Is Simone De Beauvoir’s ‘Othering’ the same thing as objectification? PDF

Preview

Summary

Title: Is Simone De Beauvoir’s ‘Othering’ the same thing as objectification?...

Description

Is Simone De Beauvoir’s ‘Othering’ the same thing as objectification? The essence of Simone De Beauvoir’s philosophy is summarized in her famous quote "One is not born, but rather becomes, a woman.1" It implies that we are born neutral and uncorrupted; the framework of society is pitted against women and our biological sex does not determine our gender. Gender is something that is imposed on us, that is learned. Her concept of the Other is based on Hegel’s theory of the master-slave dialectic, though she uses the terms Subject and Other. The Subject is transcendental and absolute, whilst the Other is inessential and subordinate. The Subject prevents the Object from achieving transcendence. Similarly, objectification refers to treating an individual as a means rather than an end. In other words, to treat a person as a ‘thing’ as opposed to another rational human being. According to Martha Nussbaum, objectification consists of seven different properties: instrumentalisation, denial of autonomy, denial of agency, treating as fungible, treating as violable, treating as ownable and denial of subjectivity2. Whilst De Beauvoir does not address these properties individually, she identifies “the specific ways that the natural and social sciences and the European literary, social, political and religious traditions have created a world where impossible and conflicting ideals of femininity produce an ideology of women’s “natural” inferiority to justify patriarchal domination. 3” I think that phenomenologically, these two umbrella terms have the same toxic consequences and refer to some similar ideas using different terminology. Ultimately, civilisation's predisposition towards Othering leads to objectification. To show this, I will compare what I think are the most important aspects of objectification with those of Othering. One of Nussbaum’s main criteria for sexual objectification is instrumentalisation. This means to treat someone as a tool of one’s purposes. She explains: “Most inanimate objects are standardly regarded as tools of our purposes, though some are regarded as worthy of respect for their beauty, or age or naturalness. 4” This means that we treat objects in such a way that they are instruments for our desires, and we apply this same logic to our treatment of human beings (mainly men towards women). Plainly, this is immoral because humans are sentient beings with emotions and should be treated as such. Thus, when we objectify someone we dehumanize them and this has distressing consequences. An example of instrumentalisation and consequently dehumanization is in Mary Prince’s historical account of her experiences as a slave. She says of an occasion when she was to be sold: “I was soon surrounded by strange men, who examined and handled me in the same manner that a butcher would a calf or a lamb he was about to purchase. 5” Not only was the enslaver looking to use Prince as a tool for his own purposes sexually and for physical labour on a plantation, he is treating her as he would an animal. It does not suit him to recognise her as human because then he will feel guilt, which gets in the way of him fulfilling his desire. 1 Simone de Beauvoir and H M Parshley, The Second sex (London: Vintage Books, 1997) (p. 295). 2 Martha C Nussbaum, 'Objectification', Philosophy & Public Affairs, iv, 24 (1995), 249–291 [accessed 21 May 2016] (p. 257). 3 Bergoffen, Debra, "Simone de Beauvoir", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), . 4 Martha C Nussbaum, 'Objectification', Philosophy & Public Affairs, iv, 24 (1995), pp. 249–291 [accessed 21 May 2016] (p.257).

5 Mary Prince, The History of Mary Prince: A West Indian Slave, ed. by Sara Salih (London, UK: Penguin Group (USA), 2000) p.11.

