Law on Public Officers Case Digests PDF

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A. Concepts and Principles: Public Office and Public OfficersSecurity of Tenure in Public Office as property for purposes of due process NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND VIOLETA GARCIAFACTS: In 1977, Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Law grad...

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A. Concepts and Principles: Public Office and Public Officers Security of Tenure in Public Office as property for purposes of due process NATIONAL LAND TITLES AND DEEDS REGISTRATION ADMINISTRATION VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND VIOLETA GARCIA FACTS: In 1977, Petitioner Garcia, a Bachelor of Law graduate and a first grade civil service eligible was appointed Deputy Register of Deeds VII under permanent status. Said position was later reclassified to Deputy of Deeds III pursuant to PD 1529 which she appointed under permanent status up to Sept. 1984 She was for 2 years designated as Acting Branch Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan by virtue of EO 649 which authorized the restricting of the Land Registration Commission to NLTDRA. Petitioner Garcia was issued an appointment as Deputy Register of Deeds II on Oct. 1, 1984 under Temporary status for not being a member of the Bar. She appealed to Sec. of Justice but her request was denied; MR was denied as well. Petitioner was administratively charged with Conduct Prejudicial to the best interest of the Service. While said case was pending decision, her temporary appointment was renewed in 1985. In Memorandum dated Oct. 30, 1986, minister and now Secretary of Justice notified petitioner of the termination of her services as Deputy Register of Deeds II on the ground she was “receiving bribe money”. Appeal to Inter-Agency Review Committee which in turn referred to appeal to the Merit System Protection Board which denied on the ground that termination of her services was due to the expiration of her temporary appointment. MR DENIED. However, in Resolution dated June 30, 1988, the CSC directed Garcia be restored to her position as Deputy Register of Deeds II because the new requirement of BAR membership would not apply to her but only to filling up of vacant lawyer position on after Feb. 9, 1981. Since she had been holding the position from 1977-1984, she would not be affected by EO 649. NALTDRA filed present petition to assail the validity of the Resolution of the CSC. CONTENTION: Sec. 8 and 10 of EO 649 abolished all existing positions in LRC and transferred to NALTDRA and Garcia is not a member of the Bar and she cannot be reinstated. ISSUE: W/N Membership of the Bar is the qualification requirement for appointment of Deputy Register of Deeds under EO 649? HELD: EO 649 authorized the re-organization of LRC into NALTDRA. It abolished all the positions and required new appointments to be issued to all employees of the NALTDRA. Law mandates from the moment an implementing order is issued, all positions in LRC are deemed “NON-EXISTENT.” After Abolition, there is No Occupant, No Tenure to Speak.

Its requirement of BAR membership for Deputy Register of Deeds is valid reorganization measure. A reorganization carried in good faith for the purpose to make bureaucracy more efficient. Creation of Public Office SEC. OF DOTC VS. MABALOT, 378 SCRA 129 (2000) FACTS: The Sec. of DOTC issued to LTFRB Chairman MO 96-735, transferring the regional functions of that office to DOTCCAR Regional Office, pending creation of a Regional LTFRO. Later, the new Sec. of DOTC issued DO 97-1025, establishing the DOTCCAR Regional Office as the Regional Office of the LTFRB to exercise regional functions of the LTFRB in the CAR subject to the direct supervision and control of the LTFRB Central Office. Mabalot protested. ISSUE: W/N the MO and DO are violative of the provision of the Constitution against encroachment on the powers of the legislative department HELD: SC upheld the validity of the issuance of the challenged orders. In the absence of any patent or latent constitutional or statutory infirmity attending the issuance of the challenged orders, Court upholds. The President, through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, may legally and validly decree the reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of the DOTCCAR as the LTFRB Regional Office of CAR with the concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB. There are three modes of establishing an administrative body: (1) Constitution; (2) Statute; and (3) by authority of law. This case falls under the third category. The DOTC Secretary, as alter ego of the President, is authorized by law to create and establish the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office. This is anchored on the President’s “power of control” under sec. 17, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution. By definition, control is “the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.” It includes the authority to order the doing of an act by a subordinate or to undo such act or to assume a power directly vested in him by law. Under sec. 20, Bk. III, E.O. 292, the Chief Executive is granted residual powers, stating that “unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws xxx” What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is PD 1772 which amended PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. Granted that the President has the power to reorganize, was the reorganization of DOTCCAR valid?

In this jurisdiction, reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. The reorganization in the instant case was decreed “in the interest of service” and “for purposes of economy and more effective coordination of the DOTC functions in the Cordillera Administrative Region.” It thus bears the earmarks of good faith.

(2) The SC pronounced that FOUNDLINGS are as a class, natural born- citizens as based on the deliberations of the 1935 Constitutional Convention, wherein though its enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language either to definitely exclude the foundlings to be natural born citizens. (3) That Foundlings are automatically conferred with the natural-born citizenship as to the country where they are being found, as covered and supported by the UN Convention Law.

B. Eligibility & Qualifications General and particular qualifications POE-LLAMANZARES VS. COMELEC AND ELAMPARO G.R.NO. 221697. MARCH 2016 FACTS: Grace Poe was found in a church in Iloilo sometime in 1968. The children of the who found her reported the incident before the Local Civil Registrar. It was named as Mary Grace Militar. She was subsequently adopted by Fernando Poe Jr. and Susan Roces sometime in 1974. In year 2006, a Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Poe was issued by the Civil Registrar of Iloilo.

