Title | Lecture notes, lectures 6 - hybrid securities |
---|---|
Course | Applied Corporate Finance |
Institution | University of New South Wales |
Pages | 13 |
File Size | 582.1 KB |
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Hybrid Securities...
Topic:HybridSecurities LectureAgenda WhyHybrid? Prosandconsofissuing – PreferredShares, – Warrantsand – ConvertibleSecurities overstraightsecuritiessuchascommonsharesand/orbonds. Valuationanddeterminationoftheyieldonhybridsecurities Hybridsecuritiestoeliminate/reducethecostofconflictofinterest betweenthecompany’sdebtholdersandshareholders. FINS3625 1
WhyHybridSecurities? Common ways to raise external capital is to issue common equity or corporate bonds. Selling hybrid securities provide alternative ways to raise capital. • Hybrid securities can be viewed as a cross between common equity or corporate bond and financial derivatives. • Hybrids are most useful when a company has difficulty raising external capital by issuing straight bonds or common equity. • Hybrids may be effective tools to resolve conflicts of interest between debt holder and equity holders. Each hybrid has pros and cons, which are based on the features of FINS3625 the security. 2
MotivatingExample,Gloomy:Conflictsofinterestbetween ManagerandDebtholders GloomyCorp.isinfinancialtroublebecauseitcannotaffordtopay itscreditors.Asaresult,thefirm’sassetvalueis$1Mwhichis belowthe$600MthatGloomyowesitscreditors.Thecreditors intendtotakeimmediateactionstoliquidatethefirm. Gloomyhasnoimmediatecashanditisinvestigatingasafeproject thatcosts$40Mandwillgenerateacertainpayoffof$630Mnext year.Theriskfreerateis5%.ThecreditorsperceiveGloomytobe sogloomywithitsprospectsthattheyarenotwillingtolendto Gloomyanymore. Isthisprojectworththeinvestment?Ifso,willtheequityholders financetheproject? FINS3625
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1
MotivatingExample,Gloomy:Conflictsofinterestbetween ManagerandDebtholders Project’sNPV: 40
630 560 1.05
NPVforequityholders: 40
631 600 0 10 1.05
TheprojecthasapositiveNPV,soitisagoodinvestment. However,theequityholderswillnotfinancetheprojectbecause mostofthegainswillgotowardpayingthedebtholders. Gloomywillfaceimmediateliquidatingbythedebtholders. FINS3625
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MotivatingExample,Gloomy:Conflictsofinterestbetween ManagerandDebtholders Now,whatifGloomy’s shareholdersnegotiatedwiththecreditorstoallow theirdebttobeconvertibleto90%ofthecompany’sstock? IfGloomy’s debtbecameconvertible: 40
% .
20.095
Theequityholderswouldbewillingtofinancetheprojectbecausethey wouldget$20,095Mwhichisgreaterthan$0fromimmediateliquidation. Moreover,thedebtholderswouldalsobebetteroffbecausethedebtvalue % wouldriseto$ $540.857 whichisgreaterthanthe$1M . currentassetvalue. Makingthedebtconvertibleresolvestheunderinvestmentproblem. FINS3625
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MotivatingExample,Gloomy:Conflictsofinterestbetween ManagerandDebtholders Makingthedebtconvertibleto90%ofequityresolvesthe underinvestmentproblemforGloomyandinsuresthatGloomydoesn’t fail. Asamatteroffact,thereisarangeofpossiblevaluesofconversionthat canalsoresolvetheunderinvestmentproblemandinsurethatGloomy doesn’tfail. Q)Solvefortherangeofconversionrateasapercentoftotalfirmvalue thatwouldresolvetheunderinvestmentproblem.Yoursolutionmust insure(a)totalfirmvaluecreation,(b)thatequityholdersarewillingto financetheproject,(c)andthatdebtholdersarebetteroffasaresultof projectadoptions. A)Tryitonyourown.Theanswershouldbebetween0.1664%and FINS3625 6 93.34%.
