HEIDEGGER’S INTRODUCTION TO BEING AND TIME PDF

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1 HEIDEGGER’S INTRODUCTION TO BEING AND TIME A PARAPHRASTIC CONDENSATION © Thomas Sheehan Stanford University July 2019 2 NOTES 1. Abbreviations: SZ = Sein und Zeit, 11th ed. M-R = Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson S-S = Being and Time, trans. Stambaugh and Schmidt 2. The numbers at the...

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HEIDEGGER’S INTRODUCTION TO BEING AND TIME A PARAPHRASTIC CONDENSATION © Thomas Sheehan Stanford University July 2019

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NOTES 1. Abbreviations: SZ = Sein und Zeit, 11th ed. M-R = Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie and Robinson S-S = Being and Time, trans. Stambaugh and Schmidt 2. The numbers at the right margin before each paragraph, separated by an “equals” sign—for example: 8c = 28c = 8b indicate the page and the paragraph of Sein und Zeit = Being and Time trans. Macquarrie-Robinson = Being and Time, trans. Stambaugh-Schmidt. 3. The letters a, b, c, d, (etc.) indicate the paragraphs on the page, beginning with the very top paragraph (= a), even if that paragraph begins in the middle of a sentence. 4. Thus, in the right margin of the first page of the book, the notation 1a = 19a = xxix-a refers to • p. 1, first paragraph of Sein und Zeit, 11th ed. • p. 19 first paragraph of Being and Time, trans. Macquarrie-Robinson • p. xxix first paragraph of Being and Time, trans. Stambaugh-Schmidt 5. The superscript mark n refers to an annotation at the beginning of the respective section, following the outline. 6. Footnotes that begin with “Hd.” refer to Heidegger’s footnotes as they appear in all editions up through the 11th edition. Footnotes that begin with “Marginal note” refer to the marginalia that appear in GA 2.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS Preface

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INTRODUCTION TO THE ENTIRE BOOK: THE QUESTION “HOW IS IT THAT WE UNDERSTANDING BEING?” CHAPTER 1: THE (1) NECESSITY, (2) STRUCTURE, AND (3) PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION

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§1 §2 §3 §4

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Necessity: Structure: Priority-1: Priority-2:

We need to re-ask the question “How is it that we understand being?” The formal structure of this question The ontological priority of this question among the sciences The ontic priority of this question rests on the ontic priority of ex-sistence

CHAPTER 2: THE (1) TWO-FOLD TASK, (2) METHOD, AND (3) OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

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§5 §6 §7 §8

22 26 31 41

The task of SZ I: Analyze ex-sistence to get the horizon for finding how we understand being The task of SZ II: Dismantle the history of ontology Method: Phenomenology Outline of the book

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PREFACE TO THE ENTIRE BOOK

1. Plato, Sophist 244a4-8 2. An unasked and unanswered question 3. Topics of the next two chapters

Editor’s notes to Preface ¶ 1, is / has being: The Eleatic Stranger uses ὄν (without the definite article), the present participle of the verb εἰµί (“I am”; infinitive εἶναι: “to be”). This ὄν points to the “is-ing” (the being) of something that “is-in-being,” i.e., that “has being.” ¶ 2, provisional aim: “Provisional” because it is the immediate aim of SZ I, whereas SZ II will take a further step and use “time” as the clue for dismantling the history of ontology. ¶ 3, time is what accounts for: Literally, “time is the possible horizon for understanding being at all.” Here “possible” is not set in contrast to “actual” but instead means “that which makes possible” (ermöglicht) the understanding of being.

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PREFACE TO THE ENTIRE BOOK SZ = MR = SS

1a = 19a = xxix-a 1. Plato, Sophist 244a4-8 [In a dialogue with the young mathematician Theaetetus, the Eleatic Stranger expresses puzzlement:] . . . δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑµεῖς µὲν ταῦτα [τί ποτε βούλεσθε σηµαίνειν ὁπόταν ὂν φθέγγησθε] πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡµεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ µὲν ᾠόµεθα, νῦν δ' ἠπορήκαµεν. . . . “It is clear that these matters [namely, what you mean in saying ‘is’ or ‘has being’] have long been known to you. We used to think we understood, but now we have become confused.” n 1a = 19b = xxxix-c 2. An unasked and unanswered question. Nowadays we have no answer to the question of what it means that something is or has being—and we are not even troubled by the fact that we don’t know. So we must renew the question. Our goal in this book is to work out concretely the question of what accounts for “being” at all. Our provisional aimn is to show that time is what accounts forn our ability to have any understanding of being. 1b = 19c = xxix-d 3. Topics of the next two chapters. The next two chapters discuss (1) the goal of the book, (2) the kind of investigation it is, and (3) the way to achieve the goal. ***

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INTRODUCTION TO THE ENTIRE BOOK THE QUESTION “WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE INTELLIGIBILIY OF BEING?”

