Lecture 9 Pyrrhonian Scepticism PDF

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5 Dec. 2017 Lecture 9

‘Pyrrhonian Scepticism’ ↳ Pyrrhonian scepticism began in Hellenistic period and extended into the Roman era. ↳ It advocated philosophical techniques in order to gain tranquillity (ataraxia) ↓ These techniques result in an extreme scepticism where no views are held by the agent. → It is unclear at first how someone could live in this way and what their behaviour and attitudes would actually be.

Lecture Outline: I.

The importance of Pyrrhonian scepticism in the history of Philosophy

II.

The difference between Academic and Pyrrhonian Scepticism

III.

History of the movement in the ancient world a. Pyrrho of Elis: an older contemporary of Epicurus b. Aenesidemus: the revivalist in the Ist century BC c. Sextus Empiricus: systematic Pyrrhonianism in the Roman Empire

I.

IV.

How to achieve suspension of judgement

V.

The problem of self-refutation

VI.

How can the sceptic live his scepticism?

VII.

Further challenges for Pyrrhonian Scepticism.

The Importance of Pyrrhonian Scepticism in the History of Philosophy

→ Pyrrhonianism represents extreme scepticism, covering knowledge, beliefs and values. ↳ Pyrrhonians profess: ›

Not to know anything

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Not to believe anything

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Not to hold that anything is the case

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Not to be committed to anything ↓

Thereby to have no reasons for action and no reasons to prefer one thing to another. → Throughout history this stance has been criticised as incoherent or unsupportable (e.g. By Aristotle and Hume).

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→ It has also been seen as attractive in its anarchism (e.g. Montaigne), and as a way forward for modern philosophy (e.g. Neo-Pyrrhonianism and comparisons with Wittgenstein).

II. ›

The Difference Between Academic and Pyrrhonian Scepticism

The Academic Sceptics occupied Plato’s Academy from the leadership of Arcesilaus (266 BCE) to around 90 BCE. ↪ They argue about the nature and the existence of the criteria of truth. ↪ They deny that knowledge is possible but assert that they have beliefs. → The denial of the possibility of knowledge is itself the assertion of a belief. ↓ Pyrrhonian sceptics are unbelievers (adoxastic) → They merely assent to appearance without any rational judgement: they have no real beliefs.

→ Pyrrhonianism is a way of life initially aiming for tranquillity ↪ While the Academics school of Sceptics are engaged in philosophy for more academic purposes → They employed many arguments against those who held to doctrines and the aim seemed to have more to do with competitiveness. ↓ Pyrrhonian philosophy was a sort of therapy or practice in an attempt to detach from desire. →Including the desire to find out about things, to think that there is any way the world is and to prove your own position to be correct. ) →In addition, it is also a practice in getting rid of false beliefs, and since it is so far impossible to secure the truth of any belief, it means giving up on certainly and conviction completely.

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We can also contrast this with Epicureanism which similarly aims at an altered state of mind (ataraxia); ↪ Epicurus must argue and convince us, so that we have convictions about the nature of the world → That the world is a cosmos of atoms randomly conglomerated. → That our souls are perishable. → That the gods do not care about us. ↳ It is only by believing these things that we can let go of previous beliefs which affect the way we act and respond to our surroundings. 2

↪ Pyrrhonianism proposes, in contrast, that we give up on all beliefs about the nature of reality.

III.

History of the Movement in the Ancient World

A. Pyrrho of Elis: an Older Contemporary of Epicurus. ›

Pyrrho came up with this idea of scepticism and labelled the movement

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He wrote nothing but lived his scepticism.

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He is old enough to have gone to India with the Alexandrian conquest → In fact, he is said to have adopted practices of wandering and meditation after this journey.

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Anecdotes emphasise his calmness → He does not pursue anything with enthusiasm and he is not perturbed by what upsets others.

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His main idea seems to have been that the sceptic does not believe anything but can adhere to appearances → This leads to tranquillity. Some argue that he was not a Pyrrhonian Sceptic because he had a view about the natural of reality. ↓

He indicates that our inability to know is not due to faulty sensory apparatus (as Democritus had held) but because the world itself lacks substance or reality.

