STST2001 Notes For Exam PDF

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Notes for the STST2001 end of year exam...

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1: The Asia-Pacific Century How do countries balance internally (nuclear weapons conscription) and externally (alliances, agreements, etc.)? Factors affecting Asian Security: 

Imperialism - means states have gained sovereignty recently. This indicates the legitimacy of ruling regimes, relations between different ethnic groups and sense of national identity may be fragile.



War and Memory - Japanese imperialism affects its standing with other states, war-crimes harboured resentment. Cold-War legacies also cause divides such as China-Taiwan.



Late-Economic Development: many states only took off economically in the last 40 years. Modernisation has become most important goal for countries. Development has also been extremely uneven.

Key Ideas of Course: 

Regions as constructed concepts



Use of multiple theoretical approaches to security



Impact of imperialism, war and late development



Power shifting to the Asia-Pacific

David. C. Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks’, International Security, 27: 4, 2003, pp. 57-85. Past IR theory derived from study of European powers, more careful attention to Asia can strengthen theories further. Argues two claims about the levels of conflict and types of alignment behaviour in Asia: Pessimistic predictions after Cold War that Asia would experience arms race and power politics have not necessarily come true. 

Based on disparities in levels of eco and military power, different political systems, and historical rivalries.



Predictions: Japanese rearmament, increased Chinese rising power, conflict with Taiwan, missile attacks from North Korea, and arms racing in SEA to solve territorial disputes.



Not been major war since 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict.

Chinese weakness has led to chaos in the past while strength has led to peace. 

Contrasts to European IR: in Asia, formal hierarchy while informal quality, little interstate conflict.



China has many territorial disputes but has neither revisionist nor imperial aims.

Contrary to expectations of standard realism, Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China and are instead choosing to bandwagon with it. 

Could be confounded by presence of the US - acts as a stabilising force in the region



American power has kept rivals from engaging and have protected smaller states vulnerable to regional wars.



There would be considerably more conflict should the US leave its pos.ition.

Realism's Japan Problem:



Provides strongest evidence that balancing does not occur in Asia as realist theories would predict

Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot (Eds). The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia. New York, Oxford University Press, 2014. Chapter 1, pp. 3-21. Four major transitions: colonisation, the Cold War conflicts of Korean and Indochina, the transformation from financial crises to centre of financial works, and the resurgence of China. Contemporary characteristics of region: 

Marked by heterogeneity



State-centred, anti-colonialist sentiment and nationalism



Scepticism toward human rights, preference for security of the state rather than individual



Economic asymmetries: Northeast dominates - 70% of regional economy, 20% of global



Dual forms of strategic uncertainty: how to deal with rapidly more powerful and richer China. Concerns - China could use eco leverage to attain political preferences.



Increased economic capacity for military modernisation



Region is porous, countries economically interdependent from rest of the world



Reduced intensity of ideological division since Cold War

Uniqueness of Asian Region: 

Greatest challenge: conflict between India and China

2: Legacy of World War II in Asia How do countries balance internally (nuclear weapons conscription) and externally (alliances, agreements, etc.)? Factors affecting Asian Security: 

Imperialism - means states have gained sovereignty recently. This indicates the legitimacy of ruling regimes, relations between different ethnic groups and sense of national identity may be fragile.



War and Memory - Japanese imperialism affects its standing with other states, war-crimes harbored resentment. Cold-War legacies also cause divides such as China-Taiwan.



Late-Economic Development: many states only took off economically in the last 40 years. Modernisation has become most important goal for countries. Development has also been extremely uneven.

Key Ideas of Course: 

Regions as constructed concepts



Use of multiple theoretical approaches to security



Impact of imperialism, war and late development



Power shifting to the Asia-Pacific

David. C. Kang, ‘Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks’, International Security, 27: 4, 2003, pp. 57-85.

Past IR theory derived from study of European powers, more careful attention to Asia can strengthen theories further. Argues two claims about the levels of conflict and types of alignment behaviour in Asia: Pessimistic predictions after Cold War that Asia would experience arms race and power politics have not necessarily come true. 

Based on disparities in levels of eco and military power, different political systems, and historical rivalries.



Predictions: Japanese rearmament, increased Chinese rising power, conflict with Taiwan, missile attacks from North Korea, and arms racing in SEA to solve territorial disputes.



Not been major war since 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict.

Chinese weakness has led to chaos in the past while strength has led to peace. 

Contrasts to European IR: in Asia, formal hierarchy while informal quality, little interstate conflict.



China has many territorial disputes but has neither revisionist nor imperial aims.

Contrary to expectations of standard realism, Asian states do not appear to be balancing against rising powers such as China and are instead choosing to bandwagon with it. 

Could be confounded by presence of the US - acts as a stabilising force in the region



American power has kept rivals from engaging and have protected smaller states vulnerable to regional wars.



There would be considerably more conflict should the US leave its position.

