Reading Notes for Social Contract Theory PDF

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The Social Contract, Thomas Hobbes I.

II. III. IV. V.

War—per Hobbes, the natural condition of human life in the absence of strong government; exists not just during explicit fighting but at any time when people are disposed to use violence against one another in the struggle for wealth, security, or honor; human existence in this natural state is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Right of nature—individuals' liberty to use their power to protect their lives in whatever way seems most prudent. Liberty—absence of external impediments to our power to do as we please. Law of nature—general rule, discovered by reason, forbidding us to do what is destructive of our own lives and obligating us to do whatever best preserves them; for example, we ought to try to make peace, insofar as we have hope of obtaining it; when we cannot obtain it, we ought to defend ourselves by any means necessary. Social contract—implied agreement among individuals relinquishing the right to do whatever they please in exchange for all others' limiting their own rights in a similar manner. objective.

Additional notes • According to Hobbes, we are at war when the will to go to battle is sufficiently known. • Hobbes cites competition, glory, and difference as a principal causes of enmity between people. • Hobbes claims that the two cardinal virtues during war are force and fraud. • The fundamental law of nature, Hobbes says, is to seek peace. • The domination of others, according to Hobbes, is typically necessary for self-preservation. • Hobbes claims that humans are naturally vastly equal, in both body and mind. • Hobbes considers the natural passions of human beings to not be sinful. • Human beings, on Hobbes's account, have a natural right to do whatever they think prudent to preserve their own lives. • Hobbes thinks we should be willing to content ourselves with only so much liberty against others as we would allow them to have against us. • According to Hobbes, nothing can be unjust in a state of war.

A Theory of Justice, John Rawls I.

Justice— social arrangement that rationally self-interested, free individuals would agree on if they were deliberating from a hypothetical state of perfect equality. II. Original position—hypothetical state of perfect equality among those who undertake the deliberative search for the principles of justice; corresponds in Rawls to the “state of nature” in traditional social contract theory. III. Veil of ignorance—hypothetical mechanism by which those in the original position have no knowledge of their own social status, class positions, or even natural abilities and inclinations; guarantees that no one can advocate principles that would be to their own special advantage. IV. Injustice—inequalities that are not to the benefit of all, especially the least advantaged. Additional notes • The characteristics of people in the original position are they do not know their social status, what their conception of the good is, and how talented they are. • The principles chosen by those in Rawls's original position would require equality of basic rights. • The usefulness of the original position is that it makes it impossible to tailor principles to one's own advantage. • The basic liberties identified by Rawls are freedom of assembly, the right to hold personal property, and the freedom from arbitrary arrest. • According to Rawls, we can enter the original position at any time, by simply following a certain procedure. • Rawls does not believe that human beings once enjoyed an original position of perfect equality. • The principles chosen by people in Rawls's original position would not eliminate all inequality. • Rawls does not argue that fairness requires the same treatment of people.

Gender Bias, Cheshire Calhoun I.

The ideology of moral self—the belief that our basic moral interests are not significantly, dissimilarly, and sometimes detrimentally shaped by our social location. II. Extra-philosophic factor—considerations such as one's social location, one's relation to one's audience, and the contours of the larger social world in which philosophic thought takes place. III. Role-reversal—one imagines how one would feel in another's' circumstance to come to a decision about a moral matter.

Additional notes • Calhoun claims the following are obstacles individuals face in attempting to take others' interests seriously: 1) one's inclination to give more weight to one's own interests, and 2) one's inclination to give more weight to the interest of those in one's own community. • In an attempt to overcome egoism and group bias, in Calhoun's view, a risk is: 1) we may mistakenly conclude that there are more substantial similarities among people than there in fact are; 2) we may under-appreciate individual difference, and exaggerate similarity; and 3) we may fail to appreciate how individuals' preferences may be malformed. • Calhoun's central objection can be summarized as undue emphasis on shared humanity underestimates how basic moral interests are shaped by social location. • Calhoun argues that in assessing moral theories we should change our methods, adjust our theoretical priorities, and better appreciate the nonlogical implications. • Calhoun worries that the search for a “moral self” may be counterproductive if we fail to appreciate how inegalitarian contexts may give rise to distorted preferences. • Calhoun would agree that our preferences are influenced by our formative experiences. • Calhoun would likely agree that there are morally significant differences between genders. • Our preferences may themselves be the product of oppressive circumstances. • Calhoun believes that the search for a “moral self” is overly intellectual and needlessly abstract. • Calhoun does not regard the project of identifying a “moral self” as the product of sloppy moral thinking....