Property - Lecture notes Full semester PDF

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Introduction to Property Law with Professor Parker....

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RIGHT TO EXCLUDE 8/19/2020 CLASS NOTES: Bundle of sticks property theory: property is comprised of multiple rights (ie. right to distribute, right to use) These rights are relative to the rights of other parties Bundle of sticks emanates from the state and relies on the state for protection Taft’s The Right of Private Property differs from the bundle of sticks theory because he views property as a single entity. Views property as a unit that can be violated rather than as a bundle of different things we can shape it with. Taft refers to the Constitution as protection of private property (4th and 5th Amendment) Property pre-exists the law (pre-political) Constitution merely declares what already exists. *Bundle of sticks has an element of separability; you can take a stick away and still have a bundle, whereas if you had a block and you chipped away at it. Intention in terms of trespass doesn't mean you intended on violating someone elses property rights, just that you intended to be there (ie. you went on a hike and wandered onto someone’s property vs. being drugged and taken somewhere)

State v. Shack Rule The ownership of real property does not include the right to refuse access to individuals providing government services to workers who are housed on the property. Facts:Tejeras and Shack (defendants) entered the private property of Tedesco (plaintiff) for the purpose of giving aid to migrant farm workers that were employed and housed by Tedesco on his property. Part of such aid was supposed to be giving legal advice to one of the migrant farm workers courtesy of a nonprofit corporation funded by the government pursuant to an act of Congress. Although offering to let Tejeras and Shack consult the migrant farm worker, Tedesco refused to allow a private legal consultation and when Tejeras and Shack insisted on privacy, Tedesco filed a written complaint with the police alleging a violation of a New Jersey trespassing statute. The Municipal Court of Deerfield Township convicted Tejeras and Shack of violating the statute. Tejeras and Shack appealed. Issue: Does an owner’s rights in his land justify his refusal to allow individuals to come onto the land and give aid in private to the owner’s employees who are housed on the land? Holding and Reasoning: No. Tedesco’s rights in his land did not justify refusing access to Tejeras and Shack when their aim was to provide aid in private to the migrant workers who were housed on the land. Rights in real property are not absolute and are limited by the maintenance of the well-being of those people that the owner permits on his land. Tedesco permitted the migrant farm workers to stay on his land, so despite his interests in his property, he is not entitled to refuse access to individuals seeking to aid those workers. The workers’ rights of privacy and the opportunity to receive such public assistance are too fundamental to be denied. Therefore, Tejeras and Shack did not invade any property rights of Tedesco and thus did not

violate the trespass statute. The convictions of Tejeras and Shack are accordingly reversed, and the case is remanded with directions to acquit. CLASS NOTES ON CASE: *This triggered a criminal trespass. Statute identified a crime. In this case, NJ statute states that if you continue to stay on someones property after the owner asks you to leave, it becomes a criminal trespass. Hence why this case is State v. Shack rather than Tedesco v. Shack *If property has signs that warn trespassers to not enter the property, should it be considered a warning that could trigger criminal trespass? *Marsh v. Alabama established that people can express their First Amendment right in public property; however, in this case, the commercial-owned town was accessible to the public, thus, they had the right to express their First Amendment right *It was argued that this was good precedent because Tedesco’s farm looked like public space; The Court did NOT buy this argument; accepting this argument would affect future adjudication in similar cases *Argues the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution; the programs defendant work for fall under the scope of Title III- B of the Economic Opportunity Act, which provide governmental services to migrant workers and their families. *NJ bases its decision on NJ law because if its based on Constitutional law, it can be appealed up to the Supreme Court. *Source of law that Court relies on is New Jersey common-law. *Ultimately, Court resolves this dispute by looking at how property law cannot be used to injure the rights of others because property rights are not absolute. In this case, barring access to governmental services available to migrant workers. Owners may bar access to solicitors or peddlers so long as regulations does not deprive the migrant worker of practical access to things they need. Owner may ask visitors to ID themselves but cannot deny workers their privacy and right to live with dignity. *Defendants conduct was beyond the reach of trespass statute. *Judgements were reversed and matters were remanded to the County Court w/ instruction to enter Judgements of Acquittal. *Based on state common law

Commonwealth v. Magadini ●

2014, the defendant is charged with trespassing on three properties in Great Barrington Barrington House, Castle Street, and SoCo Creamery. ○ Barrington House; mixed use building w/ several different restaurants, enclosed atrium, and apartments above the businesses. ○ Castle Street is a three-story building w/ retail establishments, offices, and apartments. ○ SoCo Creamery is an ice cream shop.

