Mutual Recognition, Forms OF LOW Price AND Freedom PDF

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Without a doubt, Axel Honneth ranks as one of the most prominent members of the third generation of the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory. Since the publication of The struggle for recognition: for a moral grammar of social conflicts (Honneth, 1997 [1992]), Honneth has developed an impor...

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MUTUAL RECOGNITION, FORMS OF LOW PRICE AND FREEDOM: THE THEORY OF THE STRUGGLES FOR THE RECOGNITION OF AXEL HONETH AND ITS PARTICULAR TRANSLATION IN TERMS OF A PLURAL THEORY OF JUSTICE. Without a doubt, Axel Honneth ranks as one of the most prominent members of the third generation of the Frankfurt School tradition of Critical Theory. Since the publication of The struggle for recognition: for a moral grammar of social conflicts (Honneth, 1997 [1992]), Honneth has developed an important theoretical work aimed at renewing the basal principles of the project of social criticism developed by Horkheimer within the framework of the Institut für Sozialforschung. From a particular reading of Hegel's theory of mutual recognition, the author proposes a critical social philosophy that places the social relations of reciprocal recognition at the center, as experiences of a moral nature that not only forge the identity of the subjects, but also, at the same time, they are the source of motivation for social struggles. Indeed, the author proposes an understanding of the development of modern societies from the normative development of spheres of reciprocal recognition love, law and esteem - which, embodied in social institutions and practices, are configured not only as patterns of social integration that ensure the reproduction of societies, but also nest the moral motives for the development of social struggles that explain the transformation and social change. Taking the intersubjective turn proposed by Habermas that places the normative elements for the understanding of contemporary social orders at the center, but coming into conflict with some of the basic assumptions of his theory, Honneth continues with this process of renewal of the Critical Theory based on a revaluation of normative structures as defining dimensions of the social and of social integration, through an intellectual project to generate a social theory that takes its momentum from a post-metaphysical reading of the young Hegel's theory of recognition. Thus, in front of Habermas's Kantian discourse ethics proposal, which is oriented towards an understanding of intersubjectivity based on the practical-formal conditions of the linguistic understanding; Honneth proposes an approach to this dimension of the social mediated by an update of Hegel's category of recognition thanks to its connection with contributions from sociology, psychology and even historical studies.

Both Honneth and Habermas share the conviction about the internal connection between ethics and progress; This connection, moreover, derived from the Hegelian intuitions that play a fundamental role both in them and in their predecessors. Thus, for both, societies evolve morally thanks to the potential of social reason present in history, which is progressively realized through the expansion of patterns of reciprocal recognition and their anchoring in institutions, practices and routines (Honneth, 2009 [1989 ]). However, for Honneth, anchored in Hegel's theory of recognition, this progress implies a growth in both levels of socialization and individuation, since, Starting from the premise of identity formation as a process of "being oneself in the other" developed mainly in his work System of Ethicity, each individual to constitute himself as such, requires the confirmation of himself on the part of the others In other words, the identity of the singular depends on the existence of a social bond based on reciprocal recognition. In this sense, in terms of socialization, historical development occurs in the form of moral progress understood as an improvement and expansion of the existing orders of reciprocal recognition, making them increasingly inclusive of all members of society. And, in terms of individuation, Now, distancing ourselves from Habermas and getting even closer to Hegel, the historical development of societies in the form of progress in terms of learning

A moral practice of socialization and individuation, it is allowed in Honneth by processes of struggle and social mobilization aimed at demanding an expansion of the principles of social recognition and thus, that greater aspects of the personality of individuals are socially recognized by all equally (Honneth , 1997 [1992]). As it is possible to appreciate, although he places the social struggle as a key process that explains the production, reproduction and change in societies, for Honneth the conflict will not be motivated, as it is in the Marxist tradition, in a certain class interest and a strategic action logic, but it will have a moral character, by virtue of its invocation of normative patterns of social integration anchored in institutions of reciprocal recognition that allow or enable the formation of the identity of individuals. Ultimately, for Honneth, social discontent is not only the result of unsatisfied material interests; but, above that, it would have a “normative core”: if the adjective 'social' means something more than 'what is usually found in society', social suffering and discontent have a normative core. It is about the frustration or violation of the normative expectations of society that those affected consider justified. Therefore, these feelings of discontent and suffering, insofar as they are classified as 'social', coincide with the experience that society is doing something unjust, something unjustifiable. " (Fraser & Honneth, 2006: 103)

It is thus then that in the framework of the development of his theory of the struggle for recognition, the concern for social justice appears, which is initially understood, in its negative reverse, from its association with moral scenarios in which the individuals experience feelings of suffering generated by the perception of a lack or denial of an expectation of social recognition; an expectation considered legitimate based on the principles of justification of the normative orders of socially institutionalized recognition. In this way, the forms of social contempt or denial of recognition considered legitimate, imply a damage at a subjective level in individuals that is experienced as moral damage, insofar as it damages the possibilities of positive self-understanding and intact practical self-realization of individuals. By configuring these expectations as legitimate, the negative feelings produced by these situations can be understood.

