Dante’s Use of the Liber de causis in the Convivio PDF

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Dante’s Use of the Liber de causis in the Convivio I. Introduction: In the Convivio (c. 1307) Dante seeks to provide knowledge to those who have not had the privilege of a formal education. He offers the “bread of the angels” – i.e. knowledge – to those people who lie outside of the academy. Dante t...

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Dante’s Use of the Liber de causis in the Convivio I. Introduction: In the Convivio (c. 1307) Dante seeks to provide knowledge to those who have not had the privilege of a formal education. He offers the “bread of the angels” – i.e. knowledge – to those people who lie outside of the academy. Dante thus prepares a metaphorical banquet, or convivio, in which he gathers the ‘scraps’ that fall from a ‘more blessed table’ to serve to his guests. Dante distinguishes at his banquet the ‘meat,’ which is to be the real thrust of the book, from the ‘bread,’ which is merely meant to accompany the meat and to assist in its proper digestion. Here the meat consists in canzoni, or poems, of Dante’s that had already been circulated well prior to the composition of the Convivio, while the bread consists in extensive commentary that Dante himself provides on the poetry. This commentary is meant to reveal the poems’ hidden, more philosophical meaning that may not have been obvious to the poems’ readers. However, in book III of the Convivio, Dante makes six explicit references to an obscure yet very influential text of the Middle Ages known as the Liber de causis, or Book of Causes. In short, the De causis offers a (Neo)Platonic emanationist account of the cosmos, filtered through an Arabic Monotheistic lens. Around the 13th century the text was studied quite seriously by academics in the Latin West, likely owing in part to its original (and false) attribution to Aristotle. The text itself was an abridgment, and in some ways an interpolation, of an earlier 5th century (Neo)Platonic treatise by Proclus called the Elements of Theology (Στοιχείωσις θεολογική). It played an important role for medieval academics, who used it to fill in the metaphysical gaps between Aristotelian and Christian Monotheistic doctrines. Although Dante cites the De causis extensively in the Convivio, it is my belief that he does so while adopting few of its philosophical doctrines. I will support this claim later on by highlighting two of Dante’s references to the De causis: in the first of which Dante reads hylomorphism into the De causis where it otherwise does not appear, and in the second of which he alters the conception of God at work in the De causis to better fit with his own Aristotelian and Christian commitments.1 1

Admittedly this is tricky territory, for it is very difficult to determine just what counts as strictly Aristotelian,

Neoplatonic, or Christian. And while it may seem to the modern historian that there ought to be clear divisions between these teachings or schools of thought, the medieval mind would not have shared this view. Rather, medieval thinkers often tried to find a harmony between Aristotelian, Platonic, and religious views. And due to their

2 The goal of this paper then, is to answer the question of why he would cite the text at all if he does not seem to embrace its philosophy. My proposal is that Dante’s didactic project in the Convivio – i.e. to share knowledge with those who have been excluded from the academy – requires him to legitimize himself as a man of true learning. This is because he himself is an outsider, having never attended university. Therefore, in order to appear on the same level as his intellectual opponents in the academy, Dante cites the De Causis just as they did. And moreover, because Dante engages in the unprecedented practice of commenting on his own poetry, he needs to justify to readers that his poetry is even worthy of that commentary in the first place. And thus he uses the text primarily for the air of philosophical authority, rather than for the philosophical resources, it offers him. I will begin with a brief overview of the De causis, discussing its origin and use in the Latin West, before turning to the metaphysical account of the cosmos contained within. Next I will discuss Dante’s acquaintance with the text, including where he may have encountered it, and why it was likely that he knew it was not by Aristotle. I will then examine the two references mentioned above, in which I show that Dante presents an Aristotelian reading of the De causis. Finally, I will explain in further detail Dante’s project in the Convivio, where I argue that Dante’s primary motivation for using the text is to achieve the philosophical gravitas he feels he needs in the Convivio. II. The Story of the Liber de causis

intermingling throughout history, that harmony was often a genuine one. Dante himself may even be doing so when he reads hylomorphism into the De causis. I’ve therefore tried to be careful here. Minimally, Dante shows little evidence of committing himself to any doctrine of emanation, which is the single most (Neo)Platonic thing about De causis. Likewise as I argue in section V Dante seems to alter the conception of God in the passage he quotes from the text. I discuss on pp. 10-11 other (Neo)Platonic ideas at work in Dante and their likely sources.