Likewise, Beauvoir’s Othering covers the concept of instrumentalisation: ”The drama of woman lies in this conflict between the fundamental aspirations of every subject (ego) – who always regards the self as the essential and the compulsions of a situation in which she is the inessential. 6” The existentialist believes that humans are displaced, ambiguous and purposeless; we search for anything to fill this void before we find our true purpose in life, because it is agonising to live a meaningless existence. So the woman is torn between fulfilling her own personal desires and being subordinated to the position of Other, in which their desires are secondary to the Subject’s. Yet, she will accept the position of Other because it fills the aforementioned void. However, Beauvoir distinguishes between Othering in general as opposed to within a sexual arena. She writes, “The dimension of the relation of the other still exists; but the fact is that alterity has no longer a hostile implication. 7” Lovers experience themselves as both subjects and objects of sexual desire rather than as labelled with institutionalized labels of gender. Beauvoir claims, “The erotic experience is one that most poignantly discloses to human beings the ambiguity of the condition; in it they are aware of themselves as flesh and as spirit, as the other and as the subject. 8” So, during sex the Subject and Object become ambiguous because they are mutually recognised as free. This implies a degree of gender equality in this particular context. Nussbaum touches on this difference. She quotes Sunstein as saying: “Objectification and a form of use are substantial parts of sexual life… Within a context of equality, respect and consent, objectification…may not be so troublesome.9” She notes that some features of objectification are necessary features of sexual life, for example to be recognized as a sexual being and nothing else may be liberating. Although, she fundamentally disagrees with the idea that objectification can entail equality or respect. She questions: “Why should objectification and a form of use ever be seen as ‘wonderful’ or even as ‘eradicable’ parts of sexual life?...Why should we suppose that it is at all possible to combine objectification with ‘equality, respect and consent’?10” Her enquiring implies that she believes sexual objectification is integrally disrespectful, unequal and dissented. I think that this is because sexual objectification happens because the subject views the object as the Other, and therefore their desires do not deserve respect. Thus, instrumentalisation in sexual objectification and othering differ. In Nussbaum’s eyes at least, sexual objectification and therefore instrumentalisation cannot entail equality, respect or consent because it is inherently disrespectful and dehumanizing. Whereas, sexual instrumentalism in Othering involves the merging of Subject and Object; they become ambiguous because they recognize each other as free. Thus, Othering loses its antagonism. For sexual objectification, instrumentalisation can be liberating. Although, 6 Simone de Beauvoir and H M Parshley, The Second sex (London: Vintage Books, 1997) (p. 27). 7 Bergoffen, Debra, "Simone de Beauvoir", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), .

8 Simone de Beauvoir and H M Parshley, The Second sex (London: Vintage Books, 1997) (p.402). 9 Martha C Nussbaum, 'Objectification', Philosophy & Public Affairs, iv, 24 (1995), 249–291 [accessed 21 May 2016] (p. 251). 10 Ibid p.251

only when the focus on someone’s sexuality is “habitually extended to every area of a person’s experience” should we speak of sexual objectification 11. Otherwise, it is not truly objectification as their other human qualities are recognised in the background. Another of Nussbaum’s criteria of sexual objectification is denial of subjectivity. This entails treating someone as something whose experience and feelings do not need to be taken into account. “Most objects are treated as entities whose experiences and feelings need not be taken into account”. Instrumentalisation and denial of subjectivity are interrelated in that they both dehumanize and demoralize. A famous example of sexual objectification in recent history is in Robin Thicke’s song Blurred Lines. This song uses the lyrics “I hate these blurred lines; I know you want it”. This received widespread feminist criticism because the lyrics imply a lack of consent; the object is rebuffing his advances and he is not retreating12. He is dismissing her feelings, claiming that he “knows” she wants to have sex with him despite her not giving consent. Denial of subjectivity also features in Othering, in that Beauvoir claims that men seduce women into being the Other by convincing them that the subject’s needs are more important than theirs. “They propose to stabilize her as object and to doom her to imminence since her transcendence is to be overshadowed and forever transcended by another ego which is essential and sovereign. 13” The reason for their doing this is selfinterest. The more people fulfilling their desires the better, and feelings and experiences need not matter because they are semi-human. One may question why women accept their position as Other when they are in actuality free and autonomous beings like all human creatures. From the abovementioned existentialist perspective, we are ambiguous beings and we find this unbearable. So on one hand, women get to enjoy avoiding the excruciating meaningless of freedom. Thus, men and women collaborate to produce a false situation. They divide the labour: men take on the role of free being and women the role of the ‘thing’. The man is free but anchored by his relationship to an unfree being. The woman is unfree but participates vicariously in the man’s freedom. Furthermore, women are socialised into being the Other. Baby girls are born with the biological sex ‘female’, but as they grow up they are formed so as to have the gender ‘female’ and thus the characteristics culturally expected of adult females. In Beauvoir’s saying ‘One is not born but becomes a woman’, she implied that to be a ‘woman’ is to be a female-become-feminine. Judith Butler later developed this idea to form a non-binary theory of gender, which holds that gender is simply a role we act out as opposed to something we are born with14. An example of how Othering is a product of culture is in the expectations of women that are exhibited in normative statements such as ‘Girls don’t play football’ or deeming a promiscuous woman a ‘whore’. It is this sort of statement, which many wouldn’t think to question because they are entrenched into society’s ideals, that 11 Sandra Lee Bartky, Femininity and domination: Studies in the phenomenology of oppression (New York: Routledge, 1991) (p. 26). 12 Dorian Lynskey, 'Blurred lines: The most controversial song of the decade', The Guardian, 14 November 2013. 13 Simone de Beauvoir and H M Parshley, The Second sex (London: Vintage Books, 1997) (p. 27). 14 Mary McIntosh and Judith Butler, 'Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity', Feminist Review, xxxviii (1991), 113.

