INTR2012 Lecture notes PDF

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INTR2012 Lecture Notes Table of Contents 1: Historical context..................................................................................................................................2 2: Theories of Foreign Policy.....................................................................................................................4 3: Chinese security policy during the Cold War..........................................................................................5 4: ‘Peaceful Rise’ in the post-Cold War world..........................................................................................10 6. China-US relations...............................................................................................................................23 7. Taiwan................................................................................................................................................24 8. Japan & the East China Sea.................................................................................................................24 9. North Korea........................................................................................................................................27 10. South China Sea................................................................................................................................32 11. South Pacific.....................................................................................................................................34

1: Historical context Ancient China (- 221 B.C.)  221 BC (single imperial dyn) Imperial China (221 B.C. – A.D. 1911) - China was far from isolated before the Tang dynasty - Welcomed foreign traders, visitors, goods, and faiths. Buddhism from India; Islam from Persia, Arabia, and Turkey - Sinocentrism: Expansive, tolerant, proud of its centrality, making universalist claims for its civilization - Tang China being the most cosmopolitan empire in Chinese history Isolated; Inward-looking outlook (10th – 17th Centuries) - Weak, divided, and defensive under the Song dynasty - The Mongol interlude and exception: Mongol conquest of the whole of China in 1276, the first time that all China came under foreign rule (Yuan Dynasty) - Ming dynasty (1368-1644) endorsed Neo-Confucianism to legitimize itself and tried to return to the greatness of Han (206 B.C. – A.D. 220) and Tang - But the Ming had a strong isolationist tendency, banning all private foreign trade - Comparing Western Europe that was rapidly advancing arts, technology, and sciences (reconnaissance, Great Discovery, colonialism, and industrial revolution) - Qing (1644-1911) was ruled by the Manchus, a semi-nomadic people originally residing in Ming China’s NE region o Manchus were the most skilled and successful empire-builders in all Chinese history o But Manchu rulers had sinocentric outlook  inward-looking o British envoys to China sought to estb trade and made territorial requests (trading outpost)  1793: Emperor Qian Long’s sinocentric reply to King George III of England (‘no use for [England’s] manufactures’)  Western inference of Chinese arrogance; but Chinese emperor was reacting to a potential security threat Imp CN’s Foreign Relations - conventional wisdom: the “Chinese world order” as sustained by a “tribute system” (Fairbank, 1968) - tribute system was “the medium for Chinese international relations and diplomacy” and “a scheme of things entire…the mechanism by which barbarous non-Chinese regions were given their place in the all-embracing Chinese political, and therefore ethical, scheme of things” (Fairbank and Teng, 1941) - The Chinese world order was conceived of as a regional system of tributary relations that centered on China - A “world order” of China’s own making (天下 or “All Land under Heaven”; 天子 or the “Son of the Heaven”) - Long-assumed superiority of China’s civilization, values, institutions, and resources - Flaws (Zhang, 2009): o a static framework which … reflects mainly the world order the Chinese court preferred to perceive” (Wang, Z, 1989); “oversimplification, lack of contextualization” (Crossley, 1997) o China’s foreign relations were never so rigid, inflexible and uniform as have been made out to be; realistic, pragmatic and flexible according to circs

Modern China (Century of Humiliation: 1839-1949) Beginning of modern China -

1939 = Start of Opium War: European industrialization versus Chinese stagnancy Foreign traders were restricted to port of Canton (Guangzhou); business was conducted w/o treaty arrangements o All Western traders took part in the opium trade, a very profitable product Commissioner Lin Zexu forced the foreign traders to surrender their opium and have it burned in Guangzhou The British refused the Chinese demand, resulting in the Opium War of 1839  China lost The Nanjing Treaty of 1842 with Britain, followed by the Wangxia Treaty of 1844 with America, marked the beginning of China’s century-long humiliation (1842-1949; formation of PRC) and semi-colonial status o Still shaping modern FP

Foreign spheres of influence -

Russia: Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang Britain: (after Hong Kong) Yangtze Valley, Upper Burma, Tibet Germany: Shandong France: Annam Portugal: Macau Japan: Ryukyu Islands, Korea, Taiwan America’s “Open Door” policy, 1899-1900

