Summary - Sartori\'s Polarised Plural Party System Approach PDF

Title Summary - Sartori\'s Polarised Plural Party System Approach
Author András Stefanovszky
Course Comparative European Politics
Institution University of Manchester
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Summary

Sartori's Polarised Plural Party System Approach...


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Sartori, Giovanni (1990). “A Typology of Party Systems”, in Peter Mair (ed.), The West European Party System (Oxford: OUP), pp.316-349.

Sartori’s ‘Polarised Plural Party System’ Approach “(…) it does matter how many are the parties. For one thing, the number of parties immediately indicates, albeit roughly, an important feature of the political system: the extent to which political power is fragmented or nonfragmented, dispersed or concentrated. Likewise, simply by knowing how many parties there are, we are alerted to the number of possible ‘interaction streams’ that are involved. (…) 2 parties allow for only 1 stream of reciprocal interaction, 3 parties allow for 3 (…), 4 parties for 6, 5 parties for 10, 6 parties for 15, and 7 parties for 21. Since these possible interaction streams occur at multiple levels – electoral, parliamentary, and governmental – the indication clearly is that the greater the number of parties (…) the greater the y and probably the intricacy of the system.” (317-318) "we must inquire as to the governing potential, or the coalition potential, of each party. What really weighs in the balance of multipartism is the extent to which a party may be needed as a coalition partner for one or more of the possible governmental majorities." (320) "We are thus led to formulate a second, subsidiary counting rule based on the power of intimidation, or more exactly, the blackmail potential of the opposition-oriented parties. (321) "(...) in practice the notion of blackmail party is mainly connected to the notion of anti-system party - and both the relevance and the anti-system nature of a party can be established, in turn, by a battery of ulterior indicators. (...) the blackmail potential of the electoral party finds its equivalent in the veto potential, or indeed the veto power, of the parliamentary party with respect to the enactment of legislation." (322) "(...) a party system is declared fragmented only when it has many parties, none of which approaches the absolute majority point." (323) "I am suggesting, seven classes, indicated as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

one party hegemonic party predominant party two-party limited pluralism extreme pluralism atomized " (324)

"To begin with, as it now stands the one-party case is clear: political power is monopolised by one party only, in the precise sense that no other party is permitted to exist. Then there is the case in which one party 'counts more' than all the others - but in two very different ways. On the one hand we find a hegemonic party that permits the existence of other parties only as 'satellite' or, at any rate, as subordinate parties; that is, the hegemony of the party in power cannot be challenged. On the other hand we find the predominant-party system, that is, a power configuration in which one party governs alone, without being subjected to alternation, as long as it continues to win, electorally, an absolute majority. Two-party systems pose no problem, inasmuch as their power configuration is straightforward: two parties compete for an absolute majority that is within the reach of either. This leaves us with the power configuration of multipartism in general, which can be spelled out as follows: (i) No party is likely to approach, or at least to maintain, an absolute majority, and (ii) the relative strength (or weakness) of the parties can be ranked according to their respective coalition (in)dispensability and/or (iii) their eventual potential of intimidation (blackmail)." (327) "(...) the notion of ideological distance enters the apprehension of the more-than-one party systems, whereas the notion of ideological intensity is essential to the apprehension of the one-party polities." (326)

Sartori, Giovanni (1990). “A Typology of Party Systems”, in Peter Mair (ed.), The West European Party System (Oxford: OUP), pp.316-349.

POLARISED PLURALISM "The first distinctive feature of polarized pluralism resides in the presence of relevant anti-system parties. The system is characterised by an anti-system opposition (...). A party can be defined as being anti-system whenever it undermines the legitimacy of the regime it opposes (...) an anti-system party would not change - if it could - the government but the very system of government. Its opposition is not an 'opposition on issues' (...) but an 'opposition of principle'. (...) an anti-system opposition abides by a belief system that does not share the values of the political order within which it operates. According to the strict definition, then, anti-system parties represent an extraneous ideology - thereby indicating a polity confronted with a maximal ideological distance." (329-330) "The second distinctive feature of polarised pluralism resides in the existence of bilateral oppositions. When the opposition is unilateral, i.e., all located on one side vis- à-vis the government, no matter how many parties oppose it, they can join forces and propose themselves as an alternative government. In the polarised polities we find instead two oppositions that are mutually exclusive: They cannot join forces. In fact, the two opposing groups are closer, if anything, to the governing parties than to one another. The system has two oppositions, then, in the sense that they are counter-oppositions that are, in constructive terms, incompatible." (330)s "(..) along the left-to-right dimension the metrical centre of the system is occupied. This implies that we are no longer confronted with bipolar interactions, but at the very least with triangular interactions. The system is multipolar in that its competitive mechanics hinges on a centre that must face both a left and a right. While the mechanics of moderate pluralism is bipolar precisely because the system is not centre based, the mechanics of polarised pluralism is multipolar and cannot be explained, therefore by a dualistic model. It is important to stress that when one speaks of a centre-based system, one is concerned only with a centre positioning, not with centre doctrines, ideologies, and opinions - whatever these may be. The physical occupation of the centre is, in and by itself, of great consequence, for it implies that the central area of the political system is out of competition. In other terms, the very existence of a centre party (or parties) discourages 'centrality', i.e., the centripetal drives of the political system. And the centripetal drives are precisely the moderating drives. This is why this type is centre-fleeing, or centrifugal, and thereby conductive to immoderate or extremist politics." (330-331) "If a political system obtains anti-system, bilateral oppositions and discourages - by the very fact that its centre is physically occupied - centripetal competition, these traits add up to a polarised system. In the Italian (...) case the 'pull' is (was) mostly at the left; in the Weimar case it became stronger, in the thirties, on the right; in the case of the Fourth Republic it was more evenly distributed at both ends. The fact remains that in all cases the spectrum of political opinion is highly polarised. (...) this is tantamount to saying that cleavages are likely to be very deep, that consensus is surely low, and that the legitimacy of the political system is widely questioned. Briefly put, we have polarisation when we have ideological distance (in contradistinction to ideological proximity)." (331) "(...) feature of polarised pluralism is its congenital ideological patterning. When one finds a large ideological space, it follows that the polity contains parties that disagree not only on policies but also, and more importantly, on principles and fundamentals. We are thus referred to a more substantive meaning of ideology. As noted earlier, 'ideology' may signify, (i) a highly emotive involvement in politics and (ii) a particular mentality, a forma mentis." (332) "(...) feature of polarised pluralism is the presence of irresponsible oppositions. (...) On the one hand, the centre party (or the leading party of the centre) is not exposed to alternation Being the pivot and the very backbone of any possible governmental majority, its destiny is to govern indefinitely. On the other hand, the extreme parties, the parties that oppose the system, are excluded almost by definition from alternation in office? Under normal circumstances they are not destined to govern. Under these conditions we cannot have, therefore, alternative coalitions, the swing of the pendulum from one group to another group of parties. We find, instead, a peripheral turnover - peripheral in that the access to government is limited to the centre-left and/or the centre-right parties only. Differently put, alternative coalitions presuppose a system in which all the relevant parties are governing oriented and acceptable as governing parties. Contrariwise, peripheral turnover consists of permanently governing parties that merely change partners in their neighbourhood." (333-334)

