Term Assignment 1 Crim 2260 - Case Fagan v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (1969), 1 Q.B. 439 PDF

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Procedural History: Fagan was convicted of assaulting David Morris, a constable of the Metropolitan Police Force when in the execution of his duty under s. 51 of the Police Act, 1964 at Willesden Magistrates’ court....

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Case brief CRIM2260-002 Kathleen Hunter

Fagan v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis (1969), 1 Q.B. 439

Facts: Procedural History: Fagan was convicted of assaulting David Morris, a constable of the Metropolitan Police Force, when in the execution of his duty under s. 51 of the Police Act, 1964 at Willesden Magistrates’ court. Fagan appealed to the Middlesex Quarter Sessions but the appeal was dismissed. Fagan then appealed to the Queen’s Bench Divisional Court. Fagan was in his car when a police officer approached him, asking him to move the vehicle, closer to the kerb. Fagan did so, reversed his car, and rolled it up on to the police officer's foot. The officer ordered him to move the car off his foot at which point he was sworn by Fagan. The engine stopped (either spontaneously or by Fagan). The officer repeated the order several times, trough the open car window, until Fagan obeys the command. Fagan claimed he drove on the officer’s foot accidentally. Issues: 1. Do actus reus and mens rea coincide in order to have an assault in Fagan’s actions? Was the prosecution able to determine when Fagan’s actions became intentional in order to have a criminal act? Decision: Appeal dismissed. Fagan’s conviction was upheld. (2:1) Reasons: 1) On the facts of the present case the assault alleged involved a battery. Where an assault involves a battery it does not matter whether the battery is inflicted directly by the body of the offender or through the medium of some weapon or instrument controlled by the action of the offender. 2) The majority saw no difference in principle between the action of stepping on to a person’s toe and maintaining that position and the action of driving a car on to a person’s foot and sitting in the car whilst its position on the foot is maintained. Thus, if the assault involves a battery and that battery continues there is a continuing act of assault. 3) Also for an assault to be committed both the elements of actus reus and mens rea must be present at the same time. The actus reus is the action and the mens rea is the intention to cause that effect. Although Fagan’s actions may have been initially unintentional, they became criminal from the moment the appellant indicated the intention of keeping the wheel on the officer’s foot. The actus reus and the mens rea were both present together which is a crime and they need not start and end at precisely the same time. 4) The majority decided that was not a mere omission or inactivity. The intention was formed to produce the assault which was flowing from the continuing act.

Ratio: For an assault to be committed both the elements of actus reus and mens rea must be present at the same time. The actus reus is the action and the mens rea is the intention to mean that act. It’s not necessary that mens rea should be present at the inception of the actus reus; it can be superimposed upon an existing act. However, the subsequent inception of mens rea cannot convert an act which has been completed without mes rea into an assault.

Dissenting reasons: The minority did not find facts that amount to the crime of assault. After the appellant’s car accidentally came to rest on the officer’s foot, the Appellant did nothing that constitutes an act of assault. The appellant did not deliberately maintain the pressure of the force. The car rested on the foot by its own weight and remained stationary by its own inertia. The Appellant’s fault was the omission to manipulate the controls to set it in motion again. A mere omission to act cannot amount to an assault....