Gv212 - Lecture notes week16-25 PDF

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International Organizations Tobias Böhmelt Department of Government University of Essex Week 16: Introduction – Cooperation Under Anarchy Seminar Overview § Contact details. § Overview of the course. § What is “anarchy?” § Simple problems of cooperation. § What is the role of international organizations then? Contact Details § Lecturer: Tobias Böhmelt. § Room: 5.019. § Office hours: Monday, 10am-12pm. § E-mail: [email protected]. § It is easiest to contact me by e-mail. Overview of the Course § Sessions: Thursdays, 2:00-3:30pm. § There will not be any breaks during the seminar. § Instead, we will be starting at 2:00pm and finish at 3:30pm. § Attendance and participation are expected (see also course requirements) – advise me if unable to attend. Overview of the Course § This course offers a comprehensive examination of the role of international organizations (IOs) in world politics. § Besides teaching the basic theories and methods that are necessary for studying IOs, this course frequently considers

the application of those theories and methods to a range of empirical cases (institutions). § Threefold emphasis: (1) introduction, (2) why joining IOs, and (3) what impact do IOs have? Overview of the Course § More specifically, the first part of this course offers an introduction and will seek to explain how, if at all, IOs obtain some measure of authority in international affairs. § The second part focuses on the rationale behind IOs, i.e., why states delegate certain tasks to IOs instead of dealing unilaterally or multilaterally outside of an institutional context. § The third part of the course focuses on the impact and effectiveness of international institutions. We assess whether and how IOs influence state compliance with agreements, and whether IOs socialize states to behave in certain ways. Overview of the Course § Readings (mostly) electronically available. § Slides available via Online Resource Bank (ORB): https://orb.essex.ac.uk/. § Slides and announcements via Moodle: https://moodle.essex.ac.uk/login/index.php. § Prepare the required readings for each week – even if you are not supposed to give a presentation that week. § The non-required readings are helpful for further study of a topic, BA or MA theses, and this module’s coursework. Overview of the Course § The requirements for the course include participation in class discussions (5%), one class presentation (35%), and one research paper (60%). § Participation: The quality of students’ experience in this

course depends on the participation of students. Regular attendance and active class participation constitute a significant portion of the course grade. Students will be expected to read the required readings, think critically about them, and discuss them in class. Overview of the Course § Class presentation: First, you will submit one short (2-4 pages) paper summarizing the readings for a particular week. This short paper should be distributed to the class ahead of the meeting time (email to lecturer, at least 24 hours in advance). § Each student writing such a paper must also prepare a short class presentation. The goal of this exercise is not simply to summarize the assigned readings, as others in the class will already be familiar with the assignment. § Rather, a good summary discusses the broader issues, themes, and questions underlying the readings or identifies problems with research design or potential flaws in the particular articles. The paper(s) and presentation(s) serve as a starting point for a more focused in-class discussion. Overview of the Course § Research paper: A research paper is required for the course (20-30 pages, double spaced). This paper should ask and examine a research question related to the course. Topics will be selected in consultation with the module supervisor. § Students will prepare a research design (due by four weeks before the term ends officially) that outlines the research question and the relevant literature for that paper. § This research design has to be submitted to the lecturer by

email. What Is “Anarchy?” § How would you describe the international system? § Who are the main actors? What Is “Anarchy?” § Anarchy: • “Today, nations interact without central control, and therefore the conclusions about the requirements for the emergence of cooperation have empirical relevance to many central issues of international politics” (Axelrod 1981: 307). What Is “Anarchy?” § Anarchy: • Hobbes: State of Nature – bellum omnium contra omnes. • Leviathan as the superior authority. • But not existent in international relations. • System shapes the behaviour and threatens existence of states. • Security dilemma: rivalry, socialization → similar behaviour, self-help. What Is “Anarchy?” § Sovereign (autonomy leads to self-determination, nonintervention, recognition of each other, territory, conclude treaties) states are the important actors. § They are rational and unitary, power/utility maximizing (absolute / relative terms → coordination game with distributive conflicts). § Individual motivation: evil, seek of dominance, power as key aim → conflict. § National interest (e.g., threats, vulnerabilities determine