CHAPTER 1 THE (1) NECESSITY, (2) STRUCTURE, AND (3) PRIORITY OF THE QUESTION

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§1 NECESSITY: WE NEED TO RE-ASK THE QUESTION: “WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF BEING?”

1. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM 1. The question has been forgotten 2. Being, as universal, is allegedly empty and need not be questioned 3. This mistaken view derives from three correct presuppositions of Aristotelian ontology 2. THREE TRADITIONAL PRESUPPOSTIONS ABOUT BEING AND THE MISTAKES THEY GIVE RISE TO 4. First: “Being is the most universal”—but not as a genus 5. Second: “As the most universal, being cannot be defined”—but it still remains a problem. 6. Third: “Being is self-evident”—but what accounts for it? 3. REJOINDER 7. It is the task of philosophy to investigate the so-called “self-evident.” 8. Hence the need to reformulate the question

Editor’s notes to § 1 ¶ 1, The question has been forgotten: At SZ 8d Heidegger summarizes: the question of being (1) has a venerable origins, (2) but lacks an answer, and (3) even a proper formulation. ¶ 1, Sophist 246a4-5: The Eleatic Stranger tells Theaetetus that there appears to be a war of giants and gods going on about the nature of being [οὐσία].The γιγαντοµαχία refers to the mythological war of the giants vs. the Olympian gods mentioned by Xenophanes (ca. 540 BCE; frag. 1, line 21) and Pindar (fl. ca. 450 BCE), Nemean Ode 1, 65-67, etc. ¶ 2, What accounts for the intelligibility of being?: Heidegger articulates the question about the “Sinn von Sein” as the question regarding (1) “worin gründet die innere Möglichkeit und Notwendigkeit der Offenbarkeit des Seins” (GA 16: 66.15–6), i.e., “what accounts for the intrinsic possibility and necessity of the openness of being”; and about (2) “das von woher und wodurch . . . das Sein west” (GA 73, 1: 82.15f.), i.e., about “whence and whereby being becomes present.” Title, no. 2, mistakes they give rise to: While being is in fact most universal, indefinable, and self-evident, these facts lead to three misunderstandings that Heidegger indicates here. ¶ 4, the “most universal” concept: Metaphysics II 4, 1001a21: ταῦτα [τὸ ἓν καὶ τὸ ὂν] καθόλου µάλιστα πάντων. “These two [“one” and “is/has being”] are the most universal of all things.” ¶ 4, first of all and everywhere: Summa theologiae, I-II, 94, a. 2, corpus: Illud quod primo cadit sub apprehensione est ens, cuius intellectus includitur in omnibus, quaecumque quis apprehendit; “Being [ens: “having being”] is what is apprehended first of all. The understanding of such being is included in everything—whatever it may be—that anyone apprehends. ¶ 4, universality of a genus: Metaphysics B 3, 998b 22: οὐχ ὃιόν τε δὲ τῶν ὄντων ἓν εἶναι γένος οὔτε τὸ ἓν οὔτε τὸ ὄν. “Neither of these two kinds of things [can] be a single genus, neither oneness nor having-being.” ¶ 5, differentiating out the species of the thing: For example, we define “human being” by locating it under/within the genus “animal” and, within that genus, under the species “rational animal.” The rule: Definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam. (Cf. Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, chap. 3, n. 10.) ¶ 5, being is not a thing Aquinas, De veritate, I, 1, responsio: Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua. “But no other things can be added to being [in the sense of having-being].”

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§1 WE NEED TO RE-ASK THE QUESTION: “WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE INTELLIBILITY OF BEING?” 1. INTRODUCING THE PROBLEM

2a = 21a = 1a 1. The question has been forgotten.n Today, there’s a renewed interest in metaphysics, but without a real “struggle” over the question: a γιγαντοµαχία περί τῆς οὐσίας [Sophist 246a4-5].n This utterly important question stimulated the work of Plato and Aristotle but then subsided from serious consideration, only to reemerge once more in Hegel’s Logic. However, what Plato and Aristotle wrested from the phenomena has been trivialized. 2b = 21b = 1b 2. Being, as universal, is allegedly empty and need not be questioned. The question has been trivialized and declared superfluous ever since the Greeks and precisely because of their accomplishments. People say that “being” is the most universal and empty concept—and because we already understand it, being or the is cannot and need not be defined. The Greeks found the question obscure and disturbing, but nowadays supposedly it has become “clear” and “self-evident.” Even to raise the question of “What accounts for the intelligibility of being?”n is considered to be an error of method. 2c = 21c = 2b 3. This mistaken view derives from three correct presuppositions of Aristotelian ontology. The claim that an inquiry into being is unnecessary is rooted in three presuppositions of ancient Greek ontology, the basis for our ontological categories. But before we can interpret that ontology and those categories [= SZ II], we first have to clarify the question of being along with the very source of all concepts of being [= SZ I, especially I.3]. In the present section we will simply review three truths of traditional ontology and the mistakes they lead to, so as to see the need to re-ask the question of what accounts for being. 2. THREE TRADITIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONS ABOUT BEING AND THE MISTAKES THEY GIVE RISE TO

