Lecture notes, lectures 6 - hybrid securities PDF

Title Lecture notes, lectures 6 - hybrid securities
Course Applied Corporate Finance
Institution University of New South Wales
Pages 13
File Size 582.1 KB
File Type PDF
Total Downloads 108
Total Views 142

Summary

Hybrid Securities...


Description

Topic:HybridSecurities LectureAgenda WhyHybrid? Prosandconsofissuing – PreferredShares, – Warrantsand – ConvertibleSecurities overstraightsecuritiessuchascommonsharesand/orbonds. Valuationanddeterminationoftheyieldonhybridsecurities Hybridsecuritiestoeliminate/reducethecostofconflictofinterest betweenthecompany’sdebtholdersandshareholders. FINS3625 1

WhyHybridSecurities? Common ways to raise external capital is to issue common equity or corporate bonds. Selling hybrid securities provide alternative ways to raise capital. • Hybrid securities can be viewed as a cross between common equity or corporate bond and financial derivatives. • Hybrids are most useful when a company has difficulty raising external capital by issuing straight bonds or common equity. • Hybrids may be effective tools to resolve conflicts of interest between debt holder and equity holders. Each hybrid has pros and cons, which are based on the features of FINS3625 the security. 2

MotivatingExample,Gloomy:Conflictsofinterestbetween ManagerandDebtholders GloomyCorp.isinfinancialtroublebecauseitcannotaffordtopay itscreditors.Asaresult,thefirm’sassetvalueis$1Mwhichis belowthe$600MthatGloomyowesitscreditors.Thecreditors intendtotakeimmediateactionstoliquidatethefirm. Gloomyhasnoimmediatecashanditisinvestigatingasafeproject thatcosts$40Mandwillgenerateacertainpayoffof$630Mnext year.Theriskfreerateis5%.ThecreditorsperceiveGloomytobe sogloomywithitsprospectsthattheyarenotwillingtolendto Gloomyanymore. Isthisprojectworththeinvestment?Ifso,willtheequityholders financetheproject? FINS3625

3

1

MotivatingExample,Gloomy:Conflictsofinterestbetween ManagerandDebtholders Project’sNPV:   40 

630  560 1.05

NPVforequityholders:   40 

631  600  0  10 1.05

TheprojecthasapositiveNPV,soitisagoodinvestment. However,theequityholderswillnotfinancetheprojectbecause mostofthegainswillgotowardpayingthedebtholders. Gloomywillfaceimmediateliquidatingbythedebtholders. FINS3625

4

MotivatingExample,Gloomy:Conflictsofinterestbetween ManagerandDebtholders Now,whatifGloomy’s shareholdersnegotiatedwiththecreditorstoallow theirdebttobeconvertibleto90%ofthecompany’sstock? IfGloomy’s debtbecameconvertible:   40 

%  .

20.095

Theequityholderswouldbewillingtofinancetheprojectbecausethey wouldget$20,095Mwhichisgreaterthan$0fromimmediateliquidation. Moreover,thedebtholderswouldalsobebetteroffbecausethedebtvalue % wouldriseto$  $540.857 whichisgreaterthanthe$1M . currentassetvalue. Makingthedebtconvertibleresolvestheunderinvestmentproblem. FINS3625

5

MotivatingExample,Gloomy:Conflictsofinterestbetween ManagerandDebtholders Makingthedebtconvertibleto90%ofequityresolvesthe underinvestmentproblemforGloomyandinsuresthatGloomydoesn’t fail. Asamatteroffact,thereisarangeofpossiblevaluesofconversionthat canalsoresolvetheunderinvestmentproblemandinsurethatGloomy doesn’tfail. Q)Solvefortherangeofconversionrateasapercentoftotalfirmvalue thatwouldresolvetheunderinvestmentproblem.Yoursolutionmust insure(a)totalfirmvaluecreation,(b)thatequityholdersarewillingto financetheproject,(c)andthatdebtholdersarebetteroffasaresultof projectadoptions. A)Tryitonyourown.Theanswershouldbebetween0.1664%and FINS3625 6 93.34%.

