Lecture notes plcp 3110 PDF

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PLCP 3110: Politics in Western Europe
Professor Gerard Alexander...

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The Politics of Western Europe PLCP 3110-100 Lecture Notes 1/14/2019 -

Britain, Germany, France, Italy, some of Spain, and the EU

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These themes are consistent across those five countries above o Stable democracies 

Spain in the last generation

o Parties/voting 

Why do they have the parties that they have?

o Basic contours of political economies 

Great Depression expanded gov’t intervention in economies, but now recently right gov’ts pulling gov’t out of economies

1/16/2019 The Interwar Period (1918-1939/40) -

Break up of empires, Great Depression, Germany, etc. – a lot happened

Regime Outcomes: Democracy vs. Authoritarianism -

Highly stable democracies that define democracies today o Right that comes with making elections fair 

These are taken for granted so much so that ppl think it’s always been that way

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Reading describes how undemocratic and bad economic W. Europe was in the 20s/30s

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W. Europe also was a region that created anti-democratic feelings

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Democracy survived in Britain, France, the Low Countries (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg), and most of Scandinavia

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Democracy broke down (b/c of internal issues) in Italy, Germany (1932/33), Spain (1936 military coup that controlled over half of country which sparked civil war), and Austria among others

o Very small groups of ppl seize power and rule, but this is NOT the case in these countries that we study, but the people voted for the changes or supported the overthrows -

Variations in outcomes: why some democracies died and why some survived? o Explanations considered by Mark Mazower 1) National political cultures/popular ideologies 2) Constitutional design/electoral laws 3) Economic interests, including as affected by the GB

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Ideas, Interests, Institutions

National Political Cultures and Ideologies -

Mazower’s section: “The Crisis of Democracy” o Norms dictate the regime’s just-ness in ppl’s eyes o “Democratically minded” means ppls’ ideas 

values that we hold that guide us to make decisions



values can drive people to support one form of gov’t or another – basis of a causal argument 

examples of idea-based theory: o religion is a value system o national political culture

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Mazower asking how many of these ideas in Europe were democratic o Many idea-based theories/claims at that time were anti-democratic like communism

o -

proportional representation vs. our form

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constitutional and electoral rules

o Mazower’s sections: “making constitutions” and “the critique of parliamentarian” o Institutional rules channel political processes in specific ways 

With this argument, the breakdown of democracy could be unintended 

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This causal theory is different than ideas based ones

What if the preferences of the ppl result in the stability of democracy? o

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Economic Interests, Version I o Conflicts between socio-economic groups (causal argument) 

Upper/middle class v. lower class



Mazower’s sections: “Europe’s Civil War” and “Bourgeois Doubts”

o

these are all “maybe” possibilities that he’s entertaining -

Economic Interests, Version II o General economic conditions like the issue of unemployment 

Mazower’s ch 4



1/23/19 Explanatory Concepts – Ideas, Interests, and Institutions -

understanding events as opposed to just describing them o rule #1) explanations as simple as possible o rule #2) assume causal homogeneity

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a problem is that there’s an infinite # of possible causes of major outcomes, so we have to make some assumptions about which types of causes matter more than others

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3 prominent causes that social scientists use to develop theories: interests, ideas, institutions

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Interest-based arguments o Assume that ppl act on economic interests in a calculating way o Focus att. on economic factors: money, assets, income o Examples of factors that might drive ppl’s behavior if interests matter: 

Position in a society’s class structure (owners vs. non-owners, wealth v., etc.)



Interests of specific industries or sectors of the economy (trade, gov, policies)

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Other financial benefits from gov policies

o Basic logic of an interest based explanation: 

Ppl w/ sufficiently dif interests can have dif political preferences (e.g. prefer dif policies)

o Ppl choose based on cost/benefit analysis o 2 trademarks

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

ppl w/ dif economic POV have dif. political POV

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ppl whose economic interest changing should change politically

Interest-Based arguments o Focus att. on ppl’s sense of what is “appropriate,” just, ethical, etc. o Key assumption about ppl: ppl are motivated by systems of meaning that indicate what they should find natural, appropriate, or desirable, and they respond to those indicators o Examples of factors that might drive behavior if ideas matter: nat’l political culture, ethics, norms, values, ideologies o Ideas can help explain what’s going on 

Voting on 4th 9/11 plane… that’s culture

1/23/19 Discussion -

Interwar Period o Mazower, Dark Continent 

Ch. 1 

Illustrates the rise and fall of parliamentary democracies across Europe



PR systems susceptible to failure -> lead to dictator o Majoritarian democracies prevailed (Britain, USA, France)



Ch. 4 

State of economic chaos in Europe



Move toward authoritarianism (Soviets, Italy, Germany) o Nationalist socialism, fascist capitalism, and communism as alt. to capitalism

o Core point: European democracies were not as stable as many ppl think

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3 explanations (interests, ideas, institutions)

