Lithuanian public administration: A usable state bureaucracy PDF

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Journal of Baltic Studies ISSN: 0162-9778 (Print) 1751-7877 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbal20 Lithuanian public administration: A usable state bureaucracy? Vitalis Nakrošis To cite this article: Vitalis Nakrošis (2001) Lithuanian public administration: A usable state b...

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Journal of Baltic Studies

ISSN: 0162-9778 (Print) 1751-7877 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rbal20

Lithuanian public administration: A usable state bureaucracy? Vitalis Nakrošis To cite this article: Vitalis Nakrošis (2001) Lithuanian public administration: A usable state bureaucracy?, Journal of Baltic Studies, 32:2, 170-181, DOI: 10.1080/01629770100000041 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/01629770100000041

Published online: 28 Feb 2007.

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LITHUANIAN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: A USABLE STATE BUREAUCRACY?

Vitalis Nakro~is, Vilnius University

ABSTRACT. Reform of the state bureaucracy has been a serious challenge in Lithuania. In the face of a dearth of leaders with the requisite administrative expertise as well as capacity for developing ideologically coherent programs, Lithuania's political parties have had great difficulty in properly managing and directing the ministries of the government. At the same time, the Soviet era legacy of command administration with an emphasis on formalism (versus practical execution of policy) has undermined bottom-up efforts to reform the state bureaucracy. While the European Union continues to impose reforms on Lithuania's civil service, the changes are largely cosmetic, as administrators cleave to old habits.

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ost-communist transformations in Central and Eastern European countries have focused the attention of political science on democratic consolidation. However, very few studies have sought to investigate the process of bureaucratic consolidation. Comprehensive and empirically-grounded accounts of administrative transformation are almost non-existent. A small number of studies have touched upon important aspects of bureaucratic consolidation. It has been recognized that post-communist administrations have limited institutional capacities to formulate and carry out public policies, in particular in the field of economic policy (e.g. Brunetti, Thedieck and Bertucci, World Bank). In Lithuania, recent research has concluded that insufficient state institutional capacity is a critical impediment to the successful management of European matters (Nakrogis). Besides capacity-building, the transformation from a communist administrative system to a democratic administrative system involves a lessening of the extent to which the bureaucracy can exercise unlimited power as well as a reduction of the dominance of the public sector vis-hvis the emerging private sector. This study is concerned with the question of whether or not the transformation from a communist administrative system to a democratic system has produced a bureaucracy that lends itself to the needs of a democratic state. What this question boils down to is whether after almost ten years of administrative transformation there exists a bureaucracy, which acts within, and conforms to, an established legal framework, and effectively and efficiently implements its functions.

JBS, Vol X)CXII, No 2 (Summer 2001)

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After almost ten years of transformation from a communist administrative system to a democratic administrative system it is difficult to see how the state bureaucracy could challenge the underlying principles of democracy. However, this is not sufficient for the consolidation of a democratic regime. For instance, the process of democratic consolidation is seriously eroded if the bureaucracy is plagued by frequent incidents of corruption constraining the development of the private sector. Also, how the state bureaucracy performs its functions, which range from the protection of law and order to delivery of public services, greatly affects the legitimacy of a democratic regime. New Institutionalism

This article adopts the new institutionalist approach. The basic claim of new institutionalism is that institutions matter. The approach adopts a wide interpretation of what constitutes an institution. According to one definition, institutions include formal institutions, informal institutions and conventions, the norms and symbols embedded in them as well as policy instruments and procedures (Bulmer). This definition opens the door for an examination of the informal aspects of politics and policymaking that are crucial to the understanding of post-communist politics and policy-making. However, the definition obscures the dividing line between "formal" and "informal" rules. In an attempt to solve this problem, this article employs the term "standard operating procedures" (Hall, Goodin and Klingemann), which leaves out "culture" and "social norms" while includiog agreed-upon rules of political nature, whether or not they have been written down and decided upon in a formal procedure. Central to the new institutionalism is the proposition that institutional behaviour is shaped by the "logic of appropriateness" defined by the values internal to the institution (March and OIsen). It is the logic of appropriateness that guides institutional behaviour by setting "parameters of acceptable behaviour" (Peters). By shaping institutional behaviour, institutions can either constrain or facilitate policy change. The Communist Administrative Legacy

The starting point of this article is the institutional inheritance of Lithuanian administration. Many studies have considered such a legacy to be an essential factor in shaping the pattern of transition (e.g. Crawford and Lijphardt). This legacy shapes the pattern of administrative transformation by generating more or less binding institutional constraints that need to be overcome by the continuous process of institutional and policy change. Despite nearly a decade since the

