Pyschological Egoism - JOEL Feinberg PDF

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Psychological E  goism JOEL F  EINBERG

 el F  einberg ( b  . 1  92  6), P  rofessor o  fP  hilosophy a  t t he U  niversity o  fA  rizona, h  as d  one Jo  ork i n s ocial a  nd l egal p  hilosophy. H  is b  ooks i nclude D  oing and Deserving, influential w Social Philosophy, a  nd a  r ecent q  uadrilogy w  ith t he o  verall title T  he Moral Limits of the Criminal Law.  einberg e  xamines p  sychological e  goism—  t he v iew t hat w  e n ever w In t his r eading, F  ant o  r pursue a  nything e  xcept o  ur o  wn h  appiness o  r s elf- i nterest . A  lthough t his v iew c laims t o e  xplain why w e a ct a s w e d o , F einberg p oints          ut t hat i t i s r arely s  upported b  ye  mpirical e  vidence. o

 n c ertain a rguments t hat a re s eldom c arefully e xamined. P Instead , i t t rades o  sychological  is o egoism i s, f or e  xample , o  ften t hought t o h  old b  ecause e  ach p  erson i s m  otivated b  y h  wn desires a  nd n  oo  ne e  lse' s . H  owever , a  sF  einberg n  ot  e  s, t h  e  f act t hat m  yd  esires a  re m  yo  wn  othing a  bout w  hat I d  esire. T  hus, i t d  oes n ot i mply t hat I d esire o nly my o wn implies n happiness o r s atisfaction . A gain ,      d  efenders of the v  iew s ometimes n  ote t hat w  eg  et

 elping o  thers ( o  r f eel p  angs o  f c onscience a  bout n  ot h  elping) . Y  et f ar pleasure f rom h  sychological e  goism, t his f act a  ctually t ells against i t. F  or w  hy s  hould w  e f eel from s upporting p  leasure, i f n  ot t hat h  elping o  thers s atisfies a  d  esire t o h  elp t hem- a  d  esire t hat i s such p   ot a  imed o  nly a  to  ur o  wn h  appiness? emphatically n  einberg. T Th  ese e  xamples d  on  ot e  xhaust t he a  rguments c onsidered b  y F  h  rou gh  out h  is discussion, h  owever, t he m  ain p  oint i s c lear . W  hen w  ec  onsider t he m  atter c arefully, w  e f ind  ood r eason t o a  ccept p sychological e goism. W no g  ea  re f ree, t herefore , t o accept t he common- s ense v iew t hat p  eople o  ften a  ct n  ot t o i ncrease t heir o  wn h  appiness , b  ut s imply t o help o  thers o  r t o d  o t he r ight t hing .

The Theory 1. “PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM” is t he name g  iven t o a theory widely h  eld b  y ordinary m  en, and a  t o  ne t ime almost universally accepted b  y political e  con omists, p  hilosophers, and psychologists, a  ccording to w  hich all h  uman a  ctions when properly understood can be seen to be motivated by selfish desires. More precisely, psychological egoism is the doctrine that the only thing anyone is capable o  f

desiring or p  ursuing ultimately ( as an e  nd i n i tself) is h  is o  wn s e  lf i nterest. No psychological egoist denies that men sometimes do desire things other than t heir own

welfare—the h  appiness of o  ther people, f or example; but a  ll p  sychological egoists insist t hat men a  re c apable o  f desiring t he h  appiness of others only when they take it to be a means to their own happiness. In short, MORAL PSYCHOLOGY A  ND MORAL E  DUCATION

purely altruistic and b  enevolent actions and d  esires do n  ot e  xist; but p  eople sometimes appear t o be acting unselfishly and d  isinterestedly w  hen they take t he interests of o  thers t o be m  eans to t he promotion of their own  self- interest. 2. This theory is called psychological e  g  oism to indicate that it is not a theory about what o  ught t o be t he c ase, b  ut rather a  bout what, a  sa  matter o  f fact, i s the case. That is, the theory claims to be a description of psychological facts, n  ot a prescription of ethical ideals. I t a  sserts, h  owever, n  ot m  erely that a  ll men do as a contingent matter of fact "put their own interests first,” but also that they are capable of nothing else, human nature being what it is. Universal selfishness is not just an accident or a coincidence on this view; rather, it is an unavoidable consequence of psychological laws.

