Trespass to the person Notes PDF

Title Trespass to the person Notes
Course Tort Law
Institution Manchester Metropolitan University
Pages 6
File Size 104.9 KB
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Trespass to the person Definition: The torts of trespass to the person are battery, assault, and false imprisonment. These torts are united by three characteristics. They are committed intentionally, take the form of direct harm and are actionable per see, that is, without proof of damage and the burden of disproving fault was on the defendant. The tort in Wilkinson v Downton concerns the intentional infliction of harm without a direct interferences. There were two types of actions that were concerned with the plaintiff’s person. They were ‘trespass’ and ‘action on the case’. Direct interferences were protected by trespass but where the interference was indirect the action had to be taken just in ‘case’. -

Scott v Shepherd (1773): The defendant threw a firework into a market shall. Instinctively the stallholders threw it from stall to stall eventually it injured the plaintiff. The court ruled that the plaintiff’s injury was a direct result of the defendant’s action (stallholders actions were a continuation of that)

Another distinction between ‘trespass’ and ‘case’ was that trespass was a tort of strict liability and is actionable per se which means that the plaintiff does not need to prove that he/she has suffered damage or loss as a result of the defendant’s actions. Fault is an essential element of liability in trespass to person. A trespass to the person is not actionable if it be neither intentional nor the result of negligence -

Stanley v Powell (1891): The defendant fired a shot which rebounded off a tree and hit the plaintiff. (He had not acted neither intentionally nor negligently.) the defendant not liable as trespass is a fault based tort.

Fault- Burden of proof (- Does the burden of proving fault rest with the plaintiff or defendant?) -

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Fowler v Lanning 1959: The plaintiff was injured by a shot from the defendants gun during a shooting party. The plaintiff sought to sue the defendant. On his statement of claim, the plaintiff merely alleged that the “defendant shot the plaintiff‟ . The plaintiff argued in trespass, the burden of disproving negligence was on the defendant. The defendant pleaded that this was an incorrectly filled out claim, as the plaintiff failed to disclose whether the shooting was intentional or negligent, and should therefore be thrown out. Diplock J:

Direct intentional acts of interference -

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Letang v Cooper 1965: The plaintiff was sunbathing on a carpark which the defendant drove his car over her legs therefore injuring the plaintiff. A claim in trespass was made against the defendant as the time limit of three years for negligence had expired under the Limitation Act 1980. Lord Denning: If one man intentionally applies force directly to another, the plaintiff has a cause of action in assault or battery. If he does not intentionally inflict injury, but only unintentionally, the plaintiff has no cause of action in trespass; his only cause of action is in negligence.

Assault Definition: Assault is a direct threat by the defendant that requires no physical contact, it is essentially conduct which causes the claimant a reasonable apprehension of an immediate application of force which constitutes a battery. Physical contact is not an element of assault, but the intention to carry out the threats via gesture or words is sufficient to constitute as assault. -

Stephens v Myeres 1830: the defendant attended a parish meeting with the plaintiff. The meeting ended with the a ruling that the defendant be expelled out the meeting but the defendant said that he would rather pull the plaintiff out of his chair then leave the meeting. When the defendant paced towards the plaintiff, he was stopped. The defendant was liable in assault as the intention to remove him constituted as assault.

Words can render a threat, which would constitute as assault -

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Tuberville v Savage 1669: the defendant laid his hand upon his sword and said to the plaintiff, ‘if it were not assize time, I would not take such language from you’. It was held that this did not constitute as assault because it was ‘assize time’ which meant that the defendant did not actually intend to harm the plaintiff. Thomas v National Union of Mineworkers 1986: Miners were making violent threats and gestures at the non-striking miners in the bus. There was no liability in assault because there was no danger of an immediate battery since the working miners were protected by police barricades.

Battery Definition Battery is the actual infliction of unlawful force, such as contact/touch and must be caused directly by the act of the defendant and must be the immediate result of the act without any intervening force on a claimant. What type of contact amounts to ‘force’ Touching will not be treated as battery if it is contact acceptable in the ordinary conduct od everyday life. Lord Goff explained every person’s body is inviolate ( free or protected from violation, injury, or desecration) any amount of touching, however slight, may amount to battery. -

Collins v Wilcock 1984: A police officer grabbed hold of a women’s arm whom she suspected of soliciting. The women scratched the police officers arm. It was ruled that the police officers action amounted to battery and went beyond the scope of duty.

An ‘act’ and an ‘intention’ to commit the act is required The defendant must have intended to commit the act that constitutes the trespass. -

Nash v Sheen 1953: The plaintiff went to the defendants hairdressing salon and asked for a permeant wave. Instead she was given a tone rince which caused a rash.

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The defendant was liable in battery. ( the defendant had applied the tone rinse without any consent so the direct intentional interference were present). Livingstone v Ministry of Defence 1984: The defendant intended to hit someone when he fired a baton round, but struck a different person. The defendant was found liable in battery because his action in firing the baton was intentional.

Contact to be hostile -

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Wilson v Pringle 1987: As an act of horseplay, the defendant pulled the plaintiffs schoolbag from his shoulder. This caused the plaintiff to fall and suffer a hip injury. The plaintiff argued that the horseplay amounted to battery which was accepted by the trial judge. The defendant appealed against the decision that the facts did not automatically amount to a battery. Croom-Johnson LJ: the touching must be proved to be hostile touching therefore based on the facts of the case. Re F 1990: Lord Goff said, that any touching of another’s body is, in the absence of lawful excuse, capable of amounting to a battery and a trespass.

