Torts Outline - Final - 2019 PDF

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TORTS- FENTON FALL 2019

INTENT

INTENTIONAL TORTS RULE CASES Intent: the willful, conscious intent to act; knowing the Garret v. Dailey: (“boy moved old woman fell”) consequences of those actions (knowledge component) → with -5-year-old moved chair as P was sitting down and P fell purpose and substantial certainty -Trial showed that he did not desire she hit the ground, but that he may have - Subjective Intent does NOT matter→ what I’m thinking does not matter even if actor does NOT intend known with substantial certainty that P was trying to sit -Held: D liable for battery because “substantially certain” there would be to cause harm. injuries from pulling out chair. - If CONTACT or APPREHENSION results, INTENT is met McGuire v. Almy: (“insane woman”) *TORT= WRONG = UNLAWFUL CONDUCT CAUSING -Insane woman threatened and hit caretaker with chair leg HARM (not a rule just structure of a tort)* -Held: Insane people are liable if they are capable of entertaining idea to -Intent occurs when one does an act on purpose, when one acts commit act- satisfies intent- the fact that insanity was cause of intent is to do something. An act is NOT intentional when it is an irrelevant accident, an involuntary action (reflexive), or a forced act. -Insane person is liable for his/her intentional torts -Intent is the intention to commit some ACT -Policy- as between two innocents, the one who caused the harm is liable or - If there is an intention to commit an ACT→ then the who could have prevented the harm is liable intent has occurred. -Subject intent does not matter- “I don’t care what’s in your head, you - Intent is in the completion of the act. - Intent is NOT whether you meant it; Intent is the intended to cause the action” INTENTION to DO an action. Vosburg v. Putney: (kid kicked other kid in class) - Example: intention of making a cut→ not the reason behind why cut is made (battery) -Putney’s kick caused Vosburg to lose use of leg permanently -Children are responsible for intentional torts Ways to determine Intent: -Egg-Shell Skull Rule: “take your plaintiff as they are” Transferred Intent: between people, not torts. → Actor is liable for full extent of damages caused by their The fact that it not the intended target is irrelevant. As long as defendant held the necessary intent with intentional tort respect to one person, she will be held to have -Sufficient if contact is indirect, because of substantial certainty of result of action committed an intentional tort against any other person who happens to be injured. Talmage v. Smith: (“Man threw stick at kids for trespassing”) - If I THINK it is your foot, but then another’s foot come by, this is still INTENT -Man throws stick at young kids trespassing but accidentally hits another kid - EVALUATED BY EXTERNAL MANIFESTATION in the eye, blinding him - EX) if D shoots A, and accidentally hits B, then D is -Held: although defendant claims that he did not see or intend to hurt liable to B. plaintiff, this contention is immaterial because the “right of plaintiff to Substantial Certainty: intent may be direct knowledge or recover was made to depend upon defendant’s intention to hit someone and substantial certainty that contact WILL occur. inflict and unwarranted injury upon someone” - An occurrence is intentional even if the actor did not desire the occurrence, but KNEW with SUBSTANTIAL CERTAINTY that it would occur as a result of his action - EX) if you are in a crowded hallway, you have no intention to touch others but there is

substantial certainty that you probably will touch someone. Egg-Shell Skull Rule: take your plaintiff as you find him and the defendant is responsible for the full extent of damage defendant caused. Liable for full extent of damage defendant has caused. Consequences do not have to be intended or substantially certain, or even foreseeable for the defendant to be liable. - The act must be intentional or substantially certain, but the consequence does not. - TAKE YOUR PLAINTIFF AS THEY ARE Children are responsible for their intentional torts. Insane persons are liable for their torts. BATTERY