‘It is necessary above all to consider our own knowledge; for if it is in our nature to know nothing, there is no need to inquire any further into other things. […] Pyrrho of Elis was also a powerful advocate of such a position. He himself has left nothing in writing; his pupil Timon, however, says that the person who is to be happy must look to these three points: first, what are things like by nature? second, in what way ought we to be disposed towards them? and finally, what will be the result for those who are so disposed? He [Timon] says that he [Pyrrho] reveals that things are equally indifferent and unstable and indeterminate; for this reason, neither our perceptions nor our beliefs tell the truth or lie. For this reason, then, we should not trust them, but should be without opinions and without inclinations and without wavering, saying about each single thing that it no more is than is not, or both is and is not, or neither is nor is not. Timon says that the result for those who are so disposed will be first speechlessness, but then freedom from worry (ataraxia); and Aenesidemus says pleasure.’ (Aristocles in Eusebius, Praeparatio 3

Evangelica 14.18.1–5; Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, 1987, volume 1, 1F)

The idea that the world is a certain way (‘indeterminate’) seems to indicate a view about the way it is which later Pyrrhonists do not think sceptics can have. ↓ In general, we cannot trust the sources on Pyrrho and ought not to be surprised if the views ascribed to him do not accord exactly with those of later Pyrrhonians since the philosophical ideas they were responding to had not yet been invented. B. Aenesidemus: the Revivalist in the I st century BC. ›

Aenesidemus broke from Plato’s Academy and began a self-conscious Pyrrhonian revival.

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His writings are not preserved but parts of it are available in other works.

‘In the first treatise [Aenesidemus] differentiates between the Pyrrhonists and the Academics. He says that the Academics are doctrinaire: they posit some things with confidence and unambiguously deny others. The Pyrrhonists, on the other hand, are aporetic and free of all doctrine. Not one of them has said either that all things are incognitive, or that they are cognitive, but that they are no more of this kind than of that, or that they are sometimes of this kind, sometimes not, or that for one person they are of this kind, for another person not of this kind, and for another person not even existent at all… Nor indeed, do they say there is true or false, convincing or unconvincing, existent or non-existent. But the same thing is, it might be said, no more true than false, convincing than unconvincing, or existent than non-existent; or sometimes the one, sometimes the other; or of such a kind for one person but not for another. For the Pyrrhonist determines absolutely nothing, not even this very claim that nothing is determined (We put it this way, he says, for lack of a way to express the thought). But the Academics, he says, especially those from the present-day Academy are doctrinaire about many things’ (Photius, Library; Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, 1987, volume 1, 71C) ↓ The revival was much more sophisticated than the original stance → Because there were no writings from Pyrrho, this allowed for flexibility and creativity.

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He is best known for innovating 10 ‘modes of scepticism’ . ↪ Basically, these oppose appearances and arguments in order to induce suspension of judgement. ↪ Aenesidemus was concerned with contemporary debates particularly about belief. ↪ But the goal was also ethical: when opinions conflict, there is no reason to prefer one over the other → This ‘equipollence’ leads to ‘suspension of judgement’ which leads to ataraxia.

‘Aenesidemus, in the first of his Pyrrhonian Discourses, says that Pyrrho determines nothing in doctrinaire fashion, because of the opposition of arguments, but follows appearances’ (Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, 1987, volume 1, 71A)

‘Pyrrhonist discourse is a kind of recollection of appearances, or of ideas of any kind, on the basis of which they are all brought into confrontation with each other and, when compared, found to present much disparity and confusion’ (Long and Sedley, The Hellenistic Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, 1987, volume 1, 71B)

C. Sextus Empiricus (160-210 CE): systematic Pyrrhonianism in the Roman Empire ›

The most comprehensive record of Pyrrhonian Scepticism comes from the works of Sextus Empiricus.

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Very little is known about Sextus Empiricus: his name indicates he was at one time an Empiricist Doctor.

