The Patrimonial Logic of the Police in Eastern Europe PDF

Preview

Summary

This art icle was downloaded by: [ Universit y of Ham burg] On: 14 June 2012, At : 01: 01 Publisher: Rout ledge I nform a Lt d Regist ered in England and Wales Regist ered Num ber: 1072954 Regist ered office: Mort im er House, 37- 41 Mort im er St reet , London W1T 3JH, UK Europe-Asia Studies Public...

Description

This article was downloaded by: [University of Hamburg] On: 14 June 2012, At: 01:01 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Europe-Asia Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ceas20

The Patrimonial Logic of the Police in Eastern Europe Stephan Hensell a

a

University of Hamburg

Available online: 12 Jun 2012

To cite this article: Stephan Hensell (2012): The Patrimonial Logic of the Police in Eastern Europe, Europe-Asia Studies, 64:5, 811-833 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.681244

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-andconditions This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will be complete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae, and drug doses should be independently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material.

EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 64, No. 5, July 2012, 811–833

The Patrimonial Logic of the Police in Eastern Europe

Downloaded by [University of Hamburg] at 01:01 14 June 2012

STEPHAN HENSELL

Abstract The police in Eastern Europe are often regarded as politicised, poorly trained and corrupt. This article argues that the police follow a patrimonial logic. Neo-patrimonialism is mostly understood as an authoritarian regime with a personal ruler at the top. By contrast, here a concept will be suggested which reformulates patrimonialism as the practice of the acquisition of offices and material resources. Based on this, two case studies analyse the police administration in Albania and Georgia. The findings suggest that patrimonial practices play a central role in the recruiting and financing of law enforcement officers. The result is a hybrid administration, which is significantly subject to special interests.

SINCE THE END OF SOCIALISM, THE BUREAUCRATIC apparatuses and administrative routines in Eastern Europe have, by contrast to the political institutions, changed only slowly. The reorganisation of bureaucracy has proven to be difficult and the results of reforms have been mixed at best. Administrative modernisation has stagnated and, in some cases, is even considered to have failed (Meyer-Sahling 2004; Dimitrov et al. 2006, pp. 225–29; Verheijen 2007; Oleinik 2009). This also applies to the police in Eastern Europe. The police forces have gone through a process of reform since the beginning of the 1990s (Los´ & Zybertowicz 2000; Ka´da´r 2001; ICG 2002; Uildriks & van Reenen 2003; Caparini & Marenin 2004). However, in many countries of Southeastern Europe and Eurasia this process has made only slow headway and has been accompanied by numerous setbacks. The police are considered to be politicised, ineffective, poorly trained and corrupt. Police officers are not regarded as representatives of law enforcement, but rather as ‘bandits in uniform’ or a ‘legal Mafia’, hardly distinguishable from the criminal sphere. In some places the police seem to be more like well-organised robbers, who primarily pursue

Research for this article was conducted under the project ‘Privatisation of the security sector in postsocialist states’ at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH), Germany. The author gratefully acknowledges financial support from the German Research Foundation (DFG) and the IFSH for this project. ISSN 0966-8136 print; ISSN 1465-3427 online/12/050811-23 ª 2012 University of Glasgow http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2012.681244