Battery: (1) the intent to cause contact (2) that results in such contact→ 2 components: intent & contact - Only the unauthorized touching is necessary; harm is in the unauthorized portion. - HARM IS THE UNAUTHORIZED TOUCHING (Ex. stranger kisses someone) - Reasonableness Standard for “Offensive Contact”! Policy: all people have right to freedom of harmful contacts, legal interest in the emotional and reputation concerns of persons. However not ALL contacts are considered harmful. Some contacts are socially acceptable that they likely won’t be considered battery. EX) Tapping someone’s shoulder or brushing shoulders in a crowded hallway. -If intention to commit an ACT, then sufficient for BATTERY. Intent in Battery: ∆ intended to cause bodily contact OR ∆ intended to cause imminent apprehension of bodily contact. -Reasonableness standard for “offensive” contact→ Ex. bumping into someone in a crowded subway vs. uncrowded street. -Battery occurs when contact goes beyond the level consented to→ if consent becomes invalid, then battery results (goes beyond scope of consent). -Extends to personal effects, i.e. the intentional snatching of a book. Instrumentality: it is not necessary that the ∆ touch the π with his own body; it is sufficient if he causes the contact indirectly. EX) Vosburg’s kick, ∆ sends peanut butter cookies to π through

Vosburg v. Putney “kid kicked other kid in class” -Putney’s kick caused Vosburg to lose use of leg permanently -Children are responsible for intentional torts -Egg-Shell Skull Rule: “take your plaintiff as they are” -Actor is liable for full extent of damages caused by their intentional tort -Sufficient if contact is indirect, because of substantial certainty of result of action McGuire v. Almy: “insane woman” -Insane woman threatened and hit caretaker with chair leg -Held: insane person is liable for his/her intentional torts. -Policy: as between two innocents, the one who caused the harm is liable or the who could have prevented the harm is liable. -Subjective intent does not matter “I don’t care what’s in your head, you intended to cause the action”

Garret v. Dailey: (“boy moved old woman fell”) -5-year-old moved chair as P was sitting down and P fell -Trial showed that he did not desire she hit the ground, but that he may have known with substantial certainty that P was trying to sit -Held: D liable for battery because “substantially certain” there would be injuries from pulling out chair

mail knowing π is allergic to peanuts, a battery occurred because ∆ knew with substantial certainty that a harmful contact between π and cookies would occur. -Also not necessary that D make contact with P’s body. D can makes contact with an object P is holding or wearing EX) knocking plate out of someone’s hand or grabbing their shirt.

ASSAULT

Plaintiff’s awareness of contact: not necessary that the π have actual awareness of the contact at the time it occurs, i.e. ∆ kisses π while asleep. Assault: (1) intent to cause imminent apprehension of contact (2) that results in such apprehension→ 2 components: intent & apprehension. Policy: interest being protected in π’s freedom from apprehension of contact. The tort can exist even if the contact itself never occurs. Two Types of Assault (Blackstone Commentaries): 1. Direct Threat: the threat is believable, accomplishable, imminent, and causes apprehension. 2. Inchoate: an incomplete battery. EX) Swing and a miss. -

Fear or Apprehension: All you have to do is see it; apprehend it (sufficient).

Conditional threat is NOT an assault because mere words are not enough. Words must be accompanied by some overt act that adds to threatening character of the words. - However, there may be cases where the surrounding circumstances are such that words by themselves, without any overt act, are sufficient to constitute an assault. - No assault can be made when threatening gesture is accompanied by words that contradict threatening gesture. - Mere Words: “A threatening gesture will not constitute assault when there are accompanying words which negate the gesture’s threat. Plaintiff’s awareness of contact: the π must be aware of the threatened contact. If π is not aware of threatened harm at the time threat existed→ π cannot recover for assault. Intent: ∆ must either have intended apprehension or attempted

I.de S. and Wife v. W. de S.: (“the drunk hatchet”) -Case of 1st impression: first time the court takes into consideration fear of apprehension; emergence of assault -Drunk guy swings hatchet at tavern door while owner has head out of window, but no contact -Held: intent to create the apprehension of harmful or offensive contact is assault→ P was frightened by hatchet (the harm itself) -Policy: rights as security

Tuberville v. Savage: (“it doesn’t mean a thing if I put my hand on my sword”) -P put hand on sword and said “if it were not assize-time, I would not take such language from you” -Held: no assault can be made when threatening gesture is accompanied by words that contradict threatening gesture; if no intent to cause apprehension of a harmful contact, then no assault -But, just because it’s conditional does not mean that it is not real (power structures)

