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Key cases: Powell v McFarlane (1979) 38 P&CR 452 (Ch) Powell, aged 14, lived on his grand-father’s farm. McFarlane owned land adjacent to the farm. McFarlane moved overseas and Powell started making use of the land by grazing a cow and a goat there. He also used the land for shooting and undertook repairs on the fence. These activities took place sporadically for a period in excess of 12 years. Held: Powell’s actions were not sufficient to amount to factual possession therefore his claim failed. Slade J set out the requirements to establish title based on adverse possession. Slade J: "Possession of land, however, is a concept which has long been familiar and of importance to English lawyers, because (inter alia) it entitles the person in possession, whether rightfully or wrongfully, to maintain an action of trespass against any other person who enters the land without his consent, unless such other person has himself a better right to possession. In the absence of authority, therefore, I would for my own part have regarded the word 'possession' in the 1939 Act as bearing the traditional sense of that degree of occupation or physical control, coupled with the requisite intention commonly referred to as animus possidendi, that would entitle a person to maintain an action of trespass in relation to the relevant land; likewise I would have regarded the word 'dispossession' in the Act as denoting simply the taking of possession in such sense from another without the other's license or consent; likewise I would have regarded a person who has 'dispossessed' another in the sense just stated as being in 'adverse possession' for the purposes of the Act… (1) In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the owner of land with the paper title is deemed to be in possession of the land as being the person with the prima facie right to possession. The law will thus, without reluctance, ascribe possession either to the paper owner or to persons who can establish a title as claiming through the paper owner. (2) If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to possess ("animus possidendi"). (3) Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and [exclusive] possession, though there can be a single possession exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot both be in possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed. …. Everything must depend on the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no-one else has done so."

Bucks CC v Moran [1989] 1 Ch 623 (CA) •

Council acquired disputed land for future use as part of a road;

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Land adjoined C’s garden – used the land as an extension of garden;

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Factual Possession: Only access to land was through C’s garden or a gate which he had locked;

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C conceded that he would have been obliged to leave the land if required for road.

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Intention: Intention to own defeated. BUT…

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Intention to possess the land to the exclusion of all others not defeated.

Pye v Graham [2002] UKHL 30 J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Others v Graham and another [2002] is an English land law judgment from the final court of appeal at the time, the House of Lords, on adverse possession.

Facts The company claimant acted at all times through its director, Mr Pye. Pye allowed his neighbours the Grahams to use 23 hectares (57 acres) he owned, valued at £10,000,000, under a grazing agreement. The document expressly stated that the agreement would end on the 31 December 1983 and that to continue the arrangement a new contract would need to be entered into. Pye did not enter into another agreement because he wanted to develop the land but the Grahams continued to occupy the land. After 12 years the Grahams sought to obtain it under the law of adverse possession.[1] Judgment High Court In the High Court Neuberger J ruled that under the Land Registration Act 1925 the Grahams were the lawful owners of the land as Pye had failed to take possession of this land. The case admitted in its final, unanimous, judgment that most similar instances of adverse possession in registered land will be averted on the commencement of the Land Registration Act 2002 (which took place on 13 October 2003). Court of Appeal The Court of Appeal overturned the ruling of the High Court and held that the Grahams were only using the land because of the grazing agreement, thus they hadn't been in possession of it. House of Lords The House of Lords unanimously rejected the Court of Appeals decision and restored the decision of Neuberger J.[1] This was one of the last cases to be decided before the Land Registration Act 2002 came into force, which required that any land acquired through adverse possession had to be registered using the Land Registry. As such a registration would result in the original owner being informed this would allow them to object to such possession. The effect is to make it far more difficult and unlikely to acquire registered land through squatting.[2] European Court of Human Rights The case's application of the common law applying the LRA 1925 as it stood (before repealed with effect from 13 October 2003 by the LRA 2002) was litigated as J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v United Kingdom in the European Court of Human Rights.[3] The ECtHR originally ruled that obtaining property via adverse possession was contrary to Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the right to the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions).[4] On appeal, the Grand Chamber subsequently held that although there was an interference with Convention rights, it was a proportionate and thus permissible interference; see J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v United Kingdom (2007) 46 EHRR 1083. English law on adverse possession is therefore human-rights compliant....