Internal decline -

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Decadence in the Qing dynasty – corruption, incapability (Emperor Tongzhi under a regency dominated by Empress Dowager Ci Xi), abuses of power (e.g. Summer Palace), nepotism and cliquish favoritism, lack of risk-taking initiatives, encroached imperial power over provinces and localities 3 responses: Rebellion; Reform; Revolution Rebellion o Taiping Rebellion (1850-1864), among revolts often affiliated with secret societies (e.g. White Lotus Sect) o Hong Xiuquan under the influence of Protestant missionaries o The Heavenly Kingdom – almost a fatal challenge to Qing – was crushed by a coalition of Qing and Western powers (Ever-Victorious Army) Reform o Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang etc. launched movement: “enriching the nation and strengthening the army” o Learn fr Western tech but not ideas - Zhang Zhidong: “Chinese knowledge as the essence; Western knowledge for practical use o Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, cession of Taiwan and Liaodong, “independence” of Korea o Aborted One Hundred Days’ Reform (1898): Kang Youwei’s bold proposals were supported by the young Emperor Guangxu but rejected by Empress Dowager Ci Xi o The Yihetuan (Boxers, or “militia united in righteousness”) Rebellion (1900): zealous anti-Western violence and anti-modern excesses; finally suppressed by an eight-nation international army Revolution o Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen, 1866-1925): revolution, not reform! o Xing Zhong Hui in Honolulu, 1894, and Tong Meng Hui in Tokyo, 1905, aimed to overthrow Qing o The success of the 1911 Revolution, Yuan Shikai’s dictatorship, and the warlords

Lessons of the fall of the Qing -

Was foreign aggression the main cause? Rebellions aimed at replacing Qing with a new dynasty failed Reforms aimed at sustaining the imperial rule by industrial modernization also failed Revolution aimed at replacing dynastic cycles with a new republic or democracy succeeded initially but later failed All imperial powers were predatory, hypocritical, and untrustworthy; they collaborated with Qing in cracking down rebellions, gave lip service to reforms, and opposed revolutions China should shake off the yoke of imperialism to regain independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity However, the revolutionaries had to take advantage of the contradictions among the imperial powers to achieve their goals (a new version of “use barbarians against barbarians)

Lessons of the late Qing’s encounter with foreign powers -

Territorial integrity Ethnic diversity: nation state, or multinational state? Sovereignty: a Western concept readily accepted at its face value – noninterference in Chinese politics, and sovereign rights higher than human rights From good emperor to benevolent government: legitimacy built on the country’s size, unity, and people’s livelihood Rule of international politics: law of the jungle or the weak are the prey of the strong Internal turbulence invited external invasion, bringing collapse to the dynasty For the first time in two millennia, China was defeated by outside forces that were unwilling to conform to the Confucian world order and too powerful to ward off, and that did not appear culturally inferior

Republican China (1912-1949) -

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Nationalist Party (Guomindang) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in coalition Ignored by Western powers, Sun accepted Soviet assistance and advice (1923) to reorganize Guomindang (GMD) and to establish the Huangpu (Whampoa) Military Academy Founding of the CCP (1921) following the Leninist model Sun’s Three Principles of the People (1924): Minzu (People’s Rule or “nationalism”), Minquan (People’s Authority or “democracy”), Minsheng (People’s Livelihood or “socialism”) Success of the Northern Expedition followed by the split between Guomindang and CCP Controversial leadership of Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek,1887-1975) in GMD, the rise of Mao Zedong (1893-1976) in CCP, and the civil wars (1927-1936) Guo Min Dang allying with warlords, capitalists, landlords; courting Westerners and Japanese; dismissing Soviet advisors (1927),

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persecuting Communists; regarding CCP a greater threat than Japanese aggression of China’s northeast (1931) corruption; basing power on personal loyalties rather than rule of law; playing off rival cliques against each other; resisting reforms; difficulty with KMT’s advice and advisors; Party rectifications loosing appeals to the people; peasant (land) revolution; guerrilla war and Long March; CCP: Sinification of Marxism-Leninism; anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism; New Democracy as a prelude to socialism;

