The Prince - Chapter Summary of all 26 chapters. PDF

Title The Prince - Chapter Summary of all 26 chapters.
Course Basic Political Institutions
Institution Texas State University
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Chapter Summary of all 26 chapters....


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1 Ethan Shirey Dr. Tajalli PA 3301.001 September 1, 2019

The Prince

Chapter 1: In the first chapter of the prince, Machiavelli begins to explain that, in his view, there is a dichotomy of forms of rule. Thus, for him two categories - those of the autocracy and those of the Free State - and all imaginable forms of rule can be assigned to one of these two groups. Chapter 2: At this point, Machiavelli announces that he intends to deal exclusively with those forms of rule that belong to the category of sole rulers, since the dispute with the theme of the Free States takes place separately in the Discorsi. Referring to those autocratic powers in which power is inherited, Machiavelli says that it is comparatively easy for the princes to assert themselves there. Even a mediocre ruler could successfully rule here and only need fear the risk of a sudden revolution. This, however, is small and beyond the chances of the Erbfürsten considerably, to return to such a fall quickly back to the throne. The monarch also needed to exercise less severity in such states than anywhere else and

2 feared the danger of progressive ideas to a much lesser extent than the other princes. Thus, the inherited reign seems to be a relatively rewarding task in Machiavelli's eyes. Chapter 3: The preservation of power of a sole ruler in newly conquered states (so-called mixed sole rulers), however, in the opinion of Florentiners much more complicated. The reason for this is that in this case, the prince naturally has to fear the minions of the old system, and moreover often also has to fear his former followers quickly. However, even in such a situation Machiavelli does not see the prince holding power as a doomed undertaking. In his opinion, it is sufficient to correctly classify the given circumstances and to act accordingly. For example, if the prince conquers an area that is culturally relatively close to his ancestral domain, then it is sufficient, according to the author, to neutralize the previous dynasty and, moreover, to leave the fiscal policy and legislation untouched. If the conquered territory, on the other hand, is far less close to the prince, Machiavelli advises more far-reaching steps such as the transfer of the seat of rule or the building of colonies; it also seems necessary for him to secure the support of the less powerful ethnic groups in the said territories in order to keep the old elites in check. If the prince follows these instructions and acts generally in a forward-looking and determined manner, Machiavelli concludes, he may succeed in mastering the difficult task of maintaining power in mixed autocratic regimes. Chapter 4: In light of these previously noted difficulties faced by a ruler in newly conquered territories, Machiavelli wonders why Alexander the Great and his successors so easily managed to assert themselves in the conquered Asian territories. The reason for this is that the author identifies the

3 special structure of the states subject to this. In his opinion, there exists a dichotomy of state structures: On the one hand, there are states that are centered on the person of the ruler, as was the case, for example, in the Turkey conquered by Alexander. Such states are difficult to conquer but easy to control in the aftermath, says Machiavelli. On the other hand, there were also states like the France of the time, where the prince would share power with a multitude of barons. These are easy to conquer but difficult to control. Consequently, Machiavelli concludes this chapter by stating that the ease with which Alexander's successors succeeded in controlling his empire after his death was less due to his extraordinary ability than to the particular structure of the conquered states. Chapter 5: In the following chapter, Machiavelli examines how the prince can succeed in holding power in states that used to live freely and under their own laws. He recognizes three possibilities to achieve this goal: to destroy said state, to relocate there its seat of rule or to appoint a government, which consists of citizens of the state and is allowed to pay a tribute to rule over their homeland. Which of these methods should be chosen depends on the history of the individual states: if their citizens had rights and freedoms in the past, it would be safest for the prince to destroy the state, or at least his residence there relocate. On the other hand, if the reign of supremacy in a state has a tradition, the prince must take a less rigorous approach there, since rebellions are much less likely. Thus, according to Machiavelli, the prince directs himself, according to these instructions, to having the most lasting control of his conquests, as the Romans of Capua or Carthage had done in the past. Chapter 6:

4 In this chapter, Machiavelli deals with the question of how to successfully establish a completely new rule. To this end, he examines historical figures such as Moses or Theseus, whom he certifies to have accomplished this - in his eyes colossal - work. On closer inspection, the author claims to recognize the cause of the success of these rulers in their weapons and their efficiency: they had relied as little as possible on their luck and instead, by diligent work and with the help of a strong army, the survival to ensure their rule of command. Machiavelli himself praises such an approach as absolutely exemplary, and advises his readership, as far as possible to imitate rulers like Moses, that they want to lead a completely new rule to success. Chapter 7: As a result, Machiavelli also tries to fathom how the prince can succeed in remaining in power, if he owes his rule mainly to a happy coincidence and foreign military support. In such a situation he recommends the prince to take Cesare Borgias as a model. For this was at the beginning of his reign, according to Machiavelli's analysis in exactly that situation: he owed his crown Pope Alexander VI, whose illegitimate son he was, and his rule depended on the weal and woe of Orsini, the Colonna and Louis XII. from. However, Cesare Borgia then wisely attempted to extricate himself from this dependency and, thanks to his extraordinary ability, almost achieved this endeavor. Only the sudden death Alexander VI. as well as his own life-threatening illness, in the end would have prevented him from securing his rule in the long run. Thus Machiavelli concludes that it is indeed possible to consolidate princely power, which at first was gained by fortune and foreign weapons, by special efficiency; however, he also points out that it is essential to be spared severe blows. Chapter 8:

5 Furthermore, Machiavelli sees crimes and atrocities as a possible means to gain power, and names Agathocles of Syracuse and Oliverotto da Fermo as examples of princes who founded their rule in this way. However, the author also notes that the continued existence of such domination depends entirely on the manner in which cruelty is applied. So he distinguishes between good and bad use of cruelty. The good practice is to commit atrocities only if they serve the self-preservation or benefit of the subjects; In this case too, cruelty must be carried out in one fell swoop, so as not to prolong the suffering unnecessarily. Thus Machiavelli recognizes in this chapter that it is quite realistic as a prince to base his rule on crime and violence. At the same time, however, he limits the fact that in such a case the prince may at best hope for power, but never fame. Chapter 9: Finally, Machiavelli sees one last chance to come to power in becoming "the ruler of his homeland" through the favor of his fellow citizens. These fellow citizens may be either a few "great lords" or the broad masses of the people. Furthermore, Machiavelli judges that it is easier for the sole ruler to assert himself if he owes his power to the people than if he depended on the big men of a city, as they would never cease to regard themselves as equals. Thus, Machiavelli thus recognizes that a prince who depends on the support of his fellow citizens, can persist, as long as he manages to remain popular and to keep his supporters in constant dependence on the state. Chapter 10: According to Machiavelli, the strength of a rule is reflected in the ability of the prince to "stand his ground in an emergency". In the view of the author, this requires above all a powerful army

6 and strong defenses. As exemplary in this regard, he sees the German cities of his time and urges his reader to follow their example, if he is interested in putting his rule on a stable as possible foundation. Chapter 11: In the case of clerics, Machiavelli sees the chief difficulty of the prince in gaining power, since this would inevitably require considerable happiness or personal merit. However, once the throne has been climbed, the rest of the rule is comparatively restful, as the time-honored religious institutions are so strong "that they hold the ruler in power, however he may act and live." Against this background, Machiavelli comes to the conclusion that among all conceivable dominions, only the spiritual is "safe and happy" for the prince. Chapter 12: In Machiavelli's eyes, a well thought-out army organization must have the highest priority for the prince, because it represents a sine qua non for a stable and just state. However, in his view, the mistake of hiring mercenaries must be avoided under all circumstances; because these are treacherous and expensive to maintain. In addition, they are either incompetent or dangerous competition for the prince. And so Machiavelli urgently warns his prince to assemble an army of mercenaries, otherwise his empire threatens to suffer the same fate as Italy, which has made this fatal mistake, in which consequence has fallen into many states, and since then "bondage and shame" must endure. Chapter 13: For even more devastating than mercenary Machiavelli keeps so-called "auxiliary troops". As such, he refers to troops who are subject to a foreign power, and are requested by a prince only