reinforce and entrench Othering. It is as a result of the normality of Othering that men learn to treat women as subordinate, and women believe it and thus become objectified. The problems that arise from Othering and sexual objectification are similar. Sexual objectification is incapacitating in that to be treated as an object proves difficult in establishing oneself as a person. One starts to believe that they are an object, act the part and forgets what it is to act as a person. Likewise, when a woman is Othered, they fail to realize their capacity for transcendence: “The complexity of the whole affair derives from the fact that each camp is giving aid and comfort to the enemy; woman is pursuing a dream of submission, man a dream of identification.15” Although, obstructing others from transcending obstructs men too so they also lose out. What both men and women need is reciprocal recognition, as both subjects and objects. Another feature of objectification is the denial of one’s autonomy16. This means to treat someone as lacking in self-determination or autonomy. To deny that someone is able to act independently of external pressures or internal compulsions. Thus, the object cannot make rational decisions for herself. For example, women who are bound to arranged marriages are denied their autonomy because they cannot decide for themselves who they choose to marry. Their parents decide. While the Other is also seen as irrational and sub-human, a woman can take back her autonomy in becoming liberated from being the Other. The idea that a woman can free herself from the shackles of Othering shows that othering is something that we do to ourselves, not just something that is inflicted on us. Beauvoir argues that women must become liberated by rejecting the idea that to be independent she must act like a man and unlearning the socialisation through which she becomes the gender ‘woman’. 17 Therefore, she must develop her own individuality outside the confines of the norms that are expected of her. By, for example, playing football or being promiscuous. Although, this cannot stop her from being objectified. Othering is something that women themselves participate in and reinforce whereas objectification is something that is done to you. While not being recognised as an Other, instead being mutually recognised as free, may help to prevent objectification, one cannot help if someone else objectifies you. Conclusively, I think it is fair to say that while very similar, objectification and Othering are not identical but are certainly linked. I think that the entrenched predisposition of men to Other women and their subsequent acceptance of this leads to objectification because it is the next logical step. When one does not see that a woman is a fellow human being, one treats them as an object because that is the only other option that we know of. One cannot relate to the ‘Other’, they are not something you can empathize with because they are by 15 Simone de Beauvoir and H M Parshley, The Second sex (London: Vintage Books, 1997) (p. 675). 16Martha C Nussbaum, 'Objectification', Philosophy & Public Affairs, iv, 24 (1995), 249–291 [accessed 21 May 2016] (p. 251).

17 Debra Bergoffen, "Simone de Beauvoir", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), .

definition not like you. If they are not like you then they are not human, and they are not treated as such, they are treated like animals or objects.

Bibliography Bartky, Sandra Lee, Femininity and domination: Studies in the phenomenology of oppression (New York: Routledge, 1991) Bergoffen, Debra, "Simone de Beauvoir", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), . de Beauvoir, Simone and H M Parshley, The Second sex (London: Vintage Books, 1997)

Gatens, Moira, Feminism and philosophy: Perspectives on difference and equality (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991) Lynskey, Dorian, 'Blurred lines: The most controversial song of the decade', The Guardian, 14 November 2013 McIntosh, Mary and Judith Butler, 'Gender trouble: Feminism and the subversion of identity', Feminist Review, xxxviii (1991), 113 Nussbaum, Martha C, 'Objectification', Philosophy & Public Affairs, iv, 24 (1995), 249–291 [accessed 21 May 2016]...