TRESPASS TO LAND/ CHATTEL

battery. (No hostility is required, i.e. pranks can constitute assault). - Transferred intent applies. - Mental infirmity and age Trespass: (1) intentional, (2) unauthorized, (3) entry into the property of another→ 2 components: (like battery) - Intent (entry implies intent); and - Action or contact -An action for trespass can be maintained even when there is no actual damage. -A trespass to land can occur when the ∆ enters the π’s land, or causes person or an object to enter the π’s land. - Wrongfully remaining - Failure to remove -A trespass to chattel occurs when there is an intentional unauthorized interference with the property of another. Mistake is no defense to trespass, even if mistake is reasonable. -If the ∆ has the intent to commit a physical contact with π’s land, then he will have the requisite intent for trespass. -Innocent trespasser  still a trespasser. Indirect Invasions: if the ∆ causes a tangible object to enter the π’s land, there is a trespass even though the ∆ himself has not made the entry. -It is also a trespass if the ∆ does not intend to cause the entry of the object, but knows that it is substantially certain to occur. -The ∆ also trespasses if he causes a person to enter the land.

Dougherty v. Stepp: (“surveyor claiming land on his own”) -Surveyor unknowingly trespasses on P’s land -Held: D is liable because it doesn’t matter if it was a mistake, it’s still trespass; only intent required is to do the act because it causes damage (“from every such entry against the will of the possessor, the lawn incurs some damage”) - Policy: deter carelessness Cleveland Park Club v. Perry: “the intent controlling is the intent to complete the physical act and not the intent to cause injurious consequences” -A person can have the requisite intent even though he does not intent any harm to the P’s property interest he had the requisite intent if he intended to place the ball in the pipe, regardless of whether he intended to cause any harm, or even knew that harm might occur.

-An intangible intrusion may give rise to a claim for trespass only if an aggrieve party is able to prove physical damage to the property caused by such intangible intrusion intrusion must be intentional AND cause physical harm. -Trespass to real property takes place not only on the surface but also with respect to any intrusion above or below the surface of the land. -Stringent liability whenever trespass results in actual harm.

CONVERSION

-Necessity is a defense to trespass. Conversion: (1) intentional exercise of dominion or control of another’s chattel, (2) that seriously interferes with the right of another, (3) that the actor may be required to pay the other the

Zaslow v. Kroenert: “co-tenants remove furniture” -Co-tenant removed furniture of other cotenant and put it in storage, giving them notice and access

full value of the chattel. How do you know which it is, ask: Did D assert complete dominion and control or just interest with my stuff? Trespass vs Conversion: Trespass is a mere interference and conversion is taking it and keeping it. (Joyride v auto-theft)Factors to Consider (Balancing Test): 1) Extent and duration of exercise of dominion or control 2) Intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with the other’s right of control 3) Actor’s good/bad faith 4) Extent and duration of the interference with the other’s right of control 5) Harm done to the chattel 6) Inconvenience and expense caused to another -Conversion occurs upon refusal of D without legal excuse to deliver P’s chattel D acted in bad faith. Damages: can help determine if trespass or conversion. -if completely ruined= conversion -D has to pay full value, and doesn’t give it back. Forced sale. -if it is just used= likely trespass -Only has to pay damages for trespass and give item back FALSE IMPRISONMENT

False Imprisonment: (1) deliberate/intent to (2) confine w/ no reasonable means of escape, (3) that results in confinement. -Simple restriction of movement does not suffice as confinement because confinement MUST be effective. -The area of confinement may be large, and need not be stationary, i.e. moving car confinement -Creates a perception that a person cannot leave area of confinement P is AWARE of confinement. -Specific knowledge and playing with that knowledge, then may be false imprisonment. -P must be confined within definite physical boundaries. The essence of the “confinement” is that the P is held within certain limits. Intent: P must show that the D intended to confine him; P can meet this burden by showing that J had “substantial certainty” that the confinement would result.  Transferred Intent applies. Confinement: -Physical restraint is required for false imprisonment, but does

