or damages property belonging to another (d) Murder: intention to cause death (e) Criminal damage: D intends to destroy or damage property belonging to another or is reckless as to whether such property would be destroyed or damaged.

Homicide MCQ’S: 1. What is the full actus reus of murder? (a) Conduct from a person or corporation causing the death of another person. (b) Conduct causing serious harm to another person. (c) Conduct causing the unlawful killing of another person under the Queen’s peace. (d) Conduct causing death to another person or a foetus. (e) Conduct which risks causing death to another person. 2. What is the full mens rea for murder? (a) Intention to kill or recklessness as to killing. (b) Intention to kill or cause GBH/‘really serious harm’. (c) Intention to kill. (d) Intention to cause GBH/‘really serious harm’. (e) Wilful blindness as to killing or causing GBH/‘really serious harm’. 3. Part of the mens rea of murder does not correspond with its actus reus. Which part? (a) Intention to kill. (b) Intention to cause GBH/‘really serious harm’. (c) Wilful blindness as to killing. (d) Wilful blindness as to causing GBH/‘really serious harm’. (e) Intention to kill or recklessness as to killing. 4. Ideally, how should the mens rea of murder be defined so as to correspond with its actus reus? (a) Intention to kill.

(b) Intention to kill or cause GBH/‘really serious harm’. (c) Intention to kill or recklessness as to killing. (d) Wilful blindness as to killing or causing GBH/‘really serious harm’. (e) Intention to cause GBH/‘really serious harm’. 5. Murder may sanction constructive liability in that D can be convicted of murder where D’s mens rea for that crime does not correspond with its actus reus. Which principle of criminal law does such a conviction abrogate? (a) Principle of fair warning. (b) Principle of stare decisis. (c) Principle of fair labelling. (d) The harm principle. (e)Principle of minimal criminalisation. 6. To what form of conduct does the label ‘involuntary manslaughter’ apply? (a) D commits murder, but successfully raises a partial defence to murder. (b) D causes death but does so without voluntary control over his conduct. (c) D causes death by an act and not an omission. (d) D causes death without the mens rea for murder, but with sufficient fault as to justify criminal liability. (e) D commits murder, but only because D lost control. 7. The ‘dangerous’ test in constructive manslaughter, as set out in R v. Church [1966] 1 QB 59, has since been interpreted as requiring that D’s unlawful act must be such that the reasonable person would inevitably recognise the risk of: (a) Some physical injury, including minor injury. (b) Some physical injury but limited to serious injury. (c) Psychiatric injury only. (d) Psychological and emotional harm only. (e) All physical, psychiatric, psychological and emotional harm. 8. Constructive manslaughter is a constructive liability offence. Upon what, though, is D’s liability or this offence ‘constructed’? (a) The fact that D killed with an intention to cause serious injury in the awareness that there was a serious risk of causing death. (b) The fact that D killed with an intention to cause serious injury, but with no awareness as to causing serious injury. ? (c) The fact that D killed with the intention to cause injury, or fear, or risk of injury, in the awareness that there was a serious risk of causing death. (d) The fact that D caused death through a criminal act intended to cause injury, or in the awareness of a serious risk that injury may be caused. (e) The fact that D caused death through a criminal act which was dangerous. 9. Gross negligence manslaughter (GNM) is generally concerned with inadvertent killings. However, advertent killings –i.e., where D does (subjectively) foresee a risk of death –can still sometimes be used in evidence in GNM cases. Why is this so?

(a) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of either: a duty of care (acts); or duty to act, which doubles as a duty of care (omissions). (b) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of a negligent breach of duty. (c) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of reasonable foresight that the breach gave rise to an obvious and serious risk of death. (d) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of causation. (e) Because subjective foresight of a risk of death is evidence of gross negligence. 10. Which of these offences cannot be committed by omission? (a) Constructive manslaughter. (b) Reckless manslaughter. (c) Gross negligence manslaughter. (d) Murder. (e) ‘Voluntary’ manslaughter by reason of diminished responsibility. 11. Where is the reformulated partial defence of diminished responsibility found? (a) Homicide Act 1957, s. 3. (b) Homicide Act 1957, s. 2(1), as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 52. (c) Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 52. (d) Coroners and Justice Act 2009, ss. 54 –55. (e) Diminished Responsibility Act2009, s.1(1). 12. Where is the partial defence of loss of control found? (a) Homicide Act 1957, s. 3. (b) Homicide Act 1957, s. 2(1), as amended by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 52. (c) Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s. 52. (d) Coroners and Justice Act 2009, ss. 54 –55. (e) Loss of Control Act2009, s.1(1). 13. Following R v. Golds [2016] UKSC 61, what does ‘substantial’ now mean in the ‘substantial impairment’ test under diminished responsibility? (a) Less than total impairment, but more than minimal impairment. (b) Total impairment. (c) Less than minimal impairment (d) ‘Significant’, ‘appreciable’ or ‘weighty’ impairment. (e)Any of the above –the UKSC in R v. Golds left ‘substantial’ undefined. 14. Following R v. Dowds [2012] EWCA Crim 281, what counts as a ‘recognised medical condition’ (RMC) under diminished responsibility? (a) Anything that is contained in the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11) or the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (b) Presence on the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases(ICD-11)or the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder is a necessary, but not always sufficient, requirement to raise the issue of diminished responsibility –although if a condition is not yet contained in either of these

