Henningsen v - Lecture notes 1 PDF

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Nor-Hatab M. Dalagan Some law and economics scholars have criticized this result as it will ultimately raise prices as automobile manufacturers and dealers have to pay for implied warranty costs. This results in an economically inefficient transaction since not all consumers wanted this warranty, but now all consumers are forced to pay for it. New Jersey courts, attorneys and scholars frequently cite Henningsen as the landmark case that established strict liability for defective products in the United States. However, the majority of US courts, attorneys, and law professors usually cite Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. and the Supreme Court of California as the source of the doctrine. Although Henningsen helped articulate the rationale for the then-imminent shift from implied warranty to strict liability as the dominant theory of American product liability , the case never actually imposes "strict liability" or "absolute liability" for defective products.[1]

Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. - 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960) RULE: An implied warranty of merchantability chargeable to either an automobile manufacturer or a dealer extends to the purchaser of the car, members of his family, and to other persons occupying or using it with his consent. It would be wholly opposed to reality to say that use by such persons is not within the anticipation of parties to such a warranty of reasonable suitability of an automobile for ordinary highway operation. Those persons must be considered within the distributive chain. FACTS: Plaintiffs were injured when a car they had recently purchased from dealer, made by manufacturer, veered into a highway sign because of its defective manufacture. The plaintiffs filed a case for breach of implied warranty of merchantability. The trial court found defendants liable for a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and dismissed the negligence claim. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

ISSUE: Were the defendants liable for a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability? ANSWER: Yes CONCLUSION: It is considered a disclaimer of implied warranties where the original date of purchase must be brought to the attention of the buyer. Even if the parties are free to contract, there is still the obligation to inform the buyer of such. On appeal, the court found that the express warranty, which was limited to replacement of parts sent to the factory, did not negate the implied warranty of fitness, given the inequality of bargaining power between manufacturers and purchasers of consumer goods. Reaction I agree on Dworkin argument that despite the gallons of ink spilled over the issue, the question "What is the law" had yet to be properly answer. He thought that the Realists were arrogant, and that the Positivists answered many questions, but not the truly fundamental ones. Realists argued that judges have true discretion, while Positivists say judges are bound by the secondary rules. And also Dworkin says that neither answer is sufficient. In practice, judges do not have unlimited discretion and there will always be cases in which the rules are insufficient. Judges are bound by principles. The distinction between principles and rules is important. Rules are hard and fast, all or nothing. A rule is meant to apply 100% of the time; all exceptions must be explicitly listed as part of the rule. If two rules contradict each other, one must be erased; they cannot exist side by side. Principles work differently. Principles are not all or nothing; they can apply to some cases, and not to others. They do not have explicit exceptions, because the principles themselves are not explicit. They are simply part of our common conception of justice. One of Dworkin's example cases is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors (1960). Mr.

Henningsen bought a car; the warrenty said the manufacturer's liability was limited to "making good" defective parts, and abosolutely nothing else. Here in this case in whatever reason Hennginsen argued that the manufacturer should be liable for more than just parts. At the time, there were no rules governing this issue, but the court decided for Henningsen. The court said that cars are important and dangerous, so manufacturers need to be liable for more than just parts. The court also said it couldn't support an agreement where someone's economic necessity has been exploited. The court relied on principles - especially the bit about not exploiting economic necessity. The court considered another principle - the need to hold up contracts. Here we have two principles that contradicted each other; the judge needed to weigh the two against each other. This is another aspect of principles; they have weight. In each case, the judge must decide which of the possible contradictory principles is the most important. And how do judges weigh principles? Well, it's what you call a hermeneutic process. Unfortunately, the rule of recognition cannot deal with principles; the RoR can only handle rules. Principles, Dworkin believes, spring from the meaning of justice itself. For Dworkin, the law is a continuing story. Each judge - or generation of judges, I guess - writes the next chapter. When dealing with an open texture case, a judge needs to look back over the precedent cases, and find the themes and ideas that are most important, and find a way to tie his current case to those themes. That's the work of the judge; picking out the themes of the past and continuing the story....