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introduction of democratic reforms in Lithuania, it can be argued that the post-communist legacy is still reflected in the organization and especially the functioning of Lithuanian administration. Due to the absence of a civil service under Communism, Lithuania inherited a specialist-based administration with a low degree of internal coherence. Under Communism, major tasks of the state were performed by the Communist party penetrating all bureaucratic and social institutions. De-coupling the party from the state inevitably reduced the performance of the state apparatus and contributed to the occurrence of bureaucratic dominance. This trend was further exacerbated during the transformation process by the failure to establish a uniform civil service, as well as by the deliberate decision to keep individual central government institutions weak in order to prevent the possible dominance of a single authoritarian politician over Lithuania's central government. The key institutional units of governmental decision-making remain central government ministries, each headed by a cabinet member and for the most part staffed by permanent officials. Due to a high degree of ministerial autonomy and the underdevelopment of horizontal coordination relationships, inter-ministerial coordination is ineffective. This in turn means that many ministerial issues are left for the resolution of the government centre, thus limiting its ability to concentrate on policy steering and arbitration. Also, the government's capacity for arbitration depends greatly on the Prime Minister's authority, which is circumscribed by the principle of primus inter pares Z and depends on his/her position in the ruling party or coalition. Besides the principle of ministerial autonomy, the authority of the government centre is also limited by the collegial nature of governmental decision-making, according to which most governmental decision must be approved by all cabinet members. Administrative Transformation: A Lack of "Top-Down" Control and Political Commitment

The transformation from a communist administrative system to a democratic administrative system has been plagued by several trends. As in other Central and Eastern European countries, in the first years of transition, institutional and policy changes in Lithuania were primarily driven by the mere rejection of the post-communist legacy rather than comprehensive reform programs (Hesse). Consequently, the prevailing destructive (rather than constructive) approach retarded not only the development of a stable and professional state bureaucracy, but also the complete and irreversible break with the post-communist administrative legacy.

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Government ministry responsibility for public administration reform, which was set up in 1994, does not harbour sufficient expertise and, more importantly, authority to draw up and carry out a comprehensive reform program. The lack of authority stems from the fact that until mid1999 Lithuanian governments lacked strong commitment to administrative reform. Until then no Lithuanian government had overcome the basic dilemma between the short-term adjustments in the institutional structure and the long-term investment in institutional capacity. Administrative transformation was compounded by a high degree of polarization within the political-administrative system, which contributed to a high turnover of political appointees within the state bureaucracy. Consequently, due to its short life span and the lack of institutional memory, the political leadership in Lithuania has been unable to advance administrative reform by asserting effective control over the bureaucracy. The ability of the political executive to exert control over the bureaucracy is further limited by the absence of governing ideologies with clear positions with regard to administrative reform. Such governing ideologies have the potential to assist the political executive in reforming the civil service by providing a benchmark against which officials' performance can be measured. Platforms upon which Lithuanian political parties centre their political campaigns, however, in most cases leave out public administration reform. There is also a dearth of political leadership with the capacity to formulate and carry out institutional reform initiatives once the governing party is in office. Thus governments rely excessively on the advice of the civil service with ministers dependent upon the advice of officials in their respective ministries.2 The ability of Lithuanian legislature to offset this disadvantage is still highly limited due to a combination of limited expertise, an inadequate flow of information and a heavy legislative burden in the transition process. A high degree of politicization during the transition, stemming in part from the existence during most of the period of two competing political parties (the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party and the Homeland Union [Lithuanian Conservatives]), has produced a "braindrain" in the administration. In the absence of effective civil service regulation regarding job security, the political polarization has produced numerous dismissals of officials based on political grounds. Political interests still play a major role in the appointment of officials. Consequently, job security has been practically non-existent, and promotion chances have been largely based on political loyalty rather than on performance. A combination of the high level of politicization

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within the Lithuanian administration and its limited attractiveness explains, to a large extent, the limited stability of Lithuania's civil service. This fact is manifested in the relatively high employment volatility within Lithuania's civil service. In 1997, the average career length in Lithuania's civil service was less than 3.8 years (Lithuania's

Progress). The politicized nature of appointments also seriously undermines any notion of a neutral, competent bureaucracy. In essence, administrative positions are dangerously close to being a patronage system controlled by the ruling party. As a consequence, instead of administrators being divorced from politics, they are often fully engaged in partisan politics. On the other hand, bureaucratic dominance has derailed many important reform efforts. For instance, the central government has resisted transferring numerous functions to the regional level. It is interesting to note that this process was marked by the refusal of some ministries to transfer functions to the regional level, despite the existence of governmental resolutions providing for such a transfer. An attempt by the Vagnorius government to reduce the number of officials by thirty percent, which was driven by a populist electoral pledge rather than analysis of the current situation, has resulted largely in the abolition of vacant positions in ministries, rather than actual staff reductions. These examples are illustrative of the bureaucracy's ability to assert its selfinterest vis-~t-vis the legally-binding framework of government policy. "Bottom-Up" Reform Efforts and External Reform Pressure