The theory i s to be distinguished f rom a  nother d  octrine, so-c alled “ ethical egoism,” according to which all men ought t o pursue their own well-being. This doctrine, b  eing a p  rescription of w  hat o  ught t o b  e the c ase, m  akes n  o claim t o be  f human motives; hence t he word “e  thical” appears i n its ap  sychological t heory o name t o distinguish it f rom p  sychological e  goism. 3. There are a number of types of motives and desires which might reason ably be called "egoistic” or “selfish," and corresponding to each of them is a possible version of psychological e  goism. P  erhaps t he most c ommon version of the theory is that apparently held by Jeremy Bentham. According to this version, all persons have only one ultimate motive in all their voluntary behav ior and that m  otive is a  selfish o  ne;

more s pecifically, i t is o  ne particular kind o  f selfish motive-namely, a desire for one' s o  wn pleasure. A  f the   t heory, "t he o  nly k ind of  ccording t o this v ersion o ultimate desire i s the d  esire to g  et or t o prolong pleasant experiences, and to avoid or to cut short unpleasant expe riences for oneself.” 2 T  his form o  f psychological egoism i s often g  iven t he cumbersome name-psychological egoistic hedonism. Prima Facie Reasons in Support of the Theory 4. Psychological egoism has seemed plausible to many people for a variety of reasons, of which the following are typical:

a. “Every action of mine is prompted by motives or desires or impulses

which are my motives and not somebody else's. This fact might be expressed by saying that whenever I act I am always pursuing my own ends or trying to satisfy my own desires. And from this we might pass on to—'I am always pursuing something for myself or seeking my own satisfaction.' Here is what seems like a proper description of a man acting selfishly,  89), Chap. I, first 1 See hi s Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1 7 paragraph: “Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovere ign masters,

pain and pleasure. I t is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do.... They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our subjection will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it.” 2

C. D. Broad , Ethics and the History

of Philosophy ( New York: The Humanities Press, 1952), Essay 10—“Egoism as a Theory of Human Motives," p. 218. This essay is highly recommended.

and if t he description a  pplies t o a  ll a  ctions of a  ll m  en, then it follows that all m  en i n all t heir actions a  re s elfish.”3 b  . It is a truism that w  hen a p  erson gets what he w  ants he characteristically feels p  leasure. T  his h  as suggested to m  any people that  what we r eally want i n

every case is o  ur own  pleasure, a  nd t hat we p  ursue o  ther things only as a  m  eans. C. S  eceive ourselves into thinking  elf- D  eception. O  ften we d that we desire something fine or noble when what we really want is to be thought well of by others or to be able to congratulate ourselves, or to be able to enjoy the pleasures of a  good

conscience. It is a  well-k nown fact t hat p  eople tend to conceal their true motives from themselves by camouflaging them with words like “v  irtue," “duty,” e  tc. Since w  e are so o  ften misled con c erning both o  ur o  wn real m  otives and the real motives of others, is i t not reasonable to suspect that we might alway s be deceived when we  ducation. M  orality, good think m  otives disinterested and altruistic? . ..   d . M  oral e manners, d  ecency, a  nd other v irtues must b  e teachable. Psychological e  goists o  ften notice t hat moral e  duca t ion and the inculcation of m  anners usually utilize what B  entham calls t he "sanctions of pleasure and pain.” Children are made to acquire the civilizing virtues only b  y the method of enticing r ewards and p  ainful p  unishments. Much the same is true of the history of the race. People in general have been inclined to behave well only when it is made plain to them that there is "something in it for them.” Is it not then highly prob able

that just s uch a m  echanism o  f human m  otivation as B  entham describes must b  e

presupposed by our m  ethods o  f moral e  ducation?

