The Libyan Civil War of 2011 - EU & NATO response PDF

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ABSTRACT This project seeks to examine the involvement by the prominent international actors: EU, NATO, France and United Kingdom in the Arab Spring crisis in Libya of 2011. By employing the theoretical framework of: realism and normative institutionalism, this project tries to discuss the following...

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The Libyan Civil War of 2011 - EU & NATO response Morten Penthin Svendsen

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ABSTRACT This project seeks to examine the involvement by the prominent international actors: EU, NATO, France and United Kingdom in the Arab Spring crisis in Libya of 2011. By employing the theoretical framework of: realism and normative institutionalism, this project tries to discuss the following problem formulation: Why did key European member states: France and United Kingdom choose to operate under the framework of NATO and not the CFSP, during the Libyan conflict of 2011?

As the problem formulation indicates, the primary idea originates in a desire to offer a theoretical perspective on why key EU members: France and United Kingdom decide to use one politicomilitary framework over the other. By using the theories of realism and normative institutionalism, this project examines the internal organisational structures of both EU and NATO, in order to find indications on their ability to act towards crisis management operations. The analytical chapter of this project makes use of a ‘model of response’. It contains different of factors that compliments each other and which have particular in roles connecting the theoretical framework with the decisions points made by EU, NATO and governments during the conflict. The first part of the analytical chapter starts with analysing the Libyan conflict the involvement conducted by each actor: EU and next NATO, France & UK, from a realist perspective. The chapter will make use of political statements and official intergovernmental documents from EU, NATO and UN. The perceptive of realism uses the conceptual tools of interest, gains and anarchy to examine the case of conflict. The second analytical chapter uses the same approached to analyse EU, NATO, France and UK involvement in Libya of 2011. The approach from normative institutionalism uses the conceptual tools of entrapment and cooperative bargaining to study similarities in values between the member states and the organisational structure of EU and NATO. The last chapter tries to make a comparative analysis, between the results found in realism and normative institutionalism. This chapter tries to find similarities and thereby found common indication for how each structure of EU and NATO worked during the conflict.

Keywords: European Union, NATO, realism, normative institutionalism, Libya, intervention.

Bachelor project English Language & International Studies Aalborg University

27 May 2014 Morten Penthin Svendsen

TABALE OF CONTENTS: 1.1 Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 4 2.1 Case description ................................................................................................................... 5 2.2 The Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union ............................................ 5 2.3 NATO for new century ................................................................................................................ 5 2.4 Libyan conflict............................................................................................................................. 7 2.5 EU and NATO response to the Libya conflict ............................................................................. 8 3.1 Methodology ........................................................................................................................ 9 3.2 Empirical data and treatment .................................................................................................. 10 3.3 Case Study ................................................................................................................................ 11 3.4 Qualitative Document Analysis ................................................................................................ 12 4.1 Theory ................................................................................................................................ 12 4.2 Realism ..................................................................................................................................... 12 4.3 Normative Institutionalism....................................................................................................... 15 5.1 Analysis .............................................................................................................................. 17 6.1 Realism: Interests and absolute gains .............................................................................. 18 6.2 EU response to Libya ....................................................................................................... 18 6.3 The United Kingdom, France & NATO response to the conflict Libya towards 2011 ...... 22 7.1 Normative institutionalism: Norms and values ................................................................ 25 7.2 EU response to Libya ........................................................................................................ 25 7.3 United Kingdom, France & NATO response to the conflict towards Libya in 2011 ........ 28 8.1 Comparsion of both view .................................................................................................... 30 8.2 Realism and normative institutionalism – similarities? .......................................................... 30 9.1 Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 32

10.1 References........................................................................................................................ 34

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Bachelor project English Language & International Studies Aalborg University

27 May 2014 Morten Penthin Svendsen

ABBREVIATIONS

CFSP

Common Foreign and Security Police

EEAS

European External Action Service

EU

European Union

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

TNC

Transitional National Council

UN

United Nation

UNSC

United Nation Security Council

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Bachelor project English Language & International Studies Aalborg University

