Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC PDF

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Case summary of Donoghue v Stevenson...

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Donoghue v Stevenson 1932 SC (HL) 31 This is the most famous judicial precedent in Scots law. It is a decision of the House of Lords. This court that has now been replaced by the UK Supreme Court as, among other things, the highest appeal court for Scots civil cases Donoghue had raised court proceedings against Stevenson in the Outer House of the Court of Session. She alleged that the following happened: “At or about 8.50 p.m. on or about the 26th August 1928, the pursuer (Donoghue) was in the shop occupied by Francis Minchella, and known as Wellmeadow Café, at Wellmeadow Place, Paisley, with a friend. The said friend ordered for the pursuer ice cream, and ginger beer suitable to be used with the ice cream as an iced drink. Her friend, acting as aforesaid, was supplied by the said Mr Minchella with a bottle of ginger beer manufactured by the defender for sale to members of the public. The said bottle was made of dark opaque glass, and the pursuer and her friend had no reason to suspect that the said bottle contained anything else than the aerated water. The said Mr Minchella poured some of the said ginger beer from the bottle into a tumbler containing the ice cream. The pursuer then drank some of the contents of the tumbler. Her friend then lifted the said ginger beer bottle and was pouring out the remainder of the contents into the said tumbler when a snail, which had been, unknown to the pursuer, her friend, or the said Mr Minchella, in the bottle, and was in a state of decomposition, floated out of the said bottle. In consequence of the nauseating sight of the snail in said circumstances, and of the noxious condition of the said snail tainted ginger beer consumed by her, the pursuer sustained the shock and illness.”1 Donoghue sought compensation from Stevenson, the manufacturer of the ginger beer. D was not in a contractual relationship with S, so her action could not be based on contract. Therefore, the action was based on an area of the law called delict. In the law of delict a party who owes a duty of care to a person is normally liable for illness or injury caused to that person by a failure to take reasonable care. The Outer House of the Court of Session held that the case could go to a proof (a court hearing where evidence is lead to establish the facts). The defender appealed this decision to the Inner House of the Court of Session. The Inner house allowed the appeal and threw the case out. The judges based their decision on a case (Mullen v. A. G. Barr & Co. Ltd. (1929 S.C. 461; 1929, S.L.T. 341) which they decided was binding and had to be followed by the court. This case had ruled that a manufacturer such as D did not owe a duty of care to the end user. Therefore, even if D proved her version of events she could not win. D appealed the Inner House decision to the House of Lords. The House of Lords held by a majority of 3-2 that a manufacturer such as S did owe a duty of care to D. So it reversed the decision of the Inner House and sent the case for proof (in other words it reinstated the decision of the Outer House). In so doing it set a very important judicial precedent but for what point of law? Or to put in another way, what was the ratio of the case? 1

Taken from the written pleadings: 1932 SC (HL) 31

All five judges wrote individual opinions. Lord Buckmaster and Tomlin dissented. They ruled that S did not owed a duty of care to D. However, the other three held that S did owe a duty of care to D. We have to look to their opinions to try to identify the possible ratio. Lord Atkin reviewed the existing case law and concluded from that case law that: “…a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.” 2 Lord MacMillan said:

“… a person who for gain engages in the business of manufacturing articles of food and drink intended for consumption by members of the public in the form in which he issues them is under a duty to take care in the manufacture of these articles. That duty, in my opinion, he owes to those whom he intends to consume his products.”3 Lord Thankerton indicated that a duty of care was owed where the manufacturer: “…in placing his manufactured article of drink upon the market, has intentionally so excluded interference with, or examination of, the article by any intermediate handler of the goods between himself and the consumer that he has, of his own own accord, brought himself into direct relationship with the consumer, with the result that the consumer is entitled to rely upon the exercise of diligence by the manufacturer to secure that the article shall not be harmful to the consumer.”4 Notice that each of the above statements is capable of being applied to the facts of the case. However, each is different. So what is the ratio of the case? Is it one of the above statements or a combination of all three or something else? Another factor is that Lord Atkin’s opinion also contained wider analysis of the legal concept of “duty or care”. He wanted to identify a general principle that explained all the previous cases in which the courts had decided that a duty of care existed in law. At page 44 said that the case law showed that the following legal principle existed: “The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law, you must not injure your neighbour; and the lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You 2

Per Lord Atkin at 57

3

Per Lord MacMillan at 71.

4

Per Lord Thankerton at 59-60

must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be—persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question.” Notice how this is a much wider statement than the three dicta quoted above. For example, it is not limited to manufacturers, far less manufacturers of food and drink. It applies to any situation where a person has a legal “neighbour” Is this, much wider statement the true ratio of the case? The really important (and difficult) point is that the judges who decide a case do not decide its ratio. This is a matter for judges in later cases. Donoghue v Stevenson is discussed the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (volume 22). It is pointed out that, for a time after Donoghue, judges who referred back to the case apparently favoured a version of the ratio based on Lord Atkin’s narrow version. In time, however, judges became willing to decide cases based on Lord Atkin’s much wider neighbourhood test. In other words, the SME suggests that, over time, the ratio of Donoghue changed from the narrow version to the wider version. A great example is Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd (House of Lords) [1970] A.C. 1004. Some boys detained in a young offenders institution escaped from an island by taking yachts moored nearby. In so doing the damaged the yachts. The issue was whether the Home Office (which was responsible for running the YOI) owed a duty of care to the yacht owners. The House of Lords applied Lord Atkin’s neighbourhood test and held that the HO did owe the yacht owners a duty of care. Matrix of Precedents

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