2

PreferredStocks Preferredsharesareacrossbetweencommon sharesandbonds FeaturessimilartoBonds: • Issuedatparvalue(usually$25or$100). • Periodicfixedchargeasa%ofparvaluepaidbeforeanycommon dividendsarepaid.Increasesfinancialleverage. • Perceivedtobelessriskythancommonequity. • Novotingrights,butmaygiverightstoelectminoritydirectors. • Maybesubjecttosinkingfundprovisionsand/orbecalledbythe issuer. FeaturesimilartoEquity: • Subordinatedtodebtholders.Missedpreferreddividendpayments doesnotforcebankruptcy. FINS3625 7

PreferredStocks 

ValueofPreferredStocks:   Mostpreferreddividendsdonotgrowanddividendsarefairlystable. Pros: ‐PreferredDividendsarenotfirmobligationslikeinterestpaymentson corporatebonds. ‐ Avoidsdilutionassociatedwithissuingcommonshares. ‐ Reducescashdrainfromprincipalpaymentsoncorporatebonds. Cons: ‐ PreferredDividendsarenottaxdeductible.Theyarepaidafter corporatetaxesandtaxedagaininthehandsoftheinvestors(likelyto beanissueintheclassicaltaxsystem). ‐ PreferredDividendsarenotfirmobligations,butmustbetreatedas firmobligationsbythemanager.Increasesfinancialleverage. FINS3625

8

Warrants Awarrantgivestheholdertherighttobuyaspecifiednumberofstocks fromthecompanybypayingthestrikepricebyacertaindate.Warrants areexamplesoffinancialderivatives(similartocalloptions) Generallyissuedwithdebtto‘sweetenthedeal’ • Tolowercouponrateondebtand/or • Togethigherbondprice(andloweryield)onlongtermdebt Mostofthewarrantsaredetachablefromthedebtandaretradableonthe exchanges. Warrantscanbeexercisedbytheholderif • Expirationdateisfastapproaching • ifcommondividendsgrowrapidly • ifstrikepricerisesrapidly(onlyincasesofsteppedupstrikeprices). Otherwise,likeAmericanoptions,itisbettertoholdthemortosellthem (nottoexercisethem). FINS3625

9

3

Warrants ValuationofBondswithWarrants: BondValuewithWarrants=StraightBondValue+ValueofWarrants Pros:‐ canlowerthecostofraisingdebtcapital ‐ iffirmisafastgrowingcompany,thentheexerciseofthe warrantscanbringinginmuchneededexternalcapitaltothefirm. ‐ ifwarrantsarenotexercised,thentheissuergainsattheexpense ofthelenderssincetheissuerreceivedpaymentforthewarrantsat theoutset(presumably). Cons:‐ equitydilutionifwarrantsareexercised. (i)Valuedilutionsincethestrikepriceonthewarrantsislower thanmarketprice. (ii)Dilutionofpowerduetotheincreasednumberofshares aftertheexercise ofthewarrants. FINS3625

10

ValueDilutionfromExercisingWarrants ThemarketvalueofequityisE=V‐D whereV isthefirm’smarketvalue andD isthefirm’sdebtmarketvalue. Pre‐exercisemarketpriceofcommonsharesis 

 #

Post‐exercisemarketpriceofcommonshare,ordilutedshareprice,is 

   #  

where   # FINS3625

11

YieldsonBondswithWarrants Computingtheyieldoncorporatebondswithwarrantsattheoutset (oranytime): • Determinethecashflowsfromstraightdebt • Determinewhen thewarrantisexpectedtobeexercised • Determinetheexpectedcashflowsattributedtotheexerciseof thewarrants • ComputetheIRRusingthecashflowsofaportfoliocomposedof thestraightbondandthewarrants,andthecurrentmarketvalues ofthebondandwarrants. • TheIRRistheyieldonthesecurity.It’sthemarketdetermined requiredrateofreturnonthehybridsecurity. TheIRRisalsothecostofcapitalfortheissueriftheissuerdoesnot FINS3625 12 retirethesecurities.

4

YieldonBondswithWarrants:Example Example:ABC'stotalcompanyvalueis$5Mwith1Mshares outstanding.Thefirm'svalueisexpectedtogrowat15%peryearforat leastthenext20years.ABChasrecentlyraised$2Mincapitalbyissuing 20year,5%couponand$1,000parvaluebondswithwarrants.Each bondcarries20warrantswithastrikepriceof$6andexpirein10years. Eachwarrantifexercisedgrantstheholderonestock.Thecurrentyield onbondsofcompatibleinvestmentgradeis10%andlikelytoremain constant. a) Whatisthepriceofeachwarrantatthetimeofissue? Ans:   $50 

󰇛%󰇜



%



$, 󰇛%󰇜

$1,000  $574.32 20

 $574.3

 $21.28

FINS3625

13

YieldonBondswithWarrants:ExampleCont’d b)WhatisABC’sexpectedsharepricepostexerciseofwarrants?     󰇛1  󰇜  5  󰇛1  15%󰇜 $20.227789    1  1  10%  2 2 1,000  50      20  6 1  10%  1 1  10%   

. 



 20.227789  1.385543  0.24  19.082245

 

 #



.

FINS3625

=18.35

     . 