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Critique of P  sychological Egoism: Confusions in the Arguments

 rguments of the p  sy 5. N  on - E  mpirical C  haracter o  f t he A  rguments . I f t he a chological  e  goist consisted for t he most p  art of c arefully acquired e  mpirical evidence ( w  ell-d  ocumented reports o  f controlled experiments, s urveys, inter views, l aboratory d  ata, and s o on), t hen the c ritical p  hilosopher would h  ave no business c arping at t hem. A  fter a  ll, s ince psychological e  goism purports t o be a scientific theory of human motives, it is the concern of the experimental psychologist, not t he p  hilosopher, to accept or r eject i t. But as a matter o  f f act, empirical evidence of t he required  s ort is s eldom p  resented in s upport o  f psy chological egoism. P  sychologists, on the whole, s hy away f rom generalizations about human motives which a  re s o sweeping and s o vaguely f ormulated that they are virtually incapable of scientific testing. It is usually the “armchair scientist" who h  olds the theory of u  niversal s elfishness, and his u  sual a  rgu ments are either based simply on his “impressions” or else are largely of a nonempirical sort. The latter are often shot full of a very subtle kind of logical 3 Austin Duncan-Jones, B  utler' s M  oral P  hilosophy ( L  ondon: Penguin Books, 1952), p. 96. Duncan -Jones g  oes o  n to reject this a  rgument .S  ee p. 5  12f . MORAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MORAL EDUCATION

confusion, and this makes their criticism a matter of special interest to the analytic philosopher. 6. The psychological egoist's f irst a  rgument (see 4  a) is a good e  xample of logical confusion. It begins with a truism-namely, that all of my motives and desires are my motives and desires and not someone else's. (Who would deny this?) But from this simple tautology n  othing whatever concerning the n  ature o f  my motives or the objective of my

desires can possibly follow. The fallacy of this argument consists in its violation of the general logical rule that analytic statements (tautologies), * cannot e  ntail synthetic

(factual) o  nes. That e  very voluntary act i s p  rompted by the agent's o  wn m  otives is a t autology; h  ence, it c annot be equivalent to “A person is always seeking something for himself” or “A  ll of a  person's motives are s elfish,” w  hich are synthetic. W  hat the e  goist must p  rove i s not m  erely: (i) E  very voluntary action i s prompted by a  motive of the a  gent's o  wn. but r ather: (ii) Every voluntary action is prompted by a motive of a quite particular

kind, v iz. a s elfish one. S  tatement (i) i s o  bviously true, b  ut it cannot a  ll by i tself give any logical support t o statement (ii). The source of the confusion in this argument is readily apparent. It is not the g  enesis of  r i ts m an action o  r the origin o  otives which m  akes it a “ selfish” o ne, b ut rather the  otive c omes f rom ( in  f its m  here t he m " purpose ”o  f the a  ct o  r the o  bjective o  otives ;n  ot w  ims a  td  etermines voluntary  actions i t always c omes from the agent) b  ut what i t a whether or n  ot it i s selfish. T  here i s surely a valid distinction b  etween v oluntary behavior, i n w  hich the agent's a  ction is m  otivated by purposes o  f his o  wn, a  nd  ehavior i n which t he a selfish b  gent's motives are o  f one exclusive sort. T  he egoist's argument assimilates a  ll vol untary action into the class of selfish action, by requiring, in effect, that an unselfish action be one which is not really motivated at all. 7. But if argument 4a fails to prove its point, argument 4b does no better. From the fact that a  ll o  ur successful a  ctions (those in w  hich w e g  et w  hat w e w  ere  after) are accompanied or followed by pleasure it does not follow, as the egoist claims, that the objective o  f every action is to get pleasure for oneself. To begin with, the premise of the argument is not, strictly speaking, even true. Fulfillment o  f desire (simply getting w  hat o  ne was

after) is n  o guarantee o  f s atisfaction (p leasant feelings o f gratification in the m  ind o  f the agent ). S  ome times  when we get what we want we a  lso g  e  t, as a kind of extra dividend, a warm ,g  lowing feeling o  f contentment ;b  ut o  ften , far too o  ften ,w eg  et n o