contempt as feelings of social injustice, to the extent that they forge precisely as transgressions what society considers fair. From these approaches would derive the plural character of Honneth's theory of justice, since under this new framework, it is decentered with respect to its concern and scope of action in the universalist sphere of law -– central foundation of liberal theories dominant to open up to an expanded conception in which the law is reconceptualized in terms of an institution of reciprocal recognition, which contributes to the establishment of a just society only to the extent that it is articulated with other legitimate spheres of reciprocal recognition of modern societies, as they are for Honneth in connection with Hegel, the sphere of love relationships and social esteem. Now, these initial proposals regarding a translation of his theory of recognition into a theory of justice have undergone an important development over time, in an attempt by the author to make his perspective a substantive and systematic theory that can be positioned as an alternative to the dominant theories of justice in the context of contemporary discussions. This process has involved a project to develop a particular reading of the main concepts that are at stake in the reflections on justice in modernity, namely, the categories of autonomy and freedom, from his theory of the struggles for recognition (Honneth, 2011 ; 2009). To develop these approaches, the author considers a series of innovations with respect to his initial work1 which, among the most central, In this way, his most recent writings in this area place the struggle for freedom and its relationship with the concept of autonomy as a key conflict in modern societies at the center of analysis, proposing the development of a theory of justice that is 1

We refer to the struggles for recognition. For a moral grammar of social conflicts. (Honneth, 1997 [1992])

builds on the basis of the virtuous relationship between the expansion of the institutionally anchored principles of reciprocal recognition, and the increase of the freedom of individuals: it is only possible to advance towards higher levels of individual autonomy through the establishment of social institutions that, intersubjective mode, they progressively recognize greater aspects of each person's identity. With the intention of questioning and expanding the liberal paradigm of theories of justice, the author offers a reading focused on the (social) conditions of possibility for the emergence and effective exercise of autonomy, forged from the social and historical analysis - an exercise of normative historical reconstruction will be called Honneth (Honneth, 2009) - of the ways in which freedom has been understood in modern society from its historical concretion in institutions, norms, practices and uses (Honneth, 2010 [2008]) . Developing a theory of justice on western democratic societies requires, for Honneth, a methodological structure for the construction of knowledge that reestablishes the link between philosophy and social analysis, typical of the tradition of Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, In this way, the central purpose of this thesis consists of delimiting the central proposals of the model of critical renewal of the Frankfurt School undertaken by Honneth through his proposal of the struggles for reciprocal recognition; to, from there, offer a clear and systematic reading of his approaches to justice that allow assuming the presence of a theory of it of a systematic nature and clearly distinguishable from the rest of his theoretical reflections. As we will try to substantiate, we share the thesis that Axel Honneth's theory of justice, far from constituting itself as a mere transposition of the general principles of the theory of struggles for reciprocal recognition, Rather, it is the result of a particular process of translation insofar as it has not only implied the accentuation of certain elements and the relegation of others, as well as the adoption of new theoretical approaches; but even - by virtue of the particular characteristics that this object and

because it ranks as the central concern of his contemporary writings - it has prompted Honneth to rectify and modify some of the basal assumptions of his previously developed paradigm of struggles for reciprocal recognition. In conclusion, it is these characteristics that, for us, constitute the basis from which it is possible to affirm the possibility of delimiting a theory of justice in Honneth's reflections, which is constituted as such with a certain independence and autonomy from the theoretical framework fundamental critic of the German author. An important methodological aspect to highlight is that, precisely because Honneth's work is currently in full development, it has not been possible for us to fully consider all the elements and edges of the theory of reciprocal recognition and of the plural theory of the German author's justice. In this sense, and for the purposes of this thesis, those works, articles and interviews published up to 2010 have been considered2. Regarding its structure, this thesis is divided into two sections, each one made up of two chapters. Thus, the first part of the present work is aimed at establishing the connections between Honneth's theoretical project with the tradition of Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. This constitutes an unavoidable step in the framework of the systematization of the theory of struggles for reciprocal recognition, since it emerges as an attempt to carry out the basal principles of the original project of Critical Theory, based on a particular critical diagnosis of the ways its predecessors tried to put it into practice. The first chapter, therefore, consists of a reconstruction of Honneth's reading with respect to the principles on which the intellectual project of the tradition is founded. For, 2

This selection of texts implied the exclusion of the current theoretical production of the author, and particularly of his last work Das Recht der Freiheit. Grundriß einer demokratischen Sittlichkeit (Honneth, 2011).

perform. Special mention here is the work of Foucault and his theory of power struggles; Theoretical proposal that Honneth includes in this diagnosis of the theories of the main tradition authors of the Frankfurt School, based on the concordances that the concerns of the French author would present with those of the German theorists. It is this previous work that paves the way for the second section of this thesis. Indeed, seeking to overcome the difficulties and problems that Honneth identified in the material contents of these theories, but without abandoning the basal principles of the initial theoretical project, Honneth undertakes the project of elaborating a social theory of the struggles of reciprocal recognition; proposal that will be addressed in the third chapter. From there, and finally in the fourth chapter, define the plural theory of justice Axel Honneth. Finally, in terms of conclusions, the work developed here is systematized and some final reflections are established that serve as an incentive for future research on the relationships between social criticism, reciprocal recognition and justice.

