Joseph Raz and the Authority of Law PDF

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Raz and Authority of Law...

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Joseph Raz and the Authority of Law

Introduction

Joseph Raz is a legal, moral and political philosopher. He is one of the most prominent advocates of le positivism. As a leading 'hard' or 'exclusivist' legal positivist, Raz is probably Hart's most importa intellectual heir, and much of his work has been on the nature of authority and the authoritative charac of law. Raz and Legal Positivism

Raz identifies three principle claims made by positivists and attacked by natural lawyers: The 'soc thesis': that law may be identified as a social fact, without reference to moral considerations, the 'mo thesis': that the moral merit of law is neither absolute nor inherent, but contingent upon 'the concept the law and the circumstances of the society to which it applies'. The 'semantic thesis': that normat term such as 'right' and 'duty' are not used in moral and legal contexts in the same way.

Raz accepts only the 'social thesis' on the basis of the three accepted criteria by which a legal system m be identified: its efficacy, its institutional character, and its sources. From all three, moral questions a excluded. Thus, the institutional character of law means simply that law is identified by their relationsh to certain institution (e.g. the legislature). Anything - however morally acceptable - not admitted by su institutions is not law, and vice versa. The Concept of Authority and coordinated problems:

Authorities claim the right to tell us what to do or believe. The most persuasive justification of mode political authority points to the ability of authorities to co - ordinate human activity for the common go and on the superior expertise of those authorities in areas. But the question arises as why should o follow a directive of an authority since an authority at times leads to a conclusion with which we may n agree or creates absurdity? This is known as paradox of authority. In law the traditional solution to t paradox of political authority resorts to an idea about the legitimacy of power, but this solution is n very satisfactory in overcoming the paradox. The Justification of following Authority: Service Conception:

The most famous of these defenses of political authority is that of Hobbes, who founded the legitima of state on the supposed social contract by which men could escape the state of nature, the 'war of against all'. For example, in case of illness, it would be irrational for us to ignore the doctor's advice sin to ignore the doctor would be equivalent to ignoring what years of medical research says. Thus, listen to the doctor is the rational choice here since, listening to a doctor serves his interest in the only way interests can be served.

This is the service conception of authority which Raz capitalizes on to explain the rationality of follow the practical authorities like the law. For if the authority serves us by solving a problem that we are n able or likely to solve ourself then it is obviously not irrational to follow that authority, and this is so ev if the authority sometimes gets it wrong, so long as it is likely to get it right more often than us ourselv

The service conception of authority reminds us that the function of authorities is to serve the govern Raz argues that authorities can be legitimate if by complying with the authority the subjects are bett able to follow the moral reasons that otherwise apply to them. Raz calls the 'service conception' authority the 'normal justification thesis' for authority in that it is not the only way to justify politi authority but is the 'normal justification' of authority....