Human Rights Assignment 1 PDF

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According to Richard Rorty, can human rights and ethnocentrism be reconciled? If not, why not and if so, how?...

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t According to Richard Rorty, can human rights and ethnocentrism be reconciled? If not, why not and if so, how? Before exploring Rorty’s views on whether ethnocentrism and universal human rights can co-exist, it is first important to clarify exactly what we mean by ‘ethnocentrism’. Ethnocentrism is widely accepted to be the “belief that the norms, values, ideology, customs, and traditions of one's own culture or subculture are superior to those characterizing other cultural settings” (Brown, 2007). Therefore, within this paper the question being explored is simply does Richard Rorty believe that can there be ‘universal’ human rights without having a single ‘universal’ culture.

Rorty seems to answer this question with reference to the Argentinian Philosopher Eduardo Rabossi who suggests that a “Human Rights culture” (p.115) exists separately, and is “morally superior to” (p, 116) individuals basic cultural identity. Therefore we do not have to concern ourselves with each culture individually, rather look at human rights as an umbrella over the top of them all. Essentially, It is not a issue that there is not ‘naturally’ a single overarching culture free from ethnocentrism because we, as human beings, have the power to create one. However, despite this statement seemingly alluding to the suggestion that there is a possibility of reconciling human rights and ethnocentrism, the claim of cultural superiority could be seen as perpetuating the issue of ethnocentrism yet further. This puts into question whether this ‘human rights culture’ really can be universal, when it is fundamentally a culture created from western ideology, by westerners.

In order to justify this claim of a ‘human rights culture’ Rorty suggests a move away from innate human ‘rationality’ as the justification of the ‘universality’ of human culture, as put forward by ‘foundationalist’ philosophers like Plato, Aquinas, and Kant. These philosophers suggested that individuals are capable of ‘rational thought’ which justifies their moral instincts and separates humans from animals. Rorty rejected this view as it doesn’t take into account rational individuals or groups that do not adhere to moral human rights practices. These people often rationalise their behaviour by dehumanizing their victims, as exemplified in perceptions of Reiff on the atrocities in

Bosnia: “To the serbs, the Muslims are no longer human”, giving rational justification to their immoral actions. Fundamentally, Rorty is a pragmatist, he is not concerned (like the foundationalist philosophers were) with proving the truths of moral statements such as “human beings have a special added ingredient which puts them in a different ontological category to brutes”. Rorty’s goal is to demonstrate that adopting a pragmatic paradigm would be the most efficient way of encouraging a human rights culture than trying to work solely around objective truths. He suggests that a “sentimental education” would be the most effective way of promoting the cosmopolitan utopias laid out within human rights culture. By a ‘sentimental education’ Rorty means an education which allows individuals to see similarities between themselves and people who are very different to them. The objective of this sort of manipulation of sentiment is to expand people’s horizons with reference to statements such as ‘people like us’, moving away from associating this phrase with ‘people with the same cultural background or upbringing’ to mean ‘a fellow human being’. Rorty suggests that individuals have to imagine themselves in the ‘shoes of the despised and oppressed’. However, Rorty himself highlights an issue with this concept, often people find it easy to show empathy towards the oppressed, but not the oppressor. Rorty’s suggests that when people struggle to empathise with the people we disapprove of, we should consider not their ‘deprivation of moral knowledge’ (as foundationalist would put it) but rather these individuals as being deprived of security and sympathy. Rorty states: “By ‘security’ I mean conditions of life sufficiently risk-free as to make one’s difference from others inessential to one’s self-respect, one’s sense of worth […] By ‘sympathy’ I mean the sort of reactions [...] we have more of after watching television programs about the genocide in Bosnia” (p,128). Equally, Rorty does accept that if the ‘deprived’ do not have access to the necessary social conditions, any endeavours towards a sentimental education are likely to be unsuccessful. A problem that is often worsened by the restrictive environments these deprived individuals are place in which can contribute to the absence of compassion they possess.

Rorty believes that Annette Baier’s scheme to move away Platonic concepts of the ‘true self’ and Kantian concepts that it is ‘rational to be moral’, and towards a feeling of ‘trust’ rather than ‘obligation’ as the central moral conception. Rorty suggests that we should think not “why should I care about a stander who is not kin to me” rather “[imagine] what it is like to be in her situation”.

In summary, whilst Rorty believes that ethnocentrism and human rights can, and therefore should, be reconciled but he accepts that it is no simple feat. He suggests rather than strict implementation

of these universal moral ideologies, a system of education should be in place to allow individuals to create their own moral beliefs based upon their concept of humanity and therefore basic human rights. However, Rorty also highlights that the issue with this kind of sentimental education is that it can, as Hayden (1999, p 63) puts it, ‘leave us unprepared to deal with hard cases that circumvent sympathy’. In his closing statements, Rorty suggests that the last two hundred years can be seen not as a period of education in terms of rationality or morality, but a “rapid progress of sentiments” (p, 134) which has developed us into individuals who are “moved into action” (p, 134) by the empathy we feel towards others sentimental stories. Moving us closer to belonging to what Rabossi would call a ‘human rights culture’ which is void of ethnocentrism.

Bibliography Brown, S. (2007). Ethnocentrism. In The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Oxford: Blackwells. Hayden, P. (1999). Sentimentality and Human Rights. Critical Remarks on Rorty. Philosophy in the Contemporary World, 59-66. Rorty, R. (1993). Human Rights, Rationality and Sentimentality. In On Human Rights: The Amnesty Lectures (pp. 111-134). New York: Basic Books.

Word Count: 945 (1015 with Title and Citations)...