Reese-skeleton++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++Claim+No PDF

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Civil Litigation; Skeleton Argument, Negligence, Liability, Breach, Personal Injury cases...

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION MANCHESTER DISTRICT REGISTRY

Claim No: MA22HY293

BETWEEN

MR JONATHAN REESE

Applicant/Claimant

and

EXPRESS DELIVERY LIMITED

Respondent/Defendant

___________________________________________ SKELETON ARGUMENT OF THE CLAIMANT ____________________________________________ INTRODUCTION 1. This is an application for Interim Payment pursuant to CPR r25 and s32 Senior Court Act 1981, for the court to consider and reach a judgment sum awarded to the Claimant. 2. Accident- At approximately at 11:45 on the 1st March, the claimant was using a puffin crossing to cross a road at junction between Ravenswood Road and the A56/Chester Road, in Old Trafford, Manchester. When he was struck by the Ford Transit van registration MA16 WWS driven by Daniel Gibson who, was an employee and/or agent of the defendant. 3. The accident was caused by the defendant’s breach of statutory duty and negligence 4. The defendant failed to give precedence to the claimant, who was on the carriageway within the limits of the said puffing crossing at the time when the vehicular traffic signal of the same was showing a flashing amber light, contrary to Regulation 26 of the Regulations. Pelican and Puffin Pedestrian Crossings Regulations 1997 (the Regulations) applied. 5. Following this I think a reasonable competent driver would have indicated and give adequate warning, if an indication had been made it appears that someone standing in the claimant’s position would have seen him. The Defendant would have seen the claimant had he been looking. Paragraph 103 of the Highway Code advises drivers to give clear signals in plenty of time to advise other road users before changing course of direction. 6. In the witness statement of Adam Bukowski states when he first saw the claimant (Jonathan Reese), he had not yet started to crosse the road, but he was standing on

the pedestrian island and waiting to cross indicating the claimant did stop before entering the road. In addition, the defendant was under a duty to take the appropriate steps to avoid collision and reduce the risk of injury. 7. In the witness statement of the defendant he states ‘’I saw a man know to be Jonathan Reese, part way across the road. He had reached around the white lines in the middle of the road. He was wearing running gear, I expected him to continue across the road towards the central traffic island”.

8. By reason of the defendant’s breach of statutory duty and negligence, the claimant (Mr Reese), has suffered a brain injury constituting of an intracranial bleed in the left frontal section. He has no memory of the collision, the last thing he remembers is leaving to go for a run around 11:30am on the 1st March 2018. The claimant was listening to music on his phone and wearing his headphones, a yellow bright longsleeve running top, black shorts and blue trainers. If he was not looking at that precise moment, the claimant (Mr Reese) could have failed to see him. 9. Liability- District Judge Fitzpatrick has delivered his judgement on the 22 December 2020, ordering the Defendant must pay the Claimant an amount, the court will decide the claimant’s cost. 10. The Claimant is claiming for loss of earnings, care and travel cost for the sum of £53,981.95. I am not able to advise on general damages for PSLA. I would be happy to do so when I am informed in subject to supportive medical evidence. Evidence 11. Notice of Proposed Allocation to the Multi-Track 12. Particulars of claim issued 18 September 2020 13. The Defendant has filed a defence dated 14 October 2020 14. Notice of Case Management Conference 15. Application Notice N244 16. Witness Statement of Claimant (Jonathan Reese) 17. Witness statement of James Anand 18. Witness statement of Daniel Gibson 19. Medical report of Dr Preston 20. Medical report of Mr Elliott 21. Witness statement of Adam Bukowski 22. Witness statement of Janelle Daniels 23. Witness Statement of Charlotte Scriven 24. First Medical report of Dr Azad dated 6 July 2019