14

YieldonBondswithWarrants:ExampleCont’d c)WhatistheyieldontheABC’sbondswithwarrants? 0=1000  50   

→   6.2%

󰇛󰇜 

,

 󰇛󰇜 

 

󰇛.󰇜 󰇛󰇜  

Theyieldcanbefoundbytrialanderror. Theyieldof6.2%issignificantlylowerthan10%,whichisABC’scostof debtcapital. Thewarrantswereovervaluedattheoutset.ABCreceived$21.28for eachwarrant,butthewarrant holdersareexpectedtoreceiveatotal valueof$18.35‐$6=$12.35whenexercised. FINS3625

15

5

ConvertibleSecurities Convertiblesecuritiesarebondsorpreferredsharesthatcanbeexchanged forcommonshares.Conversionhappensatthediscretionoftheholder. Unlikewarrants,conversionofconvertibles doesnotprovidenewcapitalto thefirm. Debtorpreferredequityisreplacedbycommonequityinthebalance sheet. Usuallyissuedatparvalue Theconversionratio isthenumberofsharesofstocktheholderreceives whenconversion takesplace ConversionRatio CR 

Par PC

Where istheconversionprice. isthepricetheholderpaysforthe stockwhentheconversionoccurs.

ConversionPrice  PC 

ParValueofBondorPreferred CR FINS3625

16

ConvertibleSecurities • ConversionValue,ortheexercisevalue,isthevalueinvestorreceives byconvertingintoequity        • Conversionpriceisusuallysetat20to30%abovecurrentstockprice andsomeconvertiblescanbeallowedtobe‘steppedup’. • Somehavecallprotectionperiod. • Mosthaveprotectionagainstdilutionfromstocksplits,stock dividendsandsaleofcommonsharesatpricesbelowconversion price. • Transferofwealthfromexistingshareholderstoconvertibleholders tendtoresultiftheconversionpriceisreviseddownwardsifthe companysellscommonsharesforapricebelowtheconversionprice. Thisislikelytobethecaseforpoorlyperformingfirms. FINS3625

17

ConvertibleSecurities Pros: • Giveschancefortheissuertoselldebtwithattractiveterms • Overcomestheissueofsellingundervaluedstockswhenissuing equity. • Issuercancontroltheconversionfeaturebymaking theconvertible securitycallable. • Alleviatescashdrainproblemassociatedwithprincipalpaymentsif convertiblesareexpectedtobeconverted. Cons: • Debtisabetteralternativeifthefirmisveryprofitableandstock priceisexpectedtoriserapidly • Lowcouponpaymentsterminateswithconversionorredemption • Issuercanbeburdenedwithalotofdebtifthestockpricedrops FINS3625

18

6

ValueofConvertibleSecurities Atanypointintime,thevalueoftheconvertiblesecuritymustbegreateror equaltothemaximumbetween thevalueofstraightdebtandtheconversion value    ,    ,    Thevalueoftheconvertible securityriseswiththestockpricesincethelatter increasestheconversionvalue. Often,callableconvertiblesecuritiesarecalledifthepriceofstockhas,oris expected,toappreciateinvaluesubstantially Iftheconvertiblesecurityiscallable,thenthesecurity’svaluecannotexceed thevaluetheholderreceivesifthesecurityiscalledbythecompany    FINS3625

19

ConvertibleSecurities:Example

NowassumethatABChadissuedconvertibledebtinsteadof bondswithwarrants.Again,ABC'stotalcompanyvalueis$5M with1Msharesoutstanding.Thefirm'svalueisexpectedtogrow at15%peryearforatleastthenext20years.ABChasrecently raised$2Mincapitalbyissuing20year,5%couponand1,000par valueconvertiblebonds.TheConversionRatioissetat60anditis callablein10yearsfor$1,250.Thecurrentyieldonbondswith compatibleinvestmentgradeis10%andlikelytoremainconstant.

FINS3625

20

ConvertibleSecurities:Example Q)Whatistheconversionprice?Whatdoesitmean?  

 $1,000   $16.6666 60 

A)Theconversionpricemeasurestheminimumstockpricelevel soconversioncanatleastcoverinvestors’initialinvestmentof $1,000intheconvertiblebond.It’sthebreak‐evenprice.

FINS3625

21

7

ConvertibleSecurities:Example Q)Inwhatyearisitexpectedthatthebondswillbeconverted? A)Computetheexpecteddilutedpriceofstockforeachyearafteryear10   󰇛1  󰇜 5󰇛1  .15󰇜      2 1.12 1.12 1     1 .  . 