how people would act (but: moral principles are recognized; as well as partly the interior political system: Vietnam fought for domestic reasons!) → issue hierarchy: safety (high, low politics). Simple Problems of Cooperation § Prisoners’ Dilemma. 3,3 1,4 4,1 2,2 cooperate cooperate defect defect Simple Problems of Cooperation § Preference ordering A: dc, cc, dd, cd. § Preference ordering B: cd, cc, dd, dc. § Pareto optimum at cc, cd, and dc. § Nash equilibrium at dd only, though. § None of the actors gets the preferred outcome as defection dominates cooperation. § However, the actors can gain by cooperating. § Still, free-riding problem. Simple Problems of Cooperation § Coordination game: “choosing sides.” 4,3 0,0 0,0 3,4 left left right right Simple Problems of Cooperation § Preference ordering A: ll, rr, rl = lr.

§ Preference ordering B: rr, ll, rl = lr. § Pareto optimum at ll and rr. § Nash equilibrium at ll and rr. § The actors can gain by cooperation, i.e., agreeing on one standard. § No free-riding problem. § However, the preferred outcomes differ across actors. § Which side to choose? Role of IOs Under Anarchy? § Prisoners’ Dilemma leads to inferior outcomes in the absence of an “entity above the actors.” § Distribution issue in terms of the coordination game. § Problem becomes even more severe when more actors are involved (provision of public goods, free-riding is inherent, enforcement and monitoring become costly). Role of IOs Under Anarchy? § When is cooperation possible? § What is the role of international organizations then? Role of IOs Under Anarchy? § When is cooperation possible? § Essentially: • High discount factor ai (a factor that weighs current benefits in light of future outcomes). • Infinite time horizon (t=[0, …,n]). • Tit-for-tat (reciprocity). Role of IOs Under Anarchy? § What is the role of international organizations then? • Enlarging the shadow of the future. • Reducing transaction costs. • Decrease uncertainty. • Allow for credible commitments.

• Issue linkage. • Information provision. • Providing for monitoring and enforcement.

International Organizations Tobias Böhmelt Department of Government University of Essex Week 17: International Organizations and International Law – An Overview Seminar Overview  International law – public international law.  What is an international organization?  International organizations and international law.  Soft law vs. hard law.  Legalization and domestic actors. International Law  Where does the international system come from? International Law  International law – public international law.  The emergence of the state system. • Ius inter gentes: common law and treaty law. • Origin of that system: 1648 Treaty of Westphalia.  Sovereign state as the fundamental principle of the system. International Law  Sovereign state as the fundamental principle of the system.  According to Max Weber: • Successful monopoly of the use of force. • A given territory. • Legitimate.  Self-determination, non-intervention, recognition of each other, territory, conclude treaties (pacta sunt servanda).  However, the relations are characterized by anarchy. What is an International Organization?  How would you define an international organization?

What is an International Organization?  “Sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983: 3).  “Institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets of issues in international relations” (Keohane 1989: 4). What is an International Organization?  Institution drawing membership from at least three states, having activities in several states, and whose members are held together by a formal agreement and rely on stable administrative structures. • Pevehouse (2004): IOs consist of at least three members, hold regular plenary sessions at least once every ten years, possess a permanent secretariat and corresponding headquarters, and are not emanations of already existing organizations. • Commonly known rules used to structure recurrent interaction situations that are endowed with a sanctioning mechanism (North 1990). What is an International Organization?  Established by intergovernmental treaty.  Specified field of work.  Two central bodies: CoP (assembly) and secretariat.  More or less independent actor in the international system. • But: actions depend on the (consensus) preferences of the member states. • Very limited own responsibilities. What is an International