FIRST PART. Axel Honneth and the tradition of Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School.

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CHAPTER I. What does it mean to do a Critical Theory of Society? Axel Honneth and the rescue of the model of social criticism of the Frankfurt School. As noted above, Axel Honneth's intellectual project is intended to constitute a renewal of the tradition of Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. In effect, Honneth defends the idea of the impossibility of applying today the critical theoretical project developed by the School, in function not only of the social, cultural and political transformations that are quite distant from the historical context from which the first generation generated their reflections, but above all from the presence of certain theoretical aporias that would have led to the impossibility of developing the very principles that had initially been proposed. Thus, this exercise of renewal - which, as we shall see, is indebted to Habermas' project in this regard - it will basically involve a rescue and appropriation of the central principles of the "ideal" model of criticism of the Frankfurt School tradition, and a break with respect to the ways in which it was carried out. carried out by each of its members. Ultimately, the main problems and limitations that Honneth identifies are found in the material contents of the theories of the members of the tradition and not in the central idea behind the project they sought to carry out (Honneth, Reconstructive Critique of Society with exception genealogical, 2009 [2007] b, p. 54). Thus, Honneth argues that, beyond the differences of the theories of the authors of the School, all of them - including Habermas, although he partially - defend a model of social criticism that places at the center the processes of social rationalization as mediation between theory and history (Honneth, 2009 [2007] a, p. 29). Starting from a theoretical construction model that links philosophical thought with modern social sciences, they propose an understanding of historical development as a process of formation and realization of reason - understood as social reason - in society through its anchorage in institutions and practices; which, in the various phases of capitalism, is interrupted or biased, generating a series of “social pathologies”. These pathologies, understood as the product of a deficit of social reason,

individual - as a pathological deformation of rational faculties - and collective, preventing the adequate formation of identity and the principles of social integration. As it is possible to appreciate, under these approaches, human history can be thought of as a historical process of realization of reason, which is developed through its incarnation in different forms of social praxis. Or, in other words, it is precisely this anchoring in social practices that allows the development of social rationality. However, capitalism, in its different phases, generates social pathologies, since it prevents this potential for the development of reason, historically anchored, from being effectively realized, through its deployment in social institutions and practices. It is at this point where one of the central elements of the School's project appears: the concept of immanent criticism. The central thesis of the authors of the tradition with respect to the possibilities of criticism did not consist in the mere identification of social pathologies, but rather in how such knowledge can contribute to their subsequent overcoming. It is thus then that, with different nuances, from Horkheimer to Habermas (Horkheimer, Critical Theory, 2003 [1932-1941]; Marcuse, The one-dimensional man, 2009 [1954]; Habermas, Theory of communicative action, 2003 [1981]) All the authors of the School defend the idea that the possibilities of practical overcoming of the pathological deformations of social life are already contained in the process of socio-historical formation; This is what we mean when we speak of immanent criticism. It is precisely that stock of social rationality not socially realized but contained in the same social reality, as normative ideals, which is transformed as a point of reference for criticism. Thus, it is in the same historical process of development of reason where the bases for overcoming the pathological stages characteristic of the various phases of capitalism are found. However, this wealth of rational learning in a potential state needs to be mobilized and embodied in different forms of social praxis in order to modify the pathological situation. It is thus then that this tradition postulates the existence of what they call an emancipatory interest (Habermas J., 1986), immanent to social reality, which

it motivates subjects to free themselves from the conditions that limit their identity and to rebel against the forms of life that prevent the realization of their autonomy. In this way, it is the same social praxis that, in the form of emancipatory interest, nests the possibilities of overcoming this process of historical deformation of reason. If social reason develops from its incarnation in forms of social praxis, then the only possibility of overcoming this erroneous evolutionary process can be generated through a transformation of social praxis. Now, what are the main elements of the critical project of the Frankfurt School briefly outlined here? What elements of this model, according to Honneth, must be rescued and which ones be reworked with a view to generating a critical project with returns for today's societies? It is these questions that we will now answer. a. The ethical core of criticism. Social reason, social pathologies, damaged

identity3 For Honneth, the theoretical project of the Frankfurt School would be inscribed in a longer line of philosophical thought, namely, social philosophy. In the text "Pathologies of the social: tradition and current status of social philosophy" (Honneth, 2009 [2000]), the author seeks to delimit the field of concern of this particular line of thought in order, from the definition of its premises fundamental, identify the authors and works that would be inscribed in it and, thus, finally, offer an interpretation of the development that this line has had throughout history. If the purpose of this chapter is to systematize Honneth's reading of the model of criticism of the Tradition of the Frankfurt School, this text is configured as a fruitful entry point. Not only because the theoretical claim and the specific problem that defines this disciplin...