Does Neorealism or Neoliberalism provide a more convincing explanation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine? PDF

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Page |1 Does Neorealism or Neoliberalism provide a more convincing explanation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine? The end of the Cold War precipitated considerable jubilation in Neoliberal quarters; Francis Fukuyama’s now famous pronouncement of the ‘end of history’ suggested that considerations o...

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Does Neorealism or Neoliberalism provide a more convincing explanation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine? Martin Horton-Eddison

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Does Neorealism or Neoliberalism provide a more convincing explanation of Russia's invasion of Ukraine? The end of the Cold War precipitated considerable jubilation in Neoliberal quarters; Francis Fukuyama s o

fa ous p o ou e e t of the e d of histo

suggested that o side atio s of

material power which had so dominated the epoch, had o e to a e d. The t e tieth e tu

s

previously bloody history, which could best be explained by Realist claims that states must struggle for their own survival1 in a fragile international anarchy with no over-arching central authority2 appeared over. Li e al I te atio alists ui kl att i uted the failu e of the Cold Wa to tu

hot to

the strength of interdependence; the economic, political and social convergences predicted by Kant. For Neoliberals, it was interdependence rather than material strength which had prevented a breakdown of the NATO alliance and provided strength to the bourgeoning European Union; and claimed it was this intermeshed solidity which had finally outdone the Soviet Union. To Neoliberals, international organisations such as NATO and EU continue to serve only co-operative and wellintentioned purposes3 and accordingly, a period of uncontested post-Cold War American hegemony has ushered-in a uni-polar age which had remained largely unchallenged by serous state actors for two decades. However, despite Neoliberal assertions, Neorealists maintained that the likelihood of war remained within the ungoverned architecture of the international system4 and the Cold Wa

as

o

not by

well-intentioned co-operation, but by means of pure economic power as well as military and technical superiority. In simple terms, the Soviet Union represents for Realists a doomed attempt to circumvent the essentially competitive, self-help nature of a lawless international system, and supplant it with an overly integrated order to hold itself together. ‘ealis

lo

which frequently abused the sanctity of sovereignty in

s guidi g p i ipal of self-help; that states cannot depend on

the actions of others to ensure their own security5 was born-out by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Ukraine Crisis, which began in 2014 and continues today, provides an interesting test case for both of these positivist theories of International Relations (IR), because it represents a challenge to Dunne, T. & Schmidt, B.C., I trodu tio : The Ti eless Wisdo of ‘ealis in Bayliss, J. & Smith, S., The th Glo alizatio of World Politi s , 5 Ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010. P. 87 2 Ibid. 3 Levy, M.A., Young, O.R. & Zurn, M., The Study of I ter atio al ‘egi es , European Journal of International Relations, No. 1, September, 1995. P. 288 4 Mearsheimer, J.J..,in Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., I ter atio al ‘elatio s Theories; Dis ipli e a d Di ersity rd (3 Ed), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 84 5 Op. Cit., Dunne, 2010. P. 87 1

Page |2 two decades of Western dominance of international society. It is o to the Cold Wa , a e a ple of ‘ussia agg essio

o l des i ed as a etu

and of course to Neoliberals, the cause of the

Ukraine Crisis can be found i the la k of ‘ussia s i teg atio

ith the West. However, Neorealists

might contend that Russia is merely engaged i defe si e a tio s ai ed at

ala i g the effe ts of

NATO a d the EU s i teg ated e pa sio i to ‘ussia s ea -abroad.

In order to explore this debate, the paper will evolve a critical analysis of the Neoliberal position in order to evidence the following thesis: Firstly, Russian actions in Ukraine represent a defence of Russian, rather than an assault on Ukrainian, interests in the face of Western Neoliberal expansionism. Secondly, that Western foreign policy practitioners, caught up in the promise of Neoliberalism and the norms of international law, economic and political interdependence and Western de o a

failed to realise that they were building a new Weste

g eat po e

the EU)

to rival Russian influence. Further, that because the EU is militarily reinforced by composite states and guaranteed by the NATO alliance, this threatened Russian interests, which is in accordance with Neorealist thought, provoked a rational

ala i g response from Russia. Accordingly, the pape s

central theme is as Realists might suggest: that Russia, confronted with the rising challenge of the NATO/EU alliance, had strong incentives to launch a preventative intervention in Ukraine in order to halt the rise of Western influence in its near abroad.6 Accordingly, the paper analyses the effect of NATO expansion, and of EU enlargement, on Russian foreign policy, in parti ula ega d Uk ai e as a tippi g poi t

hi h ade uatel e plai s the li it to

Neoliberal thought.