Sartori, Giovanni (1990). “A Typology of Party Systems”, in Peter Mair (ed.), The West European Party System (Oxford: OUP), pp.316-349.

MODERATE PLURALISM "Vis-à-vis the properties of twopartism, the major distinguishing trait of moderate pluralism is coalition government. This feature follows from the fact that the relevant parties are at least three, that no party generally attains the absolute majority, and that it appears irrational to allow the major or dominant party to govern alone when it can be obliged to share its power. (...) Thus the formula of moderate pluralism is not alternative government but governing in coalition within the perspective of alternative conditions" (335-336) "Aside from this major difference, in most other respects the mechanics of moderate pluralism tends to resemble and to imitate - albeit with a higher degree of complexity - the mechanics of twopartism. In particular the structure of moderate pluralism remains bipolar. Instead of only two parties we generally find bipolar alignments of alternative coalitions. But this difference does not detract from the fact that competition remains centripetal and thereby from the fact that the mechanics of moderate pluralism is still conducive to moderate politics." (336) "(...) moderate pluralism lacks relevant and/or sizeable anti-system parties. (...) it lacks bilateral oppositions. To put it in the affirmative, in a system of moderate pluralism all the parties are governing oriented, that is, available for cabinet coalitions. Hence all the non-governing parties can coalesce qua oppositions, and this means that the opposition will be 'unilateral' - all on one side, either on the left or on the right. Basically, then, moderate pluralism is non-polarised. (...) the comparison between moderate and polarised pluralism reveals that their respective ideological spreads are significantly, and indeed critically, different. In synthesis, a system of moderate pluralism is characterised by (i) a relatively small ideological distance among its relevant parties, (ii) a bipolar coalitional configuration, and (iii) centripetal competition." (336)

TWO-PARTY SYSTEM "(...) We have a two-party format whenever the existence of third parties does not prevent the two major parties from governing alone, i.e., whenever coalitions are unnecessary." (340) "The lenient conditions for a system that functions according to the rules of twopartism would thus be the following: (i) two parties are in a position to compete for the absolute majority of seats; (ii) one of the two parties actually succeeds in winning a sufficient parliamentary majority; (iii) this party is willing to govern alone; (iv) alternation or rotation in power remains a credible expectation." (342) "(...) twopartism 'works' when the spread of opinion is small and its distribution single peaked." (343) "(...) the centripetal mechanics of twopartism creates consensus. (...) the competitive mechanics of the system paves the way to consensus in that it has a conflict-minimising bent." (343) "(...) the greater the ideological distance, the more a two-party format is dysfunctional." (344)

PREDOMINANT-PARTY SYSTEMS "Parties other than the major one not only are permitted to exist, but do exist as legal and legitimate - if not necessarily effective - competitors of the predominant party. That is to say that the minor parties are truly independent antagonists of the predominant party. Therefore, the predominant-party system actually is a more-than-one party system in which rotation does not occur in fact. It simply happens that the same party manages to win, over time, an absolute majority of seats (not necessarily votes) in parliament." (345-346) "(...) A predominant-party system is such to the extent that, and as long as, its major party is consistently supported by a winning majority (the absolute majority of seats) of the voters. It follows that a predominant party can cease, at any moment, to be predominant. When this happens, either the pattern is soon re-established or the system changes its nature" (346)

Sartori, Giovanni (1990). “A Typology of Party Systems”, in Peter Mair (ed.), The West European Party System (Oxford: OUP), pp.316-349. "(...) Three consecutive absolute majorities can be a sufficient indication, provided that the electorate appears stabilised, that the absolute majority threshold is clearly surpassed" (347) Small

Low

Ideological distance

High

Centripetal competition

Twopartism

Party fragmentation

Moderate multipartism

Centrifugal competition

High

Segmented multipartism

Polarised multipartism

Sartori's Simplified Model...


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