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Defendant found sleeping in the buildings near heaters and used the bathroom in the ice cream shop.

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Defendant was barred by each property by no trespass orders. (Barrington House in 2012, Castle Street in 2008, and SoCo Creamery in 2014) All the no trespass orders were in effect at the time the charges were brought against the defendant. Defendant, who was a lifelong resident of Great Barrington, became homeless in 2004 after moving out of his parents house. He intended on coming back but the landlord refused to allow it. He generally lived outside but during the winter months he tried to find more sheltered areas from the ice and snow. He sought shelter in private buildings when the weather was too severe to handle. He was refused at a homeless shelter during a snowstorm. He was allowed to stay for a few months before being told to leave. Defendant claims that the judge erroneously denied his request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity and that he improperly excluded evidence relevant to the defense. Common-law defense of necessity “exonerates one who commits a crime under the pressure of circumstances if the harm that would have resulted from compliance of the law exceeds the harm actually resulting from the defendant's violation of the law.”

DEFENSE ARGUMENT For a defendant to be entitled to a necessary defense instruction, they must present some evidence on each of the four underlying conditions of the defense: 1. A clear and imminent danger, not one which is debatable or speculative; 2. A reasonable expectation that their action will be effective as the direct cause of abating danger; 3. There is no legal alternative which will be effective in abating the danger; and 4. The Legislature has not acted to preclude the defense by a clear and deliberate choice regarding the values at issue. ● Judge focused only on the third element of his denial of the defendant’s request for a necessity defense instruction. Judge ruled that the defendant has other available alternatives (motel, hotel, police station) a. Clear and imminent danger i. Defendant met his burden of demonstrating this requirement for six incidents (the months of March and February were cold and he was sleeping outside) but not the seventh, when he used the bathroom b. Availability of Lawful Alternatives i. Defendant must provide some evidence enough to support at least a reasonable doubt whether the unlawful conduct was justified by necessity. ii. Commonwealth argues that the defendant failed to meet his burden because he presented no evidence that he was unable to rent an apartment outside of the Great Barrington, that he was unable to gain entry to the Pittsfield shelter, and that he would still be excluded from the local homeless shelter in 2014.

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Court states that so long as the defendants evidence, taken as true, creates a reasonable doubt as to the availability of such lawful alternatives, the defendant satisfies the third element. ● Court concluded that the judge erred in denying the defendant's request for a jury instruction on the defense of necessity for the trespassing charges that occurred in Feb., March, and April, vacate those six convictions and remand for a new trial. Court affirmed the conviction stemming from the conduct that occurred on June 10, 2014. CLASS NOTES ON CASE 8/24/2020 ● Magadini couldn't buy an apartment because there were too many upfront fee ● Refused from a homeless shelter at first and was kicked out after 3 months ● Refused to leave Great Barrington because he was a lifelong resident; also did not have a drivers license to explore neighboring towns ● Is there a clear and imminent danger, one that is not debatable or speculative? YES, in the first 6 instances which happened in the winter months because of the weather. NO for the 7th instance when he used the bathroom in the summer months because there was no clear and imminent danger. ● The lower court and the State states that he did not meet the 3rd requirement (he could've gone to a motel, police station, rent an apartment, gone to a homeless shelter); Court of Appeals ruled he produced SOME evidence, which is all that is needed by a jury (no lawful alternative at the time, one considered by a reasonable person in that situation) ● Does NOT mention anything about public accommodation; also, trespass does not occur in the day, which is probably when these spaces were accessible to the public. ● How much is the defendant going to be harmed v. how much are you (property owner) giong to be harmed ● under the pressure of the situation, and given the brief time, asking the defendant to think of all the lawful alternatives is too much to ask ● In State v. Shack, the property owner invited migrant workers onto his property and then barred access to services. In this case, the property owner did not invite anyone onto their property.