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PreferredStocks Preferredsharesareacrossbetweencommon sharesandbonds FeaturessimilartoBonds: • Issuedatparvalue(usually$25or$100). • Periodicfixedchargeasa%ofparvaluepaidbeforeanycommon dividendsarepaid.Increasesfinancialleverage. • Perceivedtobelessriskythancommonequity. • Novotingrights,butmaygiverightstoelectminoritydirectors. • Maybesubjecttosinkingfundprovisionsand/orbecalledbythe issuer. FeaturesimilartoEquity: • Subordinatedtodebtholders.Missedpreferreddividendpayments doesnotforcebankruptcy. FINS3625 7
PreferredStocks
ValueofPreferredStocks: Mostpreferreddividendsdonotgrowanddividendsarefairlystable. Pros: ‐PreferredDividendsarenotfirmobligationslikeinterestpaymentson corporatebonds. ‐ Avoidsdilutionassociatedwithissuingcommonshares. ‐ Reducescashdrainfromprincipalpaymentsoncorporatebonds. Cons: ‐ PreferredDividendsarenottaxdeductible.Theyarepaidafter corporatetaxesandtaxedagaininthehandsoftheinvestors(likelyto beanissueintheclassicaltaxsystem). ‐ PreferredDividendsarenotfirmobligations,butmustbetreatedas firmobligationsbythemanager.Increasesfinancialleverage. FINS3625
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Warrants Awarrantgivestheholdertherighttobuyaspecifiednumberofstocks fromthecompanybypayingthestrikepricebyacertaindate.Warrants areexamplesoffinancialderivatives(similartocalloptions) Generallyissuedwithdebtto‘sweetenthedeal’ • Tolowercouponrateondebtand/or • Togethigherbondprice(andloweryield)onlongtermdebt Mostofthewarrantsaredetachablefromthedebtandaretradableonthe exchanges. Warrantscanbeexercisedbytheholderif • Expirationdateisfastapproaching • ifcommondividendsgrowrapidly • ifstrikepricerisesrapidly(onlyincasesofsteppedupstrikeprices). Otherwise,likeAmericanoptions,itisbettertoholdthemortosellthem (nottoexercisethem). FINS3625
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Warrants ValuationofBondswithWarrants: BondValuewithWarrants=StraightBondValue+ValueofWarrants Pros:‐ canlowerthecostofraisingdebtcapital ‐ iffirmisafastgrowingcompany,thentheexerciseofthe warrantscanbringinginmuchneededexternalcapitaltothefirm. ‐ ifwarrantsarenotexercised,thentheissuergainsattheexpense ofthelenderssincetheissuerreceivedpaymentforthewarrantsat theoutset(presumably). Cons:‐ equitydilutionifwarrantsareexercised. (i)Valuedilutionsincethestrikepriceonthewarrantsislower thanmarketprice. (ii)Dilutionofpowerduetotheincreasednumberofshares aftertheexercise ofthewarrants. FINS3625
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ValueDilutionfromExercisingWarrants ThemarketvalueofequityisE=V‐D whereV isthefirm’smarketvalue andD isthefirm’sdebtmarketvalue. Pre‐exercisemarketpriceofcommonsharesis
#
Post‐exercisemarketpriceofcommonshare,ordilutedshareprice,is
#
where # FINS3625
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YieldsonBondswithWarrants Computingtheyieldoncorporatebondswithwarrantsattheoutset (oranytime): • Determinethecashflowsfromstraightdebt • Determinewhen thewarrantisexpectedtobeexercised • Determinetheexpectedcashflowsattributedtotheexerciseof thewarrants • ComputetheIRRusingthecashflowsofaportfoliocomposedof thestraightbondandthewarrants,andthecurrentmarketvalues ofthebondandwarrants. • TheIRRistheyieldonthesecurity.It’sthemarketdetermined requiredrateofreturnonthehybridsecurity. TheIRRisalsothecostofcapitalfortheissueriftheissuerdoesnot FINS3625 12 retirethesecurities.
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YieldonBondswithWarrants:Example Example:ABC'stotalcompanyvalueis$5Mwith1Mshares outstanding.Thefirm'svalueisexpectedtogrowat15%peryearforat leastthenext20years.ABChasrecentlyraised$2Mincapitalbyissuing 20year,5%couponand$1,000parvaluebondswithwarrants.Each bondcarries20warrantswithastrikepriceof$6andexpirein10years. Eachwarrantifexercisedgrantstheholderonestock.Thecurrentyield onbondsofcompatibleinvestmentgradeis10%andlikelytoremain constant. a) Whatisthepriceofeachwarrantatthetimeofissue? Ans: $50
%
%
$, %
$1,000 $574.32 20
$574.3
$21.28
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YieldonBondswithWarrants:ExampleCont’d b)WhatisABC’sexpectedsharepricepostexerciseofwarrants? 1 5 1 15% $20.227789 1 1 10% 2 2 1,000 50 20 6 1 10% 1 1 10%
.
20.227789 1.385543 0.24 19.082245
#
.
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=18.35
.
