Grid- OAPA - notes PDF

Title Grid- OAPA - notes
Author Bne Mamvura
Course Criminal law
Institution University of London
Pages 4
File Size 133.1 KB
File Type PDF
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Summary

Offences Definition & Additional Info. Actus Reus Mens Rea Assault- section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988-Any conduct by which D, intentionally or recklessly causes V to apprehend application of immediate and unlawful force- R v Ireland; R v Burstow (Lord Hope)Summary offence- s Crimin...


Description

Offences Assault- section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988-

Definition & Additional Info. Any conduct by which D, intentionally or recklessly causes V to apprehend application of immediate and unlawful force- R v Ireland; R v Burstow (Lord Hope) Summary offence- s.39 Criminal Justice Act Includes texts, letters, tweets, etc. – Constanza Making of silent telephone calls is capable of constituting assault- R v Ireland; R v Burstow

Battery- section 39 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988

A battery is committed when D intentionally or recklessly applies unlawful force to V Summary offence- s.39 Criminal Justice Act No need for it to be rude, aggressive or hostile: Faulkner v Talbot

Actus Reus AR of assault consists of causing another to apprehend application of immediate and unlawful force: Venna  No requirement for violence.  Apprehension = anticipation (not necessarily emotion of fear Smith v Chief Superintend, Woking Police Station); if no apprehension= no offence: Lamb Victim’s belief- V must anticipate/ believe in immediate and unlawful force.  Words can negate belief: Turberville v Savage

Mens Rea Intention or subjectively recklessness as to causing another person to apprehend immediate and unlawful personal violence: R v Savage; R v Parmenter  Venna – assault and battery can be committed recklessly Venna – subjective standard of recklessness applies

Immediacy: interpreted flexibly; not right now; At some point not excluding the immediate future: R v Constanza; Words alone can constitute assault: Turberville v Savage Infliction of unlawful force (Fagan v MPC) to, or causing an ‘impact’ on the body of another  No need for V to be aware of touching  No requirement that the V apprehend (assault not necessary)  Direct and indirect: DPP v K; Haystead v Chief Constable of Derbyshire Omission-D will not be liable for an omission that causes V to be subject to force to the body unless he has a special relationship or statutory duty: DPP v Santa-Bermudez; Fagan v MPC

The intention to apply unlawful force to the body or being subjectively reckless as to the application of force to the body.  Venna – assault and battery can be committed recklessly Venna – subjective standard of recklessness applies

Section 47 of OAPA 1861 – assault occasioning actual bodily harm (ABH)

Whosoever shall be convicted on indictment occasioning actual bodily harm shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than five years.

Touching that is generally acceptable in the conduct of ordinary life- informed consent: Collins v Wilcock (Lord Goff); Wilson v Pringle AR for an assault or battery to cause ABH -

Offence used to be common law but Courtie confirmed it is statutory.

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Common assault is an ingredient of this offence- in two forms: battery and assault

Section 20 of OAPA 1861– assault occasioning grievous bodily harm (GBH)

Wounding or inflicting GBHwhosever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or inflict any GBH upon any other person, either with or without any weapon or instrument, shall be guilty of an offence Assault is not necessarily an ingredient of this offence- R v Ireland; R v Burstow

ABH: not really serious DPP v Smith (cutting substantial amount of hair); be more than merely ‘transient’ and ‘trifling’- R v Donovan (per Swift J) Psychiatric illness is capable of amounting to bodily harm for the purposes of the three sections: ChanFook; Ireland; Burstow Causation: Beech confirmed in Roberts (Stephenson LJ): whether the injury was something that could be reasonably foreseen as the consequence of what the accused did or say. – if yes: chain of causation is not broken unless V does something so ‘daft’ and ‘unexpected’

Unlawfully wounding or inflicting GBH -

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Wound: all the layers of he skin must be pierced (dermis and epidermis): Moriarty v Brooks; M’Loughlin GBH= ‘Really serious harm’: Metheram; DPP v Smith (HL); totality/ cumulative effect of all injuries: Grundy; age, health or other factors of the V can be taken into account when considering what constitutes GBH: Bollom; HIV = GBH: Dica

MR need NOT correspond with AR! No intention or recklessness required to cause ABH. No requirement to prove that D intended or was reckless as to causing some ABH: Savage; Parmenter Either assault or battery. No need for cognitive awareness by the accused of the ABH. Strict liability with regards to the element of ABH. No need for D to foresee any bodily harm whatsoever. Intention or subjective recklessness as to the causing of some harm of a minor character: Mowatt (Lord Diplock)

Section 18 of OAPA 1861– assault occasioning grievous bodily harm with intent

Psychiatric illness is capable of amounting to bodily harm for the purposes of the three sections: Ireland; Burstow Wounding or causing GBH with intent to go GBH or to resist apprehension

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Psychiatric illness is capable of amounting to bodily harm for the purposes of the three sections: Ireland; Burstow Consent

Same AR as section 20 OAPA Unlawfully wounding or inflicting GBH Wound: all the layers of he skin must be pierced (dermis and epidermis): Moriarty v Brooks; M’Loughlin GBH= ‘Really serious harm’: Metheram; DPP v Smith (HL); totality/ cumulative effect of all injuries: Grundy

Intent to cause GBH (R v Taylor) or intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or detainer of any person. Recklessness is not enough. An intent to wound is insufficient. There must be an intent to cause really serious bodily harm (Taylor) ca

Consent is not a defence technically rather when present =denial of element of unlawfulness of the AR- if there is consent there is no wrong. Implied consent is assumed to physical contact which is generally acceptable in the ordinary conduct of daily life: per Lord Goff in Collins v Wilcock Capacity to consent: covers a circumstances where the person is incapacitated to consent because of a temporary (e.g. intoxication) or permanent (e.g. mental illness) impairment of brain or mind; youth may also incapacitate you: Burrell v Harmer Informed consent: degree of knowledge V must have to be capable of giving a valid consent: Konzani Consent procured by fraud: In the offences against the person the common law approach to frauds vitiating consent = unsatisfactory.  Frauds as to the nature of the act may vitiate consent: Dica  Frauds as to the purpose of the act do not negate consent: Richardson; Bolduc and Bird Duress: may negative apparently consent. Legal limits on the validity of consent: Factual consent to mere assault and battery are valid no matter what circumstances (even if the sadomasochist encounter); factual consent to ABH or more serious harm are not valid (e.g. serious harm, wounding and death)- except if the activity is recognized by Parliament as legally valid (e.g. surgical operations). Where the act has some social interest recognized by law as valid, it is the

HIV cases

question of balancing the degree of harm which will or may be cause against the valued of purpose.  Levels of harm: (1) what level of harm is caused? (2) What level of harm is foreseeable or intended? (3) Whether the activity in which the harm arises is one of the exceptional categories in which consent is recognized by law? Where V has not consented to the risk of infection, D could be liable under section 20 OAPA, if he was reckless as to whether he might infect V. IF D intended to infect V he would be liable under s.18 irrespective of consent....


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