25. 2nd Medical report of Dr Azad dated 19 October 2020 COURTS DISCRETION 28. 26. The court has a discretion to make an order for interim payment. a, The court may grant an order for interim payment under rule CPR r25.6 for payment by the defendant on account of any damages, dept or other sum which the court may hold the defendant liable to pay CPR r25.1(k) b, if it appears to the court grants interim payment is some other good reason why the judgement may not grant an interim remedy. CPR 25.1(4) AUTHORTIES 27. Eeles v Cobham Services Ltd (2009) EWCA – sets out the test to be applied when applying for interim payments. Schott Kemp v Bentley (1991) QB 61- sets out principles to be applied in application and prospects of successfully defending the claim. Moore v Assignment Courier Ltd (1977) 1 WLR 638- Court of Appeal approves jurisdiction granted by the legislation. The Test 28. The power to order interim payments comes from s32(5) of the Senior Courts Act 1981 and s50(5) of the County Courts Act 1984. It is encompassed in CPR r25.7 accordingly, the court may grant an interim payment in of such amount as may be specified In the order, payment on account. 29. In the well-established case of Deutshe Bank AG v United Global Ltd (2016) EWCA civ 119, the Court of Appeal explained that section 32 only sets out a rule-making power in respect of orders for interim payments, and that is r25.1(1)(k) which provides the jurisdiction for the court to make such an order. It is expressly provided in CPR r41.3(6) a. There is a serious question to be tried and b. Damages would not be adequate remedy for, c. The defendant against whom the order is sought has admitted liability to pay damages or some other sum of money to the claimant. d. The claimant has obtained judgement against that defendant for damages to be assessed or for sum of money other than costs to be assessed. e. Where there is doubt as to the adequacy of the respective remedies in damages available to either party or to both, then the question of balance of convenience. f.

In which case the defendant that is insured in respect of the claim,

g. The defendant whose liability will be met by an insurer under s151 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 or an insurer acting under the Motor Insures Bureau. THE ISSUE IN THE CASE 1. A, It is submitted that the following are matters that the court may take into account in the exercise of its discretion, Following this I think a reasonable competent driver would have indicated and give adequate warning, if an indication had been made it appears that someone standing in the claimant’s position would have seen him. The claimant would have seen I, had he been looking. Paragraph 103 of the Highway Code advises drivers to give clear signals in plenty of time to advise other road users before changing course of direction. b. The claimant admits he listens to music whiles running, The claimant indicates that he was advised that the defendant is saying that he walked across the road whilst looking at his phone. The claimant denies this allegation and indicates that it sounds very unusual for him as he would not look at his phone whilst crossing. This is likely to support the action of contributory negligence and this may result in the cause of his injuries. c. The claimant will be found to have contributed to the damage he suffered, because he attempted to cross at a red pedestrian signal and paid insufficient attention. Due to the claimant was listening to music or mobile phone. d. Where all factors appear, the aspect of the claim that in my view is most vulnerable to reduction by the court is emotional support provided for 2 hours a day for six weeks following the first weeks of the most acute symptoms.

ADEQUACY OF DAMAGES FOR THE CLAIMANT 30. The claimant suffered losses for the damages the defendant has caused and is liable for the resulting personal injury to the claimant by the negligence while acting in the course of his employment, driving whilst carrying out his duties for his employer and caused a road traffic accident due to his negligence.

a. In the witness statement of James Anand he states as a result of the injuries the on being discharged from hospital the claimant was unable to cook and clean, James Anand undertook all home tasks such as cooking and cleaning. This was because the claimant was not able to do this himself. In addition, James assisted with the washing and dressing of the claimant. This was approximately four hours every day for an 8 week period.

b. The claimant has provided evidence of his finances, given that in all other respect it would be just and convenient to grant the interim payment, it is submitted that undertaking from him is unnecessary in any event.

BALANCE OF CONVENIENCE 31. As the application for an interim payment was made shortly after the claimant’s discovery of the facts providing the basis for this claim and the. Claimants subsequent efforts to inform the defendants in an attempt to settle proceedings without litigation, it is submitted that the claimant acted without any undue delay in order to prevent any further damage of injury.

32. The claimant’s personal loss of finance would have an immeasurably more devasting effect upon him than the defendant.

33. The claimant has reasonable prospects of demonstrating that the defendant was negligent in failing to observe him, anticipate him as a hazard and reduce his speed accordingly.

34. I take the view the defendant being found responsible for the claimants injuries, a witness statement from his employer to confirm the salary figures and following sums are claimed for care.

35. It is submitted that because of the high degree of assurance in this case, there is little risk of injustice to the defendant if the interim payment is granted.

CONCLUSION 36. In all the circumstances, it is submitted that the court should grant the claimant interim payment in the terms set out in the draft order....