3 The precise origins of the Liber de causis remain something of a mystery. 2 The book was likely first composed in the ninth century by an unknown author writing in Arabic.3 As previously mentioned, the text was really a summary of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. Scholars working in Arabic falsely attributed the De causis to Aristotle, calling it The Book of Aristotle's Explanation of the Pure Good, and the text was thus subsumed into the Arabic corpus of Aristotle’s work.4 The book made its way west, where it was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona in Toledo sometime near the end of the 12th century. Gerard’s translation made the book available to the Latin West for the first time, and it also renamed the text to ‘Liber de causis.’ The book enjoyed quite a popularity at the newfound faculties of the arts, particularly at the University of Paris, due to the then-very fashionable study of Aristotle. By the 1230s - 1240s, the text was already part of the canon of works that students would be acquainted with. Moreover, after March 19th, 1255, new statutes were put into place at the University of Paris, making the Book of Causes required reading for students. Each student of first philosophy was to devote a full seven weeks of study to the text. Faculty members were expected to make commentaries on the work. We thus have extant commentaries on the De causis by several key figures there, including both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas.5 Yet already by Albert’s time the Aristotelian authorship of the De causis was questioned. This questioning was inevitable, for as a better understanding of Aristotle developed among academics the apparent tensions between the De causis and the genuine works of Aristotle could

2

Much of my historical information on the Liber de causis must be credited to Dennis J. Brand’s introduction to his

translation of the book, as well as Bernardo Carlos Bazán’s foreword to the translation. 3

While most scholars believe that the De causis was likely first composed in Arabic, another text of Arab

(Neo)Platonism appeared roughly contemporaneous to the composition of the Book of Causes known as the Theology of Aristotle, which was itself a summa of Plotinus’ Enneads. This text was composed originally in Syriac before being translated into Arabic. So there is some reason to think that the Book of Causes may have been first composed in Syriac as well, thus adding one further level of translation to the already complicated history of its translation. 4

A creative use of Aristotle’s name? It is unclear whether the attribution of the book to Aristotle was done

intentionally. 5

One complication here is that while we know how the book was used at the University of Paris, to my knowledge it

is unknown how exactly it was received at the University of Bologna, a likely place for Dante’s encounter with the book.

4 not be ignored. It was, however, Aquinas who first determined that the Book of Causes was not by Aristotle. William of Moerbeke, the great translator of Greek philosophical and scientific texts, had prepared a translation of Proclus’ Elements of Theology. Upon reading this translation, Aquinas determined that the Book of Causes was in fact an abridgment of the Elements of Theology. Although it was discovered that the Book of Causes was by Proclus rather than Aristotle, this did not diminish the book’s popularity, and it continued to enjoy dedicated study at the university. III. Emanation in the De causis: The De causis is composed of 219 statements that fuse a somewhat eclectic (Neo)Platonic metaphysic with a religious Monotheism derived from its Arabic heritage. The text is, unsurprisingly, concerned with the matter of causality. The book depicts the cosmos as a complex network of causes and effects – among them ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ causes, as well as what they call ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ causes. What arises is an account of the origin of nature, described in terms of emanation from a single ultimate source called ‘the One’. The book distinguishes three primary (or per-se efficient) causes that echo the ‘hypostases’ of Plotinus. They are the ‘One,’ ‘Intelligence,’ and ‘Soul.’ The One is conceived of as a fundamental ‘unity’ in a Pythagorean sense, but it also combines the Platonic idea of the ‘Form of the Good’ as the source of all goodness with the Aristotelian concept of the ‘prime mover’ as the First Cause of all things. The One is said to be totally ‘undivided,’ or free from all multiplicity and what they call ‘diversity.’ But unlike the Plotinian view, in the Book of Causes the One is unequivocally a Monotheistic ‘God.’ It transcends all being, and it is ‘above’ even eternity. It governs all things with a supreme providence, and it outpours divine goodness upon all things in an omnipresent radiance. Finally, it is above all human knowledge and attempts at explanation. ‘Being’ we are told, is the first of created things. Here ‘being’ is identified with Intelligence, for the One is above being, properly speaking. Through contemplation of the First Cause, i.e. God, or the One, Intelligence brings itself into being. However, Intelligence itself is subdivided into a hierarchy of minds. The first mind is the most supreme of them all 6 and the hierarchy continues downward through lesser Intelligences. The Intelligences are conceived of as

6

Perhaps some kind of caricature of Aristotle’s unmoved mover, but it is not made explicit in the De causis.