27 May 2014 Morten Penthin Svendsen

1.1 Introduction: On 31 March 2011, NATO air and naval forces launched operation Unified Protector, targeting Pro-Gaddafi militaries fighting opposition forces in Libya. The intervention had international consensus after the implementation of resolution 1973 in the United Nation Security Council (Michaels, 2011). This military intervention broke a month-long stalemate and in mid-august 2011 opposition forces was able to take control of Tripoli, and thereby ending a violent civil-war that had split the country in two. The UNSC’s response, towards the crisis in Libya has been applauded for its “unprecedented speed and unanimity” (Morries, 2011 p 4). Furthermore, despite a slow start and some criticism, the definitive success of NATO intervention has become a positive success story, which has proven that the organization of NATO is still an active and relevant ‘hard’ power factor in international relations (Morries, 2011). However, the most important event in the conflict was something, which did not even occur, namely the foreign and defense structure of the European Union, who was unable to gather internal unanimity for at military intervention. The CFSP and EU reaction was as Nicole Koenig mentions: “too slow, too weak, too divided and essentially incoherent. Some have already mourned the dead of Union’s Common Foreign and Common Security Policy … the CFSP died over Libya – we just have to pick a sand dune under which we can bury it” (Koenig, 2011 p. 13). The newly signed Lisbon treaty of 2009 was formed to handle crisis management cases, as Libya in 2011. The signing gave European hope for shaping a common foreign policy, which could develop the EU into a powerful global actor. The EU wanted a more coherent policy and created the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to manage the internal structure of The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (Menon, 2011). The EU and CFSP represented a noteworthy step in the security integration within the European Union, it have been represented on several crisis management missions, ranging from RD Congo to Bosnia. These missions have been seeking to insure regional stability since 2003. However, the CSDP stood its biggest test during the Libyan conflict of 2011. It was a highly complex situation, where Dictator Mummar Gaddafi oppressed civilian demonstrations with brutal force and it was not long before massive human rights violations was reported and a ruthless civil war emerged (UNHR, March 8 2012). Observers expected the EU to intervene due to its geopolitical sphere of the conflict. However, the EU was not able to create political support for a no-fly zone and instead key EU member states: France and Britain operated under a NATO 4

Bachelor project English Language & International Studies Aalborg University

27 May 2014 Morten Penthin Svendsen

framework to conduct a military intervention in a conflict-plagued Libya in 2011. Under ‘Unified Protector’, the coalition (including nine EU member states) carried out of air strikes and supported opposition forces fighting pro-Qadhafi loyalist forces on the ground. (Koenig, 2012). This involvement, by EU and NATO in Libya is the primary idea of this project. The project has a desire to undercover, why European states (especially, France and UK) choose one politicomilitary framework over the other. The question is: Are states only using the CFSP or NATO, when it is in their own national interest or was the norms/value structure of the CFSP not strong enough to support a military operation as ‘Unified Protector’? In order to give an inclusive depiction of the complex nature of EU and NATO, this project will make use of the traditional theories of neo-realism and normative institutionalism, in order to give a theoretical perspective on their involvement in Libya of from the eight month time period from February to August in 2011 Therefore in continuation of the above, I have constructed the following problem formulation: Why did key European member states: France and United Kingdom choose to operate under the framework of NATO and not the CFSP, during the Libyan conflict of 2011?

2.1 Case description In this section, I will briefly outline and describe the EU, NATO and Libyan conflict. This section will explain some key element and historical background for the framework of CFSP and NATO. Lastly, I will summaries some crucial events during the Libyan conflict of 2011.

2.2 The Common Foreign and Security Police of the European Union Effective multilateralism has always been a cornerstone within every political area of the European Union. The signing of the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009 was to streamline the EU and create a more coherent and influential actor in international affairs. The treaty developed different forms of structural improvements in EU’s external representation and legal personality (Hosli, 2013). EU foreign policy operates under CFSP (formerly known as ESDP) and it was adopted in 1993, after European leaders wished to improve EU’s ability to act with a single voice on foreign policy issues. Furthermore, the CFSP has a great symbolic importance, as a sign of EU’s struggle to become an intergovernmental political union and not only a trade-organization. (Toje, 2010)

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Bachelor project English Language & International Studies Aalborg University

27 May 2014 Morten Penthin Svendsen

The EU’s status as a key factor, within international relation depends on the status of its Common foreign and Security policy (CFSP). The Treaty of Lisbon sought to reinforce the CFSP to become “more democratic, transparent and effective” (Cni, 2008 p. 748) foreign policy instrument, which could contain considerable institutional modifications, such as “the creation of a permanent president within European Council, an External Action Service (EEAS), a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs and a legal personality of the EU as an international actor” (Müller, 2012 p. 9). The two most important changes have been the EEAS and the High Representative, which have significantly improved the representation of CFSP at the external level. The current High Representative Catharine Ashton is also responsible for drawing together the EEAS and providing diplomatic support for a common policy. In Patrick Müller’s reading, the development of EEAS indicates an EU, who is aspiring towards creating coherence and consistency in its foreign policy relations and a system of multilateral institutional cooperation with national diplomatic services and officials from the General Secretariat of the Council, the Commission and staff from member states and thus eliminating inter-institutional competition. This new environment provides a structure, where states can create stronger ties. (Müller, 2012). The Lisbon Treaty and CFSP brings more clarity, as it provides EU with a single legal status, furthermore, the CFSP agreement insures each member state is employing common policies, in areas of coordinated strategies. However, only in areas of shared unanimity (Achick, 2010). Yet, this relatively ‘soft’ commitment to the CFSP means, that states are not excluded from seeking own interests on foreign policies issues. Therefore, states’ willingness to act cohesively within CFSP on common foreign policy issues can be an indication of the strengths, influence and relationship status between EU as an intergovernmental institution and its member states in coordination of cooperation within the CFSP.

