R v Campbell - Detailed case brief, including paragraph/page references Criminal Law: Defences: PDF

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Detailed case brief, including paragraph/page references
Criminal Law: Defences: insanity/automatism...

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Campbell Area of law concerned:

Automism

Court: Date:

1997

Judge:

Tompkins J

Counsel: Summary of Facts:

The appellant, at age 3, had suffered serious injuries when a jug of boiling water fell across his body. He was put in hospital for a lengthy period. He suffered extensive scarring, and endured embarrassment and teasing during his school years. Secondly, when he was aged between 7 and 9, he went to stay with a Mr Meiklejohn, a friend of his father. He was subject of sexual abuse. He says that this episode had a harmful effect on his sexuality as he grew up. Homicide Appellant was living with his parents. Appellant had recently broken up with is girlfriend, and felt lonely and isolated. He had spent a day in a hotel drinking. He went to the deceased’s house, the deceased being a friend of his parents. They had coffee. The deceased put his hand on the appellant’s thigh. The appellant said that the deceased was smiling at him. He said that he had seen that expression before on Mr Meiklejohn’s face. The appellant then says he lost all control. He hit the deceased across the nose with a poker, and he had not ability to stop what he was doing. He struck the deceased twice with a poker and with his fists. He picked up an axe and struck him twice. He put the axe down, took the deceased’s keys and went out with the intention of taking his car. He returned inside the house and struck the deceased again with the axe as he lay helplessly on the ground. The car had no battery. He later told his father what he had done, and his father took him to the police. Medical and psychiatric evidence. Dr Edwards (psychiatrist) diagnosed the appellant with post-traumatic stress disorder. He accepted that this was not an illness in the legal sense. He said that the accused felt he was 7 again, and his feelings and responses were those of a hurt and abused child. Trauma and horrific events tend to be stored in the mind as non-declarative memory. AN event can trigger that memory, resulting in the person acting under influence of flashback. The appellant thought that the person before him was Mr Meiklejohn, and was concerned that the abuse not repeat itself. Professor Taylor (Professor of Psychology) was also of the opinion that the appellant had PTSD. He said that flashbacks were not in a person’s control. The longer something is buried and it brews, the more violent the explosion will be unless the person obtains psychiatric help. The

appellant may have lost complete touch with reality. Dr Brinded (forensic psychiatrist) said that with PTSD there is a lack of evaluation or checking system whereby one might feel something, think how to respond and then respond. In extreme forms a person would unlikely be able to control his actions. Relief sought: Issues:

Relevant Statute(s): Procedural History:

It was found that a defence of insanity was not possible, as the appellant knew the nature and quality of his acts. Automatism would also not be supported because the appellant did not comply with the test laid down in previous cases. 142 at 25

It was applied to the judge that a complete acquittal was justified, as the appellant was acting involuntarily and was unable to exercise any control over his acts. If an act is done involuntarily, he cannot be guilty of criminal conduct. 142 at 30

The Judge said that NZ does not recognise a form of diminished responsibility, and refused to put the proposed defence to the jury. The Judge directed the jury on murderous intent and provocation. The jury found the appellant guilty of manslaughter, rather than murder, which indicates that the Crown had failed to prove either necessity murderous intent or that the accused had not acted under provocation. 143 at 5

Plaintiff/Appellant’s arguments

Defendant/Respondent’s arguments:

Result: Judge’s reasoning:

Appeal is against this ruling. The circumstances cannot be within the defences of insanity or automatism, but where there is evidence to support the contention that the appellant was acting involuntarily in the sense that he was incapable of exercising any voluntary control over his acts, that is a defence the appellant is entitled to put to the jury. Such a defence is not available. A defence of involuntariness will only be recognised if a person is within the definition of automatism as set in cases such as Cottle. The appellant is seeking to advance a defence of diminished responsibility which is not recognised in NZ. If a person is legally sane and not acting in an automatic state, he or she is responsible for his acts. Appeal dismissed R v Cottle Greeson P described automatism as: “automatism, which strictly means action without conscious volition, has been adopted in criminal law as a term to denote conduct of which the doer is not conscious- in short doing something without knowledge

of it, and without memory afterwards of having done it- a temporary eclipse of consciousness that nevertheless leaves the person so affected able to exercise bodily movements.” “…I think the notion of lack of consciousness is implicit.” Definition of automatism Bottom p 143