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Two sets of treatises: 

Outlines of Pyrrhonism

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Against the Mathematicians [ → Argues against all claims to expertise from geometry through to ethics.] ↓ Sextus begins with the naturalistic development of scepticism

↪ Nature gives people cognitive faculties. ↪ Proto-sceptics, unsettled by discrepancies, think that they will find calmness through discovering what is truly the case → Instead when there are views of equal weight, they are 5

unable to decide, give up, and only then experience tranquillity (ataraxia) (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1) ↓ He posits that not only the attempt to find things to be the case, but the holding of any belief at all is the root of all anxiety. →We must turn our urge to seek answers into a technique to overcome the desire to believe.

IV.

How to Achieve Suspension of Judgement

→ The General Description: ‘The sceptical ability is the ability to set in opposition appearances and ideas in any manner whatsoever, the result of which is first that, because of the equal force of the opposed objects and arguments, final suspension of judgement is achieved, and then freedom from disturbance (ataraxia).’ (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.4)

→ The Modes of Scepticism: several different techniques are required to induce suspension of judgement. → Different techniques are more applicable to different sort of belief claim. → Sextus gives us the 10 modes of Aenesidemus: ›

One technique (modes 1-2) is to consider experiences to be subjectivity: does one person (or animal) see the same thing as another? → This seems unlikely given how different our bodies are from each other.

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Another mode (mode 3) questions the veracity of sense experiences given their variability and unreliability (e.g. An apple can appear sweet sometimes and bitter at others.)

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Another mode (mode 8) is relativity (something is relative to something else): ‘When we have established that all things are relative, it is clear what remains is that we shall not be able to say what each of the objects is like in its own nature and all by itself, but only what it appears to be like in a relative sense. It follows that we must suspend judgement about the nature of things’ (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.140). ↓ The first two challenge using sense experience as a basis for knowledge or belief. The third one challenges claims that things have any substantial reality in themselves.

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→ Agrippa (1st century CE) came up with 5 more modes, all attacking the grounds of belief: Agrippa’s Five Modes: (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.164-177): 1. Diaphônia: argues from disagreement. ↳ With respect to some matter that presents itself, there is undecided conflict, both among the views of ordinary life and the views held by philosophers. → Due to this, we are unable to choose or reject one thing, and must fall back on suspension. 2. Eis apeiron ekballonta: arguments that throw one into an infinite regress. ↳ That which is brought forward to make a given matter credible needs yet something else to make it credible, and so on ad infinitum. → Since we thus have no starting point for our argument, suspension of judgment follows. 3. Pros ti: arguments from relativity. ↳ X only ever appears such-and-such in relation to the subject judging and to the things observed together with it. → Suspension on how it really is follows. 4. Hypothesis: someone assumes/makes assumptions without providing argument. ↳ A dogmatist, if thrown back into an infinite regress of arguments, just assumes something as a starting-point, without providing an argument. → We suspend over mere hypotheses: they could be false, opposite hypotheses could be formulated, and so on. 5. Ton diallêlon: arguments that disclose a circularity. ↳ This mode is used when that which ought to confirm a given investigated matter requires confirmation (‘pistis’: credibility) from that matter. → We are unable to assume either in order to establish the other. ↪ We suspend judgment on both. ↓ Agrippa’s modes are focused on general ways of confirming knowledge thus, are more akin to modern epistemological scepticism. They challenge whether there is any way or method by which we could ever discover whether something is the case or not. ↪ One example is any way to theorise about causes:

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‘We are unable to grasp the effect of the cause as its effect if we do not grasp the cause of the effect as its cause…. for we think we understand that something is an effect whenever we grasp the cause of it as its cause’ (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 3.23) ↓ Without resort to ‘causes’ a great many claims to know or believe become ungrounded → Although these are more general, they are not an attempt to defeat all knowledge at once (e.g. Like Descartes’ global scepticism). → These techniques are designed to be employed in a piecemeal fashion. ↪ There have been many ways of conceptualising knowledge and the world, but there will always be some way to attack any of these claims to know. ↳ Sometimes the attack can be on the foundation of knowing or confirming knowledge, but sometimes it is just against particular doctrines from any domain.