Organization? What is an International Organization?  What can international organizations do? • Enlarging the shadow of the future. • Reducing transaction costs. • Decrease uncertainty. • Allow for credible commitments. • Issue linkage. • Information provision. • Providing for monitoring and enforcement. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Legalization of the international system is a system of institutionalized rules, norms, and regulations that characterize organizations.  Along three (+1) dimensions.  These are normally implemented to credibly commit. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Along three (+1) dimensions. • Obligation. • Precision. • Delegation. • Flexibility. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Obligation. • A regime’s degree of bondage and commitment. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Obligation. • Rules are not necessarily binding in a legal sense, i.e., they may not be “subject to scrutiny under the general rules, procedures and discourse of international law” (Abbott et al. 2000: 401 ). • The majority of organizations rest on principles, norms,

and goals that are nonbinding and therefore do not create any compulsory actions for states (Porter and Brown 1996: 37). Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Obligation. • High obligation commitments enable regime members to assert legal claims (pacta sunt servanda) as well as that they engage in legal discourse, invoke binding procedures, and resort to legal remedies (Abbott et al. 2000: 411 ). • Under soft law regulations, however, nations cannot refer to any of these “official” mechanisms, but have to rely on normative claims and unofficial discourse instead. The latter process is unlikely to be fruitful, though. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Precision. • The unambiguous definition of states’ required actions in certain circumstances. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Precision. • Precise rules narrow the “scope for reasonable interpretation” (Abbott et al. 2000: 402). • Thereby introducing clarity into an IO structure and leaving the states with precise ideas of what to do. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Precision. • This mechanism reduces the level of uncertainty significantly and creates a non-contradictory framework of rules that can be carried out coherently. • A high level of precision is therefore likely to lower the propensity of rule violations. Int. Organizations and Int. Law

 Delegation. • Granting authority of implementation, interpretation, rule application, and dispute resolution to one or more than one third party. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Delegation. • States lose some degree of sovereign decision-making since bodies like enforcement organizations or secretariats take over some of this power. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Delegation. • Poorly developed or non-existent delegation mechanisms may make it increasingly difficult for regimes to reach final decisions since long and costly bargaining among states could be an obstacle. • Parties can still accept or reject an outcome without legal justification (Abbott et al. 2000: 415) or interpret agreements in a “self-serving and biased” manner (von Stein 2008: 248). Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Flexibility. • “Procedural opportunities for transcending initial constraints” (Wettestad 1999: 29). • Devices, which are normally employed to lower the concerns of states when these face uncertainty about the consequences of their actions (von Stein 2008: 249). Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Flexibility. • For example, regimes’ decision-making procedures can be slow and cumbersome. • Introducing more flexibility through majority voting is likely to address countries’ concerns about possible harmful

consequences of their actions. • They can then rapidly adjust to new circumstances that are caused by new developments in a specific problem field or just return to the previous rules. Int. Organizations and Int. Law  Flexibility. • Flexibility mechanisms might include escape clauses or opting-out possibilities. • If these are incorporated in a regime, states can circumvent exogenous shocks and other difficulties that would exacerbate compliance (Rosendorff and Milner 2001). • Flexibility mechanisms directly address countries’ concerns about sovereignty, power-sharing, and enforcement. Soft Law vs. Hard Law  How do these types of design translate into soft law and hard law?  What is the advantage of one over the other?  In designing an IO, when should states rely on hard vs. soft law? Soft Law vs. Hard Law Soft Law vs. Hard Law  Soft law: essentially weakened in one of the previously introduced dimensions of legalization. • Lower contracting costs. • Easier to negotiate. • Little impact on sovereignty. Soft Law vs. Hard Law  Hard law: essentially binding, precise, and delegates authority.  If commitments are “hard:” • They keep the actors in line. • Strengthen credibility of commitments. • Make more complete contracts.