Downloaded by [University of Hamburg] at 01:01 14 June 2012

812

STEPHAN HENSELL

private economic interests (Shelley 1999; Handelman 1995, pp. 281–93; FavarelGarrigues 2003; Bebler 2001; Taylor 2011; Gerber & Mendelson 2008; Kolennikova et al. 2008; Waller & Yasmann 1995; Volkov 2002, pp. 126–54; CSD 2004). How can this failure to establish a formal rational bureaucracy be explained and how can the bureaucratic practice of the police be characterised in more detail? My hypothesis in this article is that police administrations in Eastern Europe follow a patrimonial logic, as Max Weber (1978, pp. 226–41) developed in his type of traditional domination.1 The article argues as follows: current works in comparative politics understand neo-patrimonialism mainly as an authoritarian regime with a personal ruler at the top. This conception not only reflects a certain narrowing of Weber’s original notion, but also tends to neglect the variety of regime types in which patrimonial elements can occur, as well as the momentum of patrimonial administrations. Based on these weaknesses in the debate, I advocate a compromise concept, which understands patrimonialism as a flexible practice, at the heart of which is the acquisition of offices and material resources. This conception, which allows us to analyse patrimonialism in individual areas of the state, will also be fruitful for the empirical analysis of the police in Eastern Europe. The aim of the article is to present new empirical material on informal practices of the police in Eastern Europe and to support the assumption that the police in the post-socialist states follow a patrimonial logic. At the heart of the text are two case studies of the police bureaucracy in Albania and Georgia. Neither Albania nor Georgia figure prominently in the discourse on neopatrimonial regimes;2 however, the empirical material presented here can show that patrimonial practices play a central role in the way the police function in both countries. The article has the following structure. In the first section the understanding of neopatrimonialism that has prevailed so far will first be outlined briefly; following this it will be contrasted with Weber’s original version which, in some points, has other emphases. Based on this, an alternative view will be suggested in the second section which conceptualises patrimonialism not as a regime type, but rather as a practice of appropriation. With the help of this theoretical concept, the police administrations in Albania and Georgia will then be analysed in the next section. Here I focus on methods of recruiting and financing. Because little is known about the internal functioning of the police in Eastern Europe, the case studies have a qualitative and explorative character. They do not claim to be a systematic explanation in the strict sense, but are rather meant to demonstrate that certain phenomena can be observed

1 While Weber speaks of patrimonialism in his work on traditional domination, it is neopatrimonialism that is mostly spoken of in today’s comparative research. With the prefix ‘neo’, the intention is to emphasise that patrimonial elements in modern states always occur mixed with modern elements (Erdmann & Engel 2007). I subscribe to this view, but for reasons of simplicity, I continue to speak only of patrimonialism in relationship to my own theoretical concept and the empirical findings presented in this article. When current political or administrative phenomena are characterised as patrimonial here, it is indisputable that these always occur within the framework of modern institutions, where they compete with formal and rational logics. I always use the term neopatrimonialism when I refer to the current discussions in comparative research. 2 An exception is the work of Kitschelt et al. (1999, p. 39).

THE PATRIMONIAL LOGIC OF THE POLICE IN EASTERN EUROPE 813 under certain circumstances (Lieberson 1985, pp. 152–53, 161–62, 219–20). The goal of the case studies is to demonstrate the existence of patrimonial practices on the basis of empirical material and to interpret their variance with the help of the theoretical conception (Eckstein 1975, pp. 99–104, 108–13; George & Bennett 2004). The final section highlights similarities and differences between the two cases and draws conclusions about the police in Eastern Europe as well as the possible further development of the theoretical concept.

Downloaded by [University of Hamburg] at 01:01 14 June 2012

Patrimonialism revisited Patrimonialism, which was developed by Max Weber as an ideal type of traditional domination, has been reformulated in comparative politics mainly as neo-patrimonialism (Eisenstadt 1973). In the majority of comparative works, Weber’s ideal type is conceptualised as an authoritarian regime that is characterised by a high level of concentration of political power and personalisation at the top. Everything is oriented towards a single individual, typically the president of a country who governs arbitrarily (Erdmann & Engel 2007, pp. 97–104). The president appropriates the material resources of the state and distributes them within clientelistic networks in order to generate political support. The administration, too, is a purely personal instrument of the president which serves not only to enrich him but also to suppress political opponents. Typical examples here are the Mobutu regime in Zaire, the Marcos regime in the Philippines or the Duvalier regime in Haiti. Thus the logic of neo-patrimonial rule is determined by the person of the president who uses various strategies for retaining power and who personalises the system from above (Bratton & van de Walle 1997, pp. 61–65; Chehabi & Linz 1998a, pp. 7–10, 13–17; Geddes 1999, pp. 121–22). Analytically, most of the work concentrates on the level of the regime and the organisation of the centre of political power. As a result, the personalisation through a leader mostly appears as the central criterion of neo-patrimonialism, which has thus become more or less synonymous with authoritarian rule by a single individual. While this concept is well-established in the debate, there are two problems with this approach. First, for Weber, the central criterion of patrimonial rule lay not in the personalisation by the leader, but in the owner-like disposition over public offices by all officials at all levels of the state (Weber 1978, p. 236). Thus the notion of presidential personal rule, as neo-patrimonialism is often conceptualised, reflects a certain narrowing of Weber’s original notion. Secondly, the notion of a neopatrimonial regime type does not capture the variety of regimes in which patrimonial elements of domination can be observed and it tends to neglect the role of the administration in these settings. Each of these points shall be addressed in turn. Weber conceived patrimonialism as a type of traditional rule which he derived from pre-political patriarchal domination (Bendix 1960, pp. 331–41). The patriarchal household forms a production and a consumer collective within which the master has at his command all persons and things as personal property. According to Weber, the differentiated household economy constitutes an oikos on the basis of which, in turn, patrimonial rule develops (Weber 1978, p. 1010). Weber thus understood patrimonial