As to the residency issue, Grace Poe satisfied the 10-year residency because she satisfied the requirements of ANIMUS MANENDI (intent to remain permanently) coupled with ANIMUS NON REVERTENDI (intent of not returning to US) in acquiring a new domicile in the Philippines. Starting May 24,2005, upon returning to the Philippines, Grace Poe presented overwhelming evidence of her actual stay and intent to abandon permanently her domicile in the US, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Filipino Citizenship under RA 9225. Hence, her candidacy for Presidency was granted by the SC. General Disqualifications 1. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (194 SCRA 317)

In 2011, Poe executed an oath of renunciation of Nationality of U.S and she issued a certificate of loss of Nationality of U.S effective October 2010.

FACTS: The petitioner are assailing the Executive Order No. 284 issued by the President allowing cabinet members, undersecretary or asst. secretaries and other appointive officials of the executive department to hold 2 positions in the government and government corporations and to receive additional compensation. They find it unconstitutional against the provision provided by Section 13, Article VII prohibiting the President, Cabinet members and their deputies to hold any other office or employment. Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B further states that “Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries." In the opinion of the DOJ as affirmed by the Solicitor General, the said Executive Order is valid and constitutional as Section 7 of Article IX-B stated “unless otherwise allowed by law” which is construed to be an exemption from that stipulated on Article VII, section 13, such as in the case of the Vice President who is constitutionally allowed to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council.

Poe in year 2013 won and proclaimed a senator of the Philippines. In October 2015 she filed her certificate of candidacy for Presidency where she declared herself as natural born Filipino citizen. Several petitions were filed against Poe’s citizenship.

ISSUE: Whether Section 7 of Article IX-B provides an exemption to Article VII, section 13 of the constitution.

ISSUE: Whether the principle of Jus Sanguinis applied to foundlings, hence whether Pore is a natural born Filipino citizen.

RULING: The court held it is not an exemption since the legislative intent of both Constitutional provisions is to prevent government officials from holding multiple positions in the government for selfenrichment which a betrayal of public trust. Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the VicePresident, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. Thus, the phrase “unless otherwise provided by the Constitution” in Section 13, Article VII cannot be construed as a broad exception from Section 7 of Article IX-B that is contrary to the legislative intent of both constitutional provisions. Such phrase is only limited to and strictly applies only to particular instances of allowing the VP to become a cabinet member and the Secretary of Justice as exofficio member of the Judicial and Bar Council. The court thereby declared E.O 284 as null and void.

At the age of 18 Poe was registered as a voter of San Juan. She married to Teodoro Llamanzares and flew to U.S.A after the wedding. In 2001, Poe became naturalized American Citizen. In 2004, Poe come back to the Philippines to support her father’s candidacy. She then returned to U.S. After learning of her father’s deteriorating condition, Poe returned within the same year. Because she wanted to be with her grieving mother, she and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippine in year 2005. In 2006, Poe took her oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. She also filed a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship. The Bureau of Immigration acted in favor of the Petition and she and her children were then considered dual citizens.

HELD: YES. GRACE POE is considerably a natural-born Filipino Citizen. For that, she satisfied the constitutional reqt that only natural-born Filipinos may run for Presidency. (1) there is high probability that Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in Jaro, Iloilo, a municipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos, consequently providing 99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos. Said probability and circumstantial evidence are admissible under Rule 128, Sec 4 of the Rules on Evidence.

2. ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

FACTS: On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights. On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections. On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila. Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo. Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo. HELD: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position. D. Acquisition of Right of Title to Office Appointment CSC vs. DARANGINA FACTS: Engineer Darangina was a development management officer V in the Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA). He was extended a temporary promotional appointment as Director III, Plans and Policy Services. CSC approved the temporary appointment. New OMA Executive Director terminated the appointment, ground: Not Career Executive Service Eligible. CSC disapproved the appointment of the replacement who was also not eligible, and granted that the Darangina should be paid back wages until the expiration of his 1 year temporary appointment.CA reinstated Darangina. ISSUE: Whether Darangina should be reinstated. HELD: CA REVERSED. Petition GRANTED. No reinstatement & back wages, only salary from appointment until termination. With the expiration of his term upon his replacement, there is no longer any remaining term to be served. Administrative Code of 1987 Book V Title I Subtitle A Chapter 5 Section 27. Employment Status. –Appointment in the career service shall be permanent or temporary. (1)Permanent Status. A permanent appointment shall be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof. (2)Temporary Appointment. In the absence of eligible persons and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment shall be issued to a person who meets

all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, that such temporary appointment shall not exceed 12 mos., but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. Appointment by the President 1. SARMIENTO v. MISON (G.R. No. 79974) FACTS: In 1987, Salvador Mison was appointed as the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs by then president Corazon Aquino. Ulpiano Sarmiento III and Juanito Arcilla, being members of the bar, taxpayers, and professors of constitutional law questioned the appointment of Mison because it appears that Mison’s appointment was not submitted to the Commission on Appointments (COA) for approval. Sarmiento insists that under the new Constitution, heads of bureaus require the confirmation of the COA. Meanwhile, Sarmiento also sought to enjoin Guillermo Carague, the then Secretary of the Department of Budget, from disbursing the salary payments of Mison due to the unconstitutionality of Mison’s appointment. ISSUE: Whether or not the appointment of “heads of bureaus” needed confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. HELD: No. In the 1987 Constitution, the framers removed “heads of bureaus” as one of those officers needing confirmation by the Commission on Appointment. Under the 1987 Constitution, there are four (4) groups of officers whom the President shal...