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Rational Choice o Elster 

Starts w/ simple rational choice assumptions:



Each individual chooses what’s best for her given available options;

 

Each individual aims to max her well-being (utility)

Interest based argument: ppl selfish, only care about max wealth (least complicated)



Ideas based argument: start w/ similar logic, but adds a complication. Individual behavior is bounded by norms, values, manners, customs



Institutions based argument: similar to ideas-based, but replacing norms w/ institutions. Institutions help us solve collective actions probs 

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Private (churches) v. public (Congress)

Pirate game

1/28/19 -

Idea-based arguments o 2 trademarks of ideas-based arguments: 

ppl in a context w/ a predominant idea system should have similar political preferences 



true even if their economic interests are very different

ppl whose ideas change sufficiently will change their political preferences 

true even if their economic interests and the country’s institutions remain stable

o vulnerability of an ideas-based approach

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

where do ppl’s ideas come from?

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Example w/ rich person paying for spot in line at movie theater

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9/11 example goes w/ ideas-based arguments

proportional representation: critics argue that it leads to disagreements and people not finding common ground since they will always have a seat even with 10% of vote

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3rd great approach: Institutional arguments (institutions driving behavior argument)

o focus att. on the formal rules that organize gov’t pwrs in a representative democracy o All democracies have to have 

Constitutional rules like parliamentarism vs. presidentialism



Electoral laws

o This approach’s key assumption about ppl: 

Ppl’s behavior responds to the requirements and incentives that are embedded in the “rules of the game” that are playing

o Basic logic of an institutional explanation: 

Dif institutional requirements and incentives will produce fid. Behaviors by ppl in politics



Dif. enough institutions will cause dif. overall outcomes

o 2 trademarks of institutional arguments 

ppl in situations w/ similar institutions should have similar political preferences 

true even if they are dif economic locations or in countries w/ dif. cultures



ppl in contexts where institutions change sufficiently will change their political preferences 

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true even if their economic interests or ideas remain stable

Using the 3 approaches to describe political behavior together o Can we use 2 or 3 approaches at the same time? 

No, it doesn’t really work well 

Ex: American foreign policy o What happens if America wants to become allies w/ a country that could help us (money=interest based), but it’s a dictatorship (goes against our ideas/values). Are interests more important than values??



Which approach do you find most useful? Do ideas, interests, or institutions seem to be doing the most work in explaining the variation in outcomes?

United Kingdom 1 & 2 Causes of Democratic Stability -

Western Europe regime outcomes

Germany

1870-WWI Democracy (restricted franchise) Democracy (restricted franchise) Authoritarian

Italy

Authoritarian

Spain

Authoritarian

UK France

Interwar Democracy

Post-1945 Democracy

Precarious democracy

Democracy? (crisis in 1958) Democracy

Democracy; breakdown; Nazism Democracy; breakdown; fascism Authoritarian; democracy; breakdown; military rule

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We’re asking how come Britain’s democracy persevered.

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Explaining stable democracy in the UK

Democracy Democracy starting 1977

o 3 characteristics distinguish democracies from authoritarian regimes (Dahl) 

popular participation

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civil and political rights

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competition and contestation

o How did UK develop these aspects into durable elements of governance? -

Robert Dahl: An ideas Argument o His claim: participants in democracy must 

Agree to disagree

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Accept the risk of loosing

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Accept occasional loss

o These attitudes are neither inevitable nor natural o Dahl considers 2 conditions that might bring about… 

Gradual march to democracy 

Slow march to democracy in UK o Timeline (tomorrow): competitive elections among upper class (1830); the vote was slowly extended to more ppl overtime



Increased wealth

1/30/19 -

Slow March to Democracy o

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Dahl’s ideas argument o He focuses on the cultural norms of the elite in GB prior to 1830 and how these got disseminated and perpetuated through gradual inclusions 

When elites governed, they had long-standing practices of peacefully agreeing to loose and agreeing to disagree

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Family ties and shared values meant intra-elite differences were not so great

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Ties of affect: went to school together, married, etc.

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Values of sporting, etiquette, etc.

o The elite conducted politics w/ these values. As members of other classes were gradually admitted to politics, they found these were how politics was conducted 

If masses had been admitted abruptly, they would have swamped elite norms

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There were manners in politics in the past. A gentlemenness. To limit debate. You didn’t address ppl directly – always through the chair

o Dahl suggesting through this way, it was easier to avoid violence which prevented democratic failure b/c they established a manner that politics was conducting o He suggested as each group was entered to politics, they were socialized w/ this respect -

Even though the aristocracy gave away majority in legislature, the other groups still maintained the legacy, the manners of acting (they could have just stabbed and overthrew the gov, but they didn’t) o All of this mattered b/c, he says, Democracy was preserved b/c of these attitudes toward politics. When ppl don’t attached each other, then democracy is preserved b/c you agree to disagree, agree to loose, don’t treat other ppl hostile, etc. He says free for all and contestation risks democratic stability. This was the case in the countries that democracy failed – that’s how we got Hitler o This is why GB is dif. In the other countries, competition was socialized and that led to democratic failure. When ppl think it’s all about competition, free for all, democracy cannot be stable.