Downloaded by [University of Hamburg] at 01:01 14 June 2012

814

STEPHAN HENSELL

domination as analogous to patriarchal domination. The former is characterised by the transfer of the oikos-like ruling principle to a political organisation. The ownership-like disposition over all the seigniorial powers is thus the central criterion for patrimonialism (Breuer 1991, p. 55). ‘In the pure type, patrimonial domination . . . regards all governing powers and the corresponding economic rights as privately appropriated economic advantages’ (Weber 1978, p. 236). In everyday life, however, domination is primarily administration (Weber 1978, p. 220; Poggi 2006, p. 100). Thus Weber devotes considerable space in his work to the characteristics of patrimonial administration, which is distinguished primarily by a lack of separation of the administrative staff from administrative means—in addition to the absence of distinct spheres of competencies, fixed salaries and professional training (Weber 1978, pp. 228–41, 1025–69). The appropriation of administrative means is also, for Weber, the decisive criterion for the historically relevant primary forms of the patrimonial state (Weber 1978, pp. 1010–68). Furthermore, based on the conflict theorem of appropriation, Weber develops the typical dynamic of this form of domination, which is characterised by the dissociation of the administrative staff from the personal dependency on the master. The administration begins to make itself independent by appropriating a part of the governing powers itself (Weber 1978, pp. 231–35; Poggi 2006, pp. 102). Thus patrimonialism is always present when public offices are treated as privately appropriated economic chances, not only by the master but also by the administration. It is the owner-like disposition over public offices at all levels of the state which is the differentia specifica of patrimonialism. In the current debate with its focus on the personalisation by a single leader, this original notion has become somewhat eclipsed. Another problem is the implicit consensus that neo-patrimonial regimes are authoritarian in character (Erdmann & Engel 2007, p. 111). However, the relationship between Weber’s authority type and authoritarian regimes may not be so clear. As has been shown in other works, patrimonial elements of domination can also be observed in hybrid or even democratic regimes (Pitcher et al. 2009; Seizelet 2006; Erdmann & Engel 2007, pp. 111–13). Associating patrimonialism with a certain regime type may thus be misleading. Moreover, the focus on specific regime characteristics tends to neglect particularities of the administration. Regime and state refer to two distinct empirical realities. The regime can be understood as the organisation of the centre of political power, which determines ‘who has access to political power, and how those who are in power deal with those who are not’ (Fishman 1990, p. 428). By contrast, the state is a more permanent institution and includes the administrative apparatus with its coercive, extracting and coordinating functions. In the debate on personalised rule, however, regime and state are thought of as thoroughly entangled. Both are closely identified with the ruler (Fishman 1990, p. 428; Chehabi & Linz 1998b, pp. 10–13). While this may be true for a few wellknown or extreme examples, it is probably not always the case. For instance, the patrimonialisation of bureaucracies cannot always be traced back solely to the strategies of a single ruler. It may just as well be the result of practices that emanate from political parties, high ranking bureaucrats or from ordinary administrative personnel themselves, as a simple survival strategy. The constellations of actors, their dependencies and patterns of behaviour in the political and bureaucratic fields of