Uston v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc. ● ●

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Appellant has excluded respondent from the blackjack tables in the casino because Uston’s strategy increases his chances of winning money. Uston’s strategy falls under the current blackback rules promulgated by the Casino Control Commission. Uston argues that Appellant has no common law or statutory right to exclude him because of his blackjack strategy. While the Appellant has the right to remove anyone from the property who is disruptive or a threat, Uston does not threaten the security of any casino occupant not disrupted any functioning of the casino’s operations. Uston possesses the usual right of reasonable access to Resorts International’s blackjack tables.

Rule of Law An individual has a right of reasonable access to property open to the public. Facts Resorts International Hotel (Resorts) (defendant) refused to allow Kenneth Uston (plaintiff) near the blackjack tables at its casino because Uston’s strategy of card counting increased his odds of winning. Uston brought suit claiming Resorts had no right to exclude him simply because of his playing strategy. The lower court ruled in favor of Uston. Resorts appealed. Issue May the owner of a business establishment open to the public unreasonably exclude an individual? Holding and Reasoning No. Resorts may not unreasonably exclude Uston from its casino. An individual has a right of reasonable access to property open to the public. The reasonableness of a decision to exclude an individual must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Here, Resorts’ casino is open to the public and Uston’s desire to enter the casino and play blackjack is not unreasonable. He does not bring danger to employees or other people at the casino and he does not disrupt the functioning of the casino in any illegal way. Therefore his right to access the casino is reasonable and Resorts’ excluding him was unreasonable. The lower court’s decision is affirmed. CLASS NOTES ON CASE 8/24/2020: ● Casino states that they have the right to exclude for any and every reason unless precluded by civil rights law ● Two competing rights: Right of owner to exclude unwanted patron and right of the patron to reasonable access ● In this century, the courts began ignoring the patrons right to reasonable access. The Civil Rights Legislation passed after the Civil War gave African Americans “same” rights at white people. This left white Americans with the right to arbitrarily exclude people from their property. ● The right to arbitrarily exclude someone from your property with no explanation to the customer or to the law. ● Holding: Property owners have no legitimate interest in unreasonably excluding particular members of the public when they open their premises for public use. In this case, excluding Uston because his blackjack strategy made his chances of winning higher was not a reasonable reason to exclude. ● The word “reasonable” infers that it is an objective standard ● Property owners can only REASONABLY exclude patrons from their property (ie. disorderly, intoxicated, repeated offender)