7 because without them a military victory does not seem possible. Because, he argues, "they are beaten, you are lost; conquer it you are you prisoner. "As slightly less expensive the author categorizes mixed formations consisting partly of mercenaries, partly of own soldiers. At the end of the chapter, Machiavelli recommends, as a royal road, the action of rulers such as Philip of Macedonia, who have set up a people's army consisting of subjects and citizens, and thereby assured their state. Chapter 14: As the supreme duty of the prince Machiavelli in this chapter calls the mastery of the art of war. If this is not the case, then a prince threatens to be despised and ultimately pushed off the throne. The study of the art of war could be done just as well in the course of actual armed conflicts, as in hunting or in dealing with military history. The only important thing is that the prince in military matters sufficiently well versed, otherwise his rule could never be permanent. Chapter 15: In this chapter, Machiavelli opposes the view that the prince can do justice to the claim to obey always and everywhere the laws of morality. This is only possible in an ideal world. The real existing world, on the other hand, is full of bad people and thus the prince is not able to obey the moral precepts in all situations. Although Machiavelli advises his prince to shun, if possible, the reputation of vices, he admits that vicious behavior is sometimes unavoidable and careless if it is handled with care. Chapter 16: Furthermore, Machiavelli notes that behaviors commonly considered to be virtuous are not beneficial to the prince. To demonstrate this thesis, he cites the example of generosity. Although

8 this was generally regarded as praiseworthy, in the case of the prince it either went unnoticed or led to tax levies and thus to bad habits in the population. Consequently, the author comes to the conclusion that the prince requires an economical style of governing and that he does not need to fear the reputation of stubbornness that results from it, since the advantages of such a behavior far exceed the losses in public reputation. Chapter 17: Machiavelli begins the chapter by saying that a prince should always try to be considered merciful and not cruel. However, if this is not possible, it is preferable to be considered cruel. In no case may a prince allow it to be despised. Machiavelli argues that people are generally ungrateful, fickle, false and cowardly. In peace and happiness they would become one and swear allegiance to their lives. However, when luck turns, one can not rely on the support of the people, because it turns one's back and one in the lurch. However, if a prince is seen as cruel, the people fear his revenge and do not dare to deceive him. In the first case, the prince was thus dependent on the goodwill of the people, whereas in the latter case the prince, even when he was no longer able to rely on the people, could still rely on the threat that emanated from him. It should be noted, however, that the prince, if he makes himself feared, will not be hated at the same time. He can prevent this by never drowning in the belongings of his subjects and, if bloodshed is necessary, he always has a valid reason or the cause is obvious. Machiavelli justifies this by saying that it is much more human to shed the blood of a few than to allow riots and anarchy that harm the whole community. However, when a prince commands a force, it is his duty to be considered cruel, because he is only able to suppress disturbances and rebellions among his troops and beat his enemies. Here Machiavelli refers to Hannibal as an example, who was

9 famous for his cruelty, and although he led thousands of soldiers from various countries into battle, never had to struggle with riots or even a rebellion. Chapter 18: Furthermore, Machiavelli emphasizes that in terms of moral behavior, appearance is primarily important. So he explains the word break of the prince for almost inevitable, this wants to be successful. And since Machiavelli sees in success the prince's most important goal, he classifies the lie as a legitimate means of achieving that end. However, he points out that this must take place in the covert. For then at most a minority can recognize the true nature of the prince, while the broad masses continue to believe in the righteousness of his ruler. And since the prince's rule of power essentially depends on this majority of the population, Machiavelli comes to the conclusion that the prince may well become worthless as long as this happens unnoticed, because in this way he can increase his success without endangering his rule bring to. Chapter 19: Machiavelli also warns his prince against inciting hatred and contempt within the population, as this leads to the loss of rule, as the examples of Roman emperors like Commodus or Caracalla showed. Instead, a prince must be careful to be respected by his subjects, as he would know the people on his side in the war, and in peace minimize the risk of conspiracy against his person. But in order to gain such respect, the prince must avoid "capricious, reckless, effeminate and unconstrained" and instead show "magnanimity, audacity, earnestness and strength". Only in this way does the author conclude, could the prince establish a similarly successful rule as, for example, Marcus Aurelius. Chapter 20:

10 In this chapter, the author discusses the benefits of various measures that are often taken by rulers with the intention of securing their power. This includes, for example, the arming of the population, which Machiavelli considers to be useful if the prince has replaced the old ruler within a state, as this would secure the support of important influential bodies in the Reich. If the prince, on the other hand, conquers foreign lands, Machiavelli judges, he must disarm and soften the local population in order to secure his rule. Similarly divided, the author faces the fortress construction; this may seem opportune if a prince has to fear internal disturbances, but not when he sees himself threatened by foreign powers. Finally, Machiavelli recommends that his prince instead of such means, in the fight against the threat of loss of power to seek the respect of the population, as this is the safest of all fortresses. Chapter 21: Machiavelli sees important undertakings, such as the conquest of Ferdinand the Catholic, as the best suited to the prince. It is equally important for the prince to stand with his friends, d. H. to rush to the aid of his allies when they called for it, and not out of fear and shyness to seek salvation in neutrality. But, Machiavelli finally points out that the prince must not alone have his reputation with the kings in mind, but also seek the people. To this end, the author recommends as the most suitable means, the reward of diligent work, the consideration of guilds and estates, as well as the orientation of festivals and plays. Chapter 22: As an aid to the selection of his staff, Machiavelli advises the prince to ensure that they always strive only for the benefit of their superiors and never pursued their own interests. In return, the prince must take care of their well-being in order to bind them to themselves. Such prudent

11 selection of his employees is of the utmost importance, Machiavelli emphasizes, since the prince otherwise runs the risk of coming to a "bad end". Chapter 23: At the beginning of this chapter, Machiavelli states that the freedom of expression poses a dilemma for the prince: he gives too much to it, lacks deference to it. But if he allowed too little freedom of expression, he would soon be surrounded only by flatterers. As a way out, the author recommends a middle ground. Freedom of expression must exist, but only a select circle of princely advisors should be allowed to enjoy it. Thus, the prince protects himself from the risks that would bring him too much freedom with him, and still come into the possession of sincere advice, without which he would not be able to govern. Chapter 24: As the cause of the loss of power of Italian rulers such as Frederick I of Naples or Ludovico il Moro Machiavelli identified their inability to maintain a powerful army and their lack of support in the population. Moreover, the author reproaches these princes for having fled the approaching enemy troops and thus guilty of cowardice. Consequently, Machiavelli's conclusion is that the rulers of Italy are themselves responsible for the loss of their power. Chapter 25: In this chapter Machiavelli recognizes that some things on earth would be determined by chance or a higher power alone. But he also thinks that in about half of all cases the prince is in a position to determine his own fate. However, it is necessary to plan smartly and to make sufficient arrangements for the future in order to prepare for the most diverse imponderables and strokes of fate of life. Just as important as prudent prevention, it is true that the Prince acts

12 energetically and forcefully at crucial moments. For, as the author concludes the chapter metaphorically describes it: "... Fortuna is a woman; you have to beat it and knock it to get it. " Chapter 26: Ultimately, almost all of Machiavelli's advice has to do with the final chapter, in which, like Otfried Höffe, he asks Lorenzo di Piero de 'Medici to "seize Italy and liberate it from the barbarians." To Lorenzo from his project Machiavelli describes what great fame a success in this undertaking would bring. Moreover, the Italian people have enormous potential, and only need a strong leader to make the most of it. And so Machiavelli calls Lorenzo to follow the example of past rulers like Theseus or Moses, by freeing his people from bondage and leading them into a glorious future....


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