→   18.06 and  20.77 →   18.06  60  1,083.63  20.77  60  1,246.18 Ifconversionvalue>callableprice=$1,250,thenABCwillforceconversion. Conversionexpectedtotakeplacejustafteryear11. FINS3625

22

ConvertibleSecurities:Example A BC Convertible Bond Model 1 500

1 400

Value

1 300

1 200 1 100

1 000 9 00

8 00

8

9

10

11

12

t FINS3625

23

ConvertibleSecurities:Example Q)Whatistheyieldontheconvertibledebt?

A)Assumingthatbondsarecalledonlyatyearend,conversionis expectedtohappeninyear12,CV 12=20.77  60=1,433.18.Since theconversionvalueisgreaterthanthecallvalueinyear12, convers ionwilltakeplacejustbeforetheyarecalled. TheyieldisgivenbytheIRR 1 (1 yield )  12   0   1, 000  50   yield Initial  Investment   PVofCouponfromBond

1, 433. 18 (1  yield )12  PV of  ConversionValueinyear12

  yield  7.9% FINS3625

24

8

Hybridstosolveconflictsofinterestbetween DebtholdersandShareholders Ifacompanyhasdebt,thereisthepotentialforconflictsofinterests betweenthecompany’sdebtholdersandshareholders Thecostsfromtheseconflictscanbeverylargeandsignificantlyreduce firmvaluation. Hybridscanbeusedtoalleviateconflictsofinterestsbetweenbondand equityholders. Weinvestigatetherisk‐shiftingproblem(alsocalledthe‘goingforbroke’, or‘bettingwithdebtholder’smoney’,ortheoverinvestmentproblem). ConflictofinterestinRiskShiftingProblem: Stockholdersfavor investmentsinexcessivelyriskyprojects,eveniftheprojecthasanegative NPV. FINS3625

25

PayoffProfilesatTimeofDebtMaturity Ifstraightdebtandequityonly: StraightDebt’sPayoff: ,  Equity’sPayoff:   , 0 Ifdebtisconvertible: 

ConversionValue:CV= #   ConvertibleDebt’sPayoff:  ,     ,  ,  Equity’sPayoff:     󰆒, 0  󰇟  FINS3625   ,  ,  , 0󰇠

26

StraightDebtPayoffatTimeofMaturity

FINS3625

27

9

StraightEquityPayoffatTimeofMaturity

FINS3625

28

ConvertibleBondPayoffatTimeofMaturity

FINS3625

29

EquityPayoffatTimeofMaturityifBondsareConvertible

FINS3625

30

10

RiskShiftingProblemandHybridSecurities:Example XYZisinfinancialdistressanditsassetswillbeseizedbythedebtholders nextyearunlessXYZcansignificantlyimproveitsoperations.XYZ'scurrent firmvalueis$100Manditowesthecreditors$200M.XYZhas1Mshares outstanding.XYZhastwoprojectsunderevaluation. ProjectSafehasequalprobabilitiesofrealizingcashflowsof$110Mand $105Moneyearlater. ProjectRiskyhas1/100probabilityof$380Mand99/100probabilityof‐ $100M. Bothprojectsrequireaninvestmentof$5Mtobefinancedbythedebt holders,ifagreeable,andtheriskneutralrequiredrateofreturn onboth projectsis10%. AssumeXYZhas1Msharesoutstandingandthecouponrateis12%. FINS3625

31

RiskShiftingandHybridSecurities:Example a)Whataretheprojects’NPV? NPV5M

1

Safe Project 1 1  110M 105M92.7273M

1.1 2

Risky Project NPV5M

2

1



1

1.1 100

99

380M 100 100M91.5455M

X U 110M

X U 380M

1

1

pU 

p

2

U

100

I5M

I5M

pD 

99

1 p

2

D

100

X D 105M

X D 100M

SinceProjectSafehasapositiveNPVandProjectRiskyhasanegative NPV,projectSafeshouldbeadopted. FINS3625

32

RiskShiftingandHybridSecurities:Example b)Whataretheequityanddebtvaluesiftheprojectsaretobefinancedwith straightdebt? Shareholders Safe Project NPV0

1

 1.1

1 2

Shareholders Risky Project

1

4.4M 02.0M

NPV0

2

MaxVX

1  1 1.1 100

99

274.40M 100 0 2.4945M

U I1 cF,04.4M

MaxVX

1 p

U

I1cF,0274.40M

1 pU

U

2

100

I0

I0

99

1 p

D

pD 2

100

D

MaxVX I1 cF,00

MaxVX

D

I1cF,00

TheshareholderspreferXYZ’smanagementtoinvestintheriskyproject. FINS3625

33

11

RiskShiftingandHybridSecurities:Example b)

Debtholders Risky Project

Debtholders Safe Project NPV5M

1 1 1  1.1 2 205.60M 2

205M181.6364M NPV5M

1 1.1



1 99 205.6MM 100 03.1309M 100


Similar Free PDFs