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First contestation among elites, and gradual voting rights = created democratic stability

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Testing the Culture Argument Country

Causal variable

Societal norms

Regime

UK

Contestation b/f

Norms of

outcome Stable

inclusion

agreeing to

democracy

lose/limiting France

Simultaneous

conflict Norms of

Unstable

Germany

Inclusion b/f

maximalism Norms of

democracy Unstable

Italy

contestation Virtually

maximalism Norms of

democracy Unstable

Spain

simultaneous Inclusion b/c

maximalism Norms of

democracy Unstable

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contestation maximalism democracy Dahl doesn’t assume that later Britain voters adopted disagreement – w/in limited b/c of self-interest (self-interest may be why voters initially adopt norms, but why they become durable)

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Dahl is able to trace the ideas in ppl’s heads to a tangible case in the world

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Dahl’s Wealth Argument o 2 potential logics 

as general wealth inc, pwr is diffused. This in turn, allows groups to pursue their interests, w/out fear of any one group dominating



greater wealth among classes means less conflict between them

o can these 2 explanations be used additively? 2 reasons to be skeptical 

they assume ppl are motivated by radically dif things



are the 2 explanations usable together? 

If society has gradual inclusion and is rich, should have stable democracy



If society has abrupt inclusion and is poor, should have unstable democracy



But what if society includes gradual inclusion and is poor? o How can both culture and idea theories work at the same time? Which is it??

1/30/19 D -

Recap: explain democratic breakdown o Rational choice (Elster) 

Interest-based argument: individuals; rational calculating machines; aim to maximize their well being



Idea-based argument: individual behavior is bounded by norms, values, manners, customs



Institutions-based argument: institutions help us solve collective actions problems

o Mazower not as clear w/ his argumentation

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Just claims it was cultures, manners, etc. that brought us toward democratic breakdown

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Britain o

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Britain doesn’t have a constitution and just relies on common law

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Dahl, “Polyarchy” ( ^Probability of democracy o ^ GDP -> (upside down arrow) probability of democratic breakdown o hypothesis: inc in socioeconomic development leads to competitive regimes (polyarchies) o hypothesis: competitive regimes (polyarchies) are more likely in countries which:

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

provide literacy, education, and communication

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create a pluralistic, rather than centrally dominated social order

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prevent extreme inequalities

Dahl (need these for democratization) o Liberalization (public contestation)

o Inclusiveness (participation) -

3 paths to polyarchy o liberalization precedes inclusiveness (Britain) o inclusiveness precedes liberalization (Germany) o liberalization and inclusiveness occur simultaneously (France, after rev.)

2/4/19 -

Each explanation separately works much more simply and clearly (Dahl): o if culture matters and gradual inclusion happens, should have prodemocratic norms and stability, even if that country is poor or it suffers a severe economic downturn later and becomes poor (like, say Great Depression) o if culture matters and inclusion is abrupt, should have unhelpful norms and instability, even if that country is (or becomes) rich

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Ditto if wealth is what matters: o If country is poor, should expect democratic instability even if inclusion was gradual o If country is rich, should expect democratic stability even if inclusion was abrupt

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Exploring Dalh’s Theories o Ideas theory predicts: 

Contestation b/f mass voting -> adaptation of norms -> stable democracy

o The pessimistic outcome predicts: 

Abrupt democratization -> pursuing maximalist demands -> unstable democracy

United Kingdom 3 What drives voting and the party system? -

The party system o The UK has been predominantly a 2-party system (dif than most other W European countries, though like U.S.)

o Through the 1920s, the main parties were liberals and conservatives/Tories o Today, Labour (left) and Conservative (2010-15 the gov was a ConservativeLiberal Democratic coalition)

o -

Anthony Downs’ Economic Theory of Democracy o “Economic” b/c Downs draws a # of assumptions from microeconomic theory o a way of thinking about the “space” containing voters and parties o voters assess party options and vote for party likely to produce the policies “closest” to the policies they prefer o in turn, party’s voters’ preferences and move to capture largest voting bloc by offering key voters the policies they prefer o Assumptions 

Voters and parties have extensive info.



Parties are able and willing to relocate or re-position in order to attract votes

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The party system is ultimately driven by voter preferences

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Not religious, but religiosity rules politics

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Language policy like in Spain

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Using the left to right spectrum

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Align w/ party most closely to own

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The same way customer/consumer relationships is the same way politicians work (what voters want)

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o he says parties should ...