Anti-Japanese War (1937-1945) -

Puppet regimes in Changchun (Pu Yi) and Nanjing (Wang Jingwei) A new united front against Japan Mutual suspicions and tensions between GMD and CCP during the war; their respective strategies China’s alliance with the United States after Pearl Harbor and its great power status Initial contact between the Americans and CCP in Yan-an China gained great power status (UN Security Council standing member) without becoming a stronger power Bitter memories, instead of memories of a winner, about military defeat, traitors ( 汉奸), atrocities like the Nanjing massacre Japan was the country that humiliated and devastated China most deadly

Communists winning the civil war (1946-1949) -

Soviet seized Northeast China, opened it for CCP to move in; Marshall Mission to create a coalition gov doomed to failure GMD’s political isolation, economic stagnation, and military defeat CCP holding high the nationalist banner to win over the population Mao Zedong: U.S. as a paper tiger, Soviet Union as the ally, and New China as the People’s Democratic Dictatorship Founding of the People’s Republic of China (October 1, 1949)

Contemporary China (1949 onwards) Revolutionary PRC (1949-1976)  Revolution; formation of PRC in 1949; Mao died in 1976 Deng era (1978-): Reform and Opening The “Rise of China” since the 1990s Current OBOR policy + AIIB draw inspiration from Silk Road during Imp CN

2: Theories of Foreign Policy -

Double-sided nature of FP: domestics politics + IR  influenced by ext & int factors Dependent variable: FP; Independent variable: processes

Structure-based approaches Neorealism  Offensive realism (Mearsheimer) - States will seek to maximise their relative material power to increase security, at the expense of other states; Hobbesian view - E.g. US policy on China should be containment

Actor-based approaches Cognitive and psychological approaches The influence of actors’ beliefs, personality and cognitive traits outweigh the rational choice assumption in decisionmaking

 Defensive realism (Waltz) - States are not doomed to power maximization and conflict; Threat perceptions (source, level, direction) more important than mere rise in material power - China’s rise in power will not inevitably lead to conflict  security and cooperation can be achieved under certain conditions; all states can co-exist - Don’t believe that China is aiming for hegemony, but is primarily seeking security  Neoclassical realism  explains FP decisions - A state’s FP is informed by its place in the int’l sys  diff int’l sys (uni/bi/multi-polar…) yields diff FP - Impact of systemic factors (e.g. int’l structure) on FP will be indirect due to intervening domestic factors Neoliberal institutionalism Similarities with realism - States are primary actors in int’l sys - States are power maximisers - Anarchic in’tl sys BUT - Constraints in int’l sys can be mitigated and positively affected by institutions (provide info, common rules, create shared expectations, foster int’l cooperation to some deg) - E.g. NATO, ASEAN, ARF, APEC

Liberal or societal actor approach (1) individual and social groups define their interests independently of politics and then pursue these interests through political exchange and collective action - Primacy of societal actors over political institutions (2) State preferences represent the interests of a particular subset of society (i.e. officials) - State behaviour in international system is determined by the configuration of interdependent state preferences and constraints

Social constructivism (Alexander Wendt) Reality is socially constructed in the form of social rules and intersubjective meanings - Role of norms and identities in world politics - ** IL rule of sovereignty (since Treaty of Westphalia) - explains why US is afraid of NK’s use of nuclear power but not UK’s use of nuclear power

Bureaucratic politics approach Focused on the interactions between individual actors in government/organisational environments, in particular their ‘power and performance [then]’

Organizational behaviour Individual decision makers do not act independently of, but generally in conformity with, the dictates of the organizations employing them. - policy actions as outputs of large organizations functioning to regular patterns of behavior, usually referred to as standard operating procedures - e.g. CIA, DFAT…

Interpretative actor perspective States’ FP behaviour depends on how individuals with power perceive and analyze situations. Collective action is a sum or combination of individual actions - Interpretative epistemology; bottom-up approach - Understand decisions from standpoint of decisionmakers: how powerful individuals ‘perceive and analyse situations’

3: Chinese security policy during the Cold War China’s diplomatic situation in 1949 -

No meaningful diplomatic or economic relations with the West PRC was politically isolated, militarily contained, and economically maintaining relations with only the Soviet bloc Republic of China” on Taiwan was representing China in the United Nations and other IOs Japan was under US military occupation

Three principles of New China’s foreign relations  Make a fresh start (另起炉灶）  Cleaning the house before entertaining guests (打扫干净房子再请客)  Leaning to one side (一边倒) – Mao: ‘Sitting on the fence will not do, nor is there a third road’ o ‘Western bourgeois civilization, bourgeois democracy and the plan for a bourgeois republic have all bankrupted in the eyes of the Chinese people. Bourgeois democracy has given way to people’s democracy under the leadership of the working class and the bourgeois republic to the people’s republic. This has made it possible to achieve socialism and communism through the people’s republic, to abolish classes and enter a world of Great Harmony’ o

Revolutionary China must “unite in a common struggle with those nations of the world that treat us as equal”— ally with the Soviet Union … form an international united front…We must lean to one side.”

