Discuss the extent to which Stalin PDF

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Discuss the extent to which Stalin’s foreign policy after 1945 was mainly conservative and defensive with the sole aim of obtaining security for the Soviet Union. After the detrimental impacts of the Great Patriotic War on Russia, Stalin experienced severe insecurity and paranoia concerning the safety of the country, taking a number of measures to ensure its security. Following the Potsdam, Yalta, and Tehran conferences, Stalin began to sense weaknesses in the Great Alliance, heightening his concerns on the USSR. The aftermath of operation Barbarossa made Germany Stalin’s primary concern, leading him to make initially defensive moves in an effort to retain the USSR, followed by aggression. Despite being unsuccessful, the Nazi invasion of the USSR caused gargantuan damage to the nation, as well as highlighting major weaknesses in defense. This triggered a major change in relations between Germany and the USSR, for a purely defensive purpose. Due to the unexpected nature of the invasion, as it was a breach of the Nazi Soviet pact, Stalin demanded reparations from Germany in return for the economic damage incurred. Alongside this, he wanted to ensure that Germany was disabled from ever becoming a threat again, partially through constructing a buffer zone through the Eastern European countries on the western borders of Russia. This was enhanced by the fact that the US refused to share nuclear technology with the USSR, hence the impetus for expansion of power further west to tighten security and development of nuclear weapons. These shifts can be seen as purely defensive, as Stalin was acting in fear of Germany, without an agenda to expand Soviet power westwards. This view is in keeping with C Kennedy-Pipe, who argues that Stalin’s greatest fear and motivation in foreign policy was a revival of Germany. This opinion can be seen from an alternative point of view, that of the orthodox school of thought. Orthodox historians believe that Stalin’s actions in Eastern Europe were part of a plan hatched long before the invasion and had the ultimate goal of expansion in the West. The Berlin Blockade backs this notion, as the Soviets disapproved of the US supporting Germany economically, and they attempted to retain their section of the country behind the iron curtain by effectively laying East Berlin under siege. This move cannot be considered defensive, as it is more of an exertion of power and an attempt to maintain their sphere of influence. This proves that security was not the sole aim of the USSR, as Stalin would not have chosen to cling onto East Germany in this fashion if he considered it a major threat to the Soviet Union. Initially, Stalin’s policy was definitely shaped by fear of the Nazis, but this quickly changed into a more aggressive stance. After 1945, the Red Army takeover increased Soviet influence and hostility in Eastern Europe, with Poland being the first large nation to be controlled. This involved greater military presence, and a gradual invasion of government power within these countries. Others included Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, and although this was partially an effort to create a buffer zone from Germany, but the toppling of all democratic power and total control over these countries from a military, economic, and governmental perspective was excessive in terms of defense. The scope of investments into these countries made them satellite states under the Soviet sphere of influence, beyond what is expected from a buffer zone. These developments in Soviet policy prove that Stalin’s motive was beyond defense.

In conclusion, Stalin harnessed his fear of Nazi Germany and used defense as a guise, only to make impactful advances into Eastern Europe to expand the Soviet ‘empire’. Due to the unexpected nature of the Nazi invasion, a clear motive of defense can be observed, however this quickly escalated into an aggressive covert invasion westwards....