Traditionally , analytic statements h  ave b  een taken to b  e statements that a  re true b  y virtue o  f the meanings of words, and hence convey no information about the world. * T  raditionally, statements that do convey information a  bout the w  orld . PSYCHOLOGICAL EGOISM

dividend at all, or, even worse, the bitter taste of ashes. Indeed, it has been said that the characteristic psychological problem of our time is the dissatisfaction t hat

attends the fulfillment of our very most powerful desires. Even if we grant, however, for the sake of argument, that getting what one wants

usually yi elds satisfaction, the egoist's conclusion does not follow. We can concede that we normally get pleasure (in the sense of satisfaction) when our desires are satisfied, no matter what our desires are f  o  r; b  ut it does not follow from this roughly accurate generalization that the only thing we ever desire is our own satisfaction. Pleasure may well be the usual accompaniment of all actions in which the agent gets what he wants; but to infer from this that what the agent always wants is his own pleasure is like arguing, in William James's example, 4 that because an ocean liner constantly consumes coal on its trans-Atlantic passage that therefore the purpose

of its voyage is to consume coal. The immediate inference from even constant accompaniment to purpose (or motive) is always a non sequitur. Perhaps there is a sense of "satisfaction” (desire fulfillment) such that it is certainly and universally true that we get satisfaction whenever we get what we want. But satisfaction in this sense is simply the "coming into existence of that which is desired.” Hence, to say that desire fulfillment always yields "sat isfaction” in this sense is to say no more than that we always get what we want when we get what we want, which is to utter

a tautology like “a rose is a rose.” It can no more entail a synthetic truth in psychology (like the egoistic thesis) than "a rose is a rose” can entail significant information in botany. 8. Disinterested Benevolence. T  he fallacy in argument 4b then consists, as Garvin puts it, “in the supposition that the apparently unselfish desire to benefit others is transformed into a selfish one by the fact that we derive pleasure from carrying it out.”S Not only is this argument fallacious; it also provides us with a suggestion of a counter-argument to show that its conclusion (psychological egoistic hedonism) is false. Not only is the presence of pleasure (satisfaction) as a by-product of an action no proof that the action was selfish; in some special cases it provides rather conclusive proof that the action was unselfish. F  or in those special cases the fact that we get pleasure from a

 omething particular action presupposes that we desired something else—s other than our own pleasure—as an end in itself and not merely as a means to our own pleasant state of mind. . This way of turning the egoistic hedonist's argument

back on him can be illustrated by taking a typical egoist argument, one attributed (perhaps apoc ryphally) to Abraham Lincoln, and then examining it closely: B B 2 5

Mr. Lincoln once remarked to a fellow-passenger on an old-time mud-coach that all men were prompted by selfishness in doing good. His fellow-passenger was antagonizing this position when they were passing over a corduroy bridge that

58.  s Lucius Garvin, 4 The Principles of Psycholog y (New York: Henry Holt, 1890), Vol. II, p. 5

A Modern Introduction to Ethics ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953), p. 39. MORAL P  SYCHOLOGY AND M  ORAL EDUCATION

sp anned a  slough . A  s they crossed this b  ridge they e  spied a n o  ld razor -b  acked sow o  n the bank m  aking a  terrible n  oise b  ecause h  er p  igs h  ad g  ot into the slough and w  ere in d  anger o f drowning .A  s the o  ld coach b  egan to climb the h  ill ,M  r .L  incoln called o  ut , “D  river , can 't you stop just a m  oment ?” T  hen M  r .L  incoln jumped o  ut , ra n b  ack and lifted the little p  igs o  ut o  f the m  ud and w  ater a  nd p  laced them o  n the b  ank . W  hen h  e returned , h  is companion remarked : “N  ow Abe, where does selfishness come in on this little episode?” “Why, bless your soul Ed, that w  as the very e  ssence o  f selfishness . I should h  ave h  ad n o p  eace o f m  ind a  ll d  ay h  ad I g  one on a  nd left that suffering o  ld sow w  orrying o  ver those p  igs . I d id it to get peace of mind, don't you see?”

If Lincoln h  ad cared n  ot a w  hit for t he w  elfare o  f the little p  igs and t heir “suffering" mother, but only for his own "peace of mind,” it would be difficult to explain how he could have derived pleasure from helping them. The very fact that h  ed  id feel s atisfaction as a r esult o  f helping t he p  igs presupposes t hat he h  ad a preexisting desire for something other than his own happiness. Then when that d  as satisfied,  esire w

Lincoln o  f course derived p  leasure. The object o  incoln's desire was ...