Was it inevitable that China should lean to the Soviet side after winning the civil war? Were there any foreign policy alternatives other than an alliance with the Soviet Union?  Ideology; Interests; History; Culture; Domestic politics

 Did there exist any chance in 1949-50 for the Chinese Communist Party and the United States to reach an accommodation or, at least, to avoid a confrontation?  Two opposing schools of thought  New research reveals that in 1949-50 Mao and the CCP leadership were unwilling to establish relations with Western countries.

Sino-Soviet Alliance: ‘Lean-to-one-side’     

Mikoyan’s mission to China in January/February 1949 Liu Shaoqi’s mission to Moscow in July/August 1949 Mao’s visit to the Soviet Union (December 1949-February 1950) and the Sino-Soviet Treaty Soviets to maintain privileges in Northeast China and Xinjiang Mao’s uneasy meetings with Stalin sowed seeds of future friction

Korean War       

North Korean leader Kim Il-sung’s war Stalin’s judgment Dean Acheson’s statement in January 1950 Mao gave moral support to Kim (plus 50,000-70,000 troops of Korean origin) Outbreak of war on June 25, 1950 Truman dispatched the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait, and China had to stop preparations for invading Taiwan China finally entered the Korean War on 18 October   for security (buffer zone against a US-backed SK at its border) +  Mao’s concern for continuous revolution at home +  China’s prestige abroad (war only halted on truce; China claimed to win the war as it was the first time a foreign power could not defeat it; Boosted international status  Strengthened alliance with USSR (China as loyal ally) but disillusioned about Stalin’s internationalism  BUT China, thought poor, had to pay for much of the Soviet military supplies

Sino-Soviet relations Alliance’s Golden Years Accumulatin g tensions (1958) Rising tensions (1958) Further strains (1959)

Lushan Conference (Jul-Aug 1959)

Breakdown of alliance (1960s—)

 The Soviets’ substantial aid and Sino-Soviet cooperation in key domestic and international issues  Nikita Khrushchev’s visit to Beijing (Sept.-Oct. 1954)  Lüshun (Port Arthur) returned to China  Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin (1956) shocked the Chinese  Mao judged Stalin as 70% right; 30% wrong  Personality cult: “all right to worship Chairman Mao to the extent of having a blind faith in him”  the radio station issue  the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese submarine flotilla  the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis  Soviet leaders denounced China’s Great Leap Forward  Soviet Union’s refusal to provide China with assistance on nuclear technology  The Lushan Conference (July-August 1959), see following slides  Sino-Indian border conflict in 1959, see following slides  The debacle of Khrushchev’s visit to China in September-October  Peng Dehuai (defense minister) Anti-Party Group sharply criticized policies  Mao threatened to “raise another army”  Peng and others branded as anti-Party, dismissed, and purged  Charges that Peng was inspired by (or conspired) with Moscow (*most deadly crime is treason)  Khrushchev advised Mao in 1959 to rehabilitate Peng  deepened Mao’s suspicions of Peng  Other leaders’ self-imposed constraints  Mao’s “absolute authority”  Rise of Lin Biao  Need to demonstrate Leftist thinking  Renewed surge of radicalism  Falsified information from the grass roots  Khrushchev's recall of Soviet experts from China  Mao initiating the great polemic debate with the Soviet Union  The alliance had virtually died by 1963-64  The Cultural Revolution and Sino-Soviet enmity in 1969-89

Sino-Indian conflict  Initial China-India friendship – Zhou Enlai and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru  The Tibetan Issue: Revolt in Tibet in March 1959, and the Dalai Lama given political asylum in India  The border was never demarcated. In the years before Indian independence in 1947, the f...