Downloaded by [University of Hamburg] at 01:01 14 June 2012

THE PATRIMONIAL LOGIC OF THE POLICE IN EASTERN EUROPE 815 neo-patrimonial systems are highly complex and may not be adequately explained by the personal ruler variable. In the light of these limitations, I advocate a more differentiated and flexible application of the Weberian type. However, the intention here is not so much to advance an entirely new concept, but rather to propose a reformulation of patrimonialism on the basis of its well-known and long-discussed elements. For that purpose, I suggest a practice theory approach, which contributes in two ways to the debate. First it rests on a more precise and analytically differentiated notion of neo-patrimonialism, which defines it as the practice of appropriation of positions and material resources. Second it disconnects neo-patrimonialism from the notion of a specific regime and the figure of the all-pre-eminent president, thus allowing for a wider application of the Weberian type and opening up new analytical perspectives. The logic of patrimonial practices The bases for the following considerations are newer works on comparative politics, which conceptualise the state on the basis of concrete forms of practice and practices of actors (Migdal 2001; Migdal & Schlichte 2005; Sharma & Gupta 2006).3 Accordingly, the ideal of the state can be distinguished from the actual state practice (Migdal & Schlichte 2005, pp. 14–40). On the one hand, the state exists as a globally idealised concept and a political model. The state is supposed to be an impersonal organisation and to rest upon a clear separation of public and private spheres. However the actual state practice always deviates from this ideal. Practices can be understood as observable actions and behaviours of state and nonstate actors and as social interactions of individuals and collectives. Among these are practices of resistance, of avoidance, of evasion, of appropriation or of instrumentalisation. Thus, the state can be understood as a field of action defined by countless practices and shifting ideals (Migdal & Schlichte 2005, pp. 14–40). Following up on this, patrimonialism can also be understood as a form of practice. Here, in accordance with Weber, practices of appropriation can be characterised as constitutive for patrimonialism. These practices can be observed both in the political and in the bureaucratic field of the state.4 Moreover, they can be further differentiated in accordance with two analytical viewpoints. Geddes, in her classification of authoritarian regimes, differentiates between control over access to power and control over policy and specifies this for the type of personalised regimes as ‘access to office and fruits of office’ (Geddes 1999, p. 121). In just the same way Weber speaks of the acquisition of positions and of opportunities for earnings in relation to different types of appropriation (Weber 1978, pp. 222, 232). In this sense, based on Geddes and

3

Generally on practice theories in social sciences see Reckwitz (2002). On the state as a field of action, see the work of the French sociologist, Pierre Bourdieu (1994). Bourdieu also applied his theory of practice to the genesis of the modern state and analysed the modus of patrimonial reproduction in the dynastic state (Bourdieu 2005). For a concept of the state as a political or bureaucratic field of action with patrimonial practices see also Hensell (2009, pp. 58–69). 4

Downloaded by [University of Hamburg] at 01:01 14 June 2012

816

STEPHAN HENSELL

Weber, the appropriation of positions and of material resources can be differentiated analytically as two modes of appropriation practice.5 A typical practice for appropriation of positions is job patronage.6 It is based on dyadic ties between a higher level patron and lower level client, who are characterised by unequal status, power or resources. They exchange material privileges and favours and their relationship is characterised by reciprocity and the calculation of mutual advantages (Lande´ 1977, p. xx; Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984, pp. 29–50). Typically the patron appropriates public offices as disposable resources and distributes them among his clients, for which they provide him with personal services of all sorts. The dyadic patron–client relationships develop in the hierarchical order of the state into vertically structured networks. Within them the client himself becomes a patron of lower level clients and considers the offices under him as his personal property, which are available for the purpose of patronage (Clapham 1982, pp. 18–33; Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984, pp. 220–45). The more lucrative the positions to be distri...