Lord Denning: ”no act is punishable if done involuntarily: and an involuntary act in this context- some people nowadays prefer to speak of it as ‘automatism’means an act which is done by the muscles without any control by the mind such as a spasm, a reflex action or a convulsion, or an act done by a person who is not conscious of what he is doing such as an act done whilst suffering from concussion or whilst sleep walking. Lord Denning’s frequently cited definition- does not require lack of consciousness 144 at 6

In New Zealand, Kilbride v Lake also does not require lack of consciousness. 143 at 20

In Ryan v R the jury was instructed to acquit the defendant of manslaughter if there was a possibility that the act that caused the death was involuntary. This was despite there being no insanity defence. 143 at 30

R v Falconer (High Court of Australia) Mason CJ, Brennan and McHugh JJ: “When an accused raises automatism and assigns some malfunction of the mind as its cause, he raises a defence of unsoundess of mind or insanity unless the malfunction of his mind was (1) transient (2) cause by trauma, whether physical or psychological, which the mind of an ordinary person would be likely not to have withstood and (3) not prone to recur. A malfunction of the mind other than a malfunction which satisfies those exempting qualifications amounts to a disease of the mind, or a mental disease or natural mental infirmity. Automatism is a malfunction of the mind, with the three additional requirements. If those 3 are not present, it is merely insanity. 145 at 25

As an accused bears no ultimate onus of proving that his act was not willed, in theory an accused may raise the issue of non-insane automatism on the evidence and claim to be acquitted outright unless the prosecution disproves the issue. But in practice an accused does not raise non-insane automatism by raising automatism based merely on mental malfunction. Prima facie, mental malfunction is the consequence of mental infirmity and, until it can be proved tha a particular instance of mental malfunction satisfies the exempting qualifications, mental malfunction must be treated as a consequence of mental infirmity. It may be worrying that the onus of proof lies with the prosecution, and it may be easy theoretically for accused to get away. However, in reality, while insanity is for the pros to prove otherwise, the three exempting factors have to be raised by the accused

to be considered. 145 at 30

If an accused proves on the balance of probabilities that he was acting as an automation when the act was done by reason of mental malfunction but fails to prove that his mental malfunction satisfied the exempting qualifications, he is entitled to be acquitted on account of unsoundness of mind or on the ground of insanity. However if he proves that his mental malfunction satisfied the exempting qualifications, he is entitled to an outright acquittal. Path of insanity/automatism 145 at 40

Conclusions 1- Third category of involuntariness? There is no third category of the kind argued by the appellant. If a person is acting involuntarily in the sense that his actions are independent of his will, and are therefore not subject to any conscious control, it can only be insane or sane automatism. Involuntariness is always automatism 146 at 5

It is insane automatism where he is legally insane within the meaning of s23. It is sane automatism if he lacks the ability to control his actions because of the operation of some outside events on a sound mind, what has been described as a psychological blow resulting from external events, as discussed in Falconer, but is not suffering from a disease of the mind within s2. Check if he satisfies s23, if not, then check for Falconer test 146 at 10

But if his conduct is not within the boundaries of automatism, and he is not legally insane within s23, he is legally responsible for his acts, save only, in the case of murder to a defence of provocation reducing murder to manslaughter. No automatism, byebye 146 at 15

2- Was judge correct? It follows that the Judge was correct in his ruling that, the defence not raising insanity nor automatism, there were no other grounds upon which the defence could seek an acquittal. In New Zealand. 146 at 20

3- The appellant’s actions/condition The psychiatric and psychological evidence in this case related directly to the defence of provocation. There is no evidence to show that the appellant did not have the power of self-control of an ordinary person. But he did have particular characteristics resulting from PTSD. It is because of that condition that, when the deceased did what the appellant said he did, the appellant lost his power of self-control. He was aware of what he was doing, as is apparent from his ability to remember the events. But he had lost his power to control those

actions because of those particular characteristics. There was certainly ample evidence of those special characteristics to justify the issue of provocation going to the jury. The evidence relates to provocation, as it was stimulated by the deceased’s actions. The jury likely found that provocation was not disproved, so was available to reduce the sentence to manslaughter. 146 at 30

Counsel for the defence was correct in not seeking to have automatism put to the jury. The evidence of the appellant of his actions lead inevitably to the conclusion that he was not only aware of his acts, but also that they were his deliberate voluntary acts. Despite the medical evidence that may suggest otherwise, on any practical view of what occurred, he was acting deliberately. … Although he may have been deprived of the power of self-control by reason of the characteristics to which we have referred, what he did were acts for which he otherwise remained responsible. Still responsible for his acts, even if he did lose control due to certain characteristics. (?)

Appeal dismissed. What can be learned from this case....