Realism's Japan Problem: 

Provides strongest evidence that balancing does not occur in Asia as realist theories would predict

Saadia M. Pekkanen, John Ravenhill and Rosemary Foot (Eds). The Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of Asia. New York, Oxford University Press, 2014. Chapter 1, pp. 3-21. Four major transitions: colonisation, the Cold War conflicts of Korean and Indochina, the transformation from financial crises to centre of financial works, and the resurgence of China. Contemporary characteristics of region: 

Marked by heterogeneity



State-centred, anti-colonialist sentiment and nationalism



Scepticism toward human rights, preference for security of the state rather than individual



Economic asymmetries: Northeast dominates - 70% of regional economy, 20% of global



Dual forms of strategic uncertainty: how to deal with rapidly more powerful and richer China. Concerns - China could use eco leverage to attain political preferences.



Increased economic capacity for military modernisation



Region is porous, countries economically interdependent from rest of the world



Reduced intensity of ideological division since Cold War

Uniqueness of Asian Region: 

Greatest challenge: conflict between India and China

3: Inter-Korean Tensions Origin of Issues 

The truce was always accompanied by small-scale terror attacks and assassination attempts, mostly from the North to the South.



In the late 1950s, the US placed nukes on the Peninsula and broke the armistice clause. In response, the DPRK asked for Russian and Chinese help in developing nuclear arms, but both refused.



In 1980s, evidence that DPRK were attempting to gain nuclear power -reactors were set up at Yongbyon. In 1895, US gets NK to sign the NNPT on the condition that Russia helps them set up the reactors.

1993-94 Nuclear Crisis 

In 1993, DPRK withdraws from NNPT - fear from IAEA requests for "special inspection", US-ROK military exercised, Iraq's sovereignty damaged by US in 1991 Gulf War, this cannot be allowed to happen to DPRK.



Pyongyang threatens to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire" - DPRK artillery capabilities could do significant damage to Seoul due to its proximity to border. Estimates of casualties very high.



Deal formalised - "Agreed Framework" or 1994 - US to provide DPRK with tech, energy, economic benefits and 2 light-water reactors. Kim Il-Sung pledges nuclear program frozen, IAEA inspectors return.

2000s 

Bush inaugurated in 2001, accused democrats of appeasing DPRK - named Iraq, Iran, and DPRK as "axis of evil". In 2002, US presents DPRK with evidence of breaking the Agreed Framework by enriching uranium, ending the deal.



China hosts Six Party Talks between China, DPRK, ROK, Japan, Russia USA. Mixed record of success, talks would break down often e.g. 2005 "Joint Statement" which fell apart



In 2006, DPRK carried out its first nuclear test. In 2007, new agreement based on 2005 JS, led to in 2009 the DPRK blew up a cooling tower at Yongbyon.



In 2008, situation worsens and Sunshine Policy of ROK ends, Kim Jong-Il suffers a stroke.



In 2009, ballistic missile tests are conducted and a second nuclear test, the DPRK withdraws from armistice. Hostilities continue in 2010 with bombing of ROK territory and sinking of vessels.

2010s 

In 2011, leader dies and replaced by Kim Jong-Un. Further nuclear tests occur in 2013 and 2016. Hardest part of nuclear weaponry is miniaturising the warhead, in late 2016 a miniaturised nuclear test occurred.



In Feb 2017, launched IRBM towards Japan, and then 4 MRMBs into sea of Japan. By July, there had been an ICBM test, and US intelligence assesses that NK can miniaturise nuclear warheads.



In November, Trump responds with "fire and fury" threat, and intelligence assess that NK might have a nuclear tipped ICBM capable of hitting the continental US.



However, from 2018-19 there have been 2 summits in which the US position has shifted.

North Korea as "bad" and "mad"



Inherently untrustworthy rogue state, characterised by US officials as "outpost of tyranny" -Rice, likened to Saddam



Human rights violator - putting the military before the starvation of the people and immorality



Portrayed as offensive and never defensive.



Logical conclusion of this is that DPRK is nonredeemable, the only solution is regime change.



Not only this, but they cannot be trusted to be rational - we shouldn't bother trying to understand their policy because everything they do is deceptive.



Severe form of path dependency - there can be no change in policy rationally

4: Crises in the Taiwan Strait History 

Taiwan was controlled by the Qing dynasty from 1683-1895, when it fell under Japanese imperial control.



After the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1958, the US and PRC achieved rapprochement in 1972 and many countries transfer diplomatic recognition from ROC to PRC due to the desire to split the SinoSoviet bloc.



In 1979, US passes the Taiwan Relations Act and officially ends formal alliance with Taipei.



In 1982, US agrees to gradually reduce the number of arms it sells to Taiwan. However, the PRC would argue the US has not kept this promise.



The PRC and ROC created the 1992 consensus affirming that there is "one China", however both disagreed about the capital. However, this was agreed to by the KMT and is disagreed on by the DPP, which is currently in power.