two glossaries it may still count as an RMC in a diminished responsibility case if a body of medical opinion gives evidence in court that it should be an RMC. (c) Anything that is contained in the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11), but not the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders. (d) Anything that is contained in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, but not the World Health Organization’s International Classification of Diseases (ICD-11). (e) Anything counts as an RMC provided one medical expert gives evidence as to this in a diminished responsibility case. 15. In loss of control, the final test –D’s loss of self-control must be objectively understandable–dictates that which circumstances of D can be attributed to the reasonable person? (a) In building up the context of the triggering event, all of D’s circumstances are relevant. But only D’s age and sex are then relevant to determining D’s capacity for tolerance and selfrestraint in the context of that triggering event. (b) All of D’s circumstances are relevant in building up the context of the triggering event, and then determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint in the context of that triggering event. (c) Only D’s age and sex are relevant in building up the context of the triggering event, and then determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint in the context of that triggering event. (d) None of D’s circumstances are relevant in building up the context of the triggering event, and then determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint in the context of that triggering event. (e) Only D’s age, but not D’s sex, is relevant in building up the context of the triggering event, and then determining D’s capacity for tolerance and self-restraint in the context of that triggering event. Rape MCQ’s: 1.What is the actus reus of rape? (a) Non-consensual penile penetration of V’s vagina. (b) Non-consensual penetration of V’s anus. (c) Non-consensual penile penetration of V’s vagina, anus or mouth. (d) Non-consensual penetration of V’s vagina. (e) Non-consensual penile penetration of V’s vagina and anus. 2. What is the legal authority for the existence of the offence of rape? (a) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 74. (b) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75. (c) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76. (d) Sexual Offences Act2003, s. 1. (e) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 79. 3. What is the legal authority for the existence of the conclusive (i.e. irrebuttable) presumptions against consent in the law of English sexual offences?

(a) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 79. (b) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 74 (c) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1. (d) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75. (e) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76. 4. What is the legal authority for the existence of the evidential (i.e. rebuttable) presumptions against consent in the law of English sexual offences? (a) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1. (b) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 74. (c) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75. (d) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76. (e) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 79. 5. What is the legal authority for the existence of the general definition of consent in the law of English sexual offences? (a) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 79. (b) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 76. (c) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 75. (d) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 74. (e) Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1. 6. How did the Sexual Offences Act 2003 expand the definition of rape? (a) It made rape a non-penile-penetrative offence, thereby encompassing female perpetrators. (b) It included oral penetration for the first time. (c) It included anal penetration for the first time. (d) It included vaginal penetration for the first time. (e)All of the above. 7. The circumstances prohibited by the conclusive presumptions against consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 concern: (a) Intentional deception by D as to the nature of the act. (b) Intentional deception by D as to the nature and purpose of the act. (c) Intentional deception by D as to the nature and purpose of the act, and D’s intentional inducing of consent by impersonation. (d) Intentional deception by D as to the purpose of the act. (e) Intentional deception by D,or unilateral mistake by V,as to the nature and purpose of the act, and D’s intentional inducing of consent by impersonation.

8. If one of the circumstances in the conclusive presumptions against consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003 is found, what is conclusively presumed? (a) That V did not consent. (b) That D did not believe that V consented (c) That V did not consent, and D did not believe that V consented. (d) That D did not have a reasonable belief that V consented.

(e) That D did not have an honest belief that V consented. 9. Under the conclusive presumptions against consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, how have the courts interpreted intentional deception as to the ‘nature’ of the actin rape cases? (a) ‘Nature’ means that V must have believed a non-sexual act was taking place. (b) ‘Nature’ means that V must have believed the act was sexual but was deceived as to one or more of its physical aspects –like condom use or ejaculation. (c) ‘Nature’ means that V must have believed the act was sexual but was deceived as to one or more of the surrounding circumstances –like disease transmission. (d) ‘Nature’ means that V must have believed that act was sexual, but that D was a different person. (e) Nature’ means that V must have believed that act was sexual but served a non-sexual purpose. 10. Under the general definition of consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which factors can vitiate V’s freedom to choose to consent? (a) Only physical coercion in the form of violence. (b) Only non-physical coercion in the form of threats of violence, blackmail, improper offers, or financial threats. (c) Only non-physical coercion in the form of psychological pressure from D. (d) Only deception by D. (e) All of the above. 11. According to R v. Lawrance [2020] EWCA Crim 971, what is now the test for determining whether a deception is capable of vitiating consent under the general definition of consent in the Sexual Offences Act 2003? (a) Was the active deception so closely connected to the nature or purpose of the sexual intercourse, rather than the broad circumstances? (b) Was the active deception or failure to disclose so closely connected to the nature or purpose of the sexual intercourse, rather than the broad circumstances? (c) Was the active deception so closely connected to the nature or purpose of the sexual intercourse, or, alternatively, the broad circumstances? (d) Was the active deception or failure to disclose so closely connected to the nature or purpose of the sexual intercourse, or, alternatively, the broad circumstances? (e) Was the active deception or failure to disclose connected to D’s marital status, political or religious views, status, employment, or wealth. 12. Following cases like R v. Bree [2007] EWCA Crim 256 and R v. Kamki [ 2013] EWCA Crim 2335, can V give consent to sexual intercourse where V is voluntarily intoxicated but not unconscious? (a) No –a drunken ‘consent’ is never consent. (b) Always –a drunken consent is consent every time. (c) Yes –but a drunken consent is only consent where V’s inhibitions were merely lowered, such that voluntary intoxication made it easier for V to consent. (d) Yes –but a drunken consent is only consent where V retained capacity to choose to consent, including any reduced inhibitions; and this will depend on factors like the extent of

V’s intoxication and degree of consciousness, along with the effect of this on V’s kno...