Federal Courts Outline PDF

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Table of Contents Congressional Regulation of Federal Court Jurisdiction

2

Federal Court System and Judicial Review

2

Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction

2

Control over Rules of Decision and Judgments

4

Expanding Federal Court Jurisdiction

6

Non-Article III Tribunals

8

Justiciability Limitations

10

Standing to Sue: Constitutional Requirements

10

Statutory Standing: Third-Party Standing

12

Taxpayer Standing, Emoluments Clause Litigation

17

Legislative and Other Inter-Governmental Standing

18

Ripeness and Mootness

21

Political Questions

21

Choice of Law in Federal Courts

22

State Law

22

Federal Common Law

22

Implied Statutory Rights of Action

22

Damages Remedies for Constitutional Violations

22

Section 1983, Federal Law in the State Courts, and Abstention

22

State Official Action and § 1983

22

Individual Official Immunities

22

Federal Law in the State Courts

22

SCOTUS Review of State Court Decisions

22

Younger Abstention

22

State Sovereign Immunity

22

Meaning and Scope of Eleventh Amendment

22

Prospective vs. Retrospective Relief, State Law

22

Consent and Congressional Abrogation

22

Immunity Outside the Federal Courts; Enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment

22

Federal Courts Outline, Fall 2020, Joelle Leib

Congressional Regulation of Federal Court Jurisdiction Federal Court System and Judicial Review I.

II.

Relevant Sections of Art. III a. Section 1: “The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior courts, as the Congress may from time ordain and establish. b. Section 2: “The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the U.S., and Treaties made, under their Authority;--to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;--to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies between two or more States;—between a state and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of different states;--between Citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.” c. “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a state shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as Congress shall make.” Marbury v. Madison (1803) a. The Judiciary Act authorizing the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus when a case is brought directly to the Court conflicts with Article III section 2 of the Constitution, because that section does not grant the Court original jurisdiction in such a case, and Congress cannot otherwise grant original jurisdiction to the Court for issues not enumerated in that section. Thus, because the statute and the Constitution conflict, the Constitution must be followed, so the Court here does not have the authority to issue the writ of mandamus to Marbury, even though he has a legal right to the mandamus. b. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.” i. If the Legislature passes a law that is repugnant to the Constitution, that law is void. c. Established judicial review—the power of the Court to declare a law constitutional.

Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction I.

Congressional Control of the Federal Courts a. The question raised by the “exceptions” language of section 2 is whether the power to make exceptions to the jurisdiction of federal courts is absolute or whether it is limited—by Article III itself, or by other provisions of the Constitution, or by inferences drawn from the constitutional structure. b. The Traditional View of Congressional Power to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal and State Courts 2

Federal Courts Outline, Fall 2020, Joelle Leib

II.

III.

i. Congress has the power to make exceptions to the jurisdiction of SCOTUS over any category of cases, constitutional or otherwise. Congress has absolute/plenary power over the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme Court. 1. But, the Supremacy clause forbids Congress from depriving state courts of jurisdiction to decide constitutional questions that come before them in the course of ordinary litigation authorized by state law. Ex Parte McCardle, SCOTUS 1886 a. The exception to appellate jurisdiction under the 1868 Military Reconstruction Act (which stripped SCOTUS of its jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus appeals from Circuit Courts) is express. The 1868 act created an exception to SCOTUS’s appellate jurisdiction, so the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear McCardle’s habeas appeal (with his underlying claim being that the MRA convictions against him for publishing inflammatory articles violated the First Amendment) from the Circuit court, even though Congress passed the Act specifically to preclude McCardle’s habeas appeal from being heard by the Court. i. Court stated “we are not at liberty to inquire into the motives of the legislature” regarding the passage of the MRA of 1868. b. The 1868 act only forbids the Court from hearing habeas appeals from Circuit courts, the Court can still decide habeas appeals by issuing original writs of habeas under the Judiciary Act. Here, however, McCardle’s counsel did not raise the issue of the Judiciary Act. Congressional Power over the Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts a. Sheldon v. Sill i. Court found statute precluding federal district courts from hearing certain diversity cases involving promissory notes created in order to prevent fraudulent use of diversity jurisdiction constitutional because Congress passed the statute creating the Circuit Court, Congress can decide the jurisdiction of those courts. 1. Congress may withhold from any Court of its creation jurisdiction of any of the enumerated controversies. 2. Expansive view: Congress can decide the jurisdiction of the courts it creates. b. Webster v. Doe i. On CIA agents claim that he was wrongfully fired for being gay, the NSA statute (stating that the CIA director may, at his discretion, terminate the employment of any officer or employee whenever he shall deem necessary) precluded judicial review of all statutory claims, but the Court did not find the statute to exclude review of constitutional claims because “where Congress intends to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims its intent to do so must be clear.” 1. Distinction between statutory and constitutional claims. ii. Dissents 1. O’Connor

