Ratio decidendi and obiter dicta PDF

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Ratio Decidendi Ratio decidendi (Latin plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning "the reason" or "the rationale for the decision." The ratio decidendi is "the point in a case which determines the judgment" or "the principle wh...

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Ratio Decidendi Ratio decidendi (Latin plural rationes decidendi) is a Latin phrase meaning "the reason" or "the rationale for the decision." The ratio decidendi is "the point in a case which determines the judgment" or "the principle which the case establishes." In other words, ratio decidendi - legal rule derived from, and consistent with, those parts of legal reasoning within a judgement on which the outcome of the case depends. It is a legal phrase which refers to the legal, moral, political, and social principles used by a court to compose the rationale of a particular judgment. Unlike obiter dicta, the ratio decidendi is, as a general rule, binding on courts of lower and later jurisdiction—through the doctrine of stare decisis. Certain courts are able to overrule decisions of a court of coordinate jurisdiction—however out of interests of judicial comity they generally try to follow co-ordinate rationes. The process of determining the ratio decidendi is a correctly thought analysis of what the court actually decided – essentially, based on the legal points about which the parties in the case actually fought. All other statements about the law in the text of a court opinion – all pronouncements that do not form a part of the court’s rulings on the issues actually decided in that particular case (whether they are correct statements of law or not) -- are obiter dicta, and are not rules for which that particular case stands. The ratio decidendi is one of the most powerful tools available to a lawyer. With a proper understanding of the ratio of a precedent, the advocate can in effect force a lower court to come to a decision which that court may otherwise be unwilling to make, considering the facts of the case. Ratio decidendi also involves the holding of a particular case, thereby allowing future cases to build upon such cases by citing precedent. However, not all holdings are given equal merit; factors that can strengthen or weaken the strength of the holding include: Rank of the court (Supreme Court versus an appellate court), Number of issues decided in the case (multiple issues may result in so called, multi-legged holdings), Authority or respect of the judge(s),Number of concurring and dissenting judges ,New applicable statutes and Similarity of the environment as opposed to the age of the holding. The ability to isolate the abstract principle of law in the vehemently pragmatic application of that abstraction to the facts of a case is one of the most highly prized legal skills in the common law system. The lawyer is searching for the principles which underlined and underlay the court's decision. The difficulty in the search for the ratio becomes acute when, as is often the case in the decisions of the Court of Appeal or the House of Lords, more than one judgment is promulgated. A dissenting judgment on the point is not binding, and cannot be the ratio. However, one will sometimes find decisions in which, for example, five judges are sitting the House of Lords, all of whom purport to agree with one another but in each of whose opinions one is able to discern subtly different ratios. An example is the case of Kay v. Lambeth LBC, on which a panel of seven of their Lordships sat, and from whose opinions emerged a number of competing ratios, some made express by their Lordships and others implicit in the decision. Another problem may arise in older cases where the ratio and obiter are not explicitly separated, as they are today. In such a case, it may be difficult to locate the ratio, and on occasion, the courts have been unable to do so. Such interpretative ambiguity is inevitable in any word-bound system. Codification of the law, such as has occurred in many systems based on Roman law, may assist to some extent in clarification of principle, but is considered by some common lawyers anathema to the robust, pragmatic and fact-bound system of English law.

Obiter Dictum Obiter dictum (plural obiter dicta, often referred to simply as dicta or obiter) is Latin for a statement "said by the way." An obiter dictum is a remark or observation made by a judge that, although included in the body of the court's opinion, does not form a necessary part of the court's decision. In a court opinion, obiter dicta include, but are not limited to, words "introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument." Unlike the rationes decidendi, obiter dicta are not the subject of the judicial decision, even if they happen to be correct statements of law. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, statements constituting obiter dicta are therefore not binding, although in some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, they can be strongly persuasive. An example of an instance where a court opinion may include obiter dicta is where a court rules that it lacks jurisdiction to hear a case or dismisses the case on a technicality. If the court in such a case offers opinions on the merits of the case, such opinions may constitute obiter dicta. Less clear-cut instances of obiter dicta occur where a judge makes a side comment in an opinion to provide context for other parts of the opinion, or makes a thorough exploration of a relevant area of law. Another example would be where the judge, in explaining his ruling, provides a hypothetical set of facts and explains how he or she believes the law would apply to those facts. In reaching decisions, courts sometimes quote passages of obiter dicta found in the texts of the opinions from prior cases, with or without acknowledging the quoted passage's status as obiter dicta. A quoted passage of obiter dicta may become part of the holding or ruling in a subsequent case, depending on what the latter court actually decided and how that court treated the principle embodied in the quoted passage. Obiter dicta can be influential. One example in United States Supreme Court history is the 1886 case Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad. A passing remark from Chief Justice Morrison R. Waite, recorded by the court reporter before oral argument, now forms the basis for the doctrine that juristic persons are entitled to protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. Whether or not Chief Justice Waite's remark constitutes binding precedent is arguable, but subsequent rulings treat it as such. In other instances, obiter dicta can suggest an interpretation of law that has no bearing on the case at hand but might be useful in future cases. The most notable instance of such an occurrence is the history of the famous Footnote 4 to United States v. Carolene Products Co. which while rejecting use of the Due Process Clause to block most legislation suggested that the clause might be applied to strike down legislation dealing with questions of "fundamental right." This obiter dictum is generally considered to have led to the doctrine of strict scrutiny (and subsequently intermediate scrutiny) in racial-, religious-, and sexual-discrimination cases, first articulated in Korematsu v. United States. The arguments and reasoning of a dissenting opinion also constitute obiter dicta. These, however, might also be cited should a court determine that its previous decision was in error, as when the United States Supreme Court cited Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.'s dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart when it overturned Hammer in United States v. Darby Lumber Co....