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3b = 22b = 2c 4. First: “Being is the most universal”—but not as a genus. Aristotle calls being 1 (ὄν) the “most universal” concept,n and Aquinas says that being (ens) is what the mind encounters first of all and everywhere;n however, this is not the universality of a genus.n Rather, being (ὄν, ens) transcends genera and species: it is transcendens, a “transcendental” in the medieval scholastic sense of the term. Aristotle envisions the unity underlying all instances of being not as the highest genus of things but rather as the unity of analogy. His analogical approach placed the question of being on a new foundation (even though it depended on Plato’s formulation of the question). But Aristotle, along with the medieval Thomists and the Scotists, failed to clarify the analogy of being. Later Hegel’s Logic interpreted being as the “indeterminate immediate” and the basis for all other categories; but Hegel generates a multiplicity of categories rather than an analogical unity. Hence, to call being (i.e., the metaphysical “is” of things) the “most universal” leaves it obscure and in need of discussion. 4a = 23b = 3a 5. Second: “As the most universal, being is indefinable”—but it still remains a problem.2 As far as it goes, that is true: we cannot define “being” for the following reasons. We define things by first placing them “under” (= within) a genus and then differentiating out the species of the thing.n But first of all, being 1

Marginal note. That is, what-has-being, or beingness [das Seiend, die Seiendheit]. Hd. Pascal, Pensées et Opuscules, 6th revised edition, ed. Léon Brunschvicg (Paris: Librairie Hachette, 1912), 169.12-16: “One cannot undertake to define ‘being’ without falling into this absurdity: one cannot define a word without beginning with this: ‘It is…,’ either expressed or implied. Therefore, to define ‘being’ one has to say ‘It is…,’ thereby using the very word that is defined [in the definition].” The text is from the Opuscules, “De l’Esprit géométrique et de l’Art de persuader” [ca. 1658], section 1. 2

9 is not a thing; n and secondly it cannot be placed under a genus—i.e., it cannot be derived from or defined in terms of anything higher—because there’s nothing higher that being. (Likewise it cannot be represented by anything lower than itself). The upshot: “Being” [“Sein”] is not anything like a thing.3 Yet the “is” of things—their way of being—is still a problem to be solved. We’re simply saying that being cannot be a thing. Therefore, it can’t be defined by way of a logic based on a traditional ontology that applies only to things rather than to the “is” or way of being of things. So even though we cannot define being, we still have to ask: What accounts for the fact that we can and do understand it? 4b = 23c = 3b 6. Third: “Being is self-evident”—but what accounts for it? We use and understand “is” or “being” in all our relations, even in our relations to ourselves; hence, if being self-evident and always already understood, it seems we needn’t raise questions about it. However, this everyday intelligibility reveals a puzzling fact: a priori we do understand being, but we do not understand what makes it intelligible. Therefore we need to ask anew “What accounts for the fact that we can and do understand being?” 3. REJOINDER 4c = 23d = 3c 7. The task of philosophy is precisely to investigate the “self-evident.” Does one say that being is selfevident? But, as Kant points out, investigating the self-evident is precisely the philosopher’s job.4 4d = 24b = 3d 8. Hence the need to re-formulate the question. Two things about the question of being are clear: it does not yet have an answer, and even the question itself is obscure and lacks a clear direction. Hence we first have to find a way to adequately formulate the question about being.

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Marginal note. No! Rather, it’s that nothing can be decided about the clearing [Seyn] with the help of such conceptuality. 4 Hd. Kant, Reflexionen zur Anthropologie, Akademie-Ausgabe XV, 180, Reflexion 436 [Ed. ET Immanuel Kant, Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, Cambridge UP 2006.]

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§2 STRUCTURE: THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THIS QUESTIONn

1. THE QUESTION 1. How is being intelligible? 2. THE STRUCTURE OF ANY QUESTION 2. The three elements of any theoretical question. 3. Applying that three-fold structure to the question of being 3. WE ALREADY HAVE AN IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING OF BEING 4. Ex-sistence entails an implicit understanding of being 5. We seek to make that implicit understanding explicit 6. This pre-conceptual sense of being may be burdened by inadequate presuppositions 4. RENDERING OUR IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING OF BEING EXPLICIT 7. Two of the elements of the question about being 8. The third element of the question about being 9. Turning the question of being back upon the questioner. 5. THIS SEEMS TO BE CIRCULAR REASONING, BUT IS NOT 10. This seems to be circular reasoning 11. But it is not a vicious circle 12. The unique reciprocity of ex-sistence and being. The topics of the next two sections.

