Essay- Was the failure of détente due to divergent interests - PDF PDF

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Owen Cundall 5 April 2017

Discussing whether the pursuit of divergent interests was the main reason for the failure of détente. Détente is the term used to describe the relaxing of tensions between the USSR and the USA towards the end of the Cold War. This essay will discuss whether the main reason for the failure of this foreign policy was due to the two powers pursuing different objectives by examining first the priorities of the USA and their foreign policy aims, as well as the state of their domestic affairs at the time which no doubt influenced US foreign policy. The second paragraph will analyse the Soviet Union’s domestic and foreign affairs in the same way. After discussing the interests of the superpowers, I will discuss the impact of proxy wars including the Yom Kippur war, conflict in Africa and the USSR’s expansion tactics in the Middle East towards the end of the Cold War, and how this affected relations between the two powers in the context of détente.

American blame for the failure of détente seems to fall largely on an ultimate lack of public support; Lyndon B. Johnson, who succeeded President Kennedy in 1963, was accused of being “soft” on Communism by many in the political right when expressing the merits of pursuing a policy of détente (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 255-255). Although public opinion was always divided over the subject, much of the blame for the collapse of détente in the US falls to the Watergate scandal of the Nixon presidency and it’s aftermath, at a time where the president and vice president Kissinger had pursued détente as a seriously viable foreign policy for the US. One reason for the the lack of support was that after the scandal the press began to move away from official governmental sources and sought to use unofficial leaks and statements. Unverifiable, this sort of media reporting led to public faith and trust of the government being shattered (Foerstel, 2001, pp. 197-199) while a personnel reshuffle in the

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White House in the immediate aftermath resulted in a severe lack of teamwork (Bundy, 1998, 406-406). As a result of the Watergate crisis, Congress moved to sabotage Kissinger’s foreign policies which not only affected public faith in the competence of the Government but also alienated the Russians, no doubt contributing to the decline of détente (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 273-274). Among declining approval ratings from Watergate, Nixon was also losing support for America’s involvement in Vietnam. For détente to work in the favour of the US it needed to be given time and patience on the governmental side as well as home support which Nixon began to lose (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 258-258) with the commencement of Operation Linebacker in Vietnam; large scale US carpet bombing of North Vietnam in response to Communist aggression (LaFeber, 1996, pp.266-267). The media coverage of these attacks was largely negative; sparking college protests across America. Nixon and Kissinger were largely critical of these protests due to Nixon’s obsession with maintaining order throughout his presidency. The president’s need to retain control meant that Nixon tended to control policy with an “iron grip” and rarely opened it up to public debate, which alienated the public further from the Government (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 258-259). Watergate and the after effects made détente a much more difficult policy to uphold, and so it is clear that divergent interests had an effect; Nixon was massively focussed on being re-elected for a second term, and his actions contributed no doubt to the souring of détente. After the Vietnam War, the US had to focus on repairing relations with the Western allies after a period of time where it seemed to have forgotten about those countries in Western Europe. The USA’s constant relationship building in all areas of the globe in this period suggests that perhaps détente, as a result of divergent interests, was doomed to failure because the US had too many global responsibilities (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 272-272) in their quest for global dominance and leadership; Nixon had always been open about his belief that the 70’s would be defined by “events that sapped the USA’s dominance” in the world (LaFeber, 1996, 258-258). It can be argued therefore that the US did not pursue détente for the same reasons as the USSR, but rather used it as a way of retaining their dwindling global dominance at the time alongside repairing relations elsewhere, thus affording no country the appropriate time to meaningfully strike up a long standing peaceful settlement. America’s pursuit of global domination at odds with what the Soviets sought from détente was apparent in the early Reagan years. By 1981 American defence spending increased by $33.8 billion, rising to over $1 trillion over the next 4 years (Fischer, 2000, pp26-26). This was clearly a return to the Cold War rhetoric and arms racing that had been

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in motion since Hiroshima, and Reagan’s commencement address in 1981 stated that “America will transcend Communism and dismiss it as a bizarre chapter in human history” (Reagan, 1981); this shows how America were uninterested, for large parts of the détente period, of accepting the differences between the two cultures in the quest for peace, at least not as interested as they were in asserting global power once more.

The USSR also had motives of their own. Despite détente representing the “relaxation of tensions” between the two powers, the USSR continued to seek nuclear parity with the West with the production of MIRVs (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 270-270), despite needing détente from an economic perspective due to falling economic growth. The USSR saw détente as a major propaganda victory as it represented in their eyes the USA’s acknowledgement of their global power (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 253-253). Détente would only work if it suited the best interests of the two countries, it could be argued (in line with the Realist tradition), and Khrushchev’s establishment of the centre for American studies in order to get John F Kennedy on side in the early 60’s suggests that détente for the Soviets was acceptable for a time (Zubok, Pleshakov, and Pleshakov, 1997, pp. 240-240) however interests in superpower status clearly came first as we can observe from the ensuing Cuban missile crisis in 1962. This was not the first time the USSR allowed tensions between the two countries to become strained rather than relaxed; President Johnson initially pursued détente in the hope that the USSR would pressure North Vietnam to make peace with South Vietnam (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 252-252), something which the Soviets did not allow to happen. While détente was apparently an attractive prospect to both countries in principle, the USSR similarly to the US, would readily sacrifice détente to maintain peace and order in their sphere of influence, as they did during the Prague spring; this made America reluctant to deal with the USSR (LaFeber, 1996, 255-261) because the USA had taken a line with the USSR wherein they would only cooperate while the Soviets were seen to ‘behave’ and control their aggression (Fischer, 2000, pp. 22-24); this fragility of détente was in part due to Russia’s interests in military capability. While America had reduced their military arsenal, Russia continued to spend vast amount of GNP on the military, leading America to believe that the USSR were building offensively (Fischer, 2000, pp. 20-21). If anything, this heightened tensions and worked to undermine détente rather than helping it to develop.