5 simple, incorporeal substances with a capacity for ‘intellection,’ and who understand themselves. Though admittedly it is unclear from the text just what kind of reasoning they may have. Intelligence is commensurate with eternity, because it is said to be worthy of, or otherwise deserving of it. Moreover, Intelligence acts as a causal intermediary between the One and the things below itself, and it thus brings about the next primary cause, i.e. Soul. The One posits Soul as the stratum upon which Intelligence acts. Thus, Soul is brought into being, and it serves as a bridge between Intelligence and ‘Nature’ – i.e. the sensible world. But Soul is also a bridge between eternity and time. Unlike Intelligence, Soul is not worthy of eternity. Nevertheless, it attempts to achieve it by ‘mimicking’ Intelligence in some way. But because Soul is unworthy, it cannot achieve eternity, and so the best it can receive is a kind of infinite temporal ‘succession’ – like a ‘moving image’ of eternity. Soul thus bring about time itself. We are told that Soul’s substance is eternal, but its action is in time. Along with time, Soul gives rise to Nature. In addition, Soul is said to be the first body, and it brings about the motions of all other bodies – presumably first the heavenly bodies, and then all sensible bodies of Nature. For the highest of all natural things are the heavenly bodies, which are on-par with time,7 while the lowest of all natural things is sensible matter. The account of causal dependence on the One is explained in terms of ‘emanation.’ The basic idea here is that the One is so rich with being and goodness that it simply overflows with these perfections. Through this overflowing, the One outpours perfections and blessedness upon all things ‘below’ it in a single flow. However, this emanation is not an act of the One’s will,8 rather the view here is that it is just in the nature of the One to overflow with perfections. In other words, the One has such a plenitude of being that it cannot contain it all, and so it spills off into the cosmos. All created things share in this stream of blessedness and receive perfections and gifts from the One in varying degrees, according to what they are deserving of. The more deserving the entity, the more gifts it receives, and this accounts for the various hierarchies and divisions of created things. IV. Dante’s Acquaintance with the De causis:

7

Presumably this is an allusion to Timaeus 37d-e wherein time is identified with the motions of the heavenly bodies.

8

As we will see, whether or not the One is a mind, and therefore has a will, will be an important issue for Dante.

6 Turning now to Dante’s use of the De causis, I must first say that it is unknown where exactly he encountered the book, and just how familiar he may have been with it. Dante may have known the book primarily through Albert the Great’s commentary and paraphrase of it known as Liber de causis et processu universitatis a prima causa,9 though there is reason to doubt that this is the only avenue through which Dante knew the work. This is because Albert takes for granted that Aristotle was the author of the text, while it seems pretty clear that Dante does not. Dante only refers to the De causis by its name, or as “the above-mentioned book;” he never cites it under one of the many euphemisms he has for Aristotle, i.e. “the Philosopher says”; “the Teacher says”, etc. This could be evidence that Dante was acquainted with Aquinas’ commentary on the book, or it could be evidence that it was simply known to everyone by the time Dante encountered it that Aristotle was not its true author. However, even if Dante were acquainted with either Albert’s or Aquinas’ commentaries during his early years in Florence, it is unclear whether he would have had the philosophical training and maturity at the time to fully appreciate the nuance of the text. It is therefore more likely that Dante encountered it sometime later during his exile, but this too is uncertain. The likely range of dates for the composition of the Convivio (at least the first 3 books), is 1304-1307.10 If Dante did have access to the De causis in some form while writing the Convivio, he could have encountered it at the University of Bologna during one of his many purported trips there. It is also possible, though less likely, that he may have had access to it at the monasteries in Verona, or in the Veneto, which had a collection of many texts, but it is unknown whether they would have had something like the De causis. Dante may also have been working only with a collection of notes on the text, or some kind of make-shift summary of it, but we cannot rule out the distinct possibility that he was working from memory. 11 Why this last point is important to consider will become clear later on when I discuss a possible alterations Dante makes to the text. Although the Liber de causis is thought to be one of the key (Neo)Platonizing influences on his thought,12 it is my view that little of its core doctrines remain in Dante’s philosophy. Indeed,