2.3 NATO for a new century The North Atlantic Organization (NATO) can only be described as highly successful. Its durability as a politico-military alliance is highly impressive in an international system, where nations are constantly shifting political interest and where organizations or structures must be able to perform at the highest level in order to survive in this environment (American Foreign Policy Interest, 2013). Although critics had predict the collapse of NATO, as it lost raison d’etre, after the downfall of Soviet Union in 1991 and most believed that NATO would follow the same path. But, why did this not happen? The single simple answer would be that NATO redesigned itself, more out of necessity

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Bachelor project English Language & International Studies Aalborg University

27 May 2014 Morten Penthin Svendsen

and took on new functions (Kamp, 2010). This development and NATO’s role in modern relations can be seen in three areas: -

European Integration: Adopting former post-Soviet states (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia and Slovenia) into the alliance, thereby increasing European integration

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NATO-Russia relationship: The creation of a NATO-Russia Council, which has increased cooperation and enhanced its position as a forum for European-American dialogue. (Kamp, 2010)

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Crisis management: NATO have been able to join crisis management mission beyond its organizational territory, by being an active actor in several different peacekeeping- and military intervention operations, the most important being: Bosnia and Herzegovina (19922004), NATO in Afghanistan (2001-), Counter-piracy in the Gulf of Aden (2008-) and NATO intervention in Libya (2011) (NATO, 18 Otc 2013a)

This development in globalization of NATO shows an organization that is able to take responsibility and be flexible enough to act in peace- and military missions. This relevance to European-American cooperation was underlined in the following sentence by President Barack Obama in 2012 “We’re going to continue investing in our critical partnership and alliances including NATO, which has demonstrated time and again – most recently in Libya – that it’s a force multiplier” (Laity, 2012 p. 53). The foundation and reaffirmation of its relevance, was underlined in the NATO Strategic Concept, adopted at the Lisbon Summit in 2010, where member states presented the guide-lines for evolution of NATO to engage new threats and most importantly as mentioned in the concept: “It Commits the Alliance to prevent crisis, manage conflicts and stabilize post-conflict situations, including by working more closely with our international partners, most importantly the United Nations and the European Union” (NATO, November 2010 p 4). This shows that NATO is determined to continue the development into a political-military organization that can handle the threats of the 21st century.

2.4: Libyan conflict Libya was witness to some of the worst fighting during the Arab spring. The riots in Libya were triggered by the arrest of human rights activist: Fethi Tarbel on 15 February 2011 (Koenig, 2012). The civil riots were clearly inspired by the uprising sweeping large parts of the Arab region. The riots in Libya quickly turned highly violent and developed into an all-out revolution against Dictator 7

Bachelor project English Language & International Studies Aalborg University

27 May 2014 Morten Penthin Svendsen

Muammar Gadhafi. Forces loyal to the regime responded with violent repression and committed massive human rights violations against the civilian population (Aljazeera, Feb 17, 2011). On 5 March, rebel forces created the Transitional National Council (TNC) lead by the regimes former Justice Minister Mustafa Abd Al-Jalil, as being the sole representative of Libya (Koenig, 2012). On 26 February, the UN imposed resolution 1970 and reinforced a weapons embargo and other sanctions (UNSC, 26 Feb 2011). However the conflict continued and faced with an unbalanced civil war, the UN enforced resolution 1973, creating a no-fly zone. This also authorized member states to “take all necessary measures notwithstanding paragraph 9 resolution 1973 to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” (UNSC, Maj 31, 2011 p. 3). On 19 March, an international force lead by France, UK and US began a massive air-strike campaign against Gadhafi loyalist forces, thus quickly the operation was conducted under a NATO framework entitled ‘Unified Protector’. The actors included nine European states, and together they attack regime forces and enabled the opposition’s forces to break the months-long stalemate. This support by NATO meant that opposition forces on 22 August 2011, took control over the capital, Tripoli.

2.5 EU and NATO response to the Libya conflict: The EU possesses broad panoply of instruments to counter a crisis. The tools include: civil protection, humanitarian assistance, diplomatic measures, military and civilian operations and economic capabilities (EEAS n.d.). The EU brought a large number of these instruments into action during the Libyan conflict. On 20 February, the CFSP issued a statement, starting: “The European Union is extremely concerned by the events unfolding in Libya” (European Council, Feb 20, 2011) and later encouraged Qaddafi to step down. Furthermore, the EU supported and recognized the TNC as the sole representative of Libya. The European Commission also introduced two large humanitarian aid missions, one being: Humanitarian Aid an...