Touching in ‘anger’ -

Cole v Turner 1784:

Emotional distress: conduct ‘calculated to cause harm’ No contact or physical force can amount to battery. i.e words causing physical ad psychiatric harm. -

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Wilkinson v Downton 1897: The defendant falsely informed the plaintiff that her husband has been injured in an accident. The plaintiff suffered a mental injury as a result of this news. The conduct was not negligent but was intended to harm. Liability will arise where an act wilfully calculated to cause physical damage does actually cause harm. Rhodes v OPO 2015: The plaintiff attempted to prevent the publication of her husband’s book because it would cause psychological harm to their son.

There must be both actual harm and an intent to cause damage to amount to an act ‘calculated to cause harm’ -

Khorasandijan v Bush 1993: intentional harassment by telephone calls by a former boyfriend of the plaintiff. The calls would cause physical and psychiatric damage. Hunterv Canary Wharf Ltd 1997:

Situation involving a ‘course of conduct’ -

Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust 2003: a campaign of rudeness by colleagues was not regarded as intentional infliction of harm Majrowski v Guy’s and St Thomas’s NHS Trust 2006: Wainwright v Home Office 2003: An action was brought by a mother and son who were subjected to a strip search when they visited a prison, resulting in psychiatric harm. The son, who suffered from learning difficulties, succeeded in the tort of battery. Wilkinson v Downton did not apply, on the ground of insufficient proof of intention by the defendant to cause harm to the plaintiff.

Emotional distress alone not enough to establish liability

False Imprisonment Definition False imprisonment is the unlawful constraint on the freedom of movement of another. It does not require incarceration or the use of force. If there is any reasonable means of escape then there is no false imprisonment. A COMPLETE RESTRAINT ON FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT There is no false imprisonment if the claimant has a reasonable means of escape (restraint must be total) -

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Bird v Jones 1845: The claimant was walking along the Hammersmith bridge which was partially blocked off by the defendant and then claimed that he had been detained, in not being permitted to proceed along that path. His action for false imprisonment was unsuccessful because it had been open to him to proceed in the same direction down the footpath on the other side of the bridge. The restraint was not complete. Could this be classed as false imprisonment? R v Bournewood Community and Mental Health NHS Trust 1998: a voluntary mental patient who was kept sedated in an unlocked ward hard not been under detention despite the fact that he was incapable of leaving and was likely to compulsory detained if he attempted to do so. The patient had been denied his art 5 (1) right to liberty.

REASONABLE RESTRICTION IS NOT FALSE IMPRISONMENT When a claimant’s liberty is subject to a reasonable condition it is not false imprisonment to restrain the claimant until the condition is fulfilled. -

Robinson v Balmain Ferry Co Ltd 1910: the claimant had tunred back from a ferry boarding station but was unable to pass through the turnstile without paying one penny. This was a reasonable condition and therefore his detention had not been complete and the action for false imprisonment failed.

There is no false imprisonment where the claimant consents to the confinement. -

Herd v Weardable Steel, Coal and Coke Co 1915: was he falsely imprisoned? A miner demanded to be brought up to the mine surface. The employer refused to authorize the left to be operated until the scheduled time at the end of his shift.

False imprisonment only apply where the imprisonment was caused by the defendants acts, and not where it was caused by an omission to act. -

Iqbal v Prison Officers Association 2010: Prisoner brought a case against officers, who had gone on strick. Beacause of this strick, he was locked up in his cell all day.

KNOWLEDGE OF THE RESTRAINT NOT NECESSARY

It is not necessary to have the knowledge of the restraint at the time/the claimant beed not have been aware of imprisonment, this is cinsitent with the fct tht the trespass tortd sre actionable per se. -

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Meering v Grahame-White Aviatio Co Ltd 1919: the claimant had been detained in a room while investigated for suspected theft from his employer. He did not know that two police officers had been stationed outside the door, who would have been prevented him from leaving if he tried. Liability for false imprisonment was imposed, despite the fact that the claimant hd been unaware at the time that he was detained. Herring v Boyle 1834:

A person who is unaware that he has been falsely detained and has suffered no harm can only obtain nominal damages (refers to a token sum of damages awarded by the court when a legal right hs been infringed but where the claimant has suffered no substantial loss. There must be an actual detention. -

Murray v Ministry of defence 1988:

DETENTION BY AN ORDER OF THE COURT Detention is justified if it is carried out under an orer of the court -

Quinland v Governor of Swaleside Prison 2003:

RELEVANT INTENTION IS INTENTION TO DETAIN -

R v Governor of Brockhill prison

DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY (KETTLING) DEFENCES TO TRESPASS TO THE PERSON CONSENT IMPLIED CONSENT: PARTICIPAION IN SPORTING ACTIVITIES VOLUNTARY PARTICIPANTS IN FIGHTS CONSENT TO MEDICAL TREATMENT LACK OF MENTAL CAPACITY TO CONSENT THE MENTAL CAPACITY ACT 2005 SELF DEFENCE NECESSITY...


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