The Object of cognition PDF

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Summary

According to Dignaga, use of any such term as “external object” (bahyartha) can be regarded
only as a concession to the conventional manner of speaking. This is because the object about
which we talk empirically is not the one which is given; rather it is constructed inside by the
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Nature of External object

According to Dignaga, use of any such term as “external object” (bahyartha ) can be regarded only as a concession to the conventional manner of speaking. This is because the object about which we talk empirically is not the one which is given; rather it is constructed inside by the mind. The real object, which is not a manifestation of consciousness, is something unique and hence is not denotable by words. (One should be very careful about the fact that when the Buddhists say that there is no external reality or external object, they meant this only within the frame of empirical knowledge, that is when they say that “there is no ‘table’ or ‘chair’ in this room”, they meant that they do not exist as they appears to be as ‘given’.) Rather the reality is beyond the limit of our cognitive faculty to grasp it ‘as it is’, since everything is momentary (anitya ) ; and whatever is grasped is only a product of the creative mind which projects the structured object as something existing outside. For the conventional purposes, Dignaga maintains that external object is a cluster of atoms but appears to one because there are number of coordinating factors which acts as a functional whole binding all the parts together. Here, mind is very creative and thus all structuring takes place inside. As a result, there is a gap between the object as given and the object as grasped (yathabhuta) . However, according to Dignaga, the object in its real essence is self-cognisable (svasamvedya) which means it presents itself to be cognised. It is undirected (anirdesya ) which means one cannot know the object in its totality, and what is to be cognised is only the form which is inexpressible.

Svalaksana and Samanyalaksana

For Dignaga and Dharamkirti, there are two kinds of objects – particular (svalaksana ) and the universal (samanyalaksana) , and therefore only two means of cognition, namely, perception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumana ) , respectively. Here, the point to be noted is that the usage of the terms ‘universal’ and ‘particular’ is entirely different from that of the realists, like Naiyayikas. For the latter, particular (visesa ) and universal (samanya) have an ontological reality which inheres in the individual objects (vyakti ) . Whereas for Dignaga, only particular (svalaksana ) is the object of perception which is a real, unique, momentary, unrelated and self-characterised entity, which have nothing in common with other. It is produced, according to the inexorable law of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada ) , by its immediately preceding cause, and it is itself casually efficient in producing the other such moments. It is beyond the extensions in space and time. Thus, it is beyond the speculative thought, the categories of understanding, namely, name, class, action, etc. cannot categorise it. Therefore, svalaksana is the ultimate real (paramarthasat ) as it is not created by the mind. So, he maintains that perception has only svalaksana for its object. It is pure sensation free from conceptual construction, which means one can never have a determinate knowledge of it. Hence it is irreducible and inexpressible (nirvikalpka ) . Whereas universal (samanyalaksana) is the object of inference, for the Buddhists. It is a generalised image which is a mere thought construction. Unlike Nyaya, Buddhism does not commit to universal any ontological status of being in existence. ‘Universal, here, is an explanatory presupposition, an imagination of mind’. It is that which is superimposed upon the

perceptual data of svalaksana . This implies that samanyalaksana is the general idea which is based upon the perceived similarity of functions of svalaksana . It is unreal but not a fictitious entity like hare’s horn, rather it is the result of conceptual construction (kalpana ) which is based on the reality or svalaksana . Thus, one can hold, as stated by Dharmakirti, that it is only svalaksana which is apprehended in two ways, as it is (svarupena ) and as something other than itself (pararupena ) ; hence, the distinction between svalaksana and samanyalaksana is only due to different perspectives. Thus, the above discussion shows that how the two kinds of objects, svalaksana and samanyalaksana, differs from each other in every respect. However, this distinction is clearly mentioned by Dharmakirti in his Pramanavarttika as follows: “Svalaksana (a) has a power to produce effects (arthakriyasakti ) , (b) is specific (asadrsa ) , (c) is not denotable by word (sabdasyavisayah) , and (d) is apprehensible without depending upon other factors such as verbal conventions, while samanyalaksana (a) has no power to produce effects, (b) is common to many things, (c) is denotable by word, and (d) is not apprehensible without depending upon other factors such as verbal conventions.” Therefore, with regard to the incompatible nature of these two objects of cognition with each other, it can be understood that there cannot be anything possessing both svalaksana and samanyalaksana at the same time. So, it is corresponding to this distinction that an another distinction is maintained between the two means of cognition, namely, perception which grasps svalaksana exclusively and inference which grasps samanyalaksana  exclusively....