Liguez vs. Court of Appeals 103 Phil. 577 PDF

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**G. No. L-11240 February 13, 1958 CONCHITA LIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA NGO VDA. DE LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents. FACTS: Petitioner's/Plaintiff's claim/s (no more than 3 sentences)** In response to the Court's decision the appellees have filed a motion for reconsidera...

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G.R. No. L-11240

February 13, 1958

CONCHITA LIGUEZ, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, MARIA NGO VDA. DE LOPEZ, ET AL., respondents. FACTS: 1. Petitioner's/Plaintiff's claim/s (no more than 3 sentences) In response to the Court's decision the appellees have filed a motion for reconsideration, requesting that the court will declare (a) that the donation in question, because it was made to an illegal cause, is null and void and inexistent, and had no effect whatsoever; (b) that the pari delicto rule should be followed; (c) that which prevents the deceased donor from establishing the illegality cannot prevent his heirs from doing so; and (d) that the appellant is ensnared in estoppel. 2. Respondent's/Defendant's claim/s (no more than 3 sentences) The Honorable Court has declared that the donation was tainted by immoral (i.e., illegal) causa, rendering it null and void. Nonetheless, the court was required to apply Articles 1305 and 1306 of the Civil Code of 1889 which state that contract nullity due to illegal consideration or subject matter, when executed (rather than merely executory), has the effect of barring any action by a guilty party to recover what it has already given under the contract. The provision of Article 1305, according to the court, shall be applicable in cases where only one of the contracting parties has committed a crime or misdemeanor, but the innocent party may recover anything he may have given and shall not be bound to fulfill any promise he may have made. 3. Decisions of the lower courts (e.g. RTC, CA)

According to this Court's decisions (Addison vs. Felix, 39 Phil. 404, etc), such tradition "per chartam" is ineffective where the thing conveyed was in the physical possession of third persons at the time; however, possession by the donor or his family can be considered possession by strangers to the conveyance. The donation appears to be valid on the surface; however, the refusal of the appellees to surrender the donated property is an attack on the validity of the donation made by their predecessor, Salvador F. Lopez. It should be noted that appellant Liguez does not seek a specific performance of the donation; the latter has already been completed and no further action is required. The basis of the appellant's complaint is not an executory contract to convey, but ownership resulting from the completed conveyance, and that ownership carries with it the right jus possidend that the appellees seek to deny. To keep possession of the donated item, appellees must defeat the donation; to defeat the donation, they must invoke its illegality, which this Court has ruled they cannot do because their predecessor was prohibited by law from doing so. Debarment of appellees, qua successors and privies of the deceased donor, Salvador F. Lopez, is based not on technical rules of estoppel (as appellees mistakenly believe), but on one more basic and fundamental: that the heir or successor, in his capacity as such, cannot have a better right than the predecessor whom he replaces. This principle's justice has been recognized by both civil and common law.

The argument that the pari delicto rule should have been applied in this case ignores an important fact emphasized in the Court’s main decision: appellant Liguez was a minor of sixteen at the time the contract was made, whereas Lopez was of mature years and experience. No authority has been brought to Court’s attention that holds that the guilt of a minor should be judged with the same severity as the guilt of an adult. It is well known that minors have a privileged position in the law, and Article 1415 of the new Civil Code emphasizes the law's tender care for them. In any case, the point is irrelevant in this case because, even if the parties were found to be in pari delicto, the action of the donor or his privies to recover the conveyed property and return to the status quo would be barred by Articles 1305 and 1306. Issue/s (one sentence) Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in applying to the present case the pari delicto rule. HELD: 4. Disposition of the case (one sentence) The motion to reconsider is denied.

5. Dictum (no more than five sentences addressing the issue relevant to the topic under discussion) Donations made by the husband without the wife's consent are not considered void by the legislator, but rather fraudulent, subject to collation upon the liquidation of the conjugal partnership and deduction of its value from the donor's share of the conjugal profits. This conclusion is supported

not only by the commentators, but also by the complete absence of any provision in the Code of 1889 authorizing the wife to recover property donated during the conjugal partnership's existence, as opposed to Article 173 of the new Civil Code. Hence, the current donation falls under Article 4's exception rather than the general rule. Lastly, the rule of estoppel by laches cannot be used to prevent the application of the principle that a party to an illegal contract cannot recover what he has given in accordance with the contract, because the latter is a rule of superior public policy....