New institutionalism scholars have argued that only the "top-down" type of administrative reform can be successful (Brunsson and Oisen). This type of reform involves the "top-down" imposition of the new "logic of appropriateness" on the whole system. Therefore, "top-down" reform efforts have the potential to overcome bureaucratic resistance to change and the tendency to pursue bureaucratic self-interest. However, it is obvious from the above section that the transformation from a communist administrative system to a democratic administrative system has been marked by the absence of "top-down" reform efforts. In this context the process of administrative transformation has relied to a substantial degree upon (1) the willingness of individual offices to recognize and eliminate the discrepancy between old "standard operating procedures" and new challenges, (2) the receptiveness of the institutional environment to new reform efforts, (3) and reform pressure stemming from civil society, regulated communities and particularly from external institutions.

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At the very outset it is important to note that in the absence of "topdown" guidance, different offices have been affected by these forces in different ways. The environment where bureaucratic offices can pursue their self-interest could not result in anything other than an inconsistent and incoherent reform process based on contingent and uncoordinated reform efforts. Thus, in the absence of strong "top-down" central guidance, "bottom-up" changes cannot ensure a uniform institutional adaptation across the board at the governmental level. Owing primarily to the lack of central control, an uncontrolled proliferation of new sections has occurred, resulting in an increasing overlap of functions between different offices with vaguely defined objectives and unclear lines of accountability. This is not at all surprising given that in Lithuania there is no governmental institution that monitors (mis)matches between responsibilities and administrative resources. At present, total size and responsibilities of bureaucratic offices are not closely linked, and different staff levels are more attributable to departmental competition over staff remuneration budgets than administrative logic. The fact that a more rational distribution of staff numbers and functions will be needed means that the current institutional structure is inherently unstable. Therefore, this situation represents not only a significant challenge to policy-makers, but also a significant threat to democratic consolidation. In Lithuania, the deeply-rooted principle of ministerial autonomy allows each institution to have a great deal of discretion in building its administrative capacity. For instance, in the absence of a uniform civil service, all aspects of personnel management, including recruitment, training and promotion, are the employer's responsibilities. This is largely attributable to the communist legacy. Under communism there was no concept of a uniform civil service, and each public institution was an independent employer (Synnerstrom). However, the ability of individual offices to recognize the inadequacy of old "standard operating procedures" and adjust to new challenges has been limited and uneven. It appears that the "bottom-up" adjustments were crucially dependent on the impact of individual personalities. In some bureaucratic offices reform-minded personalities followed merit-based recruitment practices that contributed to the increasing professionalization of staff. In contrast, in other offices political appointees or senior officials resorted to patronage-based recruitment activities producing the opposite effect. Finally, many offices have retained an "elitist" character following old "standard operating procedures" and are unwilling to open up their proceedings to the public. Furthermore, the implementation of "bottom-up" reform efforts has been difficult, since the institutional environment has not been receptive

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to the replacement of old "standard operating procedures" with new practices. Despite the fact that individual offices have a great deal of discretion, they function in a highly institutionalized environment limiting their ability to change the existing pattern of governmental decision-making. For instance, the co-ordination of policy implementation is particularly weak. This stems largely from the lack of an appropriate implementation culture. In the communist administrative system, which was characterized by an excessively hierarchical and legalistic nature, officials were primarily concerned with adhering to formal requirements with substantially less attention paid to whether programs were actually being implemented (Barr). At present, the government centre monitors the implementation of government decisions mostly by relying on its formal control over the execution of the government program. Before government meetings, each minister is presented with a list of government assignments that have failed to be executed on time. Direct interventions by government officials are limited in their scope. While government officials may interfere in the co-ordination of draft legal acts, they do not control the majority of enacted government decisions. Reform pressure stemming from the civil society and regulated communities has not been very significant. This can be partly explained by the inherited culture of citizen passivity as well as the minimal involvement of Lithuanian interest groups in the policy process. Further, the development of policy networks is limited by the need to replace old policy networks, which collapsed as a result of the elimination of central control through Communist party links and privatization of state-owned enterprises, with completely new networks. As a result, severe tensions occurred between revamped "old" trade unions and new unions putting constraints on the consolidation of policy networks. In the absence of strong domestic reform guidance, external influences have provided an impetus for transforming the communist administrative system into a democratic administrative system. Most institutional and policy changes that occurred within the Lithuanian administration were clearly linked to external pressure or expectations, with the European Union (EU) playing the most critical role. Lithuania's policy and institutional change has been most facilitated by the EU's PHARE program, which generated significant policy learning effects within Lithuania's civil service and outside it, and by the EU's agendasetting instruments, in particular the Accession Partnership (Nakro~is). There are several problems associated with the large dependence of institutional and policy change on external influences. If the process of...