See for example, Mearsheimer, J.J., in Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., I ter atio al ‘elatio s Theories; rd Dis ipli e a d Di ersity (3 Ed), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 87

6

Page |3 Initially, NATO expansion included only the extremities of the old Soviet Union; those countries which had in any case been troublesome members of the Soviet Union; the Czech Republic for example, Hungary and Poland. These countries did not directly border Russia a d ‘ussia s elati e quiescent attitude regarding their NATO ascendance can be understood in Realist terms; Russia was too economically weak and militarily disorganised to offer sufficient response. However, Russian intervention in Georgia should have been taken as a warning shot across NATO s bows. It signalled the limit to Russian tolerance which NATO failed to heed, and consequently continued to absorb former Warsaw Pact members, including Albania within the year of the Georgian conflict. This round of expansion can be contextualised as NATO seeking to further its own security by means of expansion, coupled with joiner states, i effe t

a d aggo i g. Realists would further contend

that the expansion of NATO was undertaken to take advantage of the geo-strategic locations, manpower and equipment of new members.7 Joiner states were motivated to obtain a form of a security guarantee against a Russian resurgence. However, Neoliberals would counter that NATO expansion merely represents a natural extension of the li e al zo e of pea e to newly de o atised fo

e So iet satellites ut e e so e Neoli e als would recognise that state actors

who join NATO likely do so in order to maximise national interests.8 To Russian strategists, NATO expansion is viewed only in the starkest Realist terms; that of the o petitio s gai in size and strength serves to diminish Russian influence in a regional zero sum game. From a Western perspective, NATO has always been an ostensibly military organisation, originally constructed to provide a martial alliance to balance the overwhelming numerical superiority of the Soviet Union at the close of the Second World War. By contrast, the other international institution which has dominated West-East European international relations since the end of the Cold War has been the European Union (EU). The EU is viewed, almost universally by Neoliberals as a purely economic integrationist supra-national organisation built on Neoliberal assertions of peace through association. By contrast, Russia nevertheless considers the EU in more suspicious terms. Indeed, for Russia, the EU is NATO-lite; short of the American nuclear guarantee and of a large standing army, it nevertheless remains a competitive bloc with the potential to become an economic super-power i ‘ussia s a k a d. I deed, of the non-Soviet members of the Warsaw Pact, only Albania now remains outside EU membership. Within this context, the EU and Ukraine have a complex relationship, the compromises and overtures of which resemble those engaged in during Mearsheimer, J.J., The False Pro ise of I ter atio al I stitutio s , International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, 1994. P. 12 8 Levy, M.A., Young, O.R. & Zurn, M., The Study of I ter atio al ‘egi es , European Journal of International Relations, No. 1, September, 1995. P.281

7

Page |4 the ascension of states such as the Czech Republic and Poland. At the same time as Russian tanks rolled into Georgia, the EU was in fact offering huge loans to prop-up the Ukrainian economy, intent on preparing the ground for Ukraine to join the Union during the next round of EU enlargement. This preparation work, which in the case of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary also accompanied membership of NATO, played on ‘ussia s o e s of losi g out i a zero sum game. To Moscow, EU and NATO membership are one and the same; hand and glove, membership of which by a eigh ou i g state ep ese ts a e osio of ‘ussia s sphe e of i flue e a d a challenge to ‘ussia s standing in the international system. Because Neorealists assert lassi al ealis

s lai

that the

primary referent in international politics is state power,9 the expansion of the increasingly state-like EU poses a challenge to Russian power. And, as the EU e pa ds, ‘ussia s t adi g ase, politi al sphere and military options, contract. Indeed, with each loss of the near abroad, Russia loses another essential element of state power; global influence. Accordingly, in the face of the EU and NATO creeping ever- lose to ‘ussia s la d o de s, ‘ussia s a tio s i Uk ai e a

