Dahl Chapter Two - Summary A Preface to Democratic Theory PDF

Preview

Summary

Lecture 6a required reading. Two concepts of democracy....

Description

Dahl a preface to democratic theory chapter two (Lecture 6a- two concepts of democracy)

Running through the history of democratic theories is the identification od democracy with political equality, popular sovereignty and rule by majorities The term “populistic democracy”- Edward Shils There is one law that needs unanimous consent- this is the social contract They very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majoritythere is nothing in democratic states capable of resisting it The attempt to identify democracy with the unlimited power of majorities has usually gone hand in hand with an attempt to include in the definition some concept of restraints on majorities No one has ever advocated and no one except its enemies has ever defined democracy to mean that a majority would or should do anything it felt an impulse to do Every advocate of democracy and every friendly definition of it includes the idea of restraints on majorities

But one central issue is whether these restraints are or should be 1) primarily internalized restraints in the individual behaviour system such as the conscience and other products of social indoctrination 2) primarily social checks and balances of several kinds of 3) primarily prescribed constitutional checks

Among political systems to which the term democracy is commonly applied one important difference is between those which rely primarily on the first two checks and those like the US which also employ constitutional checks

Definition 1- an organization is democratic if and only if the process of arriving at government policy is compatible with the condition of popular sovereignty and the condition of political equality Definition 2- condition of popular sovereignty is satisfied if whenever policy choices exist the alternative selected and enforced is the alternative most preferred by the members Definition 3- political equality is satisfied if the preference of each member is assigned an equal value Proposition 1- the only rule compatible with decision making in a populistic democracy is the majority principle Definition 4- (THE RULE)- the principle of majority rule prescribes that in choosing among alternatives the alternative preferred by the greater number is selected The rule (definition 4) may be thought of as a norm actually governing the behaviour of individuals in a given system

All we need to specify is that whatever the constitutional rules may be they must not lead to behaviour incompatible with the rule If the conditions of popular sovereignty and political equality are to be satisfied then the individuals in the political system must behave in accordance with the rule Objections to this approach can be put into three groups- depending on whether they are technical, ethical or empirical Technical objections The argument has assumed each citizen does have a preference for one alternative- many citizens might be and usually are indifferent to the outcome . but does the fact that they are indifferent really affect the logic of the argument? To satisfy he rule it is sufficient to know the number who prefer each alternative , so adding the preferences of the indifferent would not influence the outcome

A second technical objection- the majority principle provides no solution for cases where each of the alternatives is preferred by an equal number of citizens. If deadlock occurs in a choice between two alternaitves that are very highly ranked then violence may result.

A third technical objection to the rule- suppose X is an existing policy e.g. non-interference by the federal government in lynching. And suppose Y is an alternative, to it requiring government action . if the deadlock solution is flowed no government action is taken but then if no government action is taken then in fact X is government policy. Thus by prescribing deadlock in cases of equal division of preferences (votes), it is biasing the policy making process in favour of all those that prefer government polices of inaction No outcome can be shown to be compatible with proposition one and the rule The closer a group approaches to an equal division the more any rule seems to become a mere matter of convenience

Fourth objection- even if a majority exists it may be impossible to find a voting method that satisfies the rule and at the same time meets certain practical requirements When there are more than two alternatives at issue, each of the following methods of voting can produce a collective choice that violates the preferences of a majority

Essential requirement of a system of voting that will satisfy the rule- a vote be taken on every pair of alternatives perceived to exist- this is rarely followed in the actual conduct of democratic organizations Technical requirements for perfecting attainment of rule impose high costs in time patience and agreement- may well outweigh any perceived benefits in the real world Ethical objections

Given political sovereignty and political equality as the only goals it ought to be a necessary and sufficient condition for government policy that it accords with the preferences of the greatest number of citizens Against this the Madisonian argument asserts that accordance with the preferences of the greatest number of citizens ought to be a necessary condition but not a sufficient condition for government policy That is, the cat that a given policy is preferred by a majority to all alternatives does not mean that the policy is actually adopted by the government : for eternal checks on the majority may prevent the alternative from being enacted as governmental policy It is a result of social indoctrination one feels anxieties in situations of political inequality and if populistic democracy relieves these anxieties and does not create others of equal or greater severity, and if one prefers serenity to anxiety, then it would be rational to prefer populistic democracy to Madisonian democracy

Also some argue no ethical rules other than those embodied in popular sovereignty and political equality would comply legitimacy to governmental decisions And I legitimacy could be shown to be necessary to a variety of goals such as stability, thenn populistic democracy would be necessary. If Madisonian democracy is the prevailing view in the US this argument would hardly apply to this country The most that might be shown is that americans have been indoctrinated to believe in both Madisonian and populistic democracy: that they have never fully reconcile the two: and that this failure robs governmental decisions of considerable legitimacy.

Another argument- probability of maximising a variety of highly ranked goals is higher in a populist democracy An objection to populistic democracy is that it ignored differences in intensity of preference- rejects interpersonal comparisons of utilities. Suppose it is possible for us to measure or at least to order intensities of preference Suppose x is only slightly preferred to y by a majority and y is strongly preferred to x by a minority . the definition of political equality does not take this into account and the rule ignores it.

Hence in such cases, even if the majority exceeds the minority only be one, populistic democracy would require he majoirty’s choice to be government policy X is only slightly preferred by a bare majority and y is very strongly preferred by a bare minority So rule does not adequately reflect intensities of desire

A contrary rule would have to be asserted that I some cases where the desire of the minority for y is more intense than the desire of a majority for x, government policy must follow the minority preference rather than the majority (THE QUALIFIED MINORITY RULE). To make this rule operational a method would need to be put in place for deciding when a particular instance falls within this category- one may permit the majority to decide But suppose that this kind of solution which is entirely compatible with the rule, is held to be inadequate, since the final decisions till lies with the majority Then the qualified minority rule must be made operational by specifying a particular minority that could be trusted to invoke its power in cases, but only in those cases, where the intensity of a minorities preference for y was significantly greater than the intensity of a majorities preference for x A final ethical objection to populistic democracy- it postulates only two goals to be maximisedpolitical equality and political sovereignty . yet no one, except a fanatic, wishes to maximise two goals at the expense of al others.

For most of us the cost of pursuing one or two goals at the expense of others are thought to be excessive We experience diminishing marginal utility the more we attain any one goal The theory of populistic democracy does not tell us how to approximate or maximise popular sovereignty and political equality in the real world. It simply tells us that perfect attainment to these conditions would require us to pursue the rule. Situations may change time to time- surely there is no reason for supposing that a populistic democracy would maximise ones goals in every culture, society and time.

Objections that rasie empirical questions the theory of populistic democracy does not provide any satisfactory criteria for deciding who should be included in the system. A second empirical problem is posed by Gaetano mosca- every society develops a ruling class. Rule by majority is impossible. However, the extent to which a ruling class is sensitive to popular desires depends to some extent upon the constitutional system, the prevailing ideology and social indoctrination. Third empirical problem- under a system of popular sovereignty, political equality, and majority rule, a majority might well take actions that would destroy the system. Hence some method of minority veto might be necessary to prevent this. In the US a verity of elements in the constitutional system provide a minority veto, including the supreme court, the composition of the senate, the filibuster an at time perhaps the presidency....