Editor’s notes to § 2 Title of § 2: At SZ 8c Heidegger says the topic of § 2 is the formal structure of the question of being and the conditions necessary for working it out. ¶ 2, three moments: In scholastic terminology these three would be called respectively obiectum materiale, obiectum formale quod, and obiectum formale quo, the last being the perspective/aspect (viz., intelligibility) in terms of which the second (viz., being) is being questioned. ¶ 2, ex-sisting as questioners: Here the German term Dasein is first introduced. ¶ 12, reciprocity: In the 1930s Heidegger will call this back-and-forth reciprocity “Gegenschwung” (oscillation), the unified either-or of Da-sein and Da-sein. See GA 65: 29.15 et passim; 70 126.18; 75: 59.15; 78: 335.13, etc.; cf. GA 26: 270.4-5.

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§2 THE FORMAL STRUCTURE OF THE QUESTION “WHAT ACCOUNTS FOR THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF BEING? n

1. THE QUESTION

5a = 24c = 4a 1. How is it that being is intelligible? This is the fundamental question, and it needs to be clarified. In this section we study (1) the structure of any question and (2) the distinctive character of the fundamental question “What accounts for the fact that being can be understood?” 2. THE STRUCTURE OF ANY QUESTION

5b = 24d = 4b 2. The three elements of any theoretical question. Questioning is a form of seeking, and seeking is guided by what is being sought. Questioning is a seeking for knowledge, specifically for what, that, and how the thing is. A scientific-theoretical question has three moments:n • Befragtes: the subject matter: the thing we are questioning. • Gefragtes: the focus: what we are asking about that thing • Erfragtes: the goal: what we are asking for regarding that thing Questions come from questioners, who have their own way of ex-sisting as questioners.n There are casual questions and explicit questions. In explicit questions, all three factors of the question need to be clarified. 5c = 25b = 4c 3. Applying that threefold structure to the question of being. We now use those three moments to formulate the question “What accounts for the intelligibility of being?” 3. WE ALREADY HAVE AN IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING OF BEING

5d = 25c = 4d 4. Ex-sistence entails an implicit understanding of being. If the thing being sought—in this case, the intelligibility of being—guides our search for it, it must be somehow already available to us. Above [at SZ 3b] we hinted that we always already understand being. Starting from that base we raise the question “What makes that possible?” Even if we do not yet know what the word “being” means, we do have an implicit, pre-conceptual sense of what “is” (and thus “being”) signifies. That pre-conceptual sense remains a fact even if we haven’t yet got the framework for understanding what makes being intelligible 4. RENDERING OUR IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDING OF BEING EXPLICIT

5e = 25d = 4e 5. We seek to make that implicit understanding explicit. Although it is indefinite and occasionally dim, this implicit understanding of being is a positive experience that we need to render explicit. We cannot do that right at the outset but must wait until we finally work out the full concept of being [in SZ I.3]. 6b = 25e = 5b 6. This pre-conceptual sense of being may be burdened by inadequate presuppositions. Our implicit sense of being may well be fraught with traditional notions that influence the way we generally understand being.– In any case, even if we lack an adequate concept of it, what we are seeking is not entirely unfamiliar to us. 6c = 25f = 5c 7. Two of the elements of the question about being. First, das Gefragte: We are questioning things, but what we asking about them is their being, which is not a thing at all. Rather, being is what determines that something is; it is what we understand when we understand that something is. Therefore, we may not approach being as if it were a thing, nor can we trace it back to a source in yet another thing. That would be

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what Plato calls “spinning a yarn” (µῦθόν τινα διηγεῖσθαι, Sophist 242c8). Rather we have to show how being is different from any thing. Secondly, das Erfragte: What we are asking for (i.e., what we hope to find out about being) is what accounts for the intelligibility of being, i.e., how it is that we can understand being. The concepts we use for that will be different from the concepts we use for things. 6d = 26b = 5d 8. The third element of the question about being. Thirdly, das Befragte. We are asking about being, but being is always the being of things. Hence the subject matter we start with is things: whatever has being. We are asking about their being, i.e., how the are in themselves. Such things must be already accessible, and we must be sure we have the right access to them. There are two issues here: 1. The various way something can be—for example: • what it is • how it is • that it is • its being real • its objectively present • its subsisting (in the case of numbers) • its being valid • its existing5 • even the fact that “there-is” (es gibt) such and such a thing. 2. What specific thing should we start with in order to find out how being is intelligible?6 Does any specific thing stand out as exemplary7 in manifesting being? And if ...