Glavin v. Eckman 881 N.E.2d 820 (Mass. App. CT. 2008) Facts: Defendants hired a landscaping company to top and remove ten large oak trees standing on the plaintiffs property in order to enhance their view of the ocean without plaintiffs permission. Between Glavin and Eckman’s property is Bea Gentry’s property. The Eckman’s had asked for Glavin’s permission to cut down the trees but Glavin said no. They received permission from Gentry to cut down the trees that were on her property, however, Fragosa did not ascertain the boundaries of her property relative to the Eckman’s or Glavin’s property nor did he seek permission from any other owners in the area. In cutting down the trees, Fragosa strayed fifty to one hundred feet across the unmarked boundary and cut the stand of mature oaks on Glavin’s lot. Procedural Posture: Plaintiff filed suit against defendant and landscaper for wrongful cutting of his trees. Jury rendered a special verdict in favor of the plaintiff. Jury found the following: (1) Fragosa (landscaper) willfully cut the trees on Glavin’s land; (2) Fragosa did not have good reason to believe that he was lawfully authorized to cut the trees on Glavin’s land; (3) The Eckman’s willfully cut trees on Glavin’s land by directing Fragosa to do so; and (4) The Eckman’s did not have good reason to believe they were lawfully authorized to cut the trees on Glavin’s land. Jury assessed $30,000 in damages as “the reasonable cost of restoring the property as nearly as reasonably possible to its original condition.” Defendant’s appealed, maintaining that the judge erred in permitting the jury to award a restoration cost measure of damages, rather than damages measured by the value of the timber wrongfully cut, or by the diminution in market value of the property as a result of cutting. Issue: Whether the restoration cost is an appropriate measure of damages and whether trebling of the restoration cost damaged renders such damages unreasonable. Holding: Yes. Diminution in market value was not fair and adequate measure of the damages that the plaintiff suffered. Rule:General Laws ch 242 7 specifies that one who willfully and without license cuts the trees of another shall be liable in tort “for three times the amount of the damages assessed therefor” “The statute does not prescribe how the damages shall be measured” Larabee v. Potvin Lumber Co. Reasoning: While damages measured by the value of timber or diminution in market value of property is the more common measures of property, limiting damages would encourage wrongdoers from engaging in self-help in circumstances such as the one brought before the court. Timber value may amount to no more than a tree and may even improve the market value of the property but may represent a significant loss to the owner and significant gain to the wrongdoer. Direct restoration was either physically impossible or unreasonably expensive. Thus, $30,000 was the reasonable cost of restoring the property. Given the unique value of the trees, their integral role in his intended landscaping project, and the expert evidence as to the restoration cost, the jury’s award was not unreasonable.

Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc. 563 N.W.2d 154 (Wis. 1997)

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Steenberg Homes had to deliver a mobile home. The easiest route of delivery was across Jacque’s land. Despite adamant protest from the Jacque’, Steenberg plowed a path through the Jacques’ snow covered field and delivered the mobile home. After Jacques’ called the police, the sheriff’s department issued a $30 citation (Class B forfeiture) to Steenbergs assistant manager. ● The Jacques sued Steenberg Homes for intentional trespass. Steenberg conceded the intentional trespass but argued that no compensatory damages had been proven and that punitive damages could not be awarded without compensatory damages. Jacques’ argued that both the individual and society has significant interests in deterring intentional trespass to land, regardless of the lack of measurable harm that results. The court agreed. ● Jury awarded the Jacques’ $1 in nominal damages and $100,000 in punitive damages, the circuit court set aside the jury’s award of $100,000. The court of appeals affirmed, concluding that it could not reinstate the punitive damages because it was bound by precedent establishing that an award of nominal damages will not sustain a punitive damage award. ● The US Supreme Court recognizes that the private landowner’s right to exclude others from their land is “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.” ; However, their right to exclude has no practical meaning unless protected by the State. ● Issue: Can punitive damages be awarded without compensatory damages? ● Holding: Yes ● Holding: The individual and society have a strong interest in excluding trespassers from their land. People expect wrongdoers to be appropriately punished. The $30 forfeiture was not an appropriate punishment for Steenbergs intentional trespass. If punitive damages are not allowed in this situation, what punishment would prohibit the intentional trespass to land? Moreover, what would stop Steenberg from intentionally trespassing in the future and simply paying a $30 forfeiture, which may be more profitable than taking the inconvenient path. Steenberg is likely to be faced with a dilemma again. The Court will alleviate the uncertainty of whether they should trespass and pay the $30 forfeiture or take the more costly course and obey the law. FOUR PRIMARY LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS ● Rights: claims, enforceable by state power, that others act in a certain manner in relation to the right holder ● Privileges: permissions to act in a certain manner without being liable for damages to others and without others being able to summon state power to prevent those acts ● Powers: state-enforced abilities to change legal entitlements held by oneself or others ● Immunities: security from having one’s own entitlements changed by others. FOUR NEGATIONS ● No-right: one does not have power to summon aid of the state to alter or control the behavior of others ● Duties: the absence of permission to act in a certain manner ● Disabilities: the absence of power to alter legal entitlements

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Liabilities: the absence of immunities from having one’s own entitlements changed by others Civil Rights Act of 1964: ● Under this act, in order to establish a claim you must show the following: ○ Discrimination or segregation based on the groud of race, color, religi...