9

Indeed, Albert’s commentary is a likely source of Dante’s knowledge of the astronomy of Alpetregius, so it seems

probable that Dante knew the work. (Frisardi, Dante: Convivio, pg.467, note 5). 10

I’m following Frisardi’s lead on this (Frisardi, “The Convivio: A Portrait”, xxiii).

11

Indeed, we should not underestimate the power of the medieval memory.

12

Alongside Augustine, Boethius, and Pseudo-Dionysus.

7 I hope to show that Dante presents an Aristotelian reading of the text. 13 But before jumping right into Dante’s use of the material, I would first like to comment on my methodology here. It would be beyond the scope of this paper to offer an adequate summary of Dante’s philosophical view in Convivio III, complete with an account of its apparent inconsistencies and his reception of Aristotelian and Christian doctrines. Rather I think it is sufficient for the purposes of my argument to comment on only two specific instances in which Dante cites the text. In Appendix A I have prepared a complete list of Dante’s references to the De causis and the corresponding passages in the text itself. V. Dante’s Reading of the De causis: There is no better place to begin my investigation than with Dante’s very first mention of the De causis, which occurs shortly after his definition love in Cv.III.ii Love, taken in its true sense and considered subtly, is simply the spiritual union of the soul with the beloved thing: toward which union the soul goes by its very nature… And the reason for this natural propensity may be the following. Each substantial form proceeds from its First Cause, which is God, as is written in the Book of Causes, and diversifies, not through the First Cause, which is utterly simple but through secondary causes and through the matter into which the form descends.14 We can see here Dante echoing two key phrases of the De causis which I have italicized above, but most importantly, we can see Dante introducing the Aristotelian notion of ‘hylomorphism’ as one of the causes of diversification. I cannot overstate the importance of this point. While it is true that hylomorphism is at work in (Neo)Platonism generally (albeit as a lower

13

Dante’s move here is not without an important precedent. The above-mentioned commentary by Albert the Great

itself presents a very Aristotelian reading of the De causis, possibly owing in part to his belief that the text was genuinely of Aristotle. Moreover, Albert’s commentary was one of the most influential ever produced, not just as a commentary on the De causis, but in the tradition of commenting on Aristotle more generally (cf. Dragos Calma, “The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism,” pg. 29). In any case, Dante’s possible acquaintance with Albert’s commentary could be one of the influences of his own Aristotelian reading of the De causis. 14

My italics, Cv.III.2 (Frisardi, Dante: Convivio, pg. 135).

8 cause), nowhere in the De causis does the language of hylomorphism occur.15 And because Dante probably does not have the philosophical background in (Neo)Platonism to know these intricacies, I think we can safely assume that he is creatively introducing hylomorphism into the causal picture of his own accord. This seems to be solid evidence that from the very first invocation of the De causis, Dante is already in some sense Aristotelianizing the material. And while Dante probably did not intend his first use of the De causis to be a signpost that he is Aristotelianizing the text, I think we can safely use it as exactly that. And we can see here Dante typifying the medieval habit of creatively combining sources and influences and earning his reputation as a creative thinker. I will now turn to another passage, in which we can see the possibility of a creative omission in translation on Dante’s part: And because it is utterly natural in God to will to be – since, as is written in the abovementioned book [i.e. the De causis], “The first thing is being, and before that, nothing is” – naturally the human soul wills being with all its might; and since its being depends on God and is preserved by him, naturally it desires and wills to be united with God in order to strengthen its being.16 If we examine Dante’s quote of the De causis in the above passage, we can see evidence of a possible omission from the original Latin. Where Frisardi translates: “The first thing is being, and before that, nothing is” Dante’s Italian is: prima cosa è l’essere, e anzi a quello ...