-Held: not a conversion, but a mere interference  an interference because access to property was not exclusive -A mere interference is a trespass, not a conversion Russell-Vaugn Ford: (“mean car salesman”) -Salesman told owner of car that his keys were lost, but instead he took them and kept them for a while (practical joke) -Conversion because D intentionally took someone’s property and asserted complete dominion and control over it -In taking the keys and withholding them from the owner, the salesman exercised complete dominion -Rule: a conversion occurs upon refusal of D without legal excuse to deliver P’s chattel (D acted in bad faith) Southern Counties: “burnt down property” -Filming in wrong house, and house burned in fire. -Fire almost always a reason for conversion. -Mistake does not work because intended action that destroyed property; intended to do things that destroyed property. -Although it was a mistake (conceptually similar to transferred intent), action still destroyed someone’s property. Bird v. Jones: (“3 walls do not a prison make”) -Bird wanted to enter a part of the road that was closed off for a boat race; he was able to enter, but Jones and a police officer restricted his movement: he could either stay where he was or leave -Held: not false imprisonment since P could have left if he wanted to; D did not fully restrict P’s movement -F.I. must be prevented from leaving the boundaries of confinement; confinement can be in large or small area; if you have an alternative, free to take it -Policy: if won this case, then every time someone couldn’t go the way they wanted to go, it would be F.I. Coblyn Kennedy’s Inc.: (“old men can’t steal”) -D can detain when D reasonably believe, and have grounds to believe, that P stole something, but D must have actually seen P take it--if not directly seen, then cannot detain -Held: false imprisonment because a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. P could have purchased scarf from another store, or purchased scarf on another day -Mere suspicion of theft is insufficient without actual proof -Check to see if:

not necessarily have to be used Preventing someone with the means to overcome a barrier can constitute restraint. -Any general restraint is sufficient to constitute false imprisonment, and any demonstration of physical power which, to all appearances, can be avoided only by submission, operates successfully to constitute an imprisonment A REASONABLE person would not feel entitled to leave store (restraint factor). ---^ reasonable person test -If D detains P in a reasonable manner, for a reasonable amount of time, and there are reasonable grounds for believing P was attempting commit larceny of goods for sale, then D has the privilege to detain P. -Essential element of false imprisonment is detention of the person. -P can be in a confinement when there is a general restraint, any demonstration of physical power (like grabbing your arm and pulling you into an office) or verbal demand, “ you cant leave” -Coercion and minimal harm can constitute false imprisonment. -Confinement may occurs with the use of threats of imminent harm. (Threats may be explicit or implicit).  Threats to the P’s property may constitute the necessary duress, i.e. customer’s bag is taken away to dissuade him from leaving.  No false imprisonment will occur if the P VOLUNTARILY submits to commands that are strictly verbal, unaccompanied by force or threats. -Confinement may be caused by the D’s assertion of legal authority to confine the P this applies even if the D does not in fact have legal authority, as long as the P reasonably believes that the D has legal authority, or is in reasonable doubt about whether the D has such authority, then there is false imprisonment if the P submits.

INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS (ED)

Reasonable means of escape: perception is important here -if P feels they have no reasonable means to escape, the court will consider this an unreasonable means of escape. ED: (1) intentional conduct, (2) extreme and outrageous, (3) causes severe emotional distress. Intent: -D desires to cause P emotional distress. -D knows with substantial certainty that P will suffer emotional

-the confinement was reasonable -the stop was reasonable Whittaker v. Sanford (“imprisoned yacht mother”) -D offered P a ride to Maine, and then denied her a way to leave the yacht -This was false imprisonment: physical restraint does not have to be necessarily used -Preventing someone with means to overcome a barrier can constitute restraint - It may be the case that P consents to an initial confinement; however, if the D is under a duty to release the P, or to help him escape, and does not do so, then there will be a false imprisonment. Taylor v. Johnson (“lady in Walmart”) -P was filling prescription in Walmart, pharmacist thought it was a counterfeit and delayed filling the prescription -P continued to shop in Walmart, police officer was called -Held: Walmart never detained Tayloressential element of false imprisonment is detention of person. Sindle v. NYC Transit Authority (“grouchy bus driver”) -Student claims F.I. for bus driver’s refusal to let him off the bus while driving to the police station to report those who damaged the bus - Within the bus driver’s duty to protect the kids from injury or damage to property. -Rule: A parent, guardian, or teacher entrusted with caring for a child may use reasonable physical force to maintain discipline or promote the welfare of the child. -General restraint or detention imposed for the purpose of preventing another from inflicting personal injuries or interfering with or damaging real or personal property in one’s lawful custody or possession is NOT unlawful.

Wilkinson v. Downton: (“practical joke gone wrong”) -Wife thought husband was basically dead -Practical joke was at least reckless and a reasonable person should have known that it would cause extreme emotional distress -Test: would you yell “outra...