3

Federal Courts Outline, Fall 2020, Joelle Leib a. Disagreed that a constitutional claim challenge involving this section of the NSA could be brought in federal district court because here, Congress has the authority to “close” lower federal courts to a constitutional claim, especially because the President has sole authority over international issues such as this issue involving the CIA. 2. Scalia a. Some claims are beyond judicial review because they involve political questions…it is untenable that there must be a judicial remedy for every constitutional violation, the identification of those constitutional claims that do not have a remedy should be determined by congress. If congress intended to exclude judicial review of the president’s decision in firing a CIA employee, that rationale is constitutionally permissible. b. The power not to create any lower federal courts at all includes the power to invest them with less than all of the judicial power. i. Constitutional claims cannot be eliminated from state courts and from SCOTUS appellate jurisdictions over cases from state courts. c. Immigration and Naturalization Service v. St. CYR i. Congress passed an act that seemed to withdraw from the AG the ability to grant discretionary relief from deportation orders for undocumented immigrants convicted of a crime. This law seemed to conflict with the Suspension Clause of the Constitution, which does not allow for the suspension of habeas corpus. Applying the theory of Constitutional Avoidance, the Court found that the statute did not present a clear attempt to repeal habeas jurisdiction, and instead avoided the substantial constitutional question that such jurisdiction-stripping would present. d. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld i. In 12/2005, Congress passed an act stating that “no court…shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider…an application for writ of habeas filed by an alien detained at Guantanamo.” Instead, the act said such writs would be heard by a military court and final review by the D.C. Circuit. ii. The Court held that the statute did not apply to Hamdan’s appeal because the effective date portion calling for immediate effect could not be construed as to be affecting the part of the statute relating to the jurisdiction issue. e. Boumediene v. Bush i. Same statute as Hamdan, but Congress amended the effective date so the jurisdiction stripping aspect clearly applied to all pending cases. ii. Holding that this habeas restriction statute was unconstitutional as applied to the detainees of Guantanamo under the Suspension Clause, which forbids the suspension of habeas corpus except when there is an armed rebellion. Finding that the Suspension Clause applied to detainees at 4

Federal Courts Outline, Fall 2020, Joelle Leib Guantanamo (a territory where U.S. had “exclusive jurisdiction over”) and that the D.C. Circuit was not a viable alternative because of limitations on that Court’s ability to consider exculpatory evidence iii. Takeaway 1. Confirms that Congress does not have unlimited authority to control federal court jurisdiction. Now, there is a much stronger argument that Congress cannot except jurisdiction in cases involving constitutional claims.

Control over Rules of Decision and Judgments Extent to which Congress can control decision making of Judiciary. Congress can change rules for pending cases but not for finally adjudicated cases. A case is considered pending until time to file appeal has expired. I. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Scalia opinion) a. §27A(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to the extent that it requires federal courts to reopen final judgments in private civil actions under §10 of the Act, contravenes the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine because by enacting § 27, Congress exceeded its authority by requiring the federal courts to exercise “the judicial power of the U.S.,” in a manner repugnant to the text, structure, and traditions of Art. III by mandating the Courts to reopen final judgments. i. The Framers gave the Federal Judiciary the power not merely to rule on cases but to decide them, with the understanding that a judgment conclusively resolves the case. ii. When retroactive legislation requires its own application in a case already finally adjudicated (as opposed to one still pending on appeal), it effectively reverses a decision already made. Such an act exceeds the powers of Congress and unconstitutionally infringes on the Judicial power because only the Courts have the power to decide cases. II. Miller v. French (2000) (O’Connor) a. Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PLRA) establishes standards for the entry and termination of civil cases challenging prison conditions. The Pendleton prison, currently under an injunction to remedy 8th amendment violations in prison conditions (overcrowding, mechanical restraints, quality of food) granted in 1988 before the passage of the PLRA, filed a motion to terminate prospective relief under the PLRA, triggering an “automatic stay” provision of the PLRA that operates as a stay of that relief beginning 30 days after the filing of the motion. The prisoners moved to enjoin the automatic stay and argued the automatic stay provision was unconstitutional for violating due process and separation of powers. The prisoners argue that the automatic stay provision would unconstitutionally interfere with the Court’s finding that of Eighth Amendment violations in the prison. b. The Court found that the automatic stay provision does not unconstitutionally suspend or reopen a judgment of an Article III court. When Congress changes the law underlying a judgment awarding prospective relief (the injunction), that relief is no longer enforceable to the extent it is inconsistent with the new law (the 5

Federal Courts Outline, Fall 2020, Joelle Leib

III.