• Transaction costs and modifying political strategies at domestic level as well. Soft Law vs. Hard Law  States will then comply with the specific hard-law rule even if they face high economic/political costs otherwise and a deviation from the rule appears as inefficient.  On the other hand, if there is only soft law, states will cheat, leading to a dynamic that could eventually undermine the system. → Hence, make enforcement of laws rather probabilistic and decide case-wise while having hard law? Soft Law vs. Hard Law  Ultimately, we face a trade-off (balancing act).  On the other hand, do we actually need “legalization” and should we not pursue “persuasion?” Soft Law vs. Hard Law  Persuasion.  The process of persuading states to cooperate often requires the change of crucial and deeply held state interests.  This necessitates time, which is likely to make those efforts extremely costly.  Persuasion is limited to certain representatives who are responsible for the relevant discourse, but their potential successors or colleagues are excluded here. Soft Law vs. Hard Law Soft Law vs. Hard Law Soft Law vs. Hard Law Legalization and Domestic Actors  We have not (yet) talked about the relationship between IOs and the domestic level.  But both, the international level and the domestic setup,

are strongly intertwined.  How does the previous discussion relate to IOs and the domestic level? Legalization and Domestic Actors  The costs of signing a hard agreement may outweigh the benefits. • Constrains leaders, reduces flexibility.  However, all uncertainties can never be predicted in the first place. • Undermines specific majorities “at home.”  Having said that, flexibility instruments may comprise a moral hazard.  If the circumstances of flexibility are not perfectly observed, parties have an incentive to cheat all the time.

International Organizations Tobias Böhmelt Department of Government University of Essex Week 18: Why Delegate? Constraining and Embedding Power Seminar Overview  Definition of actors and power.  The case of small actors: constraining power.  The case of major powers: embedding power.  The merchant guilds. Definitions of Actors and Power

 Who are the actors? How are they defined? Definitions of Actors and Power  Who are the actors? How are they defined?  Powerful actors (major powers) vs. small actors (minor powers).  The status is derived from power.  What is power? Definitions of Actors and Power  Power: • The ability to impose one’s own will on others. • Even if these have other preferences. • That is, subordination and domination of other states. → Influence. Definitions of Actors and Power  Two possible extreme outcomes for the structure of the system? Definitions of Actors and Power  Two possible extreme outcomes for the structure of the system:  Dominance: one single state would be able, with impunity, to overawe the other states (Morgenthau) → Unilateralism.  Balance of Power: when one state becomes inordinately powerful, other states should recognize this as a threat to their security and respond by taking equivalent measures to enhance their power → Equal powers and ultimately multilateralism. Definitions of Actors and Power  States’ strategies in such circumstances? Definitions of Actors and Power

 States’ strategies in such circumstances? • Balancing. • Bandwagoning.  However, bilateral or loose multilateral strategies are often not possible. • Free-riding problem, coordination and enforcement issues. The Case of Small Actors  What might be the interests of smaller actors in international affairs? The Case of Small Actors  What might be the interests of smaller actors in international affairs?  The more that a powerful state is capable of dominating or abandoning weaker states, the more the weaker states will care about constraints on the leading state’s policy autonomy (i.e., US in 1991 ). • What can IOs do in this context then? The Case of Small Actors  IOs can provide the rules and organizational structures to determine the appropriate constraints on national sovereignty. • Pacta de contrahendo.  IOs define what it is that states are expected to do.  And they make it difficult and costly for states to do otherwise. The Case of Small Actors  IOs define what it is that states are expected to do, and they make it difficult and costly for states to do otherwise.

• Coercion (threat of or direct action expressed unless the target state acquiesces to the articulated demand). • Enforcement. • Essentially binding and lock-in constraints that address fears of domination. The Case of Small Actors  Minor powers build long-term economic, political, and security commitments with major powers that are difficult to retract. • Alliances, for example, allow partners to restrain each other and manage joint relations. The Case of Small Actors  In essence, this allows minor powers to exert influence over major powers → Coordinating and enforcing sanctions.  Exploitation of the large by the small. • Burden sharing in IOs, i.e., the largest actor with a valid interest will provide everything. → Those who stand to gain most will pick up the cost-tab of supplying the good (see NATO). The Case of Small Actors The Case of Major Powers  What constitutes the incentive of states to commit themselves to IOs? The Case of Major Powers  Generally, major powers are reluctant to tie themselves too closely to multilater...