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YieldonBondswithWarrants:ExampleCont’d c)WhatistheyieldontheABC’sbondswithwarrants? 0=1000 50
→ 6.2%
,
.
Theyieldcanbefoundbytrialanderror. Theyieldof6.2%issignificantlylowerthan10%,whichisABC’scostof debtcapital. Thewarrantswereovervaluedattheoutset.ABCreceived$21.28for eachwarrant,butthewarrant holdersareexpectedtoreceiveatotal valueof$18.35‐$6=$12.35whenexercised. FINS3625
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ConvertibleSecurities Convertiblesecuritiesarebondsorpreferredsharesthatcanbeexchanged forcommonshares.Conversionhappensatthediscretionoftheholder. Unlikewarrants,conversionofconvertibles doesnotprovidenewcapitalto thefirm. Debtorpreferredequityisreplacedbycommonequityinthebalance sheet. Usuallyissuedatparvalue Theconversionratio isthenumberofsharesofstocktheholderreceives whenconversion takesplace ConversionRatio CR
Par PC
Where istheconversionprice. isthepricetheholderpaysforthe stockwhentheconversionoccurs.
ConversionPrice PC
ParValueofBondorPreferred CR FINS3625
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ConvertibleSecurities • ConversionValue,ortheexercisevalue,isthevalueinvestorreceives byconvertingintoequity • Conversionpriceisusuallysetat20to30%abovecurrentstockprice andsomeconvertiblescanbeallowedtobe‘steppedup’. • Somehavecallprotectionperiod. • Mosthaveprotectionagainstdilutionfromstocksplits,stock dividendsandsaleofcommonsharesatpricesbelowconversion price. • Transferofwealthfromexistingshareholderstoconvertibleholders tendtoresultiftheconversionpriceisreviseddownwardsifthe companysellscommonsharesforapricebelowtheconversionprice. Thisislikelytobethecaseforpoorlyperformingfirms. FINS3625
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ConvertibleSecurities Pros: • Giveschancefortheissuertoselldebtwithattractiveterms • Overcomestheissueofsellingundervaluedstockswhenissuing equity. • Issuercancontroltheconversionfeaturebymaking theconvertible securitycallable. • Alleviatescashdrainproblemassociatedwithprincipalpaymentsif convertiblesareexpectedtobeconverted. Cons: • Debtisabetteralternativeifthefirmisveryprofitableandstock priceisexpectedtoriserapidly • Lowcouponpaymentsterminateswithconversionorredemption • Issuercanbeburdenedwithalotofdebtifthestockpricedrops FINS3625
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ValueofConvertibleSecurities Atanypointintime,thevalueoftheconvertiblesecuritymustbegreateror equaltothemaximumbetween thevalueofstraightdebtandtheconversion value , , Thevalueoftheconvertible securityriseswiththestockpricesincethelatter increasestheconversionvalue. Often,callableconvertiblesecuritiesarecalledifthepriceofstockhas,oris expected,toappreciateinvaluesubstantially Iftheconvertiblesecurityiscallable,thenthesecurity’svaluecannotexceed thevaluetheholderreceivesifthesecurityiscalledbythecompany FINS3625
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ConvertibleSecurities:Example
NowassumethatABChadissuedconvertibledebtinsteadof bondswithwarrants.Again,ABC'stotalcompanyvalueis$5M with1Msharesoutstanding.Thefirm'svalueisexpectedtogrow at15%peryearforatleastthenext20years.ABChasrecently raised$2Mincapitalbyissuing20year,5%couponand1,000par valueconvertiblebonds.TheConversionRatioissetat60anditis callablein10yearsfor$1,250.Thecurrentyieldonbondswith compatibleinvestmentgradeis10%andlikelytoremainconstant.
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ConvertibleSecurities:Example Q)Whatistheconversionprice?Whatdoesitmean?
$1,000 $16.6666 60
A)Theconversionpricemeasurestheminimumstockpricelevel soconversioncanatleastcoverinvestors’initialinvestmentof $1,000intheconvertiblebond.It’sthebreak‐evenprice.
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ConvertibleSecurities:Example Q)Inwhatyearisitexpectedthatthebondswillbeconverted? A)Computetheexpecteddilutedpriceofstockforeachyearafteryear10 1 51 .15 2 1.12 1.12 1 1 . .