Interests of Major Parties 

PRC: Taiwan is a renegade province and China should have sovereignty over it



KMT: "pan-blue coalition": supports the current status, open to negotiations for reunification once China has sufficiently democratised.



DPP: "pan-green coalition": emphasises that Taiwan is currently independent, and many (although not all) seek formal independence.



Steps toward de jure independence may include membership of the UN, recognition as a state by the UN, or the changing of the ROC's name.

US Strategic Ambiguity 

Early 1950s: Sino-American Mutual Defence Treaty (1954) leaves ambiguity about whether the US would respond to a clash between the PRC and the ROC.



In the 1960s, the US made no decision about their defence of Taiwan if it provoked the PRC in order to discourage adventurism.



1971-72: rapprochement leads to US accepting idea of one China, ceases Seventh Fleet patrols in Taiwan Strait and gives up the Mutual Defence Treaty with Taiwan. US remains vague.



1979: Taiwan Relations Act: US vows to resist any force that would jeopardise the current situation of Taiwan.



Under Clinton and Bush, shift in this policy as military cooperation and surveillance of PRC military modernisation increased greatly. However, Taiwan's attempts to change the status quo still opposed.

Case Study: 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis History 

After the US granted a visa to the Taiwanese president, China responded by cancelling diplomatic visits to the US and holding missile tests, naval and air exercises near Taiwan, which responded with its own tests.



Further Taiwanese defensive measures interpreted as an attempt to gain public support for independence in the upcoming election. China responds by high-level war-games and missile launches.



In 1996, China puts 100,0000 troops in Fujian province, prompting a warning from the US to the PRC. Despite this, China fired three M-9 missiles near Taiwan and US response by sending two carrier battle groups to the region.



China attempting to sway Taiwan into not electing a pro-independence party such as the DPP which called for official recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty.



In March 1996, the KMT wins the presidential election and the DPP fared very badly to the relief of China.

Major Party Interests 

Preserving Taiwan's de facto independence, establishing more international recognition for Taiwan and strengthening the US security commitment to Taiwan.



China: to coerce the US into making a public commitment to to the 'one China' policy, and to convince the Taiwanese public into voting against independence.



US: To deter future Chinese military action and to reassure Taiwan and its regional allies of US defensive credibility

Domestic Factors 

Importance of the Taiwan issue to the CCP, leadership, seen as an integral part of the nation.



The increasing Taiwanese sentiment for democratisation and independence



US ability to project power so close to China was a military embarrassment for the PLA as it revealed their power over the nation.



Congressional pressure in the US is strong due to the influence of the Taiwan lobby

Perception and Misperception 

US misunderstood the strength of China's position and misread Chinese signals (e.g. 1995 missile tests)



Chinese underestimated US willingness to engage militarily on the issue

Shift in the Military Balance 

The Taiwan Strait Crisis demonstrates the importance of the balance of power between 2 states. Chinese military technology was much less advanced than US, prompting the PRC to massively increase their military spending on deterrents such as anti-ship ballistic missiles to avoid another humiliation from the US on Taiwan.



Recently, a huge expansion in the size/quality of China's military (especially M-9 cruise missiles), balance has favoured China.

Shifting Chinese and Taiwanese Policy 

Presidents Hu and Xi have increased economic interdependence and cross-Strait ties in order to deter independence in Taiwan (e.g. 2005 Anti-Secession Law)



Growing impatience under Xi, 2019: "won't allow Taiwan reunification to be postponed indefinitely



80% of Taiwanese public now support maintaining the status quo (no independence or reunification) but Taiwanese democracy makes the situation less predictable.



The presidency of Ma Ying-jeou (2008-16) involved no pursuit of de jure independence, no negotiations with the mainland and no use of force. This was rewarded with strong economic cooperation with the PRC.



After the election of Tsai Ing-wen (DPP) in 2016, Trump made first phone call between US and ROC, sparking a negative reaction from China. This caused Trump to back down and reaffirm one-China policy.

5: America’s Asian Alliances

6: China and Japan Pre-1972 History 

After the British Opium Wars, China underwent a period of "unequal treaties" with Western powers which saw some of the largest cities such as Shanghai come under partial colonisation.



Japan, observing this happen to China, changes its political system to model Western powers and empires in order that it not be defeated by them. Japan mimics colonisation in order to expand its export markets and power projection.



In 1932, Japan formally colonised Manchuria, modernising and industrialising the area. In 1937, the Japanese army invaded Nanjing and began WWII in the Asia-Pacific.



The Korean War was seen as an enormous threat to China considering the past history of imperialism, and thus the PLA intervenes. This transforms US thinking about the relationship between China and Japan, as Japan was needed as a strong ally to contain the communist threat.



Japan was forced to make diplomatic ties with the ROC and not the PRC, to its consternation. Relations were unofficial until 1972 when the US normalised relations

1972-1989 - Warming of Relations 

Japan offers wartime reparations to China, this is refused in exchange for Japanese Official Development As...