V.

The Problem of Self-Refutation

a. How is it possible to have a theory and a technique without any beliefs or views? Can one even speak or think of a proposition? If you prove that no proof is possible will not this negate your own proof? [ → Pyrrhonians cannot make any claims, even about their own stance] b. How can one have an aim (i.e. Ataraxia) if there are no truths about anything being better than or preferable to anything else? ↓ Sextus Empiricus is aware of this sort of criticism.

a. Pyrrhonians must use ‘formulae’ to avoid asserting anything in a definite manner (e.g. ‘Maybe’, ‘no more this than that’ etc.) ‘Not even in uttering the sceptical formulae about unclear matters - for example, “In no way more,” or “I determine nothing,” or one of the other formulae which we shall later discuss - do they believe anything. For if you hold beliefs, then you posit as real the things that you are said to believe about; but sceptics posit these formulae not as necessarily being real. For they suppose that, just as the formula “Everything is false” says that it too, along with everything else, is false (and similarly for “Nothing is true”), so also “In no way more” says that it too, along with everything else, is no more so than not so, and hence cancels itself along with everything else. And we say the same of the other sceptical formulae. Thus, if people who believe posit as real the things they believe about, while 8

sceptics utter their own phrases in such a way that they are implicitly cancelled by themselves, then they cannot be said to believe in uttering them. But the main point is this: in uttering these formulae they say what appears to themselves and report their own feelings without any belief (adoxastôs), affirming nothing about external objects’ (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.14–15)

↳ In addition, Sextus Empiricus has several ways of explaining the possibility of proof: a. It is a special sort of proof. b. Sceptics treat proofs merely instrumentally and then discard them without commitments. ‘The opponent says that the argument which concludes that there is no proof refutes itself by being a proof. In response to this we must say that it does not refute itself utterly. For many things are said in a way which implies exceptions; and as we say that Zeus is the father of gods and men with an implied exception of this very point (for he is surely not his own father!), so too when we say that there is no proof we say so with an implicit exception for the argument which proves that there is no proof. For this alone is a proof. And if it refutes itself it is not thereby established that demonstration exists. For there are many things which do to themselves the same thing as they do to other things. For example, just as fire consumes its fuel and then destroys itself along with it, and just as purgative medicines expel fluids from the body and then eliminate themselves as well, in the same way the argument against demonstration is able to wipe itself out after having destroyed all proof. And again, just as it is not impossible for someone, after climbing a ladder to a higher place, to knock down the ladder with his foot after he gets up there, so too it is not unreasonable for the sceptic, after arriving at the establishment of his point by using the argument which proves that there is no proof as a kind of step-stool, thereupon to destroy this argument itself.’ (Sextus Empiricus, Against the Mathematicians, 8.479-81)

b. The Pyrrhonian cannot think that anything has intrinsic value, or that there is good or bad. ↳ This means that ataraxia is not believed to be better or preferable to any other mental state. ›

The Pyrrhonian does not pursue ataraxia thinking or believing it is best.

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The Pyrrhonian accepts the unbelieved appearances, this leads her to suspension of judgement which leads to ataraxia. → She accepts this as something that appears to her.

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There is no striving.

‘They say that when Apelles was painting a horse and wished to depict the horse’s froth, he was so unsuccessful that he gave up and flung at the picture the sponge that he used to wipe off his brushes. The mark made by the sponge produced a representation of the horse’s froth. The sceptics hoped to attain a freedom from disturbance by judging the inconsistency of appearance and idea, and not being able to do this they suspended judgement. Being in this suspensive state, freedom from disturbance followed fortuitously, as a shadow follows a body.’ (Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.12).

VI.

How Can the Sceptic Live His Scepticism?

A. Can a Person Survive Without Believing Anything? ↳ Scholars disagree about how much ‘belief’ Sextus allows for (→ Does he allow for any belief at all?) ↓ ›

Consider there to be two types of belief: a. Co...