Gibbons v Ogden Case Brief PDF

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Gibbons v. Ogden 22 U.S. 1 (1824) Characters: New Jersey governor, Aaron Ogden, who received a license in 1814 to run passenger steamboats between New York City and Elizabethtown, New Jersey. Thomas Gibbons, an estranged business partner of Ogden, was determined to break the New York steamboat monopoly. Behavior: One of Gibbons strategies to break the New York steamboat monopoly, involved the federal Coasting Licensing Act of 1793. Under that Act, a federal office would issue licenses to boat owners for a fee. With a coasting license, a ship could fly the U.S. flag, would be exempt from certain federal fees and duties applicable to foreign ships, and would be “entitled to privileges of ships or vessels employed in the coasting trade for fisheries.” In 1816, Gibbons procured federal coasting licenses for two passenger steamboats (the Bellona and the Stoudinger) and began operating them on Ogden’s New York-New Jersey route. The Law(s) Involved: Article I, section 8, clause 3; Article I, section 9; 10th Amendment (An affirmative grant of power is not exclusive, unless in its own nature it be such that the continued exercise of it by the former possessor is inconsistent with the grant, and that is not of that description. Article VI, section 2. Article I, section 9, clause 4. The Specific Constitutional Provision Involved: “Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes,” [Art. I, sec 8. Cl. 3]. “No preference shall be given, by any regulation of commerce or revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another,” [Art. 9, sec 9.] “Constitution is the supreme law” [Article VI sec. 2]. The Arguments: Gibbons argued that New York had no authority to regulate commerce at all, because that was exclusively within the power of the federal government. Another, even if New York had some power to regulate internal commerce, it could not bar interstate commerce authorized by the federal government. Ogden raised two arguments in his defense: (a) Congress had no authority to issue coasting licenses to being with, and (b) even if Congress could issue coasting licenses, the license power did not strip New York of its ability to control its own waters. The Constitutional Issue: Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce? The Legal History: The state trial court ruled in favor of Ogden, issuing an injunction against Gibbons. The state court of appeals affirmed. The U.S. Supreme Court then granted review. Unique Background or Contextual Factors: The Court’s (Majority) Holding and Dispensation: The unanimous court found that New York’s licensing requirement for out-of-state operators were inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. In his opinion, Chief Justice John Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce, which included navigation on interstate waterways. He also gave meaning to the phrase “among the several states” in the Commerce Clause. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress.

The Court’s Expressed Reasoning (The Majority Opinion): Chief Justice Marshall, arguing for the majority of the Court argued that the constitution should not be interpreted literally, and that the power of commerce belongs to Congress. He argued that “among several states” also meant within a state, not just within several. He argues that power is the power to regulate, and that although both the state and the federal government have the power to make laws, they cannot conflict with each other. Collision with an act of Congress means collision with the constitution, and everything that is not made in pursuance of it is unconstitutional. Concurring and Dissenting Opinions: Justice Johnson concurred, arguing that New York had no power to enact any regulation affecting inter-state commerce – whether or not it conflicted with an enacted federal statute – because the constitution placed that entire field under the authority of the federal government. Personal Notes:...