→ 18.06 and 20.77 → 18.06 60 1,083.63 20.77 60 1,246.18 Ifconversionvalue>callableprice=$1,250,thenABCwillforceconversion. Conversionexpectedtotakeplacejustafteryear11. FINS3625
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ConvertibleSecurities:Example A BC Convertible Bond Model 1 500
1 400
Value
1 300
1 200 1 100
1 000 9 00
8 00
8
9
10
11
12
t FINS3625
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ConvertibleSecurities:Example Q)Whatistheyieldontheconvertibledebt?
A)Assumingthatbondsarecalledonlyatyearend,conversionis expectedtohappeninyear12,CV 12=20.77 60=1,433.18.Since theconversionvalueisgreaterthanthecallvalueinyear12, convers ionwilltakeplacejustbeforetheyarecalled. TheyieldisgivenbytheIRR 1 (1 yield ) 12 0 1, 000 50 yield Initial Investment PVofCouponfromBond
1, 433. 18 (1 yield )12 PV of ConversionValueinyear12
yield 7.9% FINS3625
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Hybridstosolveconflictsofinterestbetween DebtholdersandShareholders Ifacompanyhasdebt,thereisthepotentialforconflictsofinterests betweenthecompany’sdebtholdersandshareholders Thecostsfromtheseconflictscanbeverylargeandsignificantlyreduce firmvaluation. Hybridscanbeusedtoalleviateconflictsofinterestsbetweenbondand equityholders. Weinvestigatetherisk‐shiftingproblem(alsocalledthe‘goingforbroke’, or‘bettingwithdebtholder’smoney’,ortheoverinvestmentproblem). ConflictofinterestinRiskShiftingProblem: Stockholdersfavor investmentsinexcessivelyriskyprojects,eveniftheprojecthasanegative NPV. FINS3625
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PayoffProfilesatTimeofDebtMaturity Ifstraightdebtandequityonly: StraightDebt’sPayoff: , Equity’sPayoff: , 0 Ifdebtisconvertible:
ConversionValue:CV= # ConvertibleDebt’sPayoff: , , , Equity’sPayoff: , 0 FINS3625 , , , 0
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StraightDebtPayoffatTimeofMaturity
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StraightEquityPayoffatTimeofMaturity
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ConvertibleBondPayoffatTimeofMaturity
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EquityPayoffatTimeofMaturityifBondsareConvertible
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RiskShiftingProblemandHybridSecurities:Example XYZisinfinancialdistressanditsassetswillbeseizedbythedebtholders nextyearunlessXYZcansignificantlyimproveitsoperations.XYZ'scurrent firmvalueis$100Manditowesthecreditors$200M.XYZhas1Mshares outstanding.XYZhastwoprojectsunderevaluation. ProjectSafehasequalprobabilitiesofrealizingcashflowsof$110Mand $105Moneyearlater. ProjectRiskyhas1/100probabilityof$380Mand99/100probabilityof‐ $100M. Bothprojectsrequireaninvestmentof$5Mtobefinancedbythedebt holders,ifagreeable,andtheriskneutralrequiredrateofreturn onboth projectsis10%. AssumeXYZhas1Msharesoutstandingandthecouponrateis12%. FINS3625
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RiskShiftingandHybridSecurities:Example a)Whataretheprojects’NPV? NPV5M
1
Safe Project 1 1 110M 105M92.7273M
1.1 2
Risky Project NPV5M
2
1
1
1.1 100
99
380M 100 100M91.5455M
X U 110M
X U 380M
1
1
pU
p
2
U
100
I5M
I5M
pD
99
1 p
2
D
100
X D 105M
X D 100M
SinceProjectSafehasapositiveNPVandProjectRiskyhasanegative NPV,projectSafeshouldbeadopted. FINS3625
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RiskShiftingandHybridSecurities:Example b)Whataretheequityanddebtvaluesiftheprojectsaretobefinancedwith straightdebt? Shareholders Safe Project NPV0
1
1.1
1 2
Shareholders Risky Project
1
4.4M 02.0M
NPV0
2
MaxVX
1 1 1.1 100
99
274.40M 100 0 2.4945M
U I1 cF,04.4M
MaxVX
1 p
U
I1cF,0274.40M
1 pU
U
2
100
I0
I0
99
1 p
D
pD 2
100
D
MaxVX I1 cF,00
MaxVX
D
I1cF,00
TheshareholderspreferXYZ’smanagementtoinvestintheriskyproject. FINS3625
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RiskShiftingandHybridSecurities:Example b)
Debtholders Risky Project
Debtholders Safe Project NPV5M
1 1 1 1.1 2 205.60M 2
205M181.6364M NPV5M
1 1.1
1 99 205.6MM 100 03.1309M 100