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Although there is a compelling case to justify the argument that divergent interests were the main reason for the collapse of détente, there is also evidence that in actual fact the real reason could have been just the opposite; both superpowers continued to wage proxy wars in the hope of spreading their influence across the globe. Nixon entered the White House convinced that the stand off between Israel and Egypt in the late 1960’s and early 70’s was a key threat to American areas of influence in the Middle East; attempting to reach a settlement with the USSR, Israel and Egypt in the process (Milestones: 1969-1973, 1975). The plan failed when in 1973 Egypt attacked Israel. This war revealed cracks in détente as America began to supply Israel with not only weapons but also intelligence, while Russian built MIG’s were supplied to their Egyptian allies (histroylearningsite, 2016). The Yom Kippur war suggests that the two powers actually had similar interests; to protect their assets in the Middle East as well as elsewhere across the globe. Through Nixon’s attempts to use détente as containment tool, the US sold vast amounts of weapons to various 3rd world countries such as Iran which led to them being more likely to use force over diplomatic negotiation in the face of disputes, making the region more unstable (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 261-261), and this brought out more fragilities in the détente policy. During the Ogaden war, the US placed arms embargoes on both sides (Ethiopia and Somalia) due to President Carter’s belief that outside powers should not fuel regional disputes. Despite this, the USSR continued to supply both sides (Jackson, 2010, pp. 28-29) in the hopes of recruiting more sympathising states to the Communist ideology. At this point in time America were trying to maintain peace and their own dominance, so Soviet restraint would have helped to maintain the status quo; suggesting that once again the superpowers would pursue and attempt to fulfil their own interests before prioritising peace and stable relations. This attitude translates in modern events; Russia’s cooperation in Afghanistan hinges on the protection of their assets, and Russia have made it clear that unless their equality and mutual recognition of assets is not acknowledged then they continue to resort to balancing tactics (Tsygankov, 2013, pp. 31-32). It can be argued that Russia’s expansion in the Middle east was more reactive rather than planned so as not to provoke the US (Slater, 1990, pp. 559-560), who even throughout the détente period still regarded Russia as an offensive state that posed the biggest threat to peace in the Middle East (Fischer, 2000, pp. 20-20). The fact is however that the pursuit, by both sides, of increased influence throughout the world meant that both had to expand to protect their overseas interests; therefore the pursuit of the same goal contributed towards the

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fall of détente. Russia’s expansion for example in the 60’s was seen as them moving to protect their access to sea lanes in the Baltic and Black Sea, as well as their access to the Mediterranean due to strategic American threats (Slater, 1990, pp. 561-562).

In conclusion, while it is clear that proxy wars and the mutual pursuit of global influence played it’s part in the downfall of détente, I would argue that the pursuit of divergent interests was key. While America saw détente as a tool with which to constrain and control Russia, the USSR saw it as America’s recognition of their superpower status (Jackson, 2010, pp. 27-27) and for America it did not represent a step back from world affairs but simply a “new tactic in containment” (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 252-252). The tension between the two nations was a major issue that needed to be addressed and détente was a convenient way of relaxing these tensions enough to take the pressure off the two economies, however America’s biggest advocate of the policy, Richard Nixon, ultimately had too many significant issues to contend with to afford détente the proper amount of care and attention, while the USSR’s craving for nuclear parity and superpower status resulted in them being unable to move away from the Cold War theme of military investment and cultural warfare. Neither state would tolerate ideological diversity in their respective bloc (LaFeber, 1996, pp. 257-257) and this refusal, on both sides, to accept the legitimacy of one another made peace and good relations almost impossible from the beginning. For this reason, it is my belief that the pursuit of divergent interests was indeed the main reason for the ultimate failure of détente.

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Bibliography Bundy, W.P. (1998) A tangled web: The making of foreign policy in the Nixon presidency. London: I.B. Tauris. Fischer, B.A. (2000) The Reagan reversal: Foreign policy and the end of the cold war. New York, NY, United States: University of Missouri Press. Foerstel, H.N. (2001) From Watergate to Monicagate: Ten controversies in modern journalism and media. United States: Greenwood Publishing Group. historylearningsite, 2000 2016 - (2016) The Yom Kippur war of 1973. Available at: http:// www.historylearningsite.co.uk/modern-world-history-1918-to-1980/the-middle-east-1917to-1973/the-yom-kippur-war-of-1973/ (Accessed: 10 April 2017). Jackson, D.R. (2010) “The Ogaden war and the demise of detente,” The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 632(1), pp. 26–40. doi: 10.1177/0002716210378833. LaFeber, W. (1996) America, Russia, and the cold war, 1945-1996. 8th edn. New York: McGraw Hill Higher Education. Milestones: 1969–1976 (1975) Available at: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/ arab-israeli-war-1973 (Accessed: 10 April 2017). Reagan , R. (1981) Commencement Address at Notre Dame 17 May. Slater, J. (1990) “The superpowers and an Arab-Israeli political settlement: The cold war years,” Political Science Quarterly, 105(4), p. 557. doi: 10.2307/2150935. Tsygankov, A.P. (2013) “Russia’s Afghanistan debate,” Problems of Post-Communism, 60(6), pp. 29–41. doi: 10.2753/ppc1075-8216600603. Zubok, V.M., Pleshakov, C.V. and Pleshakov, K. (1997) Inside the Kremlin’s cold war: From Stalin to Khrushchev. 4th edn. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

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