section of the PLRA outlining the standards Court must identify to grant an injunction for prison conditions). The automatic stay helps the Court implement the new PLRA standards. The stay did not interfere with the adjudicatory role of the Court. i. Although the injunction here is a “final judgment” for purposes of appeal, it is not the last word of the judicial department. The prospective relief is subject to the continuing supervisory jurisdiction of the Court, and therefore may be altered according to subsequent changes in the law. Notes on Congressional Regulation of federal rules of decision and judgments a. Hayburn’s case i. Stands for the principle that Congress cannot vest review of the decisions of Art. III courts in officials of the Executive branch. Here, Sec. of War could not review federal court’s determination of appropriate disability benefits for Revolutionary war veterans. b. Klein i. Congress passed a law that excepted SCOTUS jurisdiction for cases under the Reconstruction act involving a presidential pardon as evidence of not being a confederate and mandated that such cases be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Court found the statute unconstitutional because it allowed the government to decide the case in its own favor and against what the Court had already declared as settled law (that a pardon is sufficient evidence), which offended the separation of powers. It also offended the Executive’s power to pardon by finding such pardons as evidence of guilt. ii. Takeaway: A statute cannot prescribe the rules of decision to the Judicial Department of the government in cases pending before it. This prohibition does not take hold when Congress amends applicable law. c. U.S. v. Sioux Nation i. Sioux sued the U.S. after Congress passed a law taking the Black Hills away from the tribe even though the Hills had been originally included in a land treaty. The Court of claims dismissed the Sioux’s case. When the Sioux later resubmitted the claim, the court of claims dismissed the case under res judicata (once a case has been resolved, the parties cannot relitigate the case). Congress then waived the defense of res judicata ii. SCOTUS held that Congress’s waiver of res judicata did not violate the separation of powers because Congress has the power to waive the res judicata effect of a prior judgment entered in the Government’s favor on a claim against the U.S. 1. The waiver of a legal defense did not effect the Court’s ultimate decision of the claim. d. Robertson v. Seattle Audborn Society i. Finding that Congress’s act did not compel a finding of law, but amended applicable law, even though the act directly mentioned pending cases before the Supreme Court in order to clarify the specific provisions being amended. e. Bank Markazi 6

Federal Courts Outline, Fall 2020, Joelle Leib i. Finding that Congress may amend the law and make the change applicable to the pending case, even when the amendment is outcome determinative.

Expanding Federal Court Jurisdiction Art. III Sec. 2: “The judicial power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the U.S., and Treaties…” Main Question: When can Congress have the ability to expand jurisdiction to a federal court when the case involves state law claims and does not have diversity jurisdiction? Takeaway: For Congress to create federal jurisdiction over a suit involving a state-law claim and non-diverse parties, there must be a substantial federal interest or a substantive federal law that will necessarily arise. A purely jurisdictional statute is not “arising under” jurisdiction. I. Osborn v. Bank of U.S. (1824) (Marshall) a. Holding that Statute (stating that Bank of U.S. could sue or be sued in federal court) established jurisdiction in the circuit court over any suit involving the Bank, even if the suit involved a state law claim and there was no diversity jurisdiction. Because the Bank of the U.S. is a party to the suit, the federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case even if the underlying claim involved is a state law claim (like here how the underlying claim was theft after an Ohio state agent stole funds from the Bank after McColluch held that states could not tax the Bank). i. When a question to which the judicial power is extended by the Constitution (“arising under” clause), forms an (federal) ingredient of the original cause of action, it is in the power of Congress to give the federal circuit courts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or law may be involved in it. Here, because the case involves the Bank of the U.S., the claim contains the necessary federal “ingredient.” b. Johnson dissent i. Cases do not arise under federal law until such a question actually arises, unconstitutional stretch of Art. III. Just because the case involved the Bank of the U.S. does not mean state courts do not have original jurisdiction. c. Takeaway i. This case was used to support idea of “protective jurisdiction”. II. Protective Jurisdiction a. Protective jurisdiction: Congress gives federal courts jurisdiction over state law claims asserted by non-diverse plaintiffs who need the “protection” of a federal forum, even in the absence of a substantive federal claim. The Court then determines whether this is a valid exercise of “arising under” jurisdiction. i. Congress can always confer federal court jurisdiction where it has validly created a federal claim. b. Whether, where Congress has the power to create federal substantive rights but does not do so, it may exercise the power of permitting a state-law suit to be heard in federal court. III. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills (1957) a. Holding that § 301 of Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, which grants federal courts jurisdiction over cases involving contract disputes between employer and labor organizations and employees in an industry affecting 7

Federal Courts Outline, Fall 2020, Joelle Leib

IV.

commerce, regardless of amount in controversy or citizenship of parties, is constitutional even though the statute does not clarify whether state or federal law should apply to the claims. Here, the claim at issue involved a contracts dispute governed by state law. b. Frankfurter Dissent i. Found Congress’s grant of jurisdiction to federal courts over contracts that came into being entirely by virtue of state substantive law when there is no diversity jurisdiction unconstitutional. ii. Dismisses the protective jurisdiction theory because under the “protective jurisdiction” theory, the “arising under” jurisdiction of federal courts would be vastly expanded. iii. Concludes that statute as applied here is unconstitutional because the way the commerce clause (Art. I power) is used here does not present a substantial federal interest, so federal courts should not be able to adjudica...