e pe ei ed as

ala i g – a central tenet of defensive realism; proponents

of which would contend that in the face of amassed weight to the West, Russia must counterbalance to re-order the system. The method of rebalancing is available to Russia in one of two forms; first a soft po e counter-expansion of ‘ussia s own sphere of influence Westward – which has proved impossible in the face of the irresistible EU economic lure, or a ha d po e

ala i g

the threat, or application of military force; further, a complex combination of both elements in conjunction with friendly elements within the target state. In the case of Crimea, where 60% of citizens are of ethnic Russian extraction and who broadly identify with ‘ussia as the

othe la d

Russia adopted this third way; the use of force backed by internal Ukrainian support. It is important to note that rebalancing is a natural reaction to Western expansion and does not mean that Russia is o e tl i te ested i di e tl

halle gi g the West 10 in those states which have

already acquiesced to NATO expansion or EU dominance. Rather, it means that Russia has been forced to respond to Western challenges because years of irrelevance and decline, have meant that Russia has been forced by the influence of Western Neoliberalism to go to great lengths to prove to the rest of the world that it continues to matter internationally.11 Therefore, in theoretical terms, Russia represents a predictable and necessary balancing constraint to the Neoli e al West s seemingly inexorable march eastward across Europe. Russian balancing is necessary because where K as e , S. D., ‘ealist Vie s of I ter atio al La , American Society of International Law, Vol. 96, March, 2002. P. 265 10 Mankoff, J., ‘ussia Foreig Poli y: The ‘etur of Great Po er Politi s , New York, Rowman and Littlefield, 2009. P.12 11 Ibid., P. 6

9

Page |5 po e is u ge e all

ala ed the out o e of o fli t is usuall p edi ta le, and the weaker side will

ot fight e ause it k o s it

ill lose 12 and this encourages powerful states toward

bellicosity. In this way, we can conceive of Russian interventions in Ukraine as preventative. Accordingly, on economic, diplomatic and political grounds Russia presents little challenge to the EU, where it knows it is weaker. However, by contrast, the EU is an economic giant and a military minnow; and has refused to intervene militarily in Ukraine despite being a primary cause of the conflict there as well as a major financial supporter of the new pro-Western government. Just as Russia has balanced the situation by use of its martial strength; the EU therefore can be expected to balance this response with its relative economic strength by means of direct aid to Ukraine, and sa tio s agai st ‘ussia. Fu the

o e, e ause of ‘ussia s te po a

elati e

ilita

st e gth as

compared the EU, it has been compelled to act while it still enjoys a decided power advantage over its g o i g i al 13 just as defensive realism would predict. Of note is that growing economic and political interdependence with Europe, particularly in the West of Ukraine, is balanced by the sizeable pro-Russian paramilitary units in the East. This situation ties neatly with the tenet of Realist thought; that distance and geography play a key role in the likelihood of direct involvement, or wars, in a given region. Ukraine is about as far from the mainland US as anywhere in Europe and as such the EU has led the response, and Russia has felt emboldened to deploy hard power. Consequently, Uk ai e as a flash-poi t

as e i e tl p edi ta le fo adhe e ts of ‘ealis

– its geography,

location and the competing strategic interests of its neighbours virtually assure this, a lesson ignored by Neoliberals who fail to recognise the sometimes harsh realities of Neorealist thought. On this note, the unbridled optimism of Neoliberal thought suggests that states will not necessarily fight ea h othe e e

he

pu el Realist principles do i ate 14 because of geography, shared

national interest, international alliances and the balance of power.15 However, the case of Ukraine negates positive geographic considerations, being the land bridge between Russia and the EU. In regard shared national interest, this is in fact a cause for war, rather than a deterrent to it; Ukraine is a deeply divided country, broadly separated in attitude in regard the peoples of East to West. Indeed, the large ethnic Russian majority in the East have a nationalist interest in Russia, and those in the West have a national view as European, with a particularly Germanic identity. Consequently, internal nationalisms are a casus belli in Ukraine, and shared national identity is absent. With the proxy powers competing on largely distinct parallel plains which do not directly threaten each other; Russett, B.,in Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., I ter atio al ‘elatio s Theories; Dis ipli e a d Di ersity (3 Ed), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 100 13 Mearsheimer, J.J..,in Dunne, T., Kurki, M., Smith, S., I ter atio al ‘elatio s Theories; Dis ipli e a d rd Di ersity (3 Ed), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013. P. 87 14 Op. Cit., Russett. P. 95 15 Ibid., P. 100

12

rd

Page |6 ‘ussia is a

ilita

g eat po e

he e the Ge

a -led European Union largely represents a

German state power in line with realist thought.16 Moreover, the EU is an (albeit troubled) economic great power, where Russia is not. The indirect nature of their respective challenges to each other provides a significant source of tension, but not direct conflict. With regard international alliances, Russia has few friends and many competitors. The Warsaw Pact, signed in response to NATO, disintegrated in 1991 and leaves Russia militarily isolated, with all but the Soviet members now incorporated under the NATO umbrella; with ever closer strategic objectives, shared equipment, doctrine, and recent experience fighting together in Afghanistan and Iraq.

In fact, far from

preventing war as Neoliberals might suggest, NATO has instead instigated a number of conflicts in recent years, unopposed as it is by any balancing military alliance. Neorealists would question whether such integrated co-operation necessarily proves beyond doubt that integration improves prospects for international peace and security,17 or if in fact as Russia believes, increases the likelihood of war. On this note, military and alliance co-operation may be good for peace and stability in a bi-polar world, but it threatens stability in the uni-polar post-Cold war world. In fact, despite NATO s

lai s to

e a Neoli e al i stitutio , it continues to react to problems of

international relations in Neorealist terms, and most notably constructs ‘ussia as a pote tial enemy. 18 And, thisrisks provoking Russia into reaction, as it has done in Ukraine, in a defensive manner. ‘ussia s i te e tio i Uk ai e therefore represents a strategy of coercive diplomacy, designed to le e age i te atio al a gai i g a d to halt NATO a d EU e pa sio i side ‘ussia s t aditio al sphe e of i flue e. I this ega d, Mos o s a tio s a

e easil e plai ed in Neorealist terms as a

reaction to Neoliberal practices. Accordingly, the inherent anarchy of the international system offe s Vladi i Puti s ad i ist atio

o easo

to allo

the i stallatio

of a

EU-puppet

government in Ukraine; one bent on eventual union with Europe and entry into NATO. Essentially, ‘ussia s ala i g i te e tio i Uk ai e can be understood in rational terms; great powers are never comfortable with the removal of influence and the installation of potential competitive threats close to their own borders. By means of illustration, the installation of Soviet Naval and Nuclear assets in Cuba in October 1962 caused such an adverse reaction in Washington that the Cold War come very close to turning hot. Further, lesser powers such as Spain and Argentina also remain uncomfortable with British military presence in Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands, largely because the Hispanic countries consider these territories uncomfortably close to their own borders, Mearsheimer, J.J., The False Pro ise of I ter atio al I stitutio s , International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3, Winter, 1994. P. 14 17 Ibid., P. 7 18 Op. Cit., Russett, P. 95

16

Page |7 especially when garrisoned by British troops and under British socio-economic and cultural influence. The key point here is that in ea h ase the i te t of the e pa sio ists is ot that hi h determines the threat or perception of loss or risk, rather that the threat perception can only be decided upon by the power who considers themselves unjustly treated. For example, France doesn t consider British influence in the Chanel Islands a threat, but Japan does consider Russian ownership of the South Kuril Islands a significant concern. In this regard it is Russia alone, not the EU or NATO who is permitted to decide whether a Western-backed regime in Kiev poses a threat to its national security, or otherwise. ‘ussia s poli

to a d Uk ai e, a d i deed Geo gia, is o e of i te e tio i

order to contain Neoliberal-inspired influence in its near abroad, which is in fact the result of US policy of containment toward post-Cold War Russia. Importantly, Russian intervention in Ukraine is, as defensive realists would argue, an expression of the